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Abstract
This thesis investigates the trajectory of the moderate members of Franco’s regime 
(known as aperturistas and reformists) over more than one decade until the arrival of 
democracy in 1977. These moderates, who favoured, in differing degrees, the political 
reform of the regime, were part of a group of actors who paved the way for the 
transition to democracy. The period studied ranges from 1964, the year when the Law 
of Associations was introduced, to 1977, the year of the first democratic elections. The 
thesis attempts to explain how the acceptance of a democratic system by the moderate 
Francoists following the dictator’s death was partly the result of their early advocacy of 
political reform. Their reasons for advocating political reform were rooted in (i) the 
economic and social development experienced in Spain from the beginning of the 
1960s, and (ii) their wish to avoid the dramatic break with the dictatorship (ruptura) 
proposed by the democratic opposition in the 1970s. The ruptura option implied the 
destruction of all Francoist institutions, laws, and lifestyle, and, with them, the political 
elimination of the moderate Francoists themselves. Their political survival became at 
stake after the death of Franco in 1975. From 1975, therefore, many members of the 
regime supported the arrival of democracy (without the Communist’s participation) 
merely as a strategy for their political survival. But, in the case of some moderates, 
their participation in the process of democratising Spain was a natural step after their 
long-standing advocacy of reform.
Important research has been done on the study of the moderate Francoists in the early 
1970s, but the trajectory of their personal and political ideologies throughout the 1960s 
has thus far been largely neglected. During the transition process, the regime’s 
reformists acted as a bridge between the hard-liners of the regime and a strong 
democratic opposition, helping King Juan Carlos, Adolfo Suarez and Torcuato 
Femandez-Miranda to implement the 1976 Reform Law that swept away the old 
structures of the regime. The thesis shows that the ultimate importance of the regime 
reformist in the transition to democracy, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation. It 
is beyond question, however, that the lack of a group of regime reformists would have 
yielded a different transition process.
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Glossary of Acronyms
ACNP Asociacion Catolica Nacional de Propagandistas (Catholic Association
of Propagandists).
ADE Action Democratica Espanola (Spanish Democratic Action).
AECE Asociacion Economica de Cooperation Europea (Association for the
Economic Co-operation with Europe).
AP Alianza Popular (Popular Alliance).
APEPA Asociacion para el Estudio de Problemas Actuales (Association for the
Study of Current Problems), later becoming
ANEPA Asociacion Nacional para el Estudio de Problemas Actuales (National
Association for the Study of Current Problems).
AR Action Regional (Regional Action).
BOE Boletin Oflcial del Estado (Spanish Official Bulletin).
CEISA Centro de Ensenanza e Investigation, S.A. (Centre for Teaching and
Research, Ltd.)
CCOO Comisiones Obreras (Workers’ Commissions) -  Communist linked trade
union.
CEDA Confederation Espanola de Derechas Autonomas (The Spanish
Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups).
CiU Convergencia i Unio (Convergence and Union) Catalan Nationalist
Party.
CSIC Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (Scientific Research
Superior Council).
DS Democracia Social (Social Democracy).
DSC Democracia Social Cristiana (Social Christian Democracy).
EEC European Economic Community.
ETA Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque homeland and liberty).
FAMO Federation de Asociaciones del Movimiento (Federation of Movement
Associations).
FEDISA Federation de Estudios Independientes S.A. (Federation of Independent
Studies, Ltd.).
FNE Frente Nacional Espanol (Spanish National Front).
FUDE Frente Universitario Democratico Espanol (Spanish Democratic Front
of the University).
GODSA Gabinete de Orientation y  Documentation, S.A. (Cabinet of Advice and
Documentation, Ltd.)
HO AC Hermandad Obrera de Action Catolica (Worker’s Brotherhood of
Catholic Action).
ID Izquierda Democratica (Democratic Left).
JOC Juventud Obrera Catolica (Catholic Workers’ Youth Movement).
LOE Ley Organica del Estado (Organic Law of the State) Francoist
Constitution.
MD Mundo Diario (Daily World).
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
OEEC Organization for European Economic Co-operation.
PCE Partido Comunista de Espana (Spanish Communist Party).
PDC Partido Democrata de Catalunya (Catalan Democratic Party).
PNV Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party).
PP Partido Popular (People’s Party).
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (Spanish Socialist Party).
PSP Partido Socialista Popular (Socialist Popular Party).
RD Reforma Democratica (Democratic Reform).
RDC Reforma Democratica de Catalunya (Catalan Democratic Reform).
SEU Sindicato Espanol Universitario (Spanish University Syndicate), the
official union.
UCD Union de Centro Democratico (Union of the Democratic Centre).
UDE Union Democratica Espanola (Spanish Democratic Union).
UDPE Union del Pueblo Espanol (Union of the Spanish People).
UGT Union General de Trabajadores (General Union of Workers) -  Socialist
linked trade union.
UMD Union Democrata Militar (Military Democratic Union).
UN United Nations.
UNE Union Nacional Espanola (Spanish National Union).
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
USO Union Socialista Obrera (Socialist Workers’ Union).
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1Introduction
The transition to democracy in Spain has served as an example for other countries under 
non-democratic regimes, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe, which 
regarded the ‘reform from above’ as the best method for striving towards a democracy.1 
In Spain, King Juan Carlos became Head of State after the death of Francisco Franco - 
the last of the European dictators of the inter-war period - in 1975 thus marking the 
beginning of a new era. The King‘s willingness to reform comprehensively the 
Francoist regime, and his disposition not to oppose the imminent arrival of democracy, 
were, undoubtedly, among the major factors that made possible the success of the 
transition to democracy. Other factors included the presence of a strong democratic 
opposition, which accelerated the process of change and helped to guarantee the 
implementation of a minimum programme of reforms. Likewise, regional and 
independent movements, the press, workers, students, the international community, and 
even some members of the Catholic Church influenced the population and kept the 
regime under constant pressure, to the extent of making impossible their plans to 
continue with the regime after Franco. Furthermore, the process was helped by the 
presence in the regime of some moderate members, known as aperturistas and 
reformists, who favoured, to different degrees, the political reform of the regime. In the 
moderates, especially in the reformist members of Adolfo Suarez’s cabinet, the King 
found the right collaborators to implement his reform plans (the moderates were 
especially useful in the approval of the Reform Law drawn up by Torcuato Femandez- 
Miranda). It is among those reformists that the democratic opposition found regime 
interlocutors who were approachable and open to co-operation. Hence these reformists
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became a bridge between the democratic opposition and the most conservative members 
of the regime. Finally, and above all, a significant role was played by the Spanish 
population whose unexpected political maturity after nearly forty years under a 
dictatorship was a key factor for the success of the transition process.
It is difficult to evaluate the importance of each one of those actors since their 
individual roles cannot be understood in isolation. Some scholars, however, have 
explained the success of the transition process as the result of the individual 
performance of some of these actors. For instance, Pilar and Alfonso Femandez- 
Miranda argue that it was King Juan Carlos who was ‘the “motor” of the change, the 
“entrepreneur” of the play, and the “pilot” who led the ship of the State with a firm hand 
during its journey towards the democratic shore’. Simon Parlier, senior editor of 
Encyclopaedia Bordas (Paris), considers Adolfo Suarez to be ‘the key figure in the 
Spanish transition process, the lynchpin around whom the whole process was to 
unfold’. The French journalist Max Gallo believes that ‘it was not the [democratic] 
opposition [that was the force] which controls the Spanish people but renovated 
Francoism’.4 Likewise, the historian Jose Casanova stresses that ‘it is clear that the 
opposition had nothing to do with this project [the 1976 Law of Political Reform], nor 
was it an option available to them. [...] Once the Suarez government decided upon this 
option, all the initiative, which since Franco’s death seemed to belong to the opposition, 
now passed into the hands of the government [formed mainly by reformists]’.5 In my 
opinion, however, each one of the actors played a crucial role in the process but, in any
Javier Tusell & Alvaro Soto, Historia de la transicion (1975-1986) (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1986), pp. 21-45, 
104-108.
Pilar & Alfonso Femandez-Miranda, Lo que el Rey me ha pedido. Torcuato Femandez-Miranda y la Reforma 
Poiitica. (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1996), p. 13.
Simon Parlier, “Adolfo Suarez: Democratic Dark Horse”, in Martin Westlake (Ed.), Leaders o f  Transitions, 
(London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 137.
Quoted in, Jose Maria Garcia Escudero, Historia poiitica de la Epoca de Franco, (Madrid: Rialp, 1987), p. 124.
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case, would have been insufficient alone. To that end, the presence and individual 
contribution of each one of the actors ultimately led to the consensus between the 
victors and the vanquished of the Spanish Civil War and hence to the peaceful arrival of 
democracy. As the historian Paul Preston explains, ‘a transition process based on a 
consensus between the progressive forces of the old regime and the traditional 
democratic opposition would be as near stable as could be reasonably hoped. In a sense, 
Spanish democracy’s survival of the daily bloodletting by ETA and the frequent efforts 
at a military coup has proved that to be the case’.6
In the year 2000, Spain celebrated the twenty-five years of King Juan Carlos’ 
reign and the arrival of democracy. Throughout these years, the interest of scholars on 
the Spanish transition to democracy has produced an important literature on the subject. 
Studies on the transition to democracy in Spain have, therefore, covered many aspects of
n 8the process: from general studies , via the role of the main parties to biographies of 
individual protagonists9, as well studies of the process in a variety of disciplines10. Of
5 Jose Casanova, “Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain’s Transition to Democracy”, in Social 
Research, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Winter 1983), p. 940.
6 Paul Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy in Spain, (London: Methuen, 1996), p. ix.
7 A few examples are (in chronological order of publication): Jose Amodia, Franco's political legacy. From 
dictatorship to fafade democracy, (London: Allen Lane, 1977); Raymond Carr & Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain: 
Dictatorship to Democracy, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979); Samuel D. Eaton, The forces o f  freedom in 
Spain, 1974-1979, (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1981); Paul Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy in Spain, 
(London: Methuen, 1996 [first published in 1986]); Jose Carles Clement, Historias de la transicion, 1973-1981. El 
fin del apagon, (Madrid: Fundamentos, 1994); Victoria Prego, Asi se hizo la transicion, (Circulo de Lectores, 1995); 
Santos JulM et al. Memoria de la transicion. (Madrid: Taurus, 1996); Charles Powell, Espaha en democracia, 1975- 
2000, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 2001).
8 Among others, Paul Preston, “The dilemma of credibility: The Spanish Communist Party, the Franco regime and 
after”, in Government and Opposition, Vol. 11, No. 1, winter 1976; Fernando Jauregui & Manuel Soriano, La Otra 
Historia de UCD, (Madrid, 1980); Eusebio Mujal-Leon, Communism and Political Change, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1983); Carlos Huneeus, La Union de Centro Democratico y  la transicion a la democracia en 
Espaha, (Madrid, CIS, 1985); Lourdes Lopez Nieto, Alianza Popular: estructura y  evolucion electoral de un partido 
conservador, 1976-1982. (Madrid: CIS, 1988); Abdon Mateos, El PSOE contra Franco. Continuidad y renovation en 
el socialismo espafiol, 1953-1974, (Madrid: Fundacion Pablo Iglesias, 1993); Victor Perez-Diaz, La primacia de la 
sociedad civil. El proceso de formation de la Espana democratica (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1993); Pilar Ortufio 
Anaya, unpublished Phd Thesis, The International Dimension o f  the Spanish Transition: European Socialists Parties 
and Trade Unions, (University of Oxford, 1998).
9 Among others, Jose Maria Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha. Biografia de Fraga (Plaza y Janes, 1985); Gregorio 
Moran, Adolfo Suarez. Historia de una ambition (Barcelona: Planeta, 1979); Charles T. Powell, El piloto del 
Cambio. El Rey, la monarquia y la transici6n a la democracia, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1991); Pilar & Alfonso
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these works, historical studies on the transition generally begin in December 1973 with 
the death of Franco’s right hand man, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco. Carrero’s 
assassination altered the trajectory of the regime and the positioning of many of its 
members. This is because Carrero was the principal guarantor of the continuation of the 
regime. His disappearance, therefore, exposed the Caudillo’s advanced age and the 
inability of the regime to contain the socio-economic crisis. The event triggered the 
creation of political groups and alliances amongst regime members. It is then when the 
division of the regime between those who advocated the continuation of Francoism 
(inmovilistas) and those who advocated reform (aperturistas/reformists) became 
evident. But, this division had earlier roots. The purpose of this thesis is the study of 
the trajectory of the regime moderates over more than one decade until the arrival of 
democracy in 1977, a subject neglected until now. This study is essential to understand 
their contribution and positioning during the crucial time of the transition to democracy. 
As the historian Edward Malefakis argues, ‘in Spain, [...] the events after November 20, 
1975, would be completely incomprehensible if one did not understand what had 
transpired during the previous two decades. [...] Democracy in Spain was made 
possible only because it was preceded by a long period of what might loosely be called 
protodemocratization. This period is therefore as deserving of examination as the one 
following Franco’s death.’11 But, before explaining the contents and organization of 
this thesis, it is necessary to explain several fundamental issues such as the definition of
Femandez-Miranda, Lo gue el Rey me ha pedido. Torcuato Femandez-Miranda y la Reforma Poiitica. (Barcelona: 
Plaza y Janes, 1996).
10 Among others, Jorge de Esteban, De la Diciadura a la Democracia. Diario de un periodo constituyente. (Madrid: 
Universidad Complutense, Facultad de Derecho, Section de Publicaciones, 1979); Enrique Tiemo Galvdn, Leyes 
politicos espanolas fundamentales, 1808-1978, (Madrid: Tecnos,1979); Antonio Hernandez Gil, El Cambio politico 
espanol y  la Constitucion,(Planeta: Barcelona, 1982); Alfred Stepan, “Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical 
and Comparative Considerations”, in Guillermo O’Donnel et al, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Part III, 
Comparative perspectives, (Baltimore, Maryland, 1986).
11 Edward Malefakis, “Spain and Its Francoist Heritage”, in J.H. Herz (Dtor.), From dictatorship to democracy. 
Copying with the legacies of authoritarianism and totalitarianism, (Westport-Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982),
p. 216.
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the terms inmovilista, aperturista and reformist, and the starting date of the division 
between inmovilistas and aperturistas.
The Francoist regime appeared to have been a monolithic system in which the 
Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y  de las JONS (FET y de las JONS), also known as 
National Movement, prevailed as a unified party during the nearly forty years of
1 9dictatorship. Nevertheless, despite the appearance of unity, the component elements 
of the coalition always competed for power and influence. Moreover, the members of 
the regime were divided in their attitudes towards the likely political complexion of a 
post-Francoist Spain. Although several aperturistas appeared as early as the mid-1950s, 
they mainly emerged during the economic boom of the 1960s as a result of the 
intransigent Francoists’ reluctance to introduce reforms.
Franco’s regime underwent important changes throughout its nearly forty-years 
of existence. The first cabinets tried to alleviate the critical economic situation, which 
had resulted from the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), by applying a drastic policy of 
autarkic measures. The international isolation of the Spanish economy and the 
sympathy of Franco’s regime towards the Axis won the exclusion of the Spanish regime 
from major international institutions. But, in the mid-1940s, the collapse of the Axis 
obliged Franco to transform the image of his regime from the Fascist one that 
predominated during the Second World War to a more Christian one. By the early 
1950s and the beginning of the Cold War, the image-change had paid off favourably for
12 Franco, however, defined the Movimiento Nacional as ‘the great anti-party’. See Boletln Oficial del Consejo 
Nacional del Movimiento, No. 53, Madrid, 4 de Diciembre de 1967, p. 917. On 31 March 1949 Franco said that 
‘those who maliciously consider us [to be] a party are mistaken, [since] we constitute an authentic Movimiento 
Nacional’. See Franco ha dicho. Primer apendice. (1 enero 1947-1 abril 1949), (Madrid: Ediciones Voz, 1949), p. 
33. The Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y  de las JONS (FET y de las JONS), backbone of Franco’s regime, 
became known as the Movement (or Movimiento Nacional) following the approval of the Organic Law in 1967. For 
a comprehensive study of the meaning of the Spanish party see, Juan Jose Linz, “From Falange to Movimiento- 
Organizacion: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco regime, 1936-1968”, in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement
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the Spanish regime, which suddenly appeared as a guarantor of Christian values. For 
the Western democracies, therefore, the threat of Communism taking over Spain was 
minimal under Franco. The gradual incorporation of the regime into the international 
community in the 1950s was followed by the controlled opening-up of the economy. 
The application of three economic Development Plans (1964-7, 1968-71, and 1972-5) 
by Opus Dei-linked cabinet technocrats resulted in the outstanding performance of the 
economy, especially during the 1960s. The economic recovery led to the emergence of 
a large middle class in Spain, and brought unprecedented prosperity to many Spaniards. 
Yet, the economic boom was not matched by a parallel programme of political reforms. 
The economic and social transformation brought to the surface the contradictions 
between Franco’s institutions and the economic capitalist system that had developed in 
Spain.
The so-called ‘real Spain’ was enjoying better standards of living but was also 
starting to be conscious of the political limitations of the Franco regime. The access to 
foreign and, until then, forbidden political literature as well as a more critical tone 
adopted by the press from 1966 (following the approval of the Press Law), helped to 
raise the political awareness of the man-in-the-street. By contrast, the ‘official Spain’ 
(Franco’s entourage and the most orthodox regime members) refused to accept the need 
for modernization for fear of provoking the debilitation of the system, and hence the 
loss of their own power. There were, however, some members of the regime who had 
become aware of the need for reform already in the 1950s. Sporadic cases of 
aperturistas among Francoist elite were followed by the emergence of an aperturista 
sector within the rank-and-file of the regime, mainly as a result of the economic and
H. Moore, Authoritarian Politics and Modern Society. The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1970), pp. 128-203.
Introduction 7
social changes as well the regressive attitude of Franco’s cronies. The political scientist 
Alfred Stepan explains the emergence of a moderate sector within an authoritarian 
regime in the following terms:
some major institutional power-holders within the ruling authoritarian coalition perceive that
because of changing conditions their long-term interests are best pursued in a context in which
13authoritarian institutions give way to democratic institutions.
In the 1960s, therefore, the regime became broadly divided into (i) inmovilistas 
or intransigent conservatives (also known as continuistas) and (ii) the more moderate 
elements of the regime known as aperturistas. The inmovilistas were intransigent 
conservatives who resisted change and wished to continue the Francoist regime after 
Franco’s death. The aperturistas, by contrast, favoured a tightly controlled 
liberalization of the regime in order to meet popular demands for political 
modernization.
The composition of the inmovilistas and aperturistas changed according to the 
internal and external context over the years. In the internal context, the composition of 
these groups was conditioned by issues including: (i) the Caudillo’s health (an accident 
suffered by Franco in 1961 had shaken the stability of the regime and put a question 
mark over its future, as had several hospital admissions in 1974); (ii) popular demands 
for change, especially led by workers, students, some members of the Catholic clergy, 
the press, and so forth, started timidly in the mid-1960s but became more open in the 
early 1970s; (iii) the growth of an active democratic opposition from the 1960s; (iv) and 
the emergence of the terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) at the end of the 
1960s, which proved a destabilising factor for the regime with the assassination of
13 Alfred Stepan, “Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations”, in Guillermo 
O’Donnel et al, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Part III, Comparative perspectives, (Baltimore, Maryland, 
1986), p. 72.
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Admiral Carrero Blanco, guarantor of the regime, in 1973. The composition of these 
groups also varied according to external factors including the attitude of the European 
Community towards the regime and the international economy.
In the 1960s and the early 1970s, the inmovilistas refused to accept the need for 
reform. But by 1976, one year after Franco’s death, some of these inmovilistas, who 
were part of the Francoist Cortes, voted in favour of the reform law. It may be wrong to 
claim that these inmovilistas finally agreed with the aperturistas’ thesis, but there was a 
realization that their plan to continue the regime without Franco was at best unlikely and 
at worst impossible. To that end, by 1975 it was clear, as Jose Maria Maravall and 
Julian Santamaria explain, that:
The political pillars of the regime were already crumbling. The church had withdrawn its 
valuable support. The old political factions within the regime were deeply fragmented because 
of their different views on a strategy for survival. Large sectors of the new industrial 
bourgeoisie saw the dictatorship as fully dispensable, considering it a political impediment to 
Spanish integration into the European Common Market. For their part, large sectors of the 
middle classes set their hopes on democracy. Most of the surveys conducted during this period 
demonstrated increasing support for democracy, particularly among the middle classes and 
educated people.14
The only way out of the general crisis was, therefore, to vote in favour of political 
reform. The Reform Law implied the elimination of the Francoist Cortes and the 
introduction of a democratic regime.
For their part, the aperturistas formed an heterogeneous group and therefore 
advocated different degrees of reforms that evolved with time. For instance, in the late 
1950s and throughout the 1960s some moderates favoured the introduction of timid 
changes in the political system. But, at the end of the 1960s, a new breed of young 
aperturistas, known as reformists, appeared on the political scene with more progressive
14 Jose Maria Maravall and Juli&n Santamaria, “Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, in 
Guillermo O’Donnel et al, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Prospects for Democracy, (Baltimore, Maryland, 
1986), Part I, Southern Europe, p. 81.
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plans. These young reformists supported the idea of a Westem-European type -  or at 
least a West German type - of democratic system (that is to say, a democratic system 
without the presence of the Communist Party). The reformists’ refusal to accept the 
Communists was not uncommon. At the end of the 1960s, the Cold War still prevailed 
and many people in Spain (including members of the democratic opposition, e.g. the 
wing of the Socialist Party led by Rodolfo Llopis was hostile to the Communist Party) 
and abroad were sceptical about the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), which was 
perceived as an enemy by many Spaniards since the Spanish Civil War. In 1956, 
however, the PCE had accepted the idea of democracy and adopted a policy of national 
reconciliation.15 Since the change in Communist policy was not widely accepted a 
sincere, few reformists truly advocated full democracy (in other words, truly accepted 
the immediate legalization of the Communist Party and regarded it as essential for a 
proper democratic process) in the 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, prior to the death of 
Franco, no reformist would have publicly advocated a democratic system embracing the 
Communist Party. Some of them publicly supported the legalization of the Spanish 
Communist Party before the democratic elections of June 1977 (e.g. members of the 
Tacito group declared their support for the legalization of the Communist party in April 
1976). But, many reformists remained hesitant towards the Communists until their 
legalization in April 1977 and some even beyond.16
Some of these reformists were part of Catholic organizations from the end of the 
1950s wherein, apart from other topics, they discussed the political problems of the 
country. However, they only became identified with the reformist sector at the end of
15 See Santiago Carrillo, “The Consensus-building Role of the Communist Party”, in Monica Threlfall, Consensus 
Politics in Spain. Insider perspectives. (Bristol: Intellect, 2000), pp. 53-4.
16 The majority of Adolfo Suarez’s government was formed by reformists and Santiago Carrillo, Secretary General of 
the Spanish Party (1963-1982), asserts that ‘only four or five members o f the [Suarez’s] government personally 
backed the legalization of the Communist Party for the first elections. The rest were taken by surprise and either
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the 1960s and early 1970s when some of them became part of the political scene. Some 
reformists became involved in different political groups while others got secondary 
positions in the government. Some historians have established a distinction between 
aperturistas and reformists. According to Charles Powell, the aperturistas were ‘more 
far-sighted and pragmatic elements of the Francoist elite [who] saw the Ley Organica 
del Estado as an excellent opportunity to carry out an apertura (opening) of the political 
system which would make existing institutions more representative and thereby 
encourage greater participation.’ The aperturistas emerged in the 1960s and, therefore, 
were pre-reformists. On the other hand, in Powell’s view, the young reformists came to 
prominence in the period between 1969 and 1974, and belonged to Prince Juan Carlos’s 
generation. That is to say that they were bom shortly before, during or immediately 
after the Spanish Civil War (1936-9).17 Alvaro Soto and Abdon Mateos also regard the 
aperturistas as different from the reformists because the aperturistas advocated ‘limited
1 Rdemocracy’ whereas the reformists favoured ‘democracy’. It would be more correct 
to say, however, that the aperturistas aimed at the controlled opening up of the regime 
whereas the reformists advocated a Western-type of democracy, or at least a West 
German type of democracy. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that, given their 
common loyalty to the Francoist Fundamental Laws19, what passed for a Constitution
resigned or accepted what was by then a done deal.’ See Carrillo, “The Consensus-building Role of the Communist 
Party”, in Threlfall, Consensus Politics in Spain, p. 57.
17 Charles Powell, Reform versus ‘Ruptura’ in Spain’s transition to democracy. Unpublished D.Phil. Thesis. 
University College, Oxford, Hilary 1989, pp. 10, 16-20.
18 Alvaro Soto and Abdon Mateos, “El final del Franquismo, 1959-1975”, in Historia-16, No. 29 (Temas de Hoy, 
1997), pp. 70-72.
19 As Jos6 Amodia explains, during Franco’s time the term Fundamental Laws was equivalent to the term 
Constitution. The Francoist ‘Constitution’ was, therefore, formed by the following Seven Fundamental Laws: in 
chronological order: 1. The Labour Charter of 9 March 1938; 2. The Law of the Cortes of 17 July 1942; 3. The 
Charter of the Spanish People of 17 July 1945; 4. The Law on the Referendum of 22 October 1945; 5. The Law of 
Succession of 7 July 1947; 6. The Law on the Principles of the Movement of 15 May 1958; 7. The Organic Law of 
the State (The proper Francoist Constitution) of 10 January 1967 modified Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5. See Jose Amodia, 
Franco’spolitical legacy. From dictatorship to facpade democracy, (London: Allen Lane, 1977), pp. 36-7.
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within the dictatorship, both aperturistas and reformists wanted to reform the political 
system only through procedures sanctioned within that system.
Given the very real difficulty of an accurate definition of the moderates, 
aperturistas and reformists, the clear-cut divisions cited above fail to categorize key 
politicians like Manuel Fraga Mbame (and others like Jose Maria de Areilza and Pio 
Cabanillas). Indeed Manuel Fraga is a complex figure whose demands for reform 
evolved with time. Fraga was already one of the pioneering advocates of the reform of 
the regime from his position as Minister of Information and Tourism in the early 1960s, 
which may explain why Powell regards him as a ‘precursor rather than a typical 
reformist’.20 However, despite Fraga’s advocacy of a tightly controlled liberalization of 
the regime (plausible in the period prior to Franco’s death but insufficient after that), 
and his ambiguous character (a combination of authoritarian and reformist), one cannot 
neglect Fraga’s leadership of the reformist cause from 1969 until 1975. Fraga was one 
of the first political figures of the regime to create a reformist group and a centrist 
political programme in the early 1970s, and many even regarded Fraga as the person 
who would bring democracy to Spain. In this study, therefore, I consider Manuel Fraga 
(as well as other key political figures) not only as part of the aperturista sector during 
the 1960s, but also as a very important figure of the reformist sector from 1969 until 
1975.
In summary, this thesis differentiates the regime moderates as follows: (i) 
aperturistas: the majority of those politicians who favoured a tightly controlled 
liberalization of the regime and were involved in politics in the 1960s; and (ii) 
reformists: those aperturistas of a younger generation, who appeared on the political 
scene in the late 1960s and throughout the first half of the 1970s, and favoured a
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Westem-European type of democratic system (or at least a Western Germany type of 
democracy). Both groups of moderates, aperturistas and reformists, wanted to reform 
the political system without overthrowing Francoist ‘legality’. In the early 1970s they 
all sought to come up with a political alternative to the ‘democratic-break-formulae’ 
proposed by the democratic opposition and, ultimately, to secure their own political 
survival.
The precise starting date of the division between inmovilistas and aperturistas is
unclear. Rodolfo Martin Villa, Secretary General of the official University Student
Union (SEU) in the early 1970s, recorded in his memoirs that the Francoist political
01class had clearly started to split around 1966-1967 over the Organic Law of the State , 
which represented the culmination of Franco’s Constitutional edifice.22 This is true so 
far as the splitting of the political class was more evident in the late 1960s than ever 
before. Nonetheless, as aforementioned, aperturista activities were happening during 
the 1950s. The first aperturista attempt at cabinet level was led by the Christian 
Democrat Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez in the mid-1950s. As Minister of Education, Ruiz- 
Gimenez tried to reform the educational system, but Franco halted his plans. Despite 
this failure, the aperturista spirit did not fade away. Manuel Fraga records in his 
memoirs the differences between inmovilistas and aperturistas present within the 
Francoist cabinet meetings in 1962:
Two sides were soon formed during the Francoist cabinet meetings, one reformist and another 
one with opposing ideas. The first one included, above all, me [Fraga] and [Fernando Maria de] 
Castiella, frequently supported by [Jesus] Romeo Gorria, and occasionally by [Gregorio] Lopez
20 Powell, Reform versus 'Ruptura ’, p. 19.
21 Rodolfo Martin Villa, Al servicio del Estado, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1984), p. 48.
22 With the LOE -  or Francoist Contitution - the regime ‘adopted a democratic appearance, obviously only 
superficial, but good enough to guarantee the survival of the regime.’ See Jorge de Esteban & Luis Lopez Guerra, De 
la Dictadura a la Democracia. Diario de un periodo constituyente (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, Facultad de 
Derecho, Seccidn de Publicaciones, 1979), p. 22. See also, Paul Preston, Franco. A biography, (London: Fontana 
Press, 1995), p. 729.
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Bravo. [Jose] Solis also supported us on many occasions, but with personal nuances, and with 
the influence of the Movement and the Syndicalist Organization. [General Agustin] Munoz 
Grandes and [Admiral] Nieto Antunez regarded us with affection, even though they spoke with 
logic and prudence. [...] On the other hand, and with various nuances, were [Admiral Luis] 
Carrero Blanco, [General Camilo] Alonso Vega, [Jorge] Vigon, and with more moderation 
[General Pablo] Martin Alonso, [Laureano] Lopez Rodo could not but support us sometimes, 
but in short, he played the game of Carrero and Vega, and provided them with arguments.[...]
23[professor Manuel] Lora Tamayo was closer to us [the reformists].
This thesis is not concerned with the role of the regime inmovilistas, but it is a 
study of the moderate elements of Franco’s regime from the mid-1950s until 1977. This 
research relies primarily on memoirs of the main protagonists, journals and newspapers 
of the time, and documents from various departments of the Interior Ministry (National 
Registry of Associations; Registry of Commercial Companies; Registry of Political 
Parties). Oral sources have also played an important part on this research. Evidence 
from oral interviews with major participants has helped me to understand the political 
developments of those years. Their testimonies have been remarkably useful in forming 
an idea of the trajectory of the regime moderates in the pre-transition period. Secondary 
material has been essential to place the history of the regime moderates in a wider 
context. The use of these sources has provided the bases for the central hypothesis of 
this thesis. That hypothesis is that the role played by the regime moderates (especially 
the reformists) during the transition process - their disposition to apply the King’s 
reform plan and their role as a bridge between the regime inmovilistas and the 
opposition -  was largely the result of their early awareness and advocacy - either 
genuinely or as a strategy of political survival - of the need for political reform.
23 Manuel Fraga Iribame, Memoria breve de una vida publica, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980), pp. 41-2. The Ministers 
cited above occupied the following ministries: Manuel Fraga (Information y Tourism); Fernando Maria de Castiella 
(Foreign Affairs); Jesus Romero Gorria (Labour); Gregorio L6pez Bravo (Industry); Jos6 Solis (National Movement); 
General Agustin Munoz (Vice-President); Admiral Nieto Antunez (Navy); Admiral Luis Carrero (sub-Secretary of 
the Presidency); General Camilo Alonso Vega (Interior); Laureano L6pez Rodo (Development Plan); Professor 
Manuel Lora Tamayo (Education). See Preston, Franco, pp. 704-5.
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This thesis is structured chronologically in the following way: Chapter 1 is a 
review of the trajectory of Franco’s regime and, therefore, the historical background that 
conditioned the division between inmovilistas and aperturistas/reformists. Chapter 2 
(1964-67) begins with a brief review of Francoist legal system in relation to the right of 
association. This Chapter is a study of the alternative channels used by some members 
of Franco’s regime to discuss the country’s problems, including politics before the 1964 
Law of Associations. The long-awaited 1964 Law (the first proper Law of Associations 
since the arrival of Francoism) gave the population the opportunity merely to create 
entities that had a cultural purpose - in the widest sense - not political ones. The 
practice of using alternative channels to discuss politics, which had been used before the 
1964 Law, continued, therefore, after 1964. The aperturistas' eagerness to increase 
popular participation in national politics led them to regard the ‘family’ sector of the 
Francoist Cortes as their best bet because it was the only section that was elected, albeit 
on a highly restricted franchise. They aimed at promoting associations of heads of 
family, which would represent the population at the Cortes. Their battle to achieve a 
Law of Family Representation only succeeded in 1967.
Chapter 3 (1967-1969) reviews the outcome of the Organic Law of the State (the 
Francoist Constitution), the Law of the Family Representation and the Organic Law of 
the Movement. But, overall, this Chapter is a study of the first serious attempt by the 
regime to establish a network of political associations, albeit under the strict control of 
the Movement. It also deals with some events that occurred during the summer of 1969 
(the appointment of Prince Juan Carlos as Franco’s successor and the Matesa scandal 
which resulted in a cabinet crisis) and proved essential for the future trajectory of the 
regime. Chapters 4 and 5 study the positioning of the reformists from 1969-1973 in two 
parts. Part I, Chapter 4 concentrates on the emergence of Manuel Fraga, Minister of
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Information and Tourism (1962-1969), as the leader of the reformist cause from 1969. 
This Chapter reviews his political career, and his political stance in favour of the 
political reform of the regime from the 1969 until his departure to London as 
ambassador in 1973. Part n, Chapter 5 studies the process whereby Prince Juan Carlos 
came to favour an evolution towards a European-style democracy. The Chapter also 
examines the fashion for political dinners wherein, in the absence of political 
associations, Spaniards, including regime members, met to discuss politics in the early 
1970s.
Chapter 6 (1973-1975) examines the emergence from the regime of two major 
reformist political groups. One was the Gabinete de Orientation y  Documentation, S.A. 
(GODSA), led by Manuel Fraga, and Tacito, led by a group of young reformists of 
Christian Democrat background. These two groups were to be the political core of the 
future two political parties formed by regime members. This Chapter also examines the 
disappointing 1974 Law of Associations presented by President Carlos Arias Navarro, 
and his attempt to organize a political association involving Manuel Fraga, Jose Maria 
de Areilza and Federico Silva, as representatives of several political tendencies within 
the regime. The failure of such an attempt led to the split in the Tacito group and the 
creation of an alternative political group -  Federation de Estudios Independientes 
(FEDISA) - led by seventy-five Francoist personalities, including Tacito members, 
Fraga and Areilza. In the midst of a general crisis, Franco’s death at the end of 1975 
marked the beginning of a new era.
The final Chapter (1976-1977) studies Carlos Arias’ second presidency and 
Manuel Fraga’s performance as Interior Minister in the first government of the 
monarchy. Arias’ failure to bring political reforms (especially those concerned with 
popular political representation) led to his dismissal in July 1976. The new President,
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Adolfo Suarez, as a regime apparatchik was mistrusted at first, but he finally 
transformed the old regime into a democracy. Following his departure from the Interior 
Ministry, Manuel Fraga abandoned his long acclaimed centrist position to form the 
conservative Alianza Popular (AP), with old figures of the regime failing to attract the 
moderate electorate constituted by the majority of Spaniards. For his part, Suarez took 
over the leadership of Areilza’s group, mainly formed by Tacito members, Christian 
Democrats, Liberals, and other centrists, to create a presidential party, the Union de 
Centro Democratico (UCD). The Chapter also reviews Suarez’s main achievements 
including the approval of the Reform Law in November 1976, the legalization of the 
PCE in April 1977, and the first democratic elections since the 1930s in June 1977. 
The role of the regime moderates in the transition process to democracy can only be 
understood by studying their trajectory during the two decades previous to the arrival of 
democracy in 1977. This thesis attempts to fill that gap in the literature.
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Chapter -1
Historical Background
General Francisco Franco emerged as leader of a coup d’etat in 1936, which overthrew 
the democratically elected Republican government and pushed Spain into a bloody 
three-year-long Civil War. He led a coalition of Right-wing forces that ranged from 
traditional Monarchists, via conservative Catholics to the Fascist Falange. In April 1937 
he forcibly united all these elements into a single party, FE Ty de las JONS or National 
Movement. In April 1939 the war ended with the victory of Franco’s nationalist 
coalition. Franco became the Caudillo of a dictatorial regime, which lasted until his 
death in 1975. During nearly forty years of dictatorship, the Spanish economy and 
society underwent a series of irreversible transformations, which resulted from a 
combination of regime policies, external pressures and socio-economic development 
within Spain. This chapter is a brief study of the trajectory of Franco’s regime and, 
therefore, the historical background that conditioned the division between inmovilistas 
and aperturistaslxQformisis.
1.1. 1939-1956: from economic autarky to economic recovery
From the mid-1940s until the beginning of the 1950s, Spain was immersed in a 
period of economic autarky. Although Spain did not participate in the Second World 
War, the Spanish people were still suffering the consequences of their own devastating 
Civil War, which had taken place between 1936 and 1939. In an attempt to restore 
industrial development, Franco’s cabinet imposed a package of autarkic economic 
policies based on the model of Fascist states of the 1930s. For that purpose, drastic 
economic measures of self-sufficiency and domestic capital formation were applied with 
severe State intervention. These measures, however, proved to be inefficient and
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resulted in economic stagnation. The overvalued peseta made exports unattractive, 
while imports were prohibited. Massive hunger was exacerbated by a reduction in real 
wages, and was only superficially mitigated by a large amount of foodstuffs imported 
from Argentina in 1946. The economic historian Joseph Harrison argues that although 
the majority of Spanish historians blame mainly external factors such as the post-civil 
war situation, severe drought and the resolution of the United Nations (UN) member 
States to suspend economic relations with Spain (due to Franco’s refusal to introduce 
democratic reforms), much of the responsibility for economic stagnation lay at the hands 
of the Spanish policy makers.1 In May 1947, a series of workers’ strikes broke out in 
the industrial areas of the Basque Country, Catalonia, Madrid and Galicia, in response to 
their alarming living conditions. The regime, as Paul Preston writes, acted immediately 
and harshly and employers were ordered to sack the strikers ‘without a second thought’. 
The opponents to the regime tried to convince the international community that the 
strikes were proof of Franco’s repressive regime. But, on the contrary, as Preston adds, 
the strikes convinced London and Washington of the need to reinforce Franco’s position 
against a ‘Communist-inspired mischief.3 In any case, the right to strike was forbidden 
in Spain. During Franco’s rule each worker was compulsorily registered with the 
official trade union of the sector they belonged to (each productive sector was regulated 
by a single union, the Organization Sindical, commonly known as Sindicato Vertical or 
Vertical Union). From 1940, the sindical organization reiterated that no other
1 Joseph Harrison, “Towards the liberalization of the Spanish economy, 1951-1959”, in Colin Holmes & Alan Booth 
(Eds.), Economy and Society: European Industrialization and its social consequences. Essays presented to Sidney 
Pollard, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 103.
2 Preston, Franco,pp. 569-70.
3 Ibid., pp. 569-70
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organization with similar aims was allowed under the Spanish union system. But, 
already a clandestine working class movement was emerging.4
Meanwhile, following the end of the Axis powers, Franco made a careful choice 
of Ministers for his new cabinet in July 1945. For instance, Franco appointed the 
Catholic Alberto Martin Artajo as Foreign Minister in order to present Spain 
internationally as a ‘Catholic’ rather than a ‘pro-Fascist’ country (ironically, Martin 
Artajo had himself fought with the Spanish Blue Division at the Russian front in the 
early 1940s). Yet, in 1946 Spain became internationally isolated. Franco closed the 
Spanish frontiers; the democracies withdrew their ambassadors from Madrid; and the 
UN excluded Spain from the organization.5 Thanks to Martin Artajo’s intervention, 
however, Spain received a relief credit agreed under the Franco-Peron Protocol from 
1947 until 1949.6 Besides the critical economic situation, other problems preoccupied 
Franco’s cabinet in the mid-1940s. One of the problems was the presence of a 
Communist guerrilla force that operated in the Pyrenees, and although it did not 
represent a serious destabilising factor to the regime, according to the director of the 
official syndicalist newspaper Pueblo, Emilio Romero, it kept the regime busy. The 
other problem and perhaps one of more serious concern to Franco himself, was the 
warning launched by the supporters of Don Juan de Borbon, King Alfonso XDI’s heir, 
demanding his proclamation as King of Spain thereby threatening the continuation of
4 Ibid.,p. 701; Bardavio & Sinova, Todo Franco, pp. 484-5.
5 Raymond Carr, Spain 1800-1975, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 714, 720-21.
6 Jose Maria de Areilza, in those days Ambassador to Buenos Aires, also played an important role in the negotiation 
of food relief for Spain. Areilza, a Monarchist who resigned from his ambassadorship to Paris in 1964, was to 
become an important figure during the period of the threshold to the transition. For further details on the 
Argentinian-Spanish deals see Jose Maria de Areilza, Memorias exteriores, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1984), pp. 30-2,48- 
54.
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the Caudillo as leader.7 Yet, from 1947 Franco started to ‘act as sovereign in the newly 
proclaimed Spanish Kingdom’.8 On 6 July 1947, Franco had won the referendum on the 
Ley de Sucesion, or Law of Succession, by 93 per cent of the votes to his favour. 
Despite the questionable democratic validity of the vote, the new Law proclaimed Spain 
as a ‘Kingdom’ with Franco as perpetual regent. Furthermore, according to Article 6 of 
the Law, it was Franco who could appoint his successor, a titulo de Rey o Regente, at 
any moment. In that way, and ratified by the referendum, Franco secured a privileged 
position until the end of his life thereby leaving out any chance for Don Juan de Borbon 
to claim the Spanish throne. After the referendum Franco was ‘in a state of total 
euphoria’.9
From the beginning of the 1950s, and following the period of international 
isolation, the fate of Franco’s regime underwent an about turn. Fear of Communism had 
spread around the international community, and for once the totalitarian and clearly anti­
democratic character of the Spanish regime was regarded, specially by the United States, 
as a guarantee for the repression of Communism in the Iberian Peninsula. Between 
1951 and 1955 Spain became part of various organizations of the UN such as UNESCO 
in 1952. In 1953 Spain signed a Concordat with the Vatican and in 1955 Spain became 
full membership to the UN. But, the most important step was the so-called Pacto de 
Madrid with the United States also signed in 1953.10
The agreement with the United States gave Spain a push towards an unparalleled 
increase in production levels. The United States provided Spain with aid, mostly in the
7 Emilio Romero, Tragicomedia de Espana. Unas Memorias sin Contemplaciones, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1988, 8 Ed.), 
p. 70.
Preston, Franco, p. 573.
9 Ibid., pp. 572-3; Carr, Spain, pp. 720-1; Enrique Tiemo Galvan, Leyes politicas espanolas fundam entals (1808- 
1978), (Madrid: Tecnos, 1984), pp. 240-42.
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form of agricultural surpluses, although some help also went to industry. For instance, 
the Spanish railways (RENFE) benefited from help consisting of locomotives, rails, and 
other material.11 US assistance did not come without a catch, however. As mentioned 
above, while at the end of the Second World War the Spanish dictatorship appeared to 
be of a dubious Fascist character, by the mid-1950s, at the peak of the Cold War, 
Franco’s Right-wing regime was suddenly regarded as a convenient ally. In turn, the 
agreement with the Americans boosted Spanish prestige, making Spain feel that it had 
become, ‘to all intents and purposes a partner of the United States in the joint task of 
fighting Soviet imperialism’.12 The United States gained the use of the strategically 
located Iberian Peninsula as a launch-pad for the reconquest of Europe in the event of a 
major Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The Spanish bases were quickly filled with 
American military personnel and atomic weapons facilities. Despite the still weak 
Spanish economy, it is clear that Spain benefited more from the deal than the United 
States.13
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Information and Tourism had been entrusted to the 
reactionary Gabriel Arias Salgado. From 1951 Arias Salgado had applied a heavy 
censorship which was widely criticised by the population including members of the 
Catholic Church. For instance, a series of articles published in the only uncensored 
Catholic magazine Eclessia condemned the existing press laws and urged the Minister 
to relax censorship. That pressure had some positive effect.14 Franco appointed the
10 Amando de Miguel, Sociologia del Franquismo. Analisis ideologico de los Ministros del Regimen, (Barcelona: 
Euros, 1975), p. 58.
11 Harrison, “Towards the liberalization of the Spanish economy”, p. 109.
12 The Annual Register o f  World Events. Review of the Year 1954. Ed. By Ivison S. Macadam (Aberdeen, Longman, 
1955), pp. 214-6. [Henceforth A.R.]
13 Ron Hadian, “United States foreign policy towards Spain, 1953-1975”, in Iberian Studies, Vol. VII, No. I, spring 
1978, p. 6; The Listener, 18 June 1959.
14 Cited in A.R., 1955, p. 217.
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liberal Christian Democrat Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez as Minister of Education in 1951. 
During his tenure as Minister, Ruiz-Gimenez endeavoured to re-organize the Spanish 
educational system in the first aperturista initiative at ministerial level. But in the mid- 
1950s, a series of unexpected student demands halted Ruiz-Gimenez’s plans and led to a 
cabinet crisis. The student conflict began in January 1956 when Ruiz-Gimenez received 
a letter signed by thousands of student members of the university club, Tiempo Nuevo, 
the opening of which had been authorized by the Ministry of Education a few months 
earlier. In that letter, which was signed by, among others, two men of strong Falangist 
background, Dionisio Ridruejo and Miguel Sanchez-Mazas Ferlosio, the students asked 
for permission to form a democratically-elected National Student Congress. After 
careful consideration, however, the Ministry sent the petition to Raimundo Fernandez 
Cuesta, Minister-Secretary of the Movement. Fernandez Cuesta, who was also in 
charge of the Official University Syndicate, or Sindicato Espanol Universitario (SEU), 
ignored the students’ petition. The SEU then chose new candidates but, in turn, the 
students refused to accept them and chose their own. The elections for the student 
congress were suspended in Madrid, but students ignored the suspension and carried on 
with their vote. As expected, the students’ candidates won the democratic election, 
which were once again annulled by the SEU. Students then occupied the university 
buildings, attacked SEU branches, and organized a massive demonstration in Madrid. 
Franco’s police ended the mutiny with considerable violence. These students opposed 
the archaic political system, the absence of democratic elections, and the high level of 
censorship. Although they were not alone in expressing their grievances (Monarchists 
and Falangists had also criticized the government on several grounds), their opposition 
to the regime was far from organized and, therefore, did not represent a serious threat. 
Notwithstanding, the students’ and workers’ common political fight strengthened thanks
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to the involvement of clandestine Leftist political parties in both students’ and workers’ 
affairs.15
These university events coincided with the anniversary celebration of the death 
of the Falangist Matias Montero causing the eternal battle between the Falange and the 
Catholics to resurface. In a street of Madrid, the Falangists met a student 
demonstration, and by the time the police arrived, the street had been transformed into a 
battlefield. As a consequence of this encounter, one young Falangist was seriously 
injured, and the authorities expected his comrades to take brutal revenge in the event of 
his death. In the meantime, the Minister of Information and Tourism, the reactionary 
Gabriel Arias Salgado, announced the regime’s intention to apply, if  necessary, harsh 
measures to halt a possible violent uprising. The Ministry of Information also 
condemned the Ministry of Education for its inability to stop the students from 
demonstrating, thereby revealing the latent differences among members of Franco’s own 
cabinet. A large number of young demonstrators were arrested, including Javier 
Pradera, Miguel Sanchez Mazas, Dionisio Ridruejo, Jose Maria Ruiz Gallardon, Ramon 
Tamames, Gabriel Elorriaga, Julian Marcos, Enrique Mugica, Jesus Lopez Pacheco, 
Juan Antonio Bardem, and Vicente Girbau (many of them would be protagonists of the 
period of transition to democracy after Franco’s death). The detentions were followed 
by the dismissal of Ruiz-Gimenez as Minister of Education, (and the resignation of most 
of his team), and of the chancellors of the Universities of Madrid and Salamanca, Pedro 
Lain Entralgo and Antonio Tovar, respectively, as well as that of the Minister-Secretary 
of the Movement, Fernandez Cuesta and his Vice-Secretary, Tomas Romojaro. The
15 Jose Maria Maravall, Dictadura y  disentimiento politico, Obreros y estudiantes bajo el franquismo. (Madrid: 
Alfaguara, 1978).p. 30; The Listener, 25 July 1957; A.R, 1956, pp. 216-8
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regime made its point.16 Gabriel Elorriaga, member of Ruiz-Gimenez’s team, explains 
that the resulting power vacuum left after the departure of the man responsible for a 
progressive Education department was filled with agitation and extremism. By not 
trusting its own Minister and his team, Elorriaga argues, the regime lost its opportunity
1 *7
to have a student body that was much more integrated in national politics. From then
on, the Spanish universities remained an important focus of opposition to the regime.
The first aperturista attempt by a Francoist minister had failed. The dismissal of
Ruiz-Gimenez, a man who believed in the need for urgent reforms of the regime, made
it clear that Franco was not prepared to accept such a challenge. Moreover, the events
provoked by the students, and the arrests that followed them, made the population aware
that the demonstrators were not part of a Communist, or even less a judeo-masonic
conspiracy, as the regime had presented them. The demonstrators were simply young
protesters standing up against the unjust repression by the dictatorship. According to the
British historian Raymond Carr, this incident revealed not only ‘the limits of tolerance
and the inbuilt resistance of the regime to a process of apertura or opening up, and
recurrent fissures in Francoism, [...][but also that] the opposition would no longer be
dismissed as an exile plot and it was no longer confined to the working class.
1 8University students came from respectable bourgeois families’.
16 Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 
pp. 146-7. Years later Pedro Lain Entralgo wrote an article in the Revista de Occidente where he mentioned the 
incident denouncing the lack of academic freedom in the Spanish universities. Lain denounced the practice of 
'depuration' - specially from 1939 until 1942 - within the universities, and also the practice - until recently (paper 
written in 1966) - of demanding membership in the Movement as a condition to take part in the public examinations 
for a place in the university. See Pedro Lain Entralgo, “En tomo a la libertad academica”, in Revista de Occidente, 
No. 40, July 1966, pp. 71-80. In 1967, the other chancellor dismissed during the crisis o f 1956, Antonio Tovar, 
wrote from the United States about his idea of a free university, which opposed the practice of the Spanish regime. 
See Antonio Tovar, “Un comentario personal sobre la universidad libre”, in Revista de Occidente, No. 49, April 
1967, pp.76-85. Manuel Fraga, member of Ruiz-Gimenez’s team also resigned with most of the Minister’s team. 
See Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 26.
17 Quoted in Octavio Cabezas, Manuel Fraga, semblanza de un hombre de Estado. (Madrid: Sala Editorial, 1976), p. 
72.
18 Carr, Spain, p. 722.
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In February 1956, the appointment of the Falangist Jose Luis Arrese as Minister- 
Secretary of the Movement increased the number of new Falange members by several 
thousand. Arrese’s team was determined to consolidate the internal structure of the 
Falange and to produce a new package of Fundamental Laws in order to restructure the 
State according to Falangist doctrine towards the end of 1956, and to strengthen the 
power of the Movement even further. Yet, more power to the Movement would 
diminish -  even if slightly -  Franco’s powers. Franco, therefore, refused to accept 
Arrese’s proposal. Arrese’s proposal encountered great opposition also from 
representatives of the Catholic Church, the Asociacion Catolica Nacional de 
Propagandistas, the Monarchists, the Army, and the new public force, Opus Dei. The 
proposal failed, as did the opportunity for the Falange to impose its ideological 
predominance.19
The year 1956 also represented the emergence of Opus Dei as an important 
political force. As mentioned earlier, Laureano Lopez Rodo, member of the strict 
Catholic organization Opus Dei and protege of Franco’s right-hand man, Admiral Luis 
Carrero Blanco, was appointed Technical Secretary General of the Presidency. His 
principal task was to put into practice the so-called Administrative Reform. With Lopez 
Rodo’s appointment, Opus Dei began its ascent of the ladder of political power and the 
process was initiated whereby Spain would eventually be integrated into the European 
economy. From the years of international isolation, Spain had moved forward and had 
finally been recognized as part of the Western world. Franco’s aversion to Communism 
guaranteed the support of the international community, specially the United States.
19 Preston, Franco, pp. 651-3; Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, pp. 172-3; Bardavio y Sinova, Todo Franco, 
pp. 170-1,543-544.
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Economic autarky had created an impoverished and hungry population, but Spain 
seemed ready to open her markets (albeit under tight regulation) to the world.
1.2. 1957-1969: the period o f economic and social transformation
The first cabinet of this period was the one appointed in 1957. In this cabinet 
Franco reduced the number of military men, although it was still high, and there was an 
important recruitment of technocrats linked to Opus Dei, university professors, and also 
those linked to the business world and to technical professions, such as engineers and
• 0f \architects. The new cabinet announced reforms in the future administration of Spain 
as well as potentially significant proposals for Spanish industry. These proposals 
included ‘the creation of an economic planning group to co-ordinate the nation’s 
economy, a department of nuclear energy to study the peaceful uses of nuclear fission, 
and a special committee to study the modernization and the improvement of the State
91machinery’. The country’s economy was entrusted to Mariano Navarro Rubio and 
Alberto Ullastres (both technocrats linked to Opus Dei), Ministers of Finance and 
Commerce, respectively, as well as to Pedro Gual Villalbi, a Catalan economist who 
was appointed Minister without Portfolio and President of the Council of National 
Economy.22 As a member of Opus Dei himself, Laureano Lopez Rodo, who in 
December 1956 had been appointed Technical Secretary of the Presidency, supported 
the team of Opus Dei ministers.
20 Salustiano Del Campo, Jos6 Felix Tezanos y Walter Santin, “La elite politica espanola y la transition a la 
democracia” in Sistema, 48 (May, 1982), p. 28.
21 The New York Times, 26 February 1957.
22 For more details about Pedro Gual Villabi, see Ignasi Segura, Los catalanes de Franco (Barcelona: Plaza y Jan6s, 
1998), pp. 257-260.
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So far as the economy was concerned, the arrival of the technocrats in 1956, as 
Preston explains, was followed by a period of ‘disorientation’, mainly due to the long 
preceding period of autarky, during which the previous problems of public debt, 
inflation and the balance of payments continued. Thus, it was really in the early 1960s 
that the Spanish economy took off. The 1960s have been regarded as the most 
important of the Francoist era as they saw the end of the hegemony of the Falangist 
‘Blueshirts’, of autarky, and of the prospect of a ‘national revolution’.24 The Falange 
had provided the theoretical framework, namely the so-called National Syndicalism, 
upon which the whole idea of Francoism was based. But during this period, its 
monopoly control over various sectors of society (including social services, local 
administration, the press) decreased substantially.25 It is during this period that a 
number of people who were to play an important role during the pre-transition appear on 
the political scene. They included Laureano Lopez Rodo, Federico Silva Munoz, 
Fernando Maria de Castiella and Manuel Fraga Iribame.
In their battle against the apologists for the autarkic measures, the technocrats 
introduced market reforms in order to restore the stability of the economy. For that 
purpose, they undertook a novel operation of great importance to the Spanish economy: 
the approval by Decree (Decreto Ley) of the Stabilization Plan on 21 July 1959. The 
main architects were the Ministers Navarro Rubio, and, especially, Alberto Ullastres. 
However, it was mostly thanks to the perseverance of Navarro Rubio that Franco 
agreed, albeit reluctantly, to take a new economic line for Spain implying the complete
23 Preston, Franco, p. 670.
24 Miguel, Sociologia del Franquismo, p. 63.
25 The Listener, 12 May 1955.
26 Harrison, The Spanish Economy, p. 11.
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abandonment of the autarkic measures.27 Following a period of severe austerity from 
1959 to 1961, the Stabilization Plan helped to correct the deficit in the balance of 
payments by increasing direct taxation, especially from the working middle-class, 
encouraging tourism, exports, and the reception of foreign currency; and also helped 
‘the general conditions under which the economy was functioning’.28
The new economic ideas implemented by the technocrats were brought to Spain 
through the collaboration of the Spanish authorities with American economists and 
technical staff from international organizations, such as the Organization for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) - of which Spain became a member in 1958. At that time, Spain 
also became a member of the IMF and the World Bank.29 Furthermore, in 1959 the 
visit of the American President Dwight Eisenhower to Madrid was regarded as an 
important diplomatic step for the further integration of Spain into the international 
political arena. But perhaps the most delicate problem Spanish authorities had to face 
concerning foreign policy was the fate of their colonies in Africa. After a series of 
debates in the United Nations about the future of the Spanish colonies, Spain managed 
to keep control over Ifni and the Spanish Sahara (both in Morocco). This control, 
however, proved very costly, and was to result in a future dispute between Spain and its
30territories.
27 Laureano Lopez Rodo, Memorias I, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, June 1990, 4th Ed.), pp. 182-4. For a detailed 
account o f the contents of the Stabilization Plan, see “Memorandum que el gobiemo espafiol dirige al F.M.I y a la 
O.E.C.E.”, transcribed in Angel Vinas et al, Politico Comercial Exterior en Espafia (1931-1975),Tomo 3, (Madrid: 
Banco Exterior de Espana, 1979), pp. 1433-1442.
28 OECD, Economic Survey, Spain, 1966, p. 6. See also Preston, Franco, p. 701; A.R., 1958, pp. 284-7.
29 Samuel D. Eaton, The forces offreedom in Spain, 1974-1979, (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 5; 
Harrison, The Spanish Economy, p. 12.
30 A.R., 1960, p. 288.
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So far as the economy was concerned, the 1960s was the most prosperous 
decade of the entire Francoist period. The outstanding performance of the economy 
under the command of Opus Dei-linked technocrats led to the creation of a large middle 
class in Spain, and brought unprecedented prosperity to many Spaniards. During these 
years, Spain experienced a transformation from a quasi-rural society into a more 
industrialized one, which involved a staggering level of rural migration to the cities. 
Thus, from the beginning of the 1960s, employment opportunities in large cities, such as 
Madrid, Barcelona, Vizcaya and Valencia led to a total level of more than half-a-million 
migrants per annum to each those cities. Such a high level of migration not only 
changed social structures in rural areas, but also led to acute problems in urban areas, 
such as housing shortages. Furthermore, a prosperous European economy, especially 
in France, Switzerland and Germany, attracted a total of one and a half million to 
emigrate between 1960 and 1973.32 Emigration contributed to lowering the 
unemployment level that declined to below two per cent in the early 1970s. The 
workers’ remittances to their families and the inflow of foreign exchange, largely from 
the expanding tourist industry as well as foreign investment in Spain, also contributed to 
the economic well-being of these years.
The economic boom of the 1960s raised income per capita from $1,160 in the 
early 1960s to $2,841 in 1975, reaching all levels of the society. For instance, as Eaton 
recalls, the percentage of families owning refrigerators and television sets rose from four 
percent in 1960 to nearly ninety per cent in the early 1970s. By 1970 nearly one third of
31 Roy P. Bradshaw, “Internal migration in Spain”, in Iberian Studies, Vol.I, No. 2. autumn 1972, pp. 68-75. By 
1965 the Spanish authorities had taken measures to moderate the unprecedented boom in the housing market. Thus, 
out o f 467 requests for state-supported house-building submitted to the Ministry of Housing in 1964, more than 393 
were approved, whereas of the 240 submissions in 1965 only 127 were approved. See also OECD, Economic Survey, 
Spain, July 1966, pp. 10-11.
32 Carr, Spain, p. 724. See also Gunther et al, El Sistema de Partidos en Espafia, p. 32.
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families had a car.33 There was a substantial improvement in education levels and a 
social care programme, which included health care, unemployment benefits, disability 
compensation and retirement pensions.34 By 1962, economic growth had not been felt 
yet in certain working-class sectors whose wages were still relatively low. In April and 
May 1962 several strikes broke out in the steel areas of Asturias and the Basque 
Country, and soon spread to Catalonia and Madrid. Both the Civil Guard and the armed 
police tried to halt the strikes, but the workers stopped when the employers agreed to 
increase their wages if  only to avoid the loss of production time. This wave of strikes 
marked the beginning of a clandestine working class movement and, in turn, of the
o c
demise of the Falangist Vertical Syndicates.
The sudden Spanish openness to the world market had visibly positive 
repercussions. At the beginning of the 1960s, for instance, Spain was already ranked as 
the tenth most industrialized country in the world. Nevertheless, as Paul Preston argues, 
‘for a reactionary, agrarian regime like that of Franco, to make such a bid [for openness] 
was to sow the seeds of its own disintegration’.36 Indeed, there was an important down 
side to the economic progress. Against the predictions of the technocratic ministers, 
who believed that the economic development would also bring social peace, the 
economic prosperity brought by the Stabilization Plan led to an increase in labour 
conflicts, in both the manual sector and the ‘white collar’ sectors (like banking). The 
rise in employment brought by industrialization was coupled with the growth of the 
clandestine sindical organization encouraged by Leftist parties. But, as the sociologist 
Jose Maria Maravall has thoroughly studied, the workers’ claims were not merely
33 Eaton, The forces offreedom, p. 4.
34 Ibid., p. 4.
35 Preston, Franco, p. 701. 1
36 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 7.
37 Carlos Huneeus, La Union de Centro Democratico, (Madrid: CIS, 1985), pp. 52-53.
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economic but became increasingly political.38 As will be explained later, the approval 
of the Press Law in 1966 doubtlessly contributed to the spread of political information 
amongst workers.
Indeed, as professor Francisco Lopez-Casero explains, ‘these are the years of 
economic take-off, with great quantitative growth, but without real institutional or 
structural reforms’.39 The contradictions between a capitalist system and the autocratic 
Francoist institutions, therefore, led to the emergence of a dichotomy between the so- 
called ‘real Spain’, which was enjoying better standards of living but starting to be 
conscious of the political limitations of the Spanish regime, and the ‘official Spain’, 
which refused to modernize the regime for fear of provoking its debilitation, and with it 
the power loss of a comfortably settled political class. Yet, already in the early 1960s, 
concern over the future of Spain after Franco had led members of the regime to consider 
the introduction of modernizing reforms, especially in the area of public representation. 
In those years, as is further explained in Chapter 2, the aperturistas tried to promote the 
family sector of the Cortes - which together with the municipality and sindical sector 
formed the ‘natural channels’ of the Spanish political system of representation - to 
increase popular participation in political affairs if  only to avoid the emergence of a 
strong underground political force. Indeed, the early 1960s marked the emergence of a 
Leftist democratic opposition, principally the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) which 
became the main opposition party to the regime in the peninsula. Miguel Herrero de 
Minon argues that the ‘official Spain’ wanted to monopolize the Right whereas the ‘real
38 Maravall, Dictaduray disentimiento, chaps. 2 & 3.
39 Professor L6pez-Casero explains that since the opening up of the Spanish economy in 1959, observers have 
distinguished three broad economic periods in Spain, that is 1960-1973, 1974-1984, and 1985 until today. Thus, the 
period referred to in the main text is the first one, 1960-1973. See, Francisco Lopez-Casero, “The Social 
Consequences of Economic Development in Spain since 1960”, in Iberian Studies, Vol. 19, Nos. 1 & 2, 1990, p. 59.
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Spain’, which advocated political institutions at the same level as its political and social 
development, was identified with the Left.40
By early 1962 - the end of the first Development Plan - the pace of expansion 
was slowed down, mainly caused by the interruption of investment, which affected 
economic growth and substantially increased the number of unemployed 41 The workers 
soon felt the economic crisis. For instance, as already been noted, in May 1962, a 
miners strike in Asturias mobilised more than 100,000 men, and the shipyards and 
steelworks of the Biscay Province stopped production for nearly five weeks. 
Meanwhile, an important section of the Catholic clergy displayed a critical attitude 
towards the regime, especially with reference to the working classes. These Spanish 
priests blamed the Francoist government for failing to improve the economic and 
intellectual standards of an important part of Spanish society. Their attitude was clearly 
reflected in the Encyclical Mater e Magistra, published by the Vatican in 1961, and 
containing specific warnings to the Spanish regime.42 Yet, Franco did not listen to any 
criticism, not even that coming from his Holiness.
Franco’s intransigence was again demonstrated during an incident in Munich in 
the summer of 1962. The Munich Affair - also referred to as the Conspiracy or 
Contubernio43 - refers to a meeting held in Munich by the so-called “European 
Movement” between the 5 and the 7 of June 1962, which was attended by more than 
one hundred Spaniards. They came from both the Spanish peninsula and from exile and 
represented different political tendencies including Monarchists, Christian Democrats
40 Miguel Herrero de Minon, Memorias de estio, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1993), p. 57. See also Maravall, Dictadura 
y  disentimiento, p. 27.
41 OECD, Economic Survey, Spain, January 1969, pp. 50-51; OECD, Economic Survey, Spain, January 1970, p. 6.
42 The Listener, 28 June 1959; 8 August 1963.
43 The word Contubernio means ‘concubinage’. This strong expression referred to the shaking of hands of former 
political foes, that is members of both sides in the Spanish Civil War. See Juan Jose Linz, “Opposition in and under 
an authoritarian regime: the case of Spain”, in Robert Dahl (Ed.), Regimes and Oppositions, (Yale: Yale Univesity 
Press, 1973), p. 228.
Historical Background 33
and Social Democrats. The Communists and Anarchists were not invited to attend the 
meeting. The Spaniards who travelled from the peninsula included Joaquin Satrustegui, 
Jaime Miralles, Isidro Infantes, Jose Maria Gil Robles, Simon Tobalina, Fernando 
Alvarez de Miranda, Inigo Cavero, Felix Pons, Jesus Barros de Lis, Dionisio Ridruejo 
and Ignacio Fernandez de Castro. There were also Spaniards who joined the Munich 
meeting from exile in other countries. The conference was chaired by Salvador de 
Madariaga, a Spanish liberal not affiliated to any political formation, and also by Jose 
Maria Gil-Robles, leader of the Confederation Espanola de Derechas Autonomas 
(CEDA).44 The meeting concluded with the drafting of a document in which the 
participants advocated that a change of regime in Spain be made a condition for its entry 
into the European Community 45
In Spain, Franco’s cabinet reacted by suspending Article 14 of “The Charter of 
the Spaniards” (which established the right of free residence) for a period of two years. 
The participants in the meeting were consequently arrested and obliged to choose 
between confinement to the lesser of the Canary Islands, Hierro and Fuerteventura (an 
option chosen by Joaquin Satrustegui, Jaime Millares, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, 
and Inigo Cavero), or total exile (an option chosen by Jose Maria Gil Robles, Jesus 
Prados Arrarte, Ignacio Fernandez de Castro, and Dionisio Ridruejo). The participants 
in the meeting were heavily attacked and insulted by the Francoist press, particularly the 
newspaper Arriba, and the official radio stations. Manuel Fraga, Minister of 
Information from July 1962, claimed speciously that ‘we have sent them away in order
44 Javier Tusell, La oposicion democratica al franquismo, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), pp. 389-9. For a detailed 
account of the meeting and its further consequences see Ibid.,pp. 388-420. The Catholic authoritarian party, CEDA 
was formed in February 1933 under the leadership of Gil-Robles. The CEDA advocated the reform of the Republic 
from within and became the rightish opposition of Manuel Azana’s government. CEDA members collaborated with 
Franco’s military uprising but soon after the coup, Franco distanced himself from Gil-Robles. The latter, however, 
remained loyal to Franco’s regime for some time, but after the Civil War, he became a central figure of the 
monarchist opposition to Franco. See Preston, Franco, pp. 93, 95, 249-252. See also Angel Smith, Historical 
Dictionary o f  Spain. (London: Scarecrow Press, 1996), p. 102-104.
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to protect them from the just popular indignation’.46 The reaction of the regime had a 
negative impact in both national and international moderate circles. Fraga records that 
Jose Maria de Castiella, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, confessed years later his 
intention to resign in the aftermath of the Munich Affair.47 Franco, however, was 
aware of his overreaction and its possible consequences. As Preston writes, ‘he might 
not have understood the finer points of economic theory, but his sensibility to threats to 
his survival was undiminished. ’
A few weeks after the Munich Affair, Franco reshuffled his cabinet. The 
appointment of new young Ministers, namely Opus Dei technocrat Gregorio Lopez 
Bravo, as Minister of Industry, and particularly Manuel Fraga Iribame, as Minister of 
Information and Tourism, made observers believe that ‘the era of liberalization had 
begun.’49 (Manuel Fraga’s ministry is further studied in Chapter 4). It seemed that the 
Caudillo was willing to introduce some degree of political reform to the regime, and to 
reduce the tension that had emerged between his oppressively authoritarian system and 
an increasingly modem and non-conformist Spanish society. But, while Franco devoted 
more time than ever to his hobbies of fishing, and hunting thereby neglecting Spanish 
politics, he and his regime were as tough as ever.50 In Max Gallo’s view, ‘the 
significance of the reshuffle was plain: Franco had chosen the policy of development, to 
combine liberalization with repression’.51
The most important new feature of this new cabinet of 1962 was undoubtedly 
the creation of the portfolio of vice-president of the government, a position that had
45 Linz, “Opposition in and under an authoritarian regime”, p. 228.
46 Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Del “contubernio " al consenso, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985), p. 36.
47 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 48.
48 Preston, Franco, p. 704.
49 Max Gallo, Spain under Franco. A History. (London: George Allen, 1969), p. 301.
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disappeared in 1938. Franco entrusted the new post to the Falangist Captain General 
Agustin Munoz Grandes, ex-Chief of the Spanish Blue Division. It was believed that 
the purpose of the portfolio was the delegation of some of Franco’s responsibilities to 
Munoz Grandes. The General, who took direct charge of the co-ordination of the 
departments connected with national security, would be Franco’s substitute ‘in case of 
vacancy, absence or illness’.52 The reason behind Franco’s unprecedented decision to 
delegate real power to someone else may be found a few months before the cabinet 
reshuffle of 1962. On 24 December 1961, the Caudillo suffered a serious shooting 
accident prompting him to temporarily delegate some of his powers to a man he could 
trust. Following the accident, controversial issues such as the Caudillo’s succession, the 
general future of the regime and more specifically the completion of the Organic Law of 
the State (the Constitution) were suddenly at stake. Before being operated upon, the 
Caudillo told his friend General Alonso Vega, ‘to take care of things’ (tened cuidado de 
lo que ocurra). Franco’s accident provoked clear anxiety among his unconditional 
supporters who reacted by gathering more tightly around him. In the wake of the 
accident, as Luis Ramirez points out, ‘between 1962 and 1966, the defensive forces of 
the regime were maintained through a coalition of Falangists, Opus Dei and Christian 
Democrats. They spent four years building a legal apparatus which could work as a 
democracy {que salvara la cara de la democracia formal) with the view of preparing 
the mechanism for the succession in case Franco’s condition proved mortal’.
The future of the Spanish regime was an issue that concerned not only the most 
fervent Francoists, but also the Spanish population as well as foreign observers.54
50 Preston, Franco, pp. 706-7.
51 Gallo, Spain under Franco, p. 301.
52 The New York Times, 12 July 1962; Le Monde, 11 July 1962; Preston, Franco, p. 705.
53 Luis Ramirez, “Morir en el bunker”, in Horizonte Espahol,(l) 1972 (Paris: Ruedo Iberico), p. 5.
54 Laureano L6pez Rodo, Pol'iticay Desarrollo, (Madrid: Aguilar, 1971), pp. 64-65.
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Pressures to introduce democratic reforms came from both home and abroad. Western 
European countries, in particular, exercised strong pressure on Franco’s regime to 
introduce democratic reforms if Spain wanted to become a member of the European 
Community, to which Madrid had applied earlier in 1962. Some members of the regime 
advocated that the entry of Spain into the European Community was a fundamental step 
in the development of the new political economy. While the debate over Spain’s 
incorporation into the European Community raised hopes for reforms, it also exposed 
the disagreement between the Falangists and technocrats of the regime. Laureano Lopez 
Rodo, and indeed all the technocrats linked to Opus Dei, believed that ‘the Spanish 
economy must be linked to Europe. We are Europe and we must play our cards. And, 
since in the end, mutual convenience always prevails, the agreement will be signed’.55 
But, the majority of Falangists raised their voices against the idea of Europeanization. 
In an article published by the Falangist magazine Es Asi, the ‘Old Guard’56 of the group 
attacked Franco’s pro-European policy as a ‘betrayal of the cause that made the 
Falangists fight a civil war’. The Falangists also took the opportunity to remind Franco 
of their objections to a Monarchical system, following the doctrine of Jose Antonio 
Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falange.57
Meanwhile, expectations raised by the appointment of the new cabinet were 
soon overshadowed by a new demonstration of the repressive character of the regime. 
In 1963 while political detentions continued in Spain, the Spanish Communist leader, 
Juan Grimau, was sentenced and subsequently executed by firing squad for alleged war
55 The Catholic magazine El Ciervo called for Spanish integration in Europe. See El Ciervo, No. 153. November 
1966, p. 4. (The magazine quotes another call for the integration in Europe which came from the columns of the 
Falangist Arriba (10-10-66). L6pez Rodo, Politico y  Desarrolio, p. 387.
56 The ‘Old Guard’ or Vieja Guardia was the name given to hard-line radicals o f the groups of veteran Falangist since 
1949. See Preston, Franco, p. 609.
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crimes committed nearly thirty years before (during the Spanish Civil War). His 
execution, on 20 April 1963, was universally condemned. The extremely large number 
of pleas made on Grimau’s behalf by personages from around the world, including Pope 
John XXm and Russian premier, Nikita Khrushchev, did not persuade Franco.58 The 
regime appeared insensitive, and even though the final decision remained with Franco 
himself, some of his Ministers indirectly contributed to Grimau’s assassination by not 
raising a finger to prevent it. Fraga, in particular, in his capacity as Minister of 
Information, authorised the distribution of leaflets in which Grimau’s guilt was attested. 
Fraga’s reactions led to serious doubts about his allegedly ‘progressive’ attitude within 
the regime, especially when he declared that Grimau was a repellent murderer. 
Paradoxically, when a few years later, in January 1969, Franco declared a ‘state of 
exception’ (estado de exception) in the Basque Country in resort to violence, it was 
Fraga who pressed successfully for an early end on 25 March, claiming that it would 
damage the tourist trade.59 The dichotomy in Fraga’s character, that is a combination of 
the authoritarian and the reformist, has been apparent throughout his political career - as 
is further explained in Chapter 4. Also, in 1963, the government created the 
‘Commissariat for Development’ which was entrusted to Lopez Rodo. On 1 January 
1964, and with no little opposition from the die-hard Falangists, the First Development 
Plan came into operation, just when the Stabilization Plan of 1959 had been completed. 
The liberal measures adopted by the First Development Plan yielded unparalleled 
results. Consumption, investment, exports and particularly tourism increased 
substantially.
57 Quoted in A.R., 1963, pp. 282-3.
5iA.R„ 1963, pp. 282-3.
59 Preston, Franco, pp. 708-9; Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, pp. 10-11, 20.
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On 7 July 1965 Franco undertook another cabinet reshuffle. The most important 
newcomers were the Christian Democrat Federico Silva Munoz, later known as the 
‘efficiency Minister’, a member of the Catholic organization Asociacion Catolica 
Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNP), who was put in charge of the Ministry of Public 
Work; Opus Dei members Juan Jose Espinosa San Martin, who replaced Navarro Rubio 
in Finance, and Faustino Garcia-Monco Fernandez, who replaced Ullastres in 
Commerce. The main achievements of this cabinet were the promulgation of the Ley 
Organica del Estado in 22 November 1966 and the final approval of Manuel Fraga’s 
Press Law of 13 August 1965 (the Law did not come into effect until March 1966).60 
The Press Law represented the second important aperturista attempt at ministerial level 
(the first one was the failed attempt by Ruiz-Gimenez to reform the educational system 
in the mid-1950s). The importance of the Press Law is further studied in Chapter 2.
In the meantime, in 1967 the Vice-President of the Government, General Munoz 
Grandes, resigned from his post due to health reasons. His resignation was a blow to the 
Falangists who regarded the old General as a guarantor of a non-monarchist Francoism 
after the death of the Caudillo. But, the loss seemed irreparable to them when Franco 
appointed Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco as the new Vice-President since he was a 
supporter of a monarchy under Don Juan Carlos. Carrero’s appointment, therefore, 
exacerbated the rivalries between the Falangists and the technocrats of Opus Dei close 
to Admiral Carrero.61 Rivalries amongst members of the regime were made more 
visible by the approval of the Organic Law of the State, or Franco’s Constitution in 
1967. The Law, which ‘aim[ed] to introduce the precise modifications in the already
60 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 144.
61 Preston, Franco, pp. 721-2, 733-4.
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promulgated Fundamental Laws in order to [...] perfect and accentuate the 
representative character of the political order’ , was regarded by some aperturistas as a 
legal tool to modernize the regime so far as popular representation was concerned. On 
the opposite bench, the inmovilistas refused to understand the law in such terms, and 
therefore, halted any attempt to reform the political system. The aperturistas were 
wrong, as the Caudillo had no intention of ‘accentuating the representative character’ of 
the regime. The Organic Law and the aperturistas’ attempts to increase public 
participation in political affairs are further explained in Chapter 3.
In the social context, by the second half of the 1960s, the quite old-fashioned 
way of life of the Spaniards was being overturned by the spectacular influx of tourists. 
The tourists brought to the public awareness for the first time other ways of living 
further transforming a rapidly changing society. This new knowledge coupled with an 
unevenly distributed wealth, which raised discontent particularly among workers and 
students. This period in Spain, as indeed in other European countries, especially France, 
was marked by countless student revolts. The student population had grown from 
64,000 in the academic year 1962-3 to 93,000 in 1966, which forced the creation of new 
classrooms and departments, principally at the University of Madrid. In the winter of 
1965, confrontations between students, professors and the police ended with the 
dismissal of several professors in Madrid. The Revista de Occidente published a survey 
in which six professors, Pedro Lain Entralgo, Antonio Tovar, Angel Latorre, Alejandro 
Nieto, Salustiano del Campo and Paulino Garagorri commented on the theme of the 
student revolts. They unanimously believed that the students’ demands were due to the
62 B.O.E., Ley Organica del Estado, 10 January 1967 (Publication date: 11 January 1967).
63 Blanco y  Negro, No. 2844, 5 November 1966, pp. 36-9.
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backwardness of the Spanish political system. The students demanded social reforms, 
but the regime refused to implement any.64 The dismissal of the professors propelled 
further protests all around the peninsula and led the government into discussing the 
future of the SEU. In 1965, the regime decided to freeze the syndicate and substitute it 
with the Delegation Nacional-Comisana para el SEU, an ambiguous organism led by 
Ignacio Garcia Lopez.65 The years 1967 and 1968 were particularly eventful, and 
among other things included sit-ins, mass demonstrations and the closure of a faculty, 
which provoked the dismissal of the then Minister of Education, Manuel Lora 
Tamayo.66
The frequent incidents at the Spanish universities, however, did not seem to 
sway Franco. The regime took only minor precautions, creating secret services at the 
university following the incidents with students in France in May 1968. Yet, the 
alleged ‘suicide’ of the student Enrique Ruano (Ruano fell from a window of a 7th floor 
flat while the police was searching it) provoked such violent uprisings in the universities 
of Madrid and Barcelona that the regime declared a ‘state of exception’ in both cities 
from 24 January to 24 March 1969.67 As well as the student opposition to the regime, 
disagreements between Church and State worsened. More and more Catholic priests 
contested the regime especially over issues such as the power of Franco to appoint 
Bishops and the demands of the Basque citizens in their demands for autonomy, in 
which the Basque clergy was particularly involved. Demands for Basque independence
64 Revista de Occidente, No. 68, November 1968, pp. 172-230. See also, Eustaquio Galan y Gutierrez, “iQ ue 
Universidad? Reto al Problema Universitario” Indice, Encarte, No. 233-234, pp. i-vii.
65 The new body lasted until 7 January 1970, when the regime decided to close the SEU definitely. See Bardavio & 
Sinova, Todo Franco, pp. 612-4.
66 Professor Pedro Lain Entralgo openly condemned the unfair dismissal of university professors following the events 
occurred at the Madrid Universty in February 1965. See, Pedro Lain Entralgo, “La persona y el Estado”, in Revista 
de Occidente, No. 54, September 1967, pp. 353-356. For more details about that one and other examples of student 
opposition to the regime in those years see, Enrique Tiemo Galvan, “Student Opposition in Spain”, in Government 
and Opposition, Vol. 1, No. 4, July - September, 1966, pp. 467-486.
67 Bardavio & Sinova, Todo Franco, pp. 545-9, 583-4.
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went too far when on 2 August 1968, the terrorist group ETA - which campaigned 
violently for the independence of the Basque Country - assassinated a policeman in Inin. 
Once again, the regime responded to opposition by declaring a state of exception in the
/TO
Basque country. The terrorist activities of the Basque separatists of ETA coincided 
with the terrorist activities of the ultra-Right ‘Warriors of Christ the King’. This group 
was formed by the followers of Bias Piiiar’s Neo-Nazi organization Fuerza Nueva in 
1968, and its emergence, as Preston argues, was partly due to the increasingly Leftist 
direction the Church was taking.69
Meanwhile, in the summer of 1969, Franco took his most important political 
decision to date. On 21 July he officially appointed his successor in the person of Prince
70Juan Carlos. Nevertheless, Franco was still alive and, despite his ill-health, no change 
of regime would occur until his death. This he confirmed later on during his end-of- 
year speech in 1972. ‘Here you will have me’, Franco assured the Spanish population, 
‘with the same firmness as many years ago, for as long as God wants to let me go on
71serving the destinies of the Patria with efficacy.’ Following Don Juan Carlos’ 
appointment, the stability of the government was shaken by the publicity surrounding 
the so-called ‘Matesa scandal’. The Prince’s appointment and the Matesa scandal are 
further explained in Chapter 5.
68 A.R., 1968, p. 275,A.R., 1969, pp. 271-274.
69 Preston, Franco, p. 737. Further information on Ultra-Right groups can be found in Horizonte Espafiol, (I), 1972, 
pp. 311-314.
70 The technocrats in general, but Laureano Lopez Rodo and Carrero Blanco, in particular, played an important role 
in the appointment of the Prince as successor to Franco. Laureano Lopez Rod6, Memorias II. Anos decisivos 
(Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, April 1992), pp. 379-493.
71 Quoted in Preston, Franco, p. 759. For more details about the speech see, Laureano Lopez Rodo, Memorias III. El 
principio del fin. (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, May 1992), pp. 336-8.
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1.3. 1969-1975: the last years ofFrancoism and the arrival o f democracy
So far as the economy of the country was concerned, the Second Development 
Plan, implemented in 1968, began to bear fruit by 1969. The economy had overcome 
the slowdown in production of previous years, and was beginning to improve thanks to 
the export-led economic policies, which were complemented by a devaluation of the 
peseta. By 1971 the measures to reduce the remarkably high expansion in demand, 
introduced in 1969, helped to correct the balance of payments without disturbing
noproduction levels. Overall, one could say that the three economic Development Plans 
of the technocrats (1964-7, 1968-71, and 1972-5) contributed to an outstanding 
economic boom in Spain, although the performance of the last Plan was badly affected 
by the oil crisis of 1973. The main objectives of these plans were the economic 
development of Spain, the promotion of a market economy, greater integration into the 
international system, and improvements in social welfare.73 In fact, during the early 
1970s, Spain continued to make substantial progress, thanks to high levels of investment 
and exports, and by 1973 the levels of employment and production had risen 
substantially. For instance, unemployment in the construction sector decreased by 35 
per cent from 1972 to 1973, and in the manufacturing sector by 27 per cent.74 
Furthermore, 1970 was a good year for Spain so far as international relations were 
concerned. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gregorio Lopez Bravo, signed an extension 
of the agreement with the United States (first signed in 1953) for a further 6 years, 
agreement that was reinforced by the visit of President Nixon to Spain. Spanish 
relations with Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Arab countries, also improved
72 OECD, Economic Survey, Spain, January 1971, pp. 5-9.
73 Harrison, The Spanish Economy From the Civil War to the European Community, (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), p. 15. 
For a detailed account of the main projections of both the First and Second Plan, and the target for the Third, see 
Table 11 in OECD, Economic Survey, Spain, January 1972, p. 39.
74 OECD, Economic Survey, Spain, April 1974, p. 8.
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so much that in the latter case the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser even used 
Lopez Bravo’s offices in negotiating the cease-fire in the Middle East.75
Not everything was so positive, however. The government failed to implement 
the political reforms urgently needed to match the spectacular improvement in the 
economy throughout the 1960s, thereby creating a contradictory situation in Spain. The 
contradictions in the system were particularly felt by those Spaniards who had worked 
in democratic European countries. Many of these workers were active in trade unions 
and Socialist and Communist parties abroad, and continued their activities on their 
return to Spain.76 It goes without saying that their awareness of democratic political 
systems had negative repercussions for the Francoist dictatorship. Moreover, the end of 
the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s witnessed a considerable increase in the number 
of students’ and workers’ demonstrations as a result of repressive measures applied by 
the government. Such repression had the reverse effect of the one intended, and 
conflicts reached their peak in 1970. In fact, student protests in the Basque Country 
were so serious that the government declared a state of exception three times between 
1968 and 1970.77 The unparalleled number of 1,595 workers’ conflicts was recorded 
mainly in the industrialised provinces of Asturias, Euskadi, and Barcelona in 1970. This 
number was only surpassed in 1974, when the number of protests reached the staggering 
figure of 2,290, and 3.156 in 1975.78
The Church also continued to exercise considerable pressure on the regime. On 
15 and 16 September 1971, 250 priests and bishops from all over the country urged the 
regime to allow, ‘freedom of expression, association, assembly, participation in 
government and control of the common wealth by all citizens, respect for ethnic and
75 A.R., 1970, 176.
76 Richard Gunther et al, El sistema departidospoliticos en Esparia, (CIS, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1986), p. 32.
77 Ibid., p. 33-4.
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cultural minorities, equality in educational opportunity, true equality before the law 
[...], and an end to the use of physical and mental torture in police investigation’. 
Franco’s response was to warn the Church not to interfere in State affairs, and no
7Qreforms were implemented. The Church ignored Franco’s warnings. The mam 
spokesman of the Spanish Church, Cardinal Vicente Enrique i Tarancon, agreed to 
‘speak up for those without a voice to defend their legitimate aspirations’, as it was clear 
that the Spanish citizens did not have the chance to do so themselves under the current
on
legislation. The incidents which more than ever united the forces of the opposition 
against the regime were the death sentences passed against three Basque terrorists in 
Burgos on 30 December 1970. This incident is explained in some detail in Chapter 4.
Despite this social crisis, some members of the government reiterated the 
existence of a democratic system in the country. During an interview with Malcom 
Muggeridge on BBC One in 1971, the then Minister of Industry and Opus Dei member, 
Gregorio Lopez Bravo, stated, ‘I understand that doubts still exist in Great Britain and 
some sectors insist on believing that a regime that is more authoritarian than democratic 
prevails in my country. This confusion is understandable in countries that have a 
parliamentary regime like the English one, unless Spain is studied with some care. 
What is certain is that our democracy exists, there is no doubt whatsoever of that, even
O  1
though it is different from British democracy’. By contrast, other members of the 
regime believed in the need for the introduction of some political reforms. In 1970, a 
meeting of members of the supreme body of the Movement, the Consejo Nacional or 
National Council, took place under the presidency of the aperturista Fernando Herrero
78 Maravall, Dictadura y  disentimiento, pp. 62, 81-2.
79 A.R., 1971, pp. 175-6.
80 A.R., 1972, p. 168.
81 London 1 February 1971, BBC One interview with Malcom Muggeridge. Quoted in Leslie Mackenzie, “The 
Political Ideas of Opus Dei in Spain”, in Government and Opposition, Vol. 8, Number 1, winter 1973, p. 92.
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Tejedor. Following the meeting, Herrero Tejedor demanded that the government, and 
more specifically the Minister-Secretary of the Movement, Torcuato Femandez- 
Miranda, speed up the process of legalising political associations.82
The economic and social transformation of the country led to the increasing 
emergence of reformists within the regime who advocated political change, especially in 
the area of public representation. Between 1971 and 1973, two groups of regime 
reformists emerged. The first was a group of young men who had gathered around 
Manuel Fraga in the study group Gabinete de Orientation y  Documentation (GODSA). 
The second group was formed by a young generation of intellectually capable Christian 
Democrats under the name of Tacito. These young reformists took issue with the 
backwardness of the regime - both groups are studied in more detail in Chapter 6. The 
emergence of these progressive sectors within the regime led the Ultra-Right leader, 
Bias Pinar, to stand as a defender of Francoism and its Fundamental Principles. 
Members of the Ultra-Right Warriors of Christ the King, linked to Pinar’s Fuerza 
Nueva, conducted a series of terrorist attacks around the country. Audiences and 
speakers at meetings and conferences, bookshops where Marxist books were sold, and 
artists like Pablo Picasso all suffered the violence of Pinar’s followers.83
In the summer of 1973, for the first time in its history, Franco appointed a 
President of the Council of Ministers (hitherto the top figure below the Caudillo was the 
vice-president of the government, the position created in 1962 and occupied until 1967 
by General Agustin Munoz Grandes). The Caudillo, however, retained his position as 
Head of State, Supreme Commander of the armed forces, and Leader of the National
82 Powell, “Crisis del Franquismo”, pp. 248-9.
83 Ramirez, “Morir en el bunker”, p. 12.
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Movement.84 After a loyal and impeccable career in service to the regime since its 
foundation, and serving as Vice-President since 1967, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, 
was named President. It followed the formation of a cabinet in June 1973. The novelty 
of Carrero’s new cabinet was that after four years of there being considerable power in 
the hands of the Opus-linked technocrats, their power had now been greatly reduced. 
Laureano Lopez Rodo was the only member of Opus Dei remaining. Lopez Rodo was 
moved out of domestic politics to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he could give a 
liberal veneer to a rather backward-looking cabinet. According to the sociologist 
Amando de Miguel, the technocrats contributed to laying the foundations of two 
irreversible processes: economic development, and, as already mentioned, the 
restoration of the monarchy in the person of Don Juan Carlos.85 The three most 
important newcomers of this cabinet were Torcuato Femandez-Miranda (Vice-President 
and Minister-Secretary General of the Movement), Carlos Arias Navarro (Interior -  
known as Gobernacion during Franco’s time), and Antonio Barrera de Irimo (Finance). 
The most crucial task faced by the new Ministers was dealing with the rampant inflation 
affecting the underpaid working classes.
Meanwhile, during the first years of the 1970s, the terrorist activities of the 
Basque group ETA escalated. Both Franco and Carrero believed the government had 
failed to deal with the terrorist problem. As Preston points out, the situation got so bad 
that Carrero had secretly encouraged the activities of the Ultra-Rightist terrorist squads
Q/T
of Fuerza Nueva. But on 20 December 1973, only six months after his appointment as 
President of the Government, the unexpected happened. ETA assassinated Carrero.
84 The Listener, 14 June 1973.
85 Miguel, Sociologia del Franquismo, p. 83-90 .
86 Preston, Franco, p. 759.
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With the disappearance of the most promising candidate for securing the continuation of 
Francoism after the death of its Caudillo, the regime suffered a major setback.
In January 1974, shortly after Carrero’s death, a new short-lived cabinet was 
appointed. The new President Carlos Arias Navarro - previously Interior Minister, and, 
ironically, the person in charge of the security of the State when Carrero was killed - 
continued the policy of timid liberalization, but above all the maintenance of public 
order, even by repressive means. As is further explained in Chapter 6, Arias’ new 
cabinet was appointed during one of the most difficult periods in the history of 
Francoism. The Ministers had to put up with repeated demands for progress coming 
from inside and out the country, the illness of the Caudillo, and with adverse economic 
conditions. But, now, however, there was not a single Minister of Opus Dei. Arias 
even managed without Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora, one of the most fervent 
defenders of Franco’s regime. The regime had to endure a growing, although not yet 
united, democratic opposition. As Santiago Carrillo recalls, by 1973 the PCE was a 
strong organization that had its base in the clandestine union Comisiones Obreras 
(CCOO), and in student and intellectual organizations. The PCE was also present in 
companies, in the official union, at the university and in professional colleges. Other 
prominent groups of the democratic opposition were the Socialists led by Enrique 
Tiemo Galvan, and in Catalonia the group led by Joan Raventos.87
Meanwhile, Arias Navarro announced the government’s desire for 
modernization in his eagerly awaited speech of 12 February 1974. Allegedly Arias 
advocated the formation of political associations in order to encourage the contraste de
87 Santiago Carrillo interviewed by Victoria Prego in Santos Juli£, et al. (Coord.) Memoria de la transicion. (Madrid: 
Taurus, 1996), pp. 49-50.
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pareceres or contrast of opinions. Yet it took the government an extra ten months to 
approve the controversial Statute of Political Association of December 1974, which only 
confirmed that the level of political freedom remained unchanged (the consequences of 
the failed Statute are further explained in Chapter 6). Beside the political problems, 
Arias had to face an economy which had not suffered from as high a level of
• • • QQunemployment and lack of economic activity since 1959.
During Arias’ presidency, both the ultra-Right and the Basque separatist group 
ETA increased their terrorist activities considerably. The Church continued to be 
involved in promoting political freedom, social justice, and greater participation in 
national politics as well as advocating a revision in the regime for political prisoners. 
On 24 February 1974, the Vatican supported the homily read by the Bishop of Bilbao, 
Antonio Anoveros, in which he publicized the Church’s grievances against Franco’s 
government throughout the Basque Province. The Anoveros affair worsened the already 
tense relations between Church and State authorities.89 Some members of a 
fundamental sector of the Franco regime, the Comunion Tradicionalista, also supported 
the Catholic Church’s demands for change. According to Luis Ramirez, the 
Tradicionalistas made statements that condemned totalitarianism and supported the 
workers’ demands and the nationalist claims of Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
Furthermore, dynamic sectors of the regional bourgeoisie of Catalonia, Basque Country 
and Valencia supported the integration of Spain into the European Community and the 
political opening up of the regime. In Catalonia influential sectors of the bourgeoisie 
were even willing to collaborate with the democratic opposition.90 In 1974 social 
tension reached its highest point. But, the constant demands for reforms coming from
88 OECD, Economic Survey, Spain, May 1976, pp. 5-6.
89 Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to democracy, p. 198; Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, pp. 58-9.
90 Ramirez, “Morir en el bunker”, p. 13.
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all parts of society contrasted with the passivity of Arias’ government creating an 
uncomfortable feeling of impotence in the population. In July 1974 it was officially 
announced that the Caudillo was suffering from Parkinson’s disease. Yet despite his 
enfeeblement, the Caudillo refused to transfer definitive powers to Prince Don Juan 
Carlos. The Prince substituted for Franco on two occasions for only a short while. 
Meanwhile both the democratic opposition as well as the reformists of the regime began 
feverish preparations for the post-Francoist Spain.
Following a lengthy illness, the Caudillo died in the early hours of 20 November 
1975 leaving Prince Juan Carlos as heir of his regime. The Prince was proclaimed King 
Juan Carlos I by the Francoist Cortes two days later. It was hoped that the King would 
chose a reformist President for his new government, but Juan Carlos re-appointed 
Carlos Arias Navarro as President in December 1975. Don Juan Carlos could not afford 
to alienate Franco’s hard-liners hence changes had to be introduced at a slow pace.91 
The new cabinet, which had a combination of immovilitas and reformists, had the 
arduous task of solving the social and economic problems of the country. Given the 
social context, the reformist Ministers - namely Manuel Fraga (Interior Minister), Jose 
Maria de Areilza (Foreign Affairs Minister), Antonio Garrigues (Justice Minister) and 
Alfonso Osorio (Minister of the Presidency) - realized that there was no time to lose.
In those days, although the democratic opposition remained acutely divided, it 
was increasingly putting pressure on the regime.92 As is further explained in Chapter 7, 
in March 1976 various groups within the democratic opposition joined forces against 
the government and called for the rupture with the Francoist regime. But the reformists 
of the regime wanted to avoid the victory of the ruptura option at any cost. Thus, some
91 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, pp. 78-9.
92 Powell, Elpiloto del cambio, p. 152.
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aperturistas/reformists, who had advocated different degrees of political reform since 
the mid-50s, favoured the quick implementation of a proper reform package if only to 
guarantee their political survival. Arias, however, refused to change the system. On 28 
January 1976 Arias delivered a speech to the Cortes which confirmed that there would 
be no possibility of moving ahead under his presidency. Despite promises of 
modernization, Arias announced his intention to have a limited ‘democracia a la 
espanola’ or Spanish democracy: a monarchic and representative democracy, socially in 
line with Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera’s doctrine where there would be no place for 
terrorism, anarchism, separatism or Communism.93 The regime was not willing to 
move ahead. Following the speech, Arias’s unpopularity rose considerably.
A few months after Arias’ appointment, therefore, it was clear that he would not 
lead the country to a democratic system. By June 1976 popular uprisings and an active 
democratic opposition created enough pressure to provoke a cabinet crisis. Given the 
circumstances, the King took the initiative and asked Arias for his resignation on 2 July 
1976. Once again the monarch surprised everyone by appointing a near unknown 
Adolfo Suarez, Minister-Secretary of the Movement under Arias. Nevertheless, from the 
start, Suarez’s new cabinet showed signs of a real willingness to change things. Among 
Suarez’s main achievements was the approval of the Law of Political Reform by the 
Francoist Cortes in November 1976. With the approval of this law the members of the 
Francoist Cortes voted for their own dissolution. The law, which was ratified by the 
Spanish people in a referendum held on 15 December 1976, was followed by the 
holding of general elections scheduled for 15 June 1977.94 (Suarez’s appointment and 
presidency are studied in more detail in Chapter 7).
93 Cambio-16, 2-8 February 1976, pp. 6-10; Carr & Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 211.
94 El Pais, 3 November 1976, p. 13; Abel Hernandez (Ed.), Fue posible la concordia. Adolfo Suarez, (Madrid: 
Espasa-Calpe, 1996), p. 60.
Historical Background 51
From the end of 1976, the race to the polls led to the emergence of a myriad of 
political parties representative of all political ideologies. The illegality of the 
Communists had been an issue of long-standing controversy. Thus, given the animosity 
with which most members of the regime regarded the Communist party, Suarez initially 
did not contemplate its legalization. But, by the Spring the presence of the PCE in 
Spanish politics proved inavoidable. To everyone’s surprise, Suarez legalized the 
Communist Party on 9 April 1977.
Meanwhile, the members of the regime gathered around two main political 
parties. The first was the conservative Alianza Popular (AP) created by Manuel Fraga 
in October 1976. Since the cabinet crisis of July 1976, the ex- Interior Minister had 
shifted from a pro-reformist to a very conservative position. Fraga created the AP in 
coalition with six well-known figures of the regime, including some ex-Ministers, and 
wrapped the party message in a great deal of Francoist nostalgia. The presence of 
orthodox Francoists led many of Fraga’s young followers to leave him, only a handful of 
them remaining. AP, therefore, attracted the most conservative of the moderates 
Francoists as well as many of the inmovilistas but failed in the first democratic 
elections. The second party was President Adolfo Suarez’s Union de Centro 
Democratico (UCD) which was created in March 1977. The UCD was formed by a 
large number of reformists who monopolized the political centre, including many of 
Fraga’s young followers. The moderate programme of Suarez’s party attracted the 
majority of the Spaniards who wanted a peaceful transition to a post-Francoist system, 
but demanded change. On 15 June 1977, the first democratic elections since the 1930s 
were held in Spain. Suarez’s party won followed by the Socialists, Communists, and
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Fraga’s conservatives. The democratic elections marked the beginning of a completely 
new era for the Spanish population.
Conclusion
As seen in this Chapter, Franco imposed a dictatorial system in Spain that lasted 
nearly forty years until his death. The dictatorship underwent important changes 
throughout the years of its existence. These changes were predominantly socio­
economic and were concentrated mainly in the 1960s. The outstanding performance of 
the economy under the command of Opus Dei-linked technocrats undoubtedly served as 
a catalyst for the creation of a large middle class in Spain, and brought unprecedented 
prosperity to many Spaniards. Yet, Spanish economists believe that the economic 
growth was not the result of the Development Plans but rather the result of tourism and 
return of emigrants, among other things.95 Furthermore, the economic boom was not 
matched by an appropriate programme of political reforms. Lack of political reforms 
brought social unrest at the end of the 1960s, and particularly in the early 1970s. 
Spaniards took advantage of the relaxation of censorship introduced by the Press Law of 
1966, and began to express political opinions, although still cautiously, through the 
press. The rise in student and worker conflicts was supported by a substantial part of 
the Spanish Catholic priesthood who, with the blessing of successive Popes, urged the 
Francoist regime to implement the necessary political changes to deal with the problems 
in Spanish society. Terrorism also increased during this time. But Franco remained 
reluctant to modernize his regime.
95 Amando de Miguel (Dtor.), Fundacion FOESSA, Estudios sociologiocs sobre la situacion social de Espana, 
(Madrid: Euramerica, 1970), unpublished Chapter 5 (“Vida politica y asociativa”) - censored by the Francoist 
authorites p. 96.
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Lack of real popular participation in national politics led a number of Spaniards 
to organize clandestine political parties who stood in clear opposition to the regime. 
Some members of the Francoist elite also advocated popular participation in political 
affairs if only to avoid the emergence of a strong underground political force. As early 
as the 1960s, concern over Spain’s future had led members of the regime to consider the 
introduction of reforms for modernization as the most appropriate method for a peaceful 
transition to a post-Francoist Spain. Painful memories of the Spanish Civil War taught 
Spaniards important lessons, and both the aperturistas and later reformists wished to 
avoid any friction between the regime and the democratic opposition. In the early 1970s 
Franco’s age and ill health were a clear foreboding that the transition was imminent. 
Franco’s death on 20 November 1975 was followed only a year later by the Francoist 
Cortes voting for its own dissolution. The year 1977 marked the beginning of a new 
political system in Spain.
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Chapter - 2
Right o f  association: a theoretical right in Franco’s dictatorship (1964-1967)
Spain began to develop rapidly from the beginning of the 1960s, the fruit of the 
economic recovery that resulted from the First Development Plan of 1959. This 
recovery had spectacular consequences for a Spanish population whose demands were 
increasing in an unprecedented way. Yet plans by the regime to introduce a series of 
economic (the various Stabilization Plans) and other reforms (the liberalization of the 
press by the Press Law of 1966) proved insufficient to satisfy the demands of a fast 
transforming society. Spaniards started publicly to display criticism of government 
policies through the press, from where they also demanded the right of citizens to 
participate in national politics. But Franco would not listen.
Francoist laws concerning public participation in national politics, or even 
political discussion, were very restrictive. On these grounds, Spanish people organized 
themselves in alternative ways outside the Movement. Thus, some people created 
political groups that were only mildly opposed to the regime, and were therefore, 
paradoxically, tolerated by the Francoist authorities. In relation to this issue, the 
political scientist Juan Jose Linz points out that ‘in Spain, acts that at one point would 
have been severely, even cruelly, punished, today are openly tolerated, but might not be 
so tomorrow.’ Thus, Linz argued, ‘a regime with low ideological symbolic legitimacy, 
either internally or externally or both, but with considerable efficiency (a rising standard 
of living, economic development, etc.) and efficacy (a well-organized and loyal security
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apparatus) may well prefer to allow a legal opposition rather than to persecute it as 
illegal.’1
The aperturistas wanted to apply a certain degree of reform, particularly with 
regard to increasing the permissible level of political participation, but via procedures 
sanctioned within the Francoist constitutional system. This was an arduous task given 
that political parties had been wiped from the Spanish political scene before the end of 
the Spanish Civil War, and the Francoist laws concerning political participation were, as 
aforementioned, very restrictive. As the Caudillo declared in 1937, ‘the Red 
propaganda calls for democracy, freedom of the people, and human fraternity, accusing 
the National Spain of being an enemy of those principles. [But] that democracy [...] has 
failed everywhere. We have abolished implacably the old parliamentary system of 
multiple political parties with its well-known evils: inorganic suffrage and the struggle 
of conflicting factors (meaning ideologies).’2 Thirty years later, in 1967, in the light of 
talks about popular participation in political affairs, the Caudillo reasserted that, ‘if, as 
an excuse to the contrast of opinions, they are looking [to bring back] political parties, 
they should know that those will never come.’3
The history of legal political associations and parties in the Spanish system is, 
therefore, relatively new. The single party system established by Franco in 1937 lasted 
until his death, which gave Spaniards little chance to associate according to their 
political ideas. This chapter briefly revises the trajectories of cultural associations, 
political associations and parties during Franco’s time. In this way, it might be easier to 
understand the limitations that both aperturistas and later reformists encountered given 
that they wanted to modernize the regime within the boundaries of its legal system.
1 Linz, “Opposition in and under an authoritarian regime”, pp. 211, 216.
2 The New York Times Magazine, 26 December 1937.
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2.1. Franco’s legal system in relation to the right o f association
During the Spanish Civil War, the Decree of 13 September 1936, approved by 
the insurgent side, outlawed political parties. This statement was reinforced by Point 6 
of the 26 Points of the Normas Programaticas of the Francoist regime, which read as 
follows:
Our State will be a totalitarian instrument in the service of the integrity of the fatherland. All 
Spaniards will participate in it through its familial, municipal and unionist functions. No one 
will participate in it through political parties. All political parties will be implacably abolished 
with all the consequences thereof.4
As the sociologist Luis Garcia San Miguel argues, the assurances of the 
Francoist authorities of public participation in national politics was just propaganda 
since such participation was clearly restricted to the regime’s elite.5 The Principle of 
Representation was reiterated on various occasions throughout the dictatorship, 
however. For instance, the Decree of Unification of 19 April 1937 repudiated the 
system of ‘party rivalries and political organizations’ and, therefore, advocated the 
integration of the system of representation ‘in a single political national entity [as] link 
between the State and the society’. On those grounds, in 1942 the Cortes were created 
as ‘the higher organ of representation of State affairs in Spain’.6
In 1939 the regime had established that permission for meetings and mass 
gatherings - that is meetings of more than 20 people - had to be requested from the 
Interior Minister through the Civil Governor of each province. The purpose of the 
meeting, the speakers and the topics that were to be covered had to be notified to the 
authorities for their consideration. The date had to be planned well in advance and
3 Francisco Franco’s speech in Seville on 27 April 1967. See Representacion, Participacion y  Concurrencia, 
(Madrid: Ediciones del Movement, 1971), p. 14.
4 Fundamentos del Nuevo Estado, (Madrid: Ediciones de la Vicesecretaria de Education Popular, 1943), p. 6.
5 Luis Garcia San Miguel, “Estructura y cambio del Regimen Politico Espanol”, in Sistema, No. 1, January 1973, p. 
88 .
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notified to the Civil Governor. Any gathering that took place without the proper 
authorization was considered illegal and consequently fined.7 The question of 
associations was also considered at the Law of the Security of the State of 1 March 
1939. For instance, Article 28 of this law penalized those associations constituted with 
the objective of ‘violent subversion or destruction of the political, social, economical or 
juridical organization of the State’. Articles 30 and 32, respectively, condemned those 
who organized a political group with the objective of ‘destroying or relaxing the 
national consciousness’, and also ‘those [groups] constituted to attack in any way the 
unity of the Spanish nation or to spread separatist ideas’. Furthermore, Article 41 
penalized those Spaniards who attempted the implementation of a regime in Spain based 
upon the division of the population by political or class groups’.8
Until 1964, the right to associate was ratified through (i) the Decree of 25 
January 1941; (ii) the Charter of the Spanish People - or Fuero de los Espanoles - of 17 
July 1945; (iii) the Law of Referendum of 1945; and finally (iv) the Law of Associations 
of 24 December 1964.
Firstly, the Decree of 1941, which abolished the Law of Associations of 1887, 
regulated the exercise of the right of association on a temporary basis until the creation 
of a more definite regulation, which eventually came in 1964.9 Meanwhile the Interior 
Ministry officially controlled the creation of associations through the Civil Governors of 
each Province. The Governor had to have direct and accurate information about the
6 Jose Maria Martin Oviedo, “La representacidn politica en el actual regimen espanol”, in Revista de Estudios 
Politicos, No. 198, November-December 1974, p. 242.
7 Boletin Oficial del Estado, (Henceforth, BOE), Orden circular dando normas sobre mitines, manifestaciones y  
actospublicos. 20 July 1939 (Publication date, 21 July 1939).
8 Serrera Contreras, “Algunas dudas sobre la legislation de Asociaciones”, in Revista Critica de Derecho 
Inmobiliario, Ano 1971, pp. 12-13.
9 Blanca Olias de Lima Gete, La Libertad de Asociacion en Espafia (1868-1974), (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios 
Administrativos, 1977), pp. 207-8.
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statutes of the associations as well as reliable knowledge about their promoters in order 
to authorize each one on an individual basis.10
Secondly, the Charter of the Spanish People of 1945 - one of the seven 
Fundamental Laws of the Francoist dictatorship11 - guaranteed freedom of association as 
a right, but it also established the legal ‘limits’ of this right in Articles 16 and 33. 
Through Article 16 these ‘limits’ were determined by the content of the rest of the 
Fundamental Laws, that is to say the right of association was only recognized as a 
collective manifestation, and so long as it did not interfere with the functioning of the 
State. Moreover, as set out in Article 33, this right must not be allowed to threaten the 
social, political and spiritual unity of the State. In summary, unity and respect towards 
the Principles of the Movement were the main concerns of the Francoist regime.12 
Thirdly, that same year the Law of Referendum, another cosmetic law, proclaimed the 
access of ‘all Spaniards [to] collaborate in State affairs’ and recognized that the rest of 
the laws should ‘give new life and more spontaneity to the representations’.13
Fourthly, the long-awaited Law of Associations of 1964 -  the first proper Law of 
Associations since the arrival of Francoism - replaced the Decree of 1941 but without 
introducing any major change. In fact, it was as restrictive as previous ones. In this law, 
as previously endorsed in Article 16 of the Charter of the Spanish People, the 
government confirmed that, ‘the right of association is one of the natural rights of men’. 
But the limits established by the Law of 1964 implied that, if certain assumptions were 
given, the right of association would be invalid. Section 1 of Article 1 stated that the
10 BOE, Decreto de regulacion del derecho de asociacion. 25 January 1941 (publication date 6 February 1941). For 
references to this Decree see also, Fundamentos del Nuevo Estado, (Madrid: Ediciones de la Vicesecretaria de 
Education Popular, 1943), pp. 400-2.
11 The Seven Fundamental Laws of the Francoist regime were in chronological order: 1. The Labour Charter of 9 
March 1938; 2. The Law of the Cortes o f 17 July 1942; 3. The Charter of the Spanish People of 17 July 1945; 4. The 
Law on the Referendum of 22 October 1945; 5. The Law of Succession of 7 July 1947; 6. The Law on the Principles 
of the Movement of 15 May 1958; 7. The Organic Law of the State (The Constitution) o f 10 January 1967 which 
modified Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5. See Amodia, Franco’s political legacy, pp. 36-7.
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freedom of association would have to be exercised in compliance with the law for ‘licit 
and determined’ purposes; Section 2 of Article 1 stated that the real activities of the 
association should be set in its statutes; and finally, Section 3 of Article 1 clarified that 
‘illicit’ purposes were understood to be those contrary to the Principles of the 
Movement and other Fundamental Laws, those sanctioned by the Penal Law, and those 
that could threaten moral, public order and the political and social unity of Spain’.14
As in the previous laws and decrees, the Law of 1964 excluded from its 
jurisdiction those associations that were part of the Registry of Commercial Societies; 
religious, workers (unions) and military organizations; student societies and any other 
type regulated by special laws. So far as student associations were concerned, they were 
banned two years after the creation of the official student union, SEU in the mid-1930s. 
The SEU became the only legal student association in which all university students were 
automatically registered when they entered university.15 Thus, it was not until the 
dissolution of the SEU in 1965 that student organizations were allowed again. In fact, 
following a series of student revolts at the major Spanish universities in 1965, a new 
regulatory law of student associations was passed on 27 July 1966. By this law, any 
student could be a candidate for office, the compulsory ballot was abolished, and the 
principle of majority was accepted. For the first time, these associations would be 
independent of the universities’ academic authorities. According to the daily ABC, this 
law provided Spanish students with the most democratic and autonomous instrument of 
student representation in all Europe. For that reason, the regime believed it would be 
easier to distinguish between those students who made use of their right to demand
12 Olias de Lima Gete, La Libertad de Asociacion, pp. 235-6.
13 Martin Oviedo, “La representation politica”, p. 243.
14 BOE, Ley de Asociaciones. 24 December 1964 (publication date 26 & 28 December). See also, Olias de Lima 
Gete, La libertad de Asociacion, pp.219-229.
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change through the student bodies and those who organized subversive acts.16 
Nonetheless, Laureano Lopez Rodo, Commissar of the Development Plan from 1962, 
writes that the regulatory law was a ‘hybrid, belated, and timid [measure] that did not 
solve the problems at the universities’.17
Like student associations, religious associations were not regulated by the Law 
of 1964. From the beginning of the dictatorship, freedom of association and assembly 
had been basically restricted to Christian circles (obviously on the understanding that 
the purpose of the meeting was religious). The 1964 Law did not change this practice. 
On the contrary, it emphasized that, the associations which have been constituted under 
canon law ‘will be considered to be under the jurisdiction of this law [of Associations of
* I Q
1964] when they exercise activities of different character [other than religious]’. 
Having said that, some of the most important Spanish political groups -  formed by 
aperturistas and reformists - created between the 1950s and 1970s had their origins in 
large Catholic organizations such as the Asociacion Catolica Nacional de 
Propagandists (ACNP) and Accion Catolica. It cannot be said that these Catholic 
organizations were in opposition to the regime. On the contrary, they were collaborators 
[colaboracionistas] in the regime, but many of their members raised their voices in 
favour of a more pluralist society.
On the one hand, the ACNP, which was created by Father Angel Ayala in 1908, 
‘was not, and had never been, [intended as] a political party, which explains why it 
never had a political manifesto’19, although it had ‘an unavoidable political duty to
15 BOE, Decreto del 21 de Noviembre de 1937, (Publication date, 23 November 1937); BOE, Ley del 23de 
Septiembre de 1939, (Publication date, 9 October 1939); BOE, Orden del 11 de Noviembre de 1943 (Publication 
date, 15 November 1943).
]6 ABC, 28 July 1966, p. 42.
17 Lopez Rodo, Memorias I, pp. 520-1.
18 BOE, Ley de Asociaciones. 24 December 1964.
19 Tiempo Nuevo, No. 28, 8 June 1967; Asociacion Catolica Nacional de Propagandistas, (Henceforth, ACNP), 
Bulletin No. 849, July 1967, pp. 3-4.
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fulfil’.20 Indeed, the ACNP was a pool for Christian Democrat political groups 
including the Asociacion Espanola de Cooperacion Europea (AECE) that appeared in 
the mid-1950s, and later the Tacito group of thinkers in the early 1970s. On the other 
hand, the international Accion Catolica, which arrived in Spain in 1903, became the 
most influential Catholic group in Spain in the 1940s.21 Years later, Accion Catolica 
was the source from which evolved many specialized political groups, Hermandad 
Obrera de Accion Catolica (HOAC) and the Juventud Obrera Cristiana (JOC), created 
in 1946 and 1947, respectively. The HOAC was a movement within the Accion 
Catolica that specialized in worker’s issues, and the JOC was dedicated to the education 
and evangelization of young workers. The critical attitude of HOAC and JOC towards 
the economic and social inequalities around them attracted young workers and radical 
Leftist groups alike. Members of HOAC and JOC were implicated in the general strikes 
which mobilized around three-hundred thousand workers as early as 12 March and 23 
April 1951. Eventually, both sectors were detached from the orthodoxy of the Spanish 
Catholic clergy.22 As Paul Preston points out, Franco was infuriated by the supportive 
messages these organizations received from several countries, including France, Italy, 
Germany and Switzerland, and also the support of many Spanish priests -  especially 
from the Basque Country -  in favour of the workers. For Franco, therefore, the JOC and 
HOAC were ‘not apostolic’ organizations but rather they ‘opened the way to 
Communism’.
The law of 1964 did nothing but exacerbate the discontent among some 
Catholics and Christian Democrats who, although linked to the regime in different 
degrees, had advocated popular participation in political matters, and perhaps had
20 ACNP, Bulletin No. 783, July 1964, p. 1.
21 Stanley Payne, Spanish Catholicism. A historical review. (London: University o f Winsconsin Press, 1984), p. 194.
22 Carr, Spain, p. 702; Bardavio & Sinova, Todo Franco, pp. 16-18, 60-1, 342-3, 388-90.
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expected too much from the new law. Indeed, the rights of association and participation 
in State politics were supported by John XXETs encyclical Pacem in Terris, published 
in 1963. The Pope defended, among other things, the ‘universal, inviolable and 
absolutely inalienable rights’ of men including freedom of existence, right of freedom to 
choose the form of State, freedom of association and freedom to take part in the national 
politics of one’s country.24 John XXIII’s document became known as the ‘democratic 
encyclical’ , and was to become a driving force for many Spanish Catholics.
A few months before the approval of the 1964 Law of Associations, the BOE 
(the Official Spanish Bulletin, Boletin Oficial del Estado), published an abstract of the 
law. The idea of the forthcoming law raised excitement amongst those interested in 
national politics. The liberal Catholic magazine Cuademos para el Dialogo, founded 
by the Christian Democrat Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez in 1963, dedicated the main editorial 
of its October issue to the proposed law. The editorial did not hide concern about the 
announced proposal, and called for a Law of Associations ‘faithful to the basic demands 
of human nature’. ‘It was not good enough’, therefore, ‘to declare that men have the 
right to associate freely for lawful purposes’ (as cited in Article 16 of The Charter of the 
Spanish People), for it was also necessary to act by creating independent and 
autonomous entities which, within a flexible judicial framework, could act as mediators 
between the individuals and the State. ‘It would be pharisaic’, the article added, ‘to 
proclaim the right of Association, and then exercise excessive control over them’. The 
editorial urged the cabinet to specify what they considered to be ‘lawful purposes’, and 
they advised the Ministers that so far as Christian morality, human values and the
23 Preston, Franco, p. 702.
24 ACNP, Bulletin No. 766,1 January 1964, p. 8.
25 ACNP, Bulletin No. 783, July 1964, p. 1.
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constitutional basis of national coexistence were concerned, they were acting against 
fundamental human rights.26
Although the Law of Associations of 1964 was the first proper Law of 
Associations since the arrival of Francoism, it gave the population the opportunity 
merely to create entities that had cultural purposes - in the widest sense -  not political 
ones. These associations were entitled to organize lectures, cultural events, and 
meetings as well as publish bulletins and magazines, provided that events and literature 
were officially authorized and did not have different aims to those declared in their
97statutes. On the basis of this, the theoretical recognition of the right of association did 
not, in practice, grant permission to associate and meet freely, let alone meet for 
political purposes. Fear of conspiracy against the regime was too great to allow the 
formation of democratic-style political groups. Notwithstanding, Franco could not stop 
the gradual emergence of those members of the regime who believed in the need for 
increasing popular involvement in national politics. By 1964, economic prosperity was 
already felt in Spain and with it the beginning of social changes. The disappointment of 
those concerned with politics led to the return to early practices of meeting in the 
borders of the Francoist legality.
2.2. Alternative ways o f discussing politics
Before the approval of the 1964 Law of Associations, freedom to assemble was, 
as aforementioned, restricted mainly to Catholic organizations. Hence, the practical 
impossibility of forming not only political parties but political associations28 as well, 
and the need for official permission for gatherings of twenty or more people (even if it
26 Cuadernospara el Dialogo, No. 13, October 1964, p. 3.
27 Cambio-]6, 31 March - 6 April 1975, p. 36.
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was for a family event) led to the use of alternative channels for the discussion of 
political issues. These channels included private gatherings, publications (newspapers 
and magazines), study groups or clubs (which normally were formed around a 
publication), trading or commercial societies and cultural associations. The arrival of 
the 1964 Law of Associations did not change this pattern since this law was as 
restrictive as the previous laws. For those who did not want to form proper political 
parties, thereby becoming part of the democratic opposition, the practice to meet 
through alternative channels to discuss politics continued, therefore, after 1964.
The objective of this section is to examine the variety of ways, other than 
political parties, wherein some regime members were involved before and after the 1964 
Law. Some of those political groups that were formed by progressive Catholics, 
Monarchists and Christian Democrats developed into illegal political parties thereby 
becoming part of the democratic opposition. This section is not concerned with the 
trajectory of those political parties, as this thesis does not study the parties of the 
democratic opposition.
2.2.1. Private gatherings
There is obviously no record of all private gatherings - of friends or family - 
where their participants discussed politics. Nevertheless, some cases of private 
gatherings have been recorded even before the economic boom of the 1960s, and the 
1964 Law. A number of people, mainly youths linked in various degrees to the regime, 
became aware of the political problems of the country in the mid-1950s, and even 
earlier. Their main concern was to discuss such problems and, to some extent, the
28 The main difference between a party and an association is that, unlike associations, political parties participate in 
elections.
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potential problems of a post-Franco Spain. Some of these people became aperturistas 
and some others -  the most progressive -  became part of the democratic opposition 
during the economic boom of the 1960s and as a result of the Francoists’ reluctance to 
modernize the regime.
For instance, in 1949 some Monarchists and Christian Democrats got together as 
‘a political social group’ in the so-called Cafes de Rodriguez Soler, or Rodriguez Soler’s 
coffee sessions. These meetings took place at private addresses on Saturday afternoons 
and were organized by Jose Rodriguez Soler. Rodriguez Soler was a fervent Monarchist 
with a Christian Democratic background who worked as a lawyer in the Madrid 
guildhall. His political origins started in the youth sector of the Confederacion 
Espanola de Derechas Autonomas (CEDA), and he held important positions in Catholic 
associations such as the ACNP and Accion Catolica. The idea of these tertulias (the 
name given to after lunch/coffee discussions) was not to create a political party or to 
resurrect the conservative CEDA, but rather to avoid a power vacuum in the post- 
ffancoist Spain. The ideology of the group was clearly conservative although there was a 
clear detachment from the regime.29 ‘The idea’, Rodriguez Soler explained, ‘was not to 
go against the regime but to act outside it.’30 These cafes became quite important 
amongst progressive circles of the regime, especially during the first half of the 1950s. 
Some of the participants included Christian Democrats such as Fernando Alvarez de 
Miranda, Jesus Barros de Lis as well as future collaborators of the regime like Alfonso 
Osorio, who was also a Christian Democrat.31 As the historian Javier Tusell points out, 
the Francoist authorities consented to this type of ‘opposition’, although sometimes they
29 Tusell, La oposicion democratica, pp. 318, 322.
30 Quoted in Ibid., p. 319.
31 Fernando Alvarez de Miranda recalls participating in political meetings - ‘mainly of study and formation’ - held by 
Germiniano Carrascal and Jose Rodriguez Soler in the 1940s. Alvarez de Miranda recalls these meetings were known 
as ‘tertulias de los sabados’ or Saturday meetings. He took many friends of his generation to these tertulias. It is
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advised the participants to limit their activities. From 1957 Rodriguez Soler’s group 
entered a period of internal crisis which led to its re-organization and, subsequently, to
'X'Jthe creation of the political party Democracia Social Cristiana (DSC).
Rodriguez Soler influenced the creation of other political groups. In October 
1956, for instance, Jesus Barros de Lis, Jose Gallo and a group of university friends of 
Christian Democrat ideology formed the Union Democrata Cristiana (UDC). The UDC 
was not, in its beginnings, exactly a political party but a group of friends who had 
coincided in the Cafes de Rodriguez Soler. In 1957, however, they found a leader in the 
person of Manuel Gimenez Fernandez, ex-Minister of Agriculture of the CEDA and 
Professor of Canon Law at the University of Seville, and the UDC became a more 
serious political group.33 Members of the UDC defined it as a ‘centrist party [...] of 
radical inspiration and genuinely Christian’. With a view to a future Spain, members of 
the party proposed a federal Spain with a strong decentralised government for the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy.34 Rodriguez Soler’s initiative shows that 
interest in Spain’s political future was already present at the highest level in the early 
1950s.
Another example of private gatherings was the so-called Cenas de los Nueve,
■ i r
which have their origins in 1957. The nine participants belonged to different political 
factions of the regime, but were united by a common concern about the future of the 
country. Alfonso Osorio, one of the participants, described the background of his 
friends as follows, (i) Federico Silva, a Christian Democrat whose aspiration in those
possible that he must be referring to the same meetings I mention above. See Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Del 
"contubernio", (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985), p. 12. Tusell, La oposicion democratica, pp. 319, 322.
32 Tusell, La oposicion democratica, p. 323.
33 Ibid., p. 327.
34 Tusell & Calvo, Gimenez Fernandez, pp. 268-9. See also Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio ", p. 62.
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days was to become Minister of Franco’s cabinet and who was closely linked to the 
Catholic organization ACNP. Like many Christian Democrats, Silva believed that the 
modernization of the country would only be achieved by collaborating with the regime, 
(ii) Jesus Fueyo, professor of Constitutional Law and Director General in the Ministry of 
the Movement, favoured a totalitarian monarchy around Don Juan, (iii) Torcuato Luca 
de Tena was also a fervent defender of Don Juan and legislator at the Cortes with the 
regime. Years later, out of loyalty to Don Juan, Luca de Tena voted against the 
proclamation of Prince Juan Carlos as Franco’s successor, and also against Suarez’s 
political reform project, (iv) Jose Maria Ruiz Gallardon was a profoundly conservative 
democrat, although he always acted within the legal bounds set by the regime, (v) 
Fermin Zelada was a Christian Democrat who believed in the evolution of the regime 
from a conservative perspective, (vi) Florentino Perez Embid was a well-known 
member of the Opus Dei and a clear defender of a monarchist system (in the person of 
Don Juan) but within the Francoist regime. He enjoyed good relations with Don Juan, 
and worked to improve relations between the Pretender and Franco in order to establish 
a monarchy during the regime, (vii) Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo was also a pro-monarchist 
(in the figure of Don Juan), (viii) Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora was one of the early 
ideologists of the regime, and indeed one of the most orthodox apologists of the regime. 
Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora was closely linked to the Private Council of Don Juan de 
Borbon at the end of the 1950s.36 Finally, (ix) Alfonso Osorio defines himself as 
someone, ‘of monarchical conviction, of Christian Democratic formation and of Liberal
35 Alfonso Osorio, Trayectoria de un Ministro de la Corona, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980), p. 16.
36 Don Juan had established a Private Council as an advisory body in Estoril in 1947 although the origins of the 
council date from 1942. The decade of the 1950s was, however, characterized by the lack of a political leader and 
the failure to establish a dialogue with Franco and strengthen the hope of Don Juan becoming the future monarch. 
The council was twice re-organized in the 1960s. During the second restructuring, Jose Maria de Areilza was 
appointed Political Secretary, and it was then that Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora resigned from the council because 
of differences with Areilza. From then on, Fernandez de la Mora became a strong supporter of Prince Juan Carlos. 
See Bardavio y Sinova, Todo Franco, pp. 154-7.
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tendency’. Although he says never to have collaborated directly with the regime, he 
always believed it needed to evolve from within in order to become a democratic 
system.37
The nine participants met for dinner at one of their homes at least once a month. 
Their main objective was to analyse the Spanish political situation and exchange 
information about it. During each dinner they discussed a specific topic which had been 
unanimously agreed. As Fermin Zelada recalled, some of the participants supported the
- I Q
current political situation while others adopted either intermediate or distant positions. 
But their common ground (with the exception of Jesus Fueyo who favoured a 
totalitarian monarchy around Don Juan), Osorio emphasises, was the evolution of the
-IQ
regime towards a ‘democratic system’. Those are Alfonso Osorio’s words today. It is 
hard to imagine, however, that such a conservative group of people advocated a 
‘democratic system’ or even a German-style democratic system at the end of the 1950s. 
Yet, so far as this thesis is concemED, it is worth emphasising that (i) although the 
participants of the dinners did not advocate full democracy, at least they agreed on the 
need for modernization of the Spanish regime; and that (ii) the Cenas de los Nueve were 
an illustrative example of political discussions held by members of the regime in 
relation the future of the country as early as the mid-1950s. Furthermore, according to 
Osorio, it was during the Cenas de los Nueve that the participants learned to engage in 
dialogue and to respect different points of view. Their encounters became a kind of
37 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999. Osorio’s affirmation that he has never collaborated with the 
regime is misleading since he was Councillor o f the Kingdom at the last part of the dictatorship. Equipo Mundo, Los 
90 ministros de Franco, (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1971, 3 Ed.), p. 338.
38 Marino G6mez-Santos, Conversaciones con Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1982), pp. 102-104.
39 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999.
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institution and continued until 1965, when Federico Silva was appointed Minister of 
Public Works.40
Other early examples of private dinners recorded by some of the participants 
were those organized also at the end of the 1950s, by a group of Christian Democrats 
and Monarchists. Some of the participants including Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, 
Inigo Cavero, Pablo Castellanos and Jose Federico de Carvajal. Alfonso Osorio and 
Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo also attended some of these dinners. In those years, Joaquin 
Satrustegui, founder of the Monarchist Union Espanola,41 also hosted some dinners that 
enjoyed the occasional presence of Alfonso Osorio. During my interview, Osorio made 
it clear that he only attended a few of Satrustegui’s dinners. Their different political 
views may be the reason for Osorio’s absences.42 Incidentally, some participants of 
these dinners such as Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Inigo Cavero, Jaime Miralles, 
Vicente Pinies, and Joaquin Satrustegui himself, shifted to a position clearly more 
identified with the democratic opposition to the regime.43 Others like Alfonso Osorio 
and Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo were more identified with the reformists of the regime who 
emerged onto the political scene at the beginning of the 1970s.
40 Ibid.
41 In December 1957, the young Monarchist and known industrialist Joaquin Satrustegui created, together with Jaime 
Miralles and Enrique Tiemo Galvan among others, a pro-Monarchist political party. Union Espanola (UE) was 
presented to a selected audience at the Menfis Hotel in Madrid, on 29 January 1959. Eighty people attended the 
meeting most of whom were lawyers, doctors, university professors and industrialists. The manifesto of the new party 
recognized Don Juan as the rightful King of Spain, and advocated his immediate restoration to the throne, an 
announcement that took Franco by surprise. These Monarchists favoured a popular monarchy that would uphold 
their religious beliefs, permit freedom of association and speech, and establish a representative government for the 
preparation of laws and the administration of the country. The party dissolved in 1976, and its members joined other 
parties that defended their interests. For more details see, Guillermo Cortazar, “Union Espanola (1957-1975). Una 
plataforma de la oposicion democratica frente al franquismo”, in Javier Tusell, Alicia Alted & Abdon Mateos (Eds.) 
La oposicion al regimen de Franco. Actas del congreso intemacional que, organizado por el Departamento de 
Historia Contemporanea de la UNED, tuvo lugar en Madrid del 19 al 22 October de 1988. Tomo I, Vol. 1, pp. 396- 
397.
42 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999.
43 Tusell, La oposicion democratica, p. 348.
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2.2.2. Study groups and publications
Another way of discussing politics was in study groups and publications. There 
must certainly have been a number of study groups, organized merely as informal 
meetings, and hence there is no official documentation for them. Most study groups 
were created around publications and became very popular following the final approval 
of the Press Law in 1966. This formula, however, was also used before 1966 by groups 
attached to the regime. For instance, in the mid-1950s several study groups emerged 
from publications such as Pax Romana, Arbor, and Estudios Politicos. The common 
feature of these groups was their link with well-established institutions. Thus, the Pax 
Romana, presided over by Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez, was linked to the Institute of 
Hispanic Culture; the Estudios Politicos was mainly based at the Institute of Political 
Studies; and finally Arbor, the Opus Dei’s magazine, used the Ateneo of Madrid as its 
base. These institutions served as a platform to disseminate the political ideas of the 
groups’ members. These groups did not contest the regime’s policies but rather 
discussed political issues within the framework of the Francoist system. Hence, the 
level of opposition to the Francoist regime of these study groups was at most very 
modest. At times, they even enjoyed the presence of members of the cabinet.44
These early cases of study groups and publications exercised hardly any 
opposition to the regime. This pattern changed when Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez’s created 
Cuadernos para el Dialogo in October 1963, two years before the approval of the Press 
Law. Although its first editorials were quite cautious, the magazine was soon 
recognized to be one of the leading platforms for the defence of democracy. Alvarez de
44 Juan Ferrando Badla, El regimen de Franco. Un enfoque politico-juridico (Madrid: Tecnos,1984).p. 90. See also, 
Carr, Spain, p. 764.
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Miranda argues that Ruiz-Gimenez’s publication ‘represented - although timidly at the 
outset - one of the first attempts of democratic opening up, [and] managed to gather a 
series of writers who were not affiliated to any party although their tendency was close 
to a progressive Christianism. The magazine cautiously proposed an openly democratic 
approach skirting the borderline (manteniendose en el fllo  de la navaja). To demand 
more would have meant its immediate closure.’45 Also, for Garcia San Miguel, Ruiz- 
Gimenez was a notorious example of a reformist who wanted to take advantage of the 
mechanism of the system to produce the change.46 In sum, Cuadernos was, in the 
journalist Tom Bums Maranon’s view, ‘a microcosm of the opposition to the regimen 
where there were those who were to have a political career in the Right, and future 
leaders of the Left’. Moreover, collaboration in Cuadernos was compared with ‘a 
campaign medal for Right-wing politicians during the transition’.47
More progressive groups arose, however, following the approval of the Press 
Law in 1966. It is from this date, therefore, that there emerged a visible transformation 
in the Spanish press. Controversial articles began to appear in the newspapers, and 
publishing houses launched magazines of various political tendencies. As Information 
Minister, Manuel Fraga spent three years preparing the Press Law. The law was initially 
approved by Franco’s cabinet on 13 August 1965, but the next step was to present it to 
the Cortes for approval which did not happen until March 1966.48 Admiral Carrero 
Blanco and General Camilo Alonso Vega opposed the law to the end, but despite his 
own disbelief in the need for the law, Franco had already decided to ratify it. The
45 Alvarez de Miranda, Del “contubernio ”, p. 52.
46 Garcia San Miguel, “Estructura y cambio”, p. 102.
47 As Bums recalls, Cuadernos was mainly formed by Christian Democrats although it also had collaborators from 
very different ideologies including Social Democrats (Rafael Arias-Salgado, who was linked to Fernandez Ordonez’s 
group), leaders of Comisiones Obreras (Marcelino Camacho and Julian Ariza), Liberal Monarchists (Joaquin 
Satrustegui). Furthermore, Pablo Castellanos was the representative of the Socialist party in the magazine, and Elias 
Diaz the representative of the Socialist sector represented by Tiemo Galvan. In 1972 the Socialist presence was
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Caudillo told the members of the Cortes, ‘I do not believe in this freedom but it is a step 
many important reasons oblige us to take. And, on the other hand, I think that if those 
weak governments of the beginning of the century could govern with press freedom in 
the middle of that anarchy, we also will’.49 However, Franco, as Alvarez de Miranda 
recalls, ‘knew that the level of newspaper reading among the Spanish people was low; 
the application of that same freedom of [information] to radio or television would have 
been another matter.’50
By today’s light the law is a restrictive document, full of threats and warnings. 
But, at the time, it constituted an unprecedented document marking the furthest point 
that the Francoist regime could go as far as reforms were concerned. Thanks to the 
liberalization of the Press Law, Juan Jose Linz argues, critics of the regime took the 
opportunity to write on delicate political issues such as the dangers of continuismo; the 
need for parties in a democracy; monarchism versus republicanism; electoral law, and so 
forth. Such liberalization, according to Linz, ‘not only changed the style and content of 
some newspapers but allowed the publication of political essays by the legal or alegal - 
but not illegal - opposition. While [Dionisio] Ridruejo’s Escrito en Espana (1962) was 
published abroad, Gil Robles’s Cartas del pueblo espanol (1966), Manuel Jimenez de 
Parga’s Atisbos desde esta Espana (1968), Rafael Calvo Serer’s Espana ante la 
libertad, la democracia y  elprogreso (1968), Jose Maria de Areilza’s Escritos politicos 
(1968), and the two-volume Espana perspectiva, 1968 and 1969 were all published in 
Spain.’51 Having said that, as will further explained in Chapter 4, despite the relaxation
strengthened by the incorporation of Gregorio Peces Barba. See Tom Bums Maranon, Conversaciones sobre la 
derecha,. (Madrid: Plaza y Janes, 1997), pp. 319,322.
48 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 163.
49 Quoted in Ibid., pp. 144-5.
50 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio", p. 53n.
51 Linz, “Opposition in and under an authoritarian regime”, pp. 216-7.
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of censorship some of these publications suffered a number of sanctions and even 
closures.
Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez claimed that, ‘the Press Law of 1966 was the most 
important step taken towards the “democratization” of institutions and of the habits of 
Spanish public life. [...] It may sound strange perhaps’, he added, ‘that I say this when 
is it is notorious that Cuadernos para el Dialogo has many scratches in its skin [caused 
by] some of the thorns hidden under this law. [...] But, it is no less true [to say] that, 
under the protection of this law, new newspapers, new magazines and new book series 
have emerged in our homeland [which have lead to] a new climate for information,
c'y
criticism and promotion of collective dialogue/ The journalist Juan Luis Cebnan also
agrees that Fraga’s law constituted an irreversible step towards modernization, which 
undoubtedly contributed to the deterioration of the Francoist foundations.
Full freedom of the press was still unthinkable, but from 1966/7 it was possible 
to acquire an ample variety of publications even of a Marxist tendency.54 On this light, 
Luis Garcia San Miguel argues that although ‘it is debatable if the openness was 
sufficient, no one can deny that it was considerable. From 1966 the Spanish newspapers 
acquired a different complexion. Their boring uniformity broke. The first debates took 
place, and [also] clearly different political ideologies emerged: a tendency towards 
democratization of the political system from within [could be detected] in YA; a 
democratic tendency slightly connected with Capitalism and various people from the 
opposition in Nuevo Diario; a certain social democratic [tendency] in [the newspaper] 
Madrid, [and the magazines] Cuadernos para el Dialogo, Revista de Occidente, 
Triunfo, Indice, El Ciervo, Destino, and later Sabado Grafico enjoyed an ample freedom
52 Jos6 Carles Clemente, Conversaciones con las corrientes politicos de Espana,(Barcelona: DOPESA, 1971), p.
206.
53 Juan Luis Cebrian, La Espana que bosteza, (Madrid: Taurus, 1980), pp. 105-7.
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of manoeuvre. And, what is perhaps more important, [is that] the provincial press 
removed its orthopedic corset and began to publish the first liberal-oriented articles’.55
The testimony of Gabriel Cisneros helps to evaluate the real importance of the 
law. Cisneros argues that,
The approval of this law allowed the emergence in to the public light of the political pluralism 
existing within the regime, and to some extent - although very timidly - the political pluralism 
existing outside the regime.56
So far as this thesis is concerned, this could be considered as the most important 
consequence of the law since one of the conditions for a representative system is a free 
press.
The approval of the Press Law, therefore, opened new channels of opinion 
through newspapers and magazines where people expressed their views individually or 
collectively. In 1969, few years after the approval of the law, a group of young 
progressives with a political vocation got together to write weekly newspaper articles on 
social and political issues. These articles signed with the name of Juan Ruiz appeared 
first in YA (from 3 October to 16 November 1969), and later in Madrid (from 24 
November 1969 to June 1971). The collective was formed among others by Miguel 
Herrero de Minon, Juan Antonio Garcia Diez, the brothers Enrique and Luis Maria 
Linde de Castro, Carlos Espinosa, Paco Condomines, Eugenio Bregolat, Eduardo 
Martinez de Pison and Andres Amoros Guardiola, from whom the original idea had 
emerged. Years later, they all held important positions, not just in the political arena 
(mainly in the various centrist groups of the transition), but also in a wider range of
54 Maravall, Dictadura y  disentimiento, p. 26.
55 Luis Garcia San Miguel, “Estructura y cambio”, pp. 95-96. See also Luis Garia San Miguel, Teona de la 
Transition, p. 40. A preliminary assessment of the Press Law conducted by the French historian, Guy Hermet, in 
July 1967, only 18 months after the application of the Law can be found in, Guy Hermet, “La presse espagnole et la 
censure”, in Revue Fran gaise de Science Politique, Vol. XVIII, 1968, No. 1 February, pp. 44-67.
56 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13-09-1999.
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fields including diplomacy, economy, ecology and literary criticism. They held a 
workshop at Andres Amoros’ house once a week where, as Herrero de Minon recalls, 
they discussed the current political problems, ‘with an openly democratic ideology, and 
also with a good dose of technical competence’. The main political concern of this 
collective was the issue of nationalism (not to be confused with the term regionalism). 
As Herrero de Minon clarifies, ‘they identified [themselves with] that rare species of 
loyal activist to their own national community whose loyalty obliges [one] to wish to 
improve it every day, and to point out [...] its defects and remedies’. The collective 
Juan Ruiz suffered the temporary suspensions of the daily Madrid, and ended with the 
final and controversial closure of the newspaper. The members of the collective 
travelled to Estoril to meet Don Juan de Borbon. They offered their support to Don 
Juan, and also to what he claimed to advocate; a traditional monarchy and a national 
democracy. In 1973, the Christian Democrat group Tacito followed the idea of Juan 
Ruiz but, according to Herrero de Minon, Tacito was politically more conformist.57 The 
Tacito group as well as other political groups that appeared in the early 1970s are 
studied further in Chapter 6.
2.2.3. Associations
It is not difficult to imagine the disappointment felt by progressive members of 
the regime when the much-awaited 1964 Law of Associations completely ignored 
political associations or those with ‘political aims’.58 In any case, some Spaniards used 
the veil of legality of ‘cultural’ associations to meet, in a quasi-legal way, to discuss 
politics but not many. As Amando de Miguel points out, ‘a naive observer could think
57 Herrero de Minon, Memorias, pp. 47-50.
58 BOE, Ley de Asociaciones. 24 December 1964.
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that since political parties are not permitted in Spain, once could expect an amazing 
blossoming of more “natural” associations (of heads of family, co-operatives, local or 
civic associations...). Unfortunately, this has not happened (apart from the sporting 
world)’.59 That explains why some people continued to discuss politics in the same 
ways as before the 1964 Law. But let us see what the regime understood by 
‘associations’.
Within the definition of ‘Associations’ the Interior Ministry classified ten types 
of entities, each one of which is itself sub-divided into various categories according to 
its activities.60 From 30 April 1965, when the 1964 Law of Associations took effect, 
until 31 December 1974, when the Law of Political Association was approved, more 
than 11,000 associations had been registered and were active. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to find out how many new associations were registered following the 
approval of the 1964 Law and how many which were registered under the Decree of 
1941 had updated their statutes in order to comply with the precepts of the new law.61
But my concern was to discover associations that could have carried out illegal
(\)activities. Thus, with the help of Angel Garcia del Velio (Chief of Service of the 
National Registry of Associations of the Interior Ministry until 1999) and later Carmen 
Aguilar Godoy, we tried to make word combinations, to see, for example, how many 
associations had the word ‘study’ in their titles. The computer found a total of 119 in
59 FOESSA, Informe Sociologico 1970, Chapter 5, p. 9.
60 The ten different categories are classified as cultural and ideological; sporting, leisure, and young; handicaps and 
illnesses; economic and professional; family, consumer, and elderly; women; philanthropic and assistance; 
educational; neighbours; and miscellaneous. It is worth noting that those associations registered in the National 
Registry are not lucrative. They are run with membership fees, and selling of publications, and so on. Those 
association created with the intention of profit must be registered at the Registry of Commercial Societies, which 
makes them subject to different Laws.
61 Some associations did not update their statutes straight away after the 1964 Law what makes the search even more 
difficult.
62 These illegal activities we refer to are the formation of a political group under the fafade of a cultural association 
or simply the discussion of political issues, or even political propaganda against the regime.
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the period 1965-1974. Or how many associations were registered under the category of 
Civic-Political in the same period. The computer found 11.
In any case this search seems rather pointless when one realizes that the statutes 
do not tell us whether or not members of these collectives used the cover of legal 
endorsement to carry out illegal activities. In fact that endorsement of the statutes meant 
that the associations met the conditions required. In any case, in the period 1965-1974, 
0 associations were suspended. This number only means that even if an association was 
carrying out illegal activities (which was the case of some associations as we shall see 
later) they were not discovered by the authorities.
There is, however, a record of a commercial company - not an association - 
whose underground activities were discovered. The entity was registered as a Limited 
Liability Company - for profit - under the name of Centro de Ensenanza e Investigacion, 
S. A. (CEISA) on 4 October 1965. The statutes of the society, which referred to the Law 
of 17 July 1951 were, ‘the promotion and setting up of all kinds of intellectual activities 
- that is educational and formative - for young people, as well as the establishment, 
running, and development of centres and institutes of study. [The society] will also be 
able to develop any other activity that could be complementary to its objectives’. These 
statutes were signed by Rodrigo Uria Gonzalez, Luis Sampedro Saez, Vicente Pinies 
Rubio, Jose Maria Ruiz Gallardon, Guillermo Luca de Tena, Rafael Perez Escolar, Juan 
Carlos Guerra Zunzunegui and Inigo Cavero Latailla.64 Incidentally, the last three 
names appeared in 1975 among the members of the progressive society FEDISA, which 
is studied in Chapter 6.
63 These lists of associations were provided by request at the National Registry of Associations of the Interior 
Ministry in Madrid by the Chief of Service, Angel Garcia del Velio, ex-governor o f the Union de Centro 
Democratico in the late 1970s for Le6n (3 September 1998). The information has been later updated by Carmen 
Aguilar Godoy, current Chief of Service.
64 Statutes of the Centro de Ensenanza e Investigacion, S.A. Registro Mercantil, Madrid.
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As Juan Jose Linz points out, CEISA ‘has been intellectually fruitful’ in linking 
‘students, particularly in the social sciences, to professors of different shades of opinion, 
from moderate to some radical younger staff members’. Yet, ‘[it] has not achieved 
some of its political goals. Some of the intellectual mentors of academic protest have 
had second thoughts about the course it has taken.’65 In 1974, the society was fined by 
the Francoist authorities on the grounds of partisan proselytism conducted in the 
University of Madrid in clear opposition to the Spanish regime. The authorities claimed 
that, ‘the meetings were illegal, and were dedicated to issues of a social-political 
character contrary to those of the ruling regime’. The purpose of these ‘seminars’ was, 
according to the authorities, ‘to attempt the disruption of the exercise of rights 
recognized in the Fundamental Laws of the State’.66 The company was fined twice 
before it was finally dissolved soon after. CEISA appears to be an example, albeit an 
isolated case, of a commercial society fined by the Spanish authorities for carrying out 
alleged illegal activities.
Many associations of different categories emerged following the Law of 
Associations of 1964. However, there are a few cases of recorded ‘undercover’ political 
associations that were created before 1964. That was the case of the Asociacion 
Espanola de Cooperacion Europea (AECE), or Spanish Society of European Co­
operation, which emerged as early as June 1954 as a result of a wave of interest on the 
idea of an unified Europe. As Alvarez de Miranda recalls, ‘at the beginning of the 
1950s Barcelona became home to various institutes which, from a strictly cultural point- 
of-view, studied the realities of the unification of Europe. These organizations included
65 Linz, “Opposition in and under an authoritarian regime”, p. 213.
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the Institute of European Studies, the Circle of European Studies of the French Institute 
also the Spanish Committee of the European League of Economic Co-operation. Whilst 
for some progressive members of the regime Europe was synonymous with democracy 
and modernization, for others it was more ‘the task of the anti-Spain in order to favour 
the capitalist and Masonic powers’.67
The AECE was formed by young Monarchists such as Alfonso Osorio, Juan Luis 
Simon Tobalina, Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez, Valentin Andres Alvarez, Jose Maria Ruiz 
Gallardon, Joaquin Satrustegui and Fernando Alvarez de Miranda (some of them were 
regulars of the Cafes Rodriguez and the Cenas de los Nueve). Founders and participants 
of the association were young members of the Circulos de Estudios of the ACNP. 
These young people did not have serious problems in meeting since most of them, with 
the exception of a few like Alfonso Osorio, were well-known in Francoist circles, and
ro
came from families fully integrated into the regime. Incidentally, the authorization of 
the association read that, ‘the persons who form the commission are devoted to the 
regime, and are of good conduct’.69
The AECE was used as a centre for the discussion of subjects such as the 
transition to a post-Francoist Spain. The Propagandistas of the AECE aimed at 
‘promoting and spreading the study of the idea of co-operation between the countries of 
Europe, as the most adequate means of guaranteeing social stability and long lasting 
peace, based upon an international Christian order, respect for human beings, social
70justice, and the co-ordination and better use of economic resources. Moreover they
66 Victor Lopez Rodriguez, El Derecho de Asociacion, (Madrid: Secretaria General Tecnica, Ministerio del Interior, 
1983), pp. 77-82. The same case can be found in German Fem&ndez Farreres, Asociaciones y  Constitucion, (Madrid: 
Civitas, 1987), pp. 167-172n.
67 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio ", pp. 24-25.
68 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 17 December 1998.
69 Statutes of the Asociacion Espanola de Cooperacion Europea. Registro Nacional de Asociaciones. Ministerio del 
Interior, Madrid.
70 Ibid.
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studied all possible benefits that the integration to Europe could offer to Spain in the 
cultural, political, social, and economic areas, following the guidance of Pope Pio XII, 
and of important pro-European Catholics such as Adenauer, Schuman, and De 
Gasperi.71
As Alvarez de Miranda recalled, the idea of getting closer to democratic Europe
72was regarded as the only way to escape the suffocating gag of Francoism. Thus these
intellectuals, who defined themselves variously as Christian Democrats, Liberals, and 
Monarchists, aimed at defending the principles of democracy, monarchy, and Europe. 
However, these principles did not appear in the statutes of the association since, 
according to Alfonso Osorio, the situation in Spain was such that an association with 
those principles would have never been authorized. Therefore, they excluded these 
principles from the statutes as well as the fact that their chief intention was to establish a 
democratic monarchy after Franco’s era, in the person of Don Juan de Borbon. In any 
case, it is improbable that they all advocated the establishment of full democracy in 
Spain since, as mentioned before, the idea of the legalization of the Communist Party in 
Spain was not even considered in the 1950s. Perhaps they considered a German-type of 
democracy that excluded the participation of the Communist Party. In fact, Alfonso 
Osorio himself opposed the participation of the Communist Party in the first democratic
71 A.C .NdeP., Bulletin No. 551, 1 November 1954, pp. 5-6.
72 Alvarez de Miranda, Del “contubernio ", p. 26.
73 Alfonso Osorio, Trayectoria, pp. 15-16. The weekly Cambio-16, recorded the three main themes of the 
organization as being Europe, Democracy, and Socialism (instead of Monarchy). See Cambio-16, 31 March-6 April 
1975, p. 36. Yet, according to Osorio’s own testimony, Cambio-16's  statement was not true, at least in the early 
period. It could be that the proximity of Socialist sympathisers with the remainder o f the members o f the 
organization could have prompted the idea that the association had changed one of its three pillars. In any case, 
Osorio said that it is very unlikely that the changed principle had been that of ‘monarchy’, because, above all, this 
was the main common denominator of the founders. Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 17 December 1998.
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elections in Spain as late as 1977 because he considered its legalization to go against the 
current law.74
Despite their common attachment to the ACNP, AECE members had different 
political tendencies that soon became well-defined groups. On the one hand, there was 
the group of Francoist Catholics including Alfonso Osorio, Federico Silva and Leopoldo 
Calvo Sotelo; and on the other, a Christian Democratic group led by Jose Maria Gil- 
Robles including Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Inigo Cavero, Ignacio Camunas and
7SJesus Barros de Lis. ‘The dialectic ‘ruptura’ or reform’, Alfonso Osorio recalls in his 
memoirs, ‘and open repudiation of or critical collaboration with Franco’s regime
7 f tdivided us’. By the end of the 1950s, the direction of the association had been taken 
over by the progressive bloc of Christian Democrats. By that time, the AECE had 
become a real forum of political discussion where personalities of different tendencies, 
but mainly from the democratic opposition, met to discuss politics - in between 
scientific or informative talks. As professor Enrique Tiemo Galvan recalled, ‘on many 
occasions, behind the fagade of informative talks, there was political discussion or 
[rather] the political effort to unite against General Franco’s’ regime’ (en muchas 
ocasiones, detras de la mascara de la informacion estaba el hecho de la discusion
77  tpolitica o del esfuerzo por unirse en contra del regimen del general Franco). Still 
active in 1975, the association had by then clearly adopted an even more critical attitude 
towards the regime. They organized various lectures by the speakers associated with
74 Alfonso Osorio also believed that the legalization of the Communist Party would alienate the armed forces and, in 
turn, would threaten the stability of the crown. Alfonso Osorio, De Orilla a Orilla, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 2000), 
pp. 309-333.
75 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio ", p. 21.
76 Osorio, Trayectoria, pp. 15-16.
77 Tiemo Galv£n, Cabos sueltos, p. 333.
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Socialist and Christian Democrats groups. The speakers included Luis Gonzalez Seara, 
Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez, Enrique Tiemo Galvan and Dionisio Ridmejo, among others.78
Following the 1964 Law, another association with a twofold objective was 
created. That was the Centro de Estudios de Problemas Contemporaneos created by the
• 7Q • •young Monarchist lawyer Antonio Gavilanes in 1967. The idea of forming a political 
group began to brew in Gavilanes’ mind during his university years but he never became
O A
a member of illegal university groups linked to the democratic opposition. He 
believed in the need for a constitutional democratic monarchy after Franco that could 
satisfy the Church, the armed forces, financial powers and international powers (namely 
the United States that feared a Communist uprising) as well as the forces of the Left. 
On these grounds, between 1965 and 1966, Gavilanes attempted the creation of a study 
group to serve as a platform for the gathering of people of different progressive 
tendencies. This platform was to be the magazine Convivencia or Coexistence in which 
personalities of the democratic opposition including Jose Luis Aranguren, Enrique 
Tiemo Galvan, and Dionisio Ridmejo, had agreed to participate. Yet, Fraga, then 
Minister of Information, did not authorize its publication. The reason was simple. The 
name was too ambiguous for its time, and the people involved were not identified with 
the regime.
Nevertheless, Gavilanes’ group persevered in their decision to create a 
discussion fomm, but this time they wanted it registered as an association. From past
1%Cambio-16, 31 March-6 April 1975, p.36.
79 The information given in the following pages about the Centro de Estudios de Problemas Contemporaneos was 
entirely provided, unless otherwise stated, by its founder Antonio Gavilanes during an interview held on 
21 September 1999.
80 Some of these groups were the Socialist Federacion Universitaria Espanola (FUDE), the Agrupacion Socialista 
Universitaria (ASU); the Christian Democrat Union Democratica Espanola (UDE), Izquierda Democrata Cristiana 
(IDE), the Partido Democrata de Accion Democristiana (PSAD); and the Communist Frente de Liberacion Popular 
(FELIPE).
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experience they had learned two things. Firstly, they should choose a rather bland name 
for their association, one with a general social meaning and secondly, its promoters 
should not be identifiable with the democratic opposition. The person chosen to register 
their new association was Juan Ignacio Gil Sanz, a personal friend of Gavilanes, who 
had previous links with sporting activities from their time at university. Gil Sanz 
presented the documents for the registration of the Centro de Estudios de Problemas 
Contemporaneos and this time the Interior Ministry authorized the approval of the 
association. According to the official statutes of the centre, its objective was, ‘to 
promote studies on contemporary sociology and economy as well as those studies, based 
on the Christian Public right that could currently contribute in a constructive and 
positive way to the new generations’.81 But, this was simply a cover. As Gavilanes 
declared in 1972, ‘since its foundation, the Centre has never been considered a cultural 
centre or an ateneo, but a political club’.82
Once the official registration of the association had been obtained, Gil Sanz 
transferred the direction of the association to Antonio Gavilanes, Fernando Serrano Gos- 
Gayou, Alfredo Rodriguez Santiago, Juan Luis Cebrian, Ignacio Camunas and Alberto 
Ballarin. They chose Antonio Gavilanes as President of the association. The next step 
was to find premises in which to organize colloquiums and other meetings. They found 
a tiny apartment in General Moscardo Street, in Madrid, which they managed to rent 
thanks to small donations by its members. But, because political meetings were still 
illegal, they presented themselves to the landlord as a group of university students who 
needed the place to study, and prepare public examinations.
81 Statutes of Centro de Estudios de Problemas Contemporaneos. Registro Nacional de Asociaciones. Ministerio del 
Interior, Madrid.
82 La Vanguardia Espanola, 29 June 1972.
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The colloquiums, which consisted of a brief talk followed by a debate, quickly 
became popular but the smallness of the flat also became a problem. Once a week on 
the evening of the meeting, the little sitting room was packed with people who literally 
sat wherever they found a space. Gavilanes recalls that the sheer size of the meetings 
became dangerous, first because they could have been caught having meetings of a 
political character, and second because, given the tiny size of their office, the number of 
people jeopardised their own physical safety. The members of the centre could have run 
into trouble on a number of occasions, but for different reasons. For instance, on one 
occasion, Gavilanes invited General- Lieutenant Rafael Garcia Valino, ex-Captain 
General of Madrid, who was on bad terms with Franco due to personal circumstances, to 
attend Joaquin Satrustegui’s talk. The General’s visit to the centre coincided with the 
mysterious death of the young Communist university leader, Enrique Ruano, in police 
custody. Despite the presence of such a personality, and not without risk, those present 
stood up and kept a minute’s silence for the youth and to their surprise the General did 
likewise. One could say his mere presence had great significance in terms of national 
reconciliation and how the times were changing. Gavilanes speculates that this perhaps 
could have been the first time since the Spanish Civil War that a prominent member of 
the Francoist armed forces (known in the Civil War as the Butcher of Navarra), stood 
and kept a minute’s silence for a young man from the enemy’s side.
A list of known progressive personalities gave talks at the centre. Among the 
speakers were Dionisio Ridruejo, Enrique Tiemo Galvan, Manuel Jimenez de Parga, 
Carlos Ollero, Raul Morodo, Fernando Moran, Jeronimo Saavedra, Miguel Boyer, 
Roberto Dorado, Rafael Calvo Serer, Joaquin Garrigues Walker, Antonio Menchaca, 
Joaquin Satrustegui, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Luis Gomez Llorente, Hernando 
Baeza and Inigo Cavero. The centre also invited the Portuguese Socialist leader Mario
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Soares, although after making all the arrangements for his visit, the Interior Ministry did 
not authorize the lecture.
By 1969 the popularity of the colloquiums was such that members of the centre 
were obliged to look for larger premises. They found various places in Madrid. One of 
them belonged to the Chamber of Commerce at Plaza de la Independencia, and the other 
was the premise of the Circle of the Commercial Union at the Gran Via. In both 
premises the centre held lectures which attracted a huge turnout. At times there were 
five-hundred people attending the lectures. Thus the centre organized small 
colloquiums on a weekly basis, and large lectures in the other premises every three 
weeks. The sheer size of the audience who attended the lectures obliged the centre to 
ask for permission from the Interior Ministry, who had to be informed in advance about 
the theme of each lecture, the speaker, the date and so forth. The owners of the 
premises where the talk was to be held always requested the written authorization of the 
Interior Ministry before letting people in. Otherwise, they themselves could run into 
trouble. Gavilanes tried to reduce political discussions at the lectures because a 
representative of the Interior Ministry - who was publicly presented together with other 
guests or personalities at the outset of the lecture as a warning signal to the participants - 
always attended them due to their public character. The seminars, on the other hand, 
were considered a private meeting of association members, for which no official 
representative was present.
Sometimes, however, it was difficult to contain the feelings of such a large 
audience. At the beginning of 1969 the Bishop of Huelva, Gonzalez Moralejo gave a 
lecture to five-hundred people with the title ‘The post-Conciliar Church’. During this 
lecture the young Socialist Carlos Zayas stood up and called for the need to legalize the 
political parties, including of course the Socialists and Communists. The presence of
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members of the Francoist security forces, national and foreign intelligent services, 
representatives of a number of embassies, and the Bishop himself did not prevent the 
audience, this time mainly composed of Christian Democrats, Socialists and 
Communists (but not members of the regime), showing their agreement with loud 
applause. The presence of embassy representatives reflected international interest in the 
Spanish situation. Following these lectures, Gavilanes received numerous warnings 
from the regime and constant visits to his home by the police. The colloquiums and the
on
lectures were often followed by dinners, which became very fashionable.
As seen so far, uncertainty about the future of Spain was openly discussed 
amongst the more progressive circles of the regime. Other questions such as, where are 
we going? and, by what means will the regime relinquish power? were posed more 
openly by the population, and especially by members of the democratic opposition, after 
the 1966 Press Law.84 However, in 1965, an unprecedented meeting took place secretly 
in Madrid. Members of Franco’s immediate entourage organized their first political 
dinner to discuss the post-Francoist issue. The participants included the orthodox 
Francoist Bias Pinar, then Director of the Institute of Hispanic Culture; members of the 
clergy and the armed forces; and even some members of Franco’s own cabinet, such as 
Federico Silva Munoz - Public Works Minister. It is interesting to note that Manuel 
Fraga did not attend that dinner because of his existing disagreement with Bias Pinar
O f
over political issues.
83 The political dinners became the most popular event organized by the centre at the beginning of the 1970s, 
attracting the participation of political personalities of both the opposition and the regime itself. The development of 
these dinners is studied further in Chapter 4.
M Indice, Nos. 211-212, p. 5.
85 Testimony of Pedro Perez Alhama, Secretary General of the ANEPA, 12 September 1998.
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During this secret dinner - allegedly Franco was unaware of the event - these 
prominent members of the regime discussed the future of Spain, and agreed to pave the 
way for a post-Francoist era in which they could secure the continuity of the system. To 
this end they decided to create the magazine Fuerza Nueva which could serve as a 
platform for the spreading of their ideas among the Spanish population. Fuerza Nueva's 
main promoter, the notary Bias Pinar, aimed at the creation of a pressure group to 
oppose the aperturista strategy of various groups of the regime, and the maintaining of 
the ‘Monarchy of 18 July’ (Franco’s uprising).86
Parallel to Fuerza Nueva there existed the so-called University National 
Brotherhood, Hermandad Nacional Universitaria - registered as a student association - 
which was led by Luis Coronel de Palma, and primarily defended the prominence of the 
Church in the Spanish education system, and particularly in the university. This 
brotherhood was closely linked to the regime and, although formally limited to Church- 
university relations, and especially created for the interest of parents, university 
students, staff and so forth, it sometimes tackled political issues in its main platform, the 
magazine Avanzada. Incidentally, as Pedro Perez Alhama - secretary of the brotherhood 
- explained, some members of this brotherhood were also linked to Fuerza Nueva, and 
this small group regularly held private meetings at the Hotel Sideral in Madrid, where 
they discussed political issues. These meetings lasted until 1967 when Bias Pinar’s 
reactionary attitude led to the schism of some of the participants from Fuerza Nueva 
who went on to create a new group.
86 Incidentally, years later in 1977, Fuerza Nueva became a political party, despite Pifiar’s long standing aversion 
towards the concept o f ‘political parties’. Yet, the ultra-right tendency of the party failed to thrive in a society 
searching for moderation and a peaceful post-Francoist transition. The party managed to secure the election of a 
deputy for Toledo, who was Bias Pinar himself, but that was its entire achievement. Ultimately, the party was wound 
up in 1982. Jos6 Luis Rodriguez Jimenez, “Origen, desarrollo y disolucion de Fuerza Nueva”, in Revista de Estudios 
Politicos, No. 73, July-September, 1991, p. 265. See also Jose Luis Rodriguez, “The Extreme Right after Franco” in 
Patterns o f  Prejudice, Vol. 24, Nos. 2-4, 1990.
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The main figure of this new collective was Alejandro Rodriguez de Varcarcel, 
then Vice-Secretary General of the Movement, President of the Consejo del Reino, or 
Council of the Kingdom87, and a known continuista, who decided to create the so-called 
Association for the Study of Current Problems, Asociacion Nacional para el Estudio de 
Problemas Actuales (ANEPA).88 ANEPA aimed at ‘the gathering of men, who, through 
their organization, could ensure the continuity of the Institutions in a positive way. And 
secondly, the reiteration once again, of [their] enthusiasm to illuminate, and contribute
Q Q
to, the welfare of the country through politics’. Basically, they favoured the 
implementation of timid reforms but as long as those reforms did not threaten the 
continuity of the regime.
As a prominent Falangist, Rodriguez de Varcarcel was considered by the 
Falangist daily Arriba to be part of the Falangist ‘old guard’ and the ‘most important 
member’ of ANEPA.90 Hence the restless members of the Falange, who believed that 
he favoured the regime’s adaptation to the new demands of the Spanish population, 
warmly welcomed his appointment as President of the Council of the Kingdom.91 
Rodriguez de Varcarcel’s understanding of these ‘new demands’ appears to have been
87 The Council of the Kingdom was created by Franco in April 1954 with the idea of adopting a ‘monarchical form of 
government’. Thus, under Franco’s command the Council, which was made up of loyal Movement ‘great and good’, 
would determine the succession to the Caudillo. See Preston, Franco, pp. 529, 564, 754n. According to Raymond 
Carr, the Council of the Realm (or Kingdom) ‘composed of the dignitaries of the regime, had one important function: 
the drawing-up of the terna, the list of three from which the Head of State must select a President of the Council of 
Ministers’. Carr, Spain, p. 706.
88 The association never registered as such until 1974, following the approval of the Statute of Associations of 
December 1974. Thus, as soon as the statute was passed ANEPA was the first one to be registered at the Plaza de la 
Marina in Madrid, followed by Cantarero del Castillo’s association. Testimony of Pedro Perez Alhama, 16 
September 1998. The association was first called Asociacion para el Estudio de Problemas Actuales (APEPA). But 
by early 1970s, Perez Alhama changed the name in order to include the word ‘National’ in its title. Hence for the 
sake of simplicity, and given that many people knew the association as ANEPA for most of its existence, I will refer 
to it as ANEPA. See Secretaria General del Movement. Ministerio de la Interior, Madrid. Caja No. 171 ,18 June 
1975.
89 Asociacion para el Estudio de Problemas Contemporaneos, Monarquia. Futuro del poder politico, (Madrid, 1971), 
pp. 13-14.
90 Arriba, 4 February 1976, p. 14.
91 Lopez Rodo, Memorias II, p. 547. See also Romero’s welcoming comment on Varcarcel’s appointment in Pueblo, 
27 November 1969, p. 3.
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rather limited, however. In a note written in August 1968 in relation to the crisis of the 
Movement, he stated that, ‘for the Movement, participation is forever the goal’. He 
insisted on the importance of underlying the need ‘to strengthen a network of 
associations (asociacionismo) in two directions (yertiente): towards the majorities via 
family networks, and towards the minorities via the creation of selected associations of 
representative - intellectuals, professionals, etc. - from each province. [...] It does not 
mean [to create] associations for each tendency but one association for all tendencies, 
against the common foe’. On these grounds, given their advocacy of such a limited 
system of representation, it would be inaccurate to categorize ANEPA’s members as 
aperturista. In fact, ANEPA’s first two Presidents, Leopoldo Stampa at the outset and 
Enrique Thomas de Carranza from 1976, had both belonged to the ultra-Right Fuerza 
Nueva93 But it was in 1976 with Thomas de Carranza as President that ANEPA 
adopted a very conservative line.94 On the other hand, under Leopoldo Stampa, ANEPA 
clearly advocated some kind of political opening-up. Alfonso Osorio says that 
ANEPA’s members were clearly evolutionist and supporters of a democratic monarchy 
(again perhaps he is referring to a German-style of democracy), but their position was 
close to that of the regime.95
From its creation in 1967, but especially at the beginning of the 1970’s, ANEPA 
organized activities such as round tables, dinners, meetings, lunches, lectures and 
debates with the sole idea of preparing the transition to a post-Francoist society.96 The
92 Lopez Rodo, Memorias II, Anejo 28, pp. 623-626.
93 Fuerza Nueva, Ano VIII. No. 378 (6 April 1974). Thomas de Carranza remained as President until nearly the end 
of the society which coincided with the first democratic elections of 1977. In January 1977 the National Council of 
ANEPA voted two thirds in favour of the standing down of Carranza as President. Jos6 Ramon Alonso y Rodriguez- 
Nadales was elected provisional President of the association. See Registro de Asociaciones Politicas. Ministerio del 
Interior, Madrid. CajaNo. 171, 13 January 1977.
94 Carlos Argos recalls that, when in 1977, Thomas de Carranza became part of Manuel Fraga’s Alianza Popular, 
Argos was shocked to hear Thomas’ ultra-Right conservative ideas. During a conversation with Fraga, Argos 
questioned Carranza’s presence in AP. Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14 September 1999.
95 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999.
96 Testimony of Pedro Perez Alhama, 16 September 1998.
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participants at ANEPA’s round tables analysed through a conservative prism, the 
country’s current problems and those that might arise in the post-Francoist era. ANEPA 
dealt with issues including the future of the monarchy in Spain; the relation between the 
Church and the State; political participation; regionalism; development of constitutional 
laws and political integration; professional participation and representation, and 
authority and liberty.97
ANEPA’s round tables became very popular and were attended by a large 
number of important personalities of the regime, including many aperturistas among 
whom were some who later played vital roles during the transition to democracy. These 
personalities included Alfonso Osorio, Fernando Suarez, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, 
Miguel Primo de Rivera, Leon Herrera, Marcelino Oreja, Fraga Iribame, Landelino
Q Q
Lavilla, Federico Silva Munoz and Pio Cabanillas. There were also some military 
men of different ranks, entrepreneurs such as Jose Maria Oriol y Urquijo, ex-Ministers 
such as Garcia Hernandez, Jose Solis and Fraga himself, and an important number of 
progressive procuradores familiares (procuradores were nominated members of the 
Francoist Cortes; the procuradores familiares were members of the Family sector who 
were elected by heads of household) such as Juan Manuel Fanjul, Eduardo Tarragona 
and Enrique Villoria Martinez. Not all of them, however, were ANEPA members. 
Thus, whereas Alfonso Osorio merely participated in one round table, Manuel Fraga 
was a member and at one point was also a candidate to occupy its presidency.99
ANEPA’s round tables and other activities had the merit of bringing together 
continuistas and aperturistas to discuss the problems of the country and their solutions 
to them. Indeed, as a platform for political discussions, ANEPA surely helped the
97 Asociacion Nacionalpara el Estudio de Problemas Actuales, 40 Politicos ante el futuro, (Madrid: Edipasa, 1974).
98Laureano L6pez Rodo, Memorias IV. El principio del fin, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1992), pp. 61-2.
99 Testimony of Pedro Perez Alhama, Secretary General of the ANEPA, 12 September 1998.
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aperturistas to explain their views on the need for reform, and especially on the need for 
greater public involvement in national politics, and to debate them with the inmovilistas. 
It may be not far wrong to consider that these forums served to attract some inmovilistas 
to the aperturista camp. However, ANEPA was not the only association that allowed 
political debates between the inmovilistas and aperturistas.
At the end of the 1960s there emerged another association that was regarded as a 
smaller version of the regime itself. It was the so-called Asociacion Club Siglo XXI that 
was created a few years after ANEPA in May 1969. The club was created by Antonio 
Guerrero Burgos as a meeting point to talk about post-Francoism, and was principally 
frequented by the Francoist elite - including prominent members of the armed forces, 
ex-Ministers and Ministers, such as Carlos Arias Navarro100 - for whom the club had a 
distinctively strong conservative ideology101. Guerrero Burgos’ aims were ‘to promote
i cvythe benefits of culture, favouring coexistence and peace within order’. The club 
became one of the most important political platforms from the beginning of the 1970s, 
and it continues to host important lectures today. Some of the first speakers included 
Manuel Fraga, Jose Kirkpatrick and Adolfo Munoz Alonso in 1971; Federico Silva in 
1973; Alfonso Osorio, Jose Miguel Orti Bordas, Emilio Romero, Antonio Hernandez 
Gil, Antonio Garrigues Diaz-Canabate, Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, Rafael Perez Escolar 
and Cruz Martinez Esteruelas in 1974. The lectures covered a wide range of topics such
100 Acta fundacional del Club Siglo XXI, 10 de Mayo de 1969. Registro Nacional de Asociaciones. Ministerio del 
Interior, Madrid. This document was signed by twenty-one members of the regime. An example from the continuista 
side was Carlos Arias; and from the aperturista Pio Cabanillas.
101 Among the twenty-one founding members there were Carlos Arios Navarro, Antonio Hemdndez Gil, Juan Herrera 
Femdndez, Alfonso Garcia Valdecasas. Among some of its few aperturistasfxeformists members there was also Pio 
Cabanillas. See Acta Fundacional del Club Siglo XXI. Registro Nacional de Asociaciones. Ministerio del Interior, 
Madrid.
102 Statutes of Club Siglo XXI. Registro Nacional de Asociaciones. Ministerio del Interior, Madrid. A list of members 
of the Club Siglo X XI according to professions is listed in Cambio-16, 9-15 December 1974, p. 27. According to the 
journal the largest groups were formed by military men (118), lawyers (111), engineers (52), industrialists (26), 
diplomats (19), academic professors (18), aristocrats (16), architects (12), and so forth.
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as political participation, the Fundamental Laws, the Council of Kingdom, State-Church
101relations, the Cortes, Spain and Europe, and had a special emphasis on the Monarchy.
So far we have seen that from the 1950s and especially throughout the 1960s, 
Spaniards were already concerned about the political future of the country, and more 
specifically, post-Franco Spain. The restricted freedom of assembly and association led 
them to develop other ways of discussing politics. From private gatherings, via study 
groups and publications, to ‘cultural’ associations and political dinners, Spaniards found 
the way to talk about the political problems of the country and exchange their ideas 
about them. But, the Spanish people could not, in any way, have a real say in the 
politics of their country. Not even the members of the Francoist Cortes were able to 
make political decisions without Franco’s prior acceptance. The Cortes were merely an 
administrative body. Notwithstanding, some aperturistas regarded its family sector as 
their only hope in influencing the decision-making process. Thus, given the lack of 
political associations, they sought to increase public participation in politics through the 
associations of heads of families, which they regarded as their best potential channels of 
public opinion.
2.3. The Spanish Family as political representation
In March 1960, Alfonso Osorio gave a lecture at the premises of the ACNP 
within the cycle of lectures about ‘Family Representation’. According to Osorio, Franco 
had given the ‘go-ahead’ for the creation of family associations as channels of public
103 The lectures are collected in Club Siglo XXI, La Espaha del F uturoyla  Monarquia, (Madrid: Fomento Editorial, 
1972); Espaha, su Monarquia y  Europa, (Madrid: Fomento Editorial, 1974); Espaha, su Monarquia y  el Futuro, 
(Madrid: Fomento Editorial, 1975); Espaha, Monarquia y  Cambio Social, (Madrid: Fomento Editorial, 1976).
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representation and opinion.104 Franco’s words of encouragement gave rise to an 
ongoing debate on this issue, which ultimately led to approval of the Law of Family 
Representation in the Cortes in 1967.
Francoist authorities had defined the Spanish political system as ‘an organic 
democracy’.105 The meaning of ‘organic democracy’, as Amodia explains, ‘remains to 
be discovered. There is no official explanation, and a search through the constitution for 
a legal explanation contributes little.’106 The closest meaning to ‘organic democracy’ is 
perhaps the one given by the Programmatic Norms of the regime whereby the Spanish 
system is defined as a ‘democracy [that] would rest upon the natural representative 
institutions: family, municipality, and syndicate’.107 This philosophy, which had been 
introduced by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of the Falange, was adopted 
by Franco’s regime, and removed any chance of introducing political parties to the 
system. According to Jose Antonio - as he was commonly known - ‘no one is bom a 
member of a political party, [...] but, we are all bom members of a family, we are all 
members of a municipality, we all do our best at work.. .’.108 In the early 1960s, Franco 
reiterated to the Cortes that in ‘our democracy [...] heads of households [family 
representatives] chose one third of the councillors of our municipalities, the syndicates 
another third, and the cultural and corporative entities the remaining third’.109
In practice, however, this system of representation did not imply that the 
Spanish population had a say in the country’s politics. In the syndical elections workers 
chose their representatives to speak on their behalf to their employer at an internal level
104 ACNP, Bulletin No. 677, 1 March 1960, pp. 5-6.
105 Martin Oviedo, “La representation politica en el actual regimen espanol”, p. 244.
106 Amodia, Franco’s political legacy, p. 93.
107 Sixth point o f the F.E.T. y de las J.O.N.S. Lecture given by don Victor Fem&ndez Gonzalez in the Circulo de 
Estudios del Centro de Madrid. ACNP, Bulletin No. 679, 1 April 1960, pp. 3-6. See also,ABC, 31 March 1963, pp. 
48-49.
108 Fuerza Nueva, No. 126, 7 June 1969, p. 13. See also, Adolfo Munoz Alonso, Un pensador para un pueblo, 
(Madrid: Ediciones Almena, 1969), p.222.
Right o f  association: a theoretical right in Franco’s dictatorship (1964-1967) 94
and, therefore, the workers’ representatives dealt only with work-related matters. In the 
municipal elections the duty of a candidate elected for the post of concejal, or town 
councillor, was merely administrative, and therefore carried no political 
responsibility.110 The family election, however, was regarded by some aperturistas as a 
possible channel to increase public participation at the Cortes. Manuel Fraga, in his 
capacity as National Delegate of Associations111, took important steps for the 
strengthening of the family as a representative body in the Cortes.
On the one hand, in 1958, Fraga laid the foundations that would ensure families 
proper representation in public life. To that end, he first of all created a sub-delegation 
within his main Delegation of Associations called Service of Family Associations, or 
Servicio de Asociaciones Familiares, and put Gabriel Elorriaga, a journalist and 
university student who had directed the prestigious student magazine La Hora, in charge 
of the Service. Elorriaga brought with him a number of brilliant university students 
such as Juan Jose Bellod, Ernesto Perez de Lama, Enrique Ramos, Jesus Lopez Medel, 
Luis Gonzalez Seara, Luis Borreguero and Octavio Cabezas, most of whom were to be 
connected to Fraga in ensuing years. Fraga edited a wide range of works devoted to 
family affairs. Among them was the periodical Hojas de Informacion y  Documentation, 
which later became the monthly magazine Familia Espanola, directed by Gabriel 
Elorriaga. In December 1962, Fraga, in his capacity as Minister of Information and
119Tourism, declared the magazine to be of ‘public interest’. In February 1959, Fraga 
also organized the ‘First Congress of the Spanish Family’ in order to bring together 
people, institutions, and entities concerned with family-related problems. The outcome
109 Discursos y  mensajes del Jefe del Estado, (Madrid: Direction General de Informacion, 1964), p. 210.
uo ABC, 23 March 1967, p. 32.
111 The National Delegation of Associations had been created in July 1957 as part o f the structure of the National 
Movement. Its aim was to encourage the creation of professional associations and associations of heads of families. 
See Amodia, Franco’s political legacy, p. 137.
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of the congress was quite positive. The ‘concept’ of family was widely acknowledged 
as being of vital interest, and the conclusions reached at the congress became the basis
I  1 -i
for the future Law of Family Associations.
Following the Family Congress, on 1 April 1959, the General Secretary of the 
Movement created the so-called National Council of Associations, from which a 
network of family associations was to be set up. But, as Lopez Rodo points out, 
‘evidently, these associations had nothing to do with the recognition of political 
pluralism’.114 Nevertheless, Fraga encouraged the participation of family members in 
several public and private organizations, as well as the collaboration of experts, 
intellectuals and public authorities to develop family-related-topics for further study. 
With his team he prepared a proposal for a Law of Family Associations. Following the 
example set by the congress, the Catholic ACNP also organized a series of talks, called 
‘Family Representation’, where they discussed the role of the Spanish family in national 
politics. These lectures boosted the hope of those who, like Federico Silva - elected 
Vice-President of the ACNP in I960115 - believed that family associations must ‘defend 
and promote the rights of the individual, as an integral part of a family, and the rights of 
families in all fields. [Thus, family associations] must implement the political 
representation before any political organization’.116
Yet, the proposed Law of Associations of Heads of Household, announced by 
the Spanish authorities in 1964, brought discontent even among the fervent defenders of 
family representation, including members of the Spanish clergy. As Federico Silva 
recalls, ‘the government had sent a bill to the Cortes which proposed that all
112 Familia Espahola, No. 100, February 1968, p. 28.
1,3 ACNP, Bulletin No. 679, 1 April 1960; Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 26.
114 Lopez Rodo, Memorias I, p. 173.
115 Federico Silva, Memorias Politicos, (Planeta, Barcelona, 1993), pp. 78-79.
116 ACNP, Bulletin No. 679, 1 April 1960, p. 6.
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associations of heads of households were part of the Movement [...]. From the Catholic 
Church’s point of view, [this bill] meant the denial of the natural and supra-political 
character of the family’.117 sGiven that Silva had been appointed member of the 
committee that dealt with this question, the Archbishop of Valencia, Monsignor 
Marcelino Olaechea (also a procurador in Cortes) as well as many bishops asked Silva 
to oppose the bill. Thus, on 29 January 1965, Silva sent a letter to the President of the 
Cortes whereby, on behalf of the religious Conferencia de Metropolitanos, headed by 
Monsignor Olaechea, he expressed serious concern about the proposed bill. Silva 
argued that the bill did not respect the natural principles of the family as a basic cell of
1 I Q
the society, and did not favour the unity of the Spanish people.
Those points were important but there were others who questioned more 
fundamental issues. For instance, Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez believed that, ‘it is not in the 
nature of the family to transform itself into a channel of political representation’. The 
Christian Democrats went further by adding that, unlike the so-called ‘natural’ channels, 
that is family, municipalities and unions, ‘legally recognized political associations 
would be dedicated to the gathering together of men of different political persuasions to 
address the needs of common well-being, on the politics of restructure and socio­
economic development, on the cultural promotion, etc., and they would also exercize a 
constructive criticism of the government’s work’. Ruiz-Gimenez concluded that 
political associations would only be possible in Spain, however, after a new Press Law 
(which as we already know, was passed in 1966), and a new Law of Associations were
117 Silva, Memorias politicos, p. 91.
118 Ibid., pp. 91-2. Lopez Rod6 reproduces a letter that Silva sent to Monsignor Olaechea in December 1964, 
explaining a list of proposed amendments to the bill. See Enmienda a la totalidad de la Ley de Asociaciones de 
Cabezas de Familia entregada por Federico Silva al Arzobispo de Valencia, Mons. Marcelino Olaechea, de 
Diciembre de 1964. Letter reproduced in Lopez Rod6, Memorias, Anejo 57, pp. 754-758.
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added to the statutes.119 Time would prove him right. In any case, Silva’s note was
• 120passed to the Caudillo, and the proposed bill was never mentioned again.
Indeed, public participation in national politics and freedom of association were 
becoming issues of importance inside and outside the regime. For instance, during a 
worker’s strike in the North of Spain in 1962 members of the Catholic JOC and HOAC 
published leaflets that referred to the Church’s doctrine on worker’s rights. The various 
points included proper salaries, right of association, right of workers to lead their own 
organizations and the right to strike. Yet, the police intercepted the leaflets before they 
could reach the workers. Ramon Torrella, member of JOC and years later Archbishop
191 •of Tarragona, had his Church licence suspended for more than one month. Also, m 
the mid-1960s, four to five-hundred university-linked men and women met to discuss 
freedom of association at a Capuchin friary outside Barcelona. The gathering was 
halted by the police, and some thirty-four of the participants were fined. But, their 
appeal was closely followed by university members across Spain, who organized 
demonstrations all over the country, especially in Madrid. The demonstrations went on 
from April until May. Moreover, the Church protested against the ill-treatment received 
by one of the detained students at the hands of the police.122 In 1967, during a lecture 
given in Malaga, Mariano Navarro Rubio, in his capacity as Governor of the Bank of 
Spain, talked about the still controversial issue of ‘social participation’. In a moderate 
way, Navarro Rubio argued that ‘participation in public duties could no longer be the 
exclusive responsibility of one group, or of the authorities. [...] Social participation had 
to be conducted through social groups, [...], which nowadays not only ask for protection
119 ACNP, Bulletin No. 783, 15 September 1964.
120 Silva, Memorias Politicos, p. 93.
121 Bardavio & Sinova, Todo Franco, p. 389.
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but for participation [as well]’. Navarro Rubio emphasized the need to find new 
formulas of expression to allow a proper ‘contrast of views’, and hence avoid the
1 07movement of opinions through clandestine or marginal ways.
On those grounds, and given the lack of political associations, the more 
moderate members of the regime sought to strengthen the power of the family sector in 
the Cortes in an attempt to achieve greater popular participation in national politics. 
Yet, the apologists of this system of participation had to wait from 1960 (when Franco 
had allegedly given the go-ahead) until the final approval of the Law of Family 
Representation, approved in the summer of 1967 (this law is studied in more detail in 
Chapter 3). The Spanish authorities declared that this law represented the wish to 
complete ‘the system of our organic democracy and to improve the representative 
system, encouraging greater participation from the different social sectors in public 
duties.124 The Spanish system of representation, therefore, would be integrated by the 
Law of Family Representation, the Organic Law of the Movement and the Syndical 
Law, obviously all under the tight control of the regime.125 This was another trick used 
by the regime to disguise the lack of real public representation at the Cortes.
Conclusion
Franco’s dictatorship prohibited the formation of political associations and hence 
political parties. Until the 1964 approval of the Law of Associations, the right to 
associate was ratified through the Decree of 25 January 1941; the Charter of the Spanish
122 A.R., A Review of the Year 1966, p. 280.
123 ABC, 11 April 1967, p. 49.
124 See Martin Oviedo, “La representation politica en el actual regimen espafiol”, p. 244.
125 After countless debates, and modifications, the Syndical Law was finally approved on 16 February 1971. This 
thesis will focus on those laws, which are directly related with the public representation on national politics. The 
workers would elect their representatives at the Cortes to defend labour issues. Thus, given the exclusive labour 
character o f this law I am not going to study it further. For more details on this issue see, for example, Amodia,
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People - or Fuero de los Espanoles - of 17 July 1945; the Law of Referendum of 1945. 
Yet freedom of assembly remained very restricted. The Law of Associations of 1964 
confirmed that, ‘the right of association is one of the natural rights of men’. But the 
theoretical recognition of the right of association did not, in practice, grant permission to 
associate and meet freely. The 1964 Law gave people the opportunity to create entities 
with cultural purposes - in the widest sense. The possibility of participating in national 
politics via a network of elected political associations was consequently unthinkable.
The economic and social transformation that Spain experienced from the end of 
the 1950s, but especially throughout the 1960s, brought to the surface the contradictions 
between Franco’s institutions and the economic capitalist system that Spain had 
become. Fear of provoking the debilitation of the system, and with it the power loss of 
a comfortably settled political class, led the regime inmovilistas to refuse the 
implementation of reforms. Some member of the regime, however, did not share such a 
regressive stance. These were the origins of the division between aperturistas and 
inmovilistas. The important point to emphasize is that whereas some observers like 
Rodolfo Martin Villa state that the Francoist political class had started to split around 
1966-1967 (over the Organic Law of the State), such a division, although confirmed 
during the 1960s, dates from the 1950s when their stance pro or against the opening up 
of the system was beginning to be drawn.
Given the impossibility of forming legal political groups, people, connected in 
different degrees to the regime, developed alternative ways to meet in order to discuss 
the political problems of the country. These included private gatherings, publications 
(newspapers and magazines), study groups or clubs (which normally were formed
Franco's political legacy, pp. 144-159. Also Cuadernos para el Dialogo deals with the syndical problem basically 
since its first publication in 1963.
126 Martin Villa, Al servicio, p. 48.
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around a publication), trading or commercial societies, cultural associations and 
political dinners. Some of these people became part of the aperturistas and some others 
-  the most progressive -  became part of the democratic opposition during the economic 
boom of the 1960s and as a result of the Francoists’ reluctance to modernize the regime. 
They all realized, however, that the Spanish people could not, in any way, have a say in 
the politics of the country. The legal ways to allegedly participate in the politics of the 
State were through the so-called ‘natural channels’ that is to say the family, municipality 
and unions, all represented at the Cortes. Yet, not even the members of the Francoist 
Cortes were able to make political decisions without Franco’s prior acceptance. Having 
said that, the most moderate Francoists regarded the family sector as their only hope to 
increase popular representation at the Cortes through a network of associations of heads 
of families. The Law of Family Representation was finally approved in 1967 but it did 
not yield the expected increase in popular representation.
101
Chapter - 3
In search o f  the *Third Way’? (1967-1969
Despite the significance of the Law of Family Representation, the most important event 
in 1967 was undoubtedly the approval of the Ley Organica del Estado, or Organic Law 
of the State (LOE). The LOE was approved by Referendum on 14 December 1966, and 
promulgated by the Cortes on 10 January 1967.2 The LOE stressed the separation 
between the Head of State and Government although it was not until 1973 that Franco 
delegated some power to Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco by appointing him President of 
the Government. The approval of this law marked the threshold of the period before 
the transition to democracy, whose beginning is considered by many observers to be the 
end of 1975, following Franco’s death on 20 November 1975.
This chapter is a study of the first serious attempt by the regime to establish a 
network of political associations albeit under the strict control of the Movement. The 
enthusiasm felt by aperturista circles at the approval of the LOE had its roots in the 
potential of the law for introducing reforms, particularly in the area of public 
participation in political affairs. But, by 1969, their enthusiasm had waned. The 
Caudillo’s evident reluctance to modernize his regime hindered any progress in the 
direction desired by the aperturistas. Nevertheless, a greater level of awareness of the 
need to introduce political associations was achieved among a larger number of 
Francoists. A legalized network of political associations would facilitate a peaceful
1 Cruz Martinez Esteruelas explained the term of political associations as the ‘third way’ between political parties and 
a single-party system. Quoted in Juan Ferrando Badia, Del Autoritarismo a la Democracia, (Madrid: Rialp, 1987), p. 
47.
2 BOE, Ley Organica del Estado, 10 January 1967 (Publication date, 1 July 1967).
3 The separation of the Head of State and Government had been previously established on Article 2 of the Ley 
Juridica de la Administracion of 26 July 1957, but obviously neglected until 1967. See Amodia, Franco’s political 
legacy, p. 47.
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transition to a post-Francoist era. The predictions for the following years were, 
however, rather negative.4
3.1. The Organic Law o f the State o f 1967
At the end of the 1950s, Franco had received three drafts for a possible Organic 
Law. These drafts had been drawn up by Francisco Herrero Tejedor and Jose Solis, 
Carrero Blanco and Lopez Rodo, and Manuel Fraga. Yet, Franco did not seem willing 
to compromise at that stage. Paradoxically, during the speech for the opening of the 
seventh legislative year of the Cortes, in 1961, Franco encouraged the procuradores to 
keep on working in order to ‘complete and continue the work of the previous Cortes and 
complete our legislation with the Organic Law of the State, which would complete and 
frame the institutions of the regime, and the already enacted Fundamental Laws, in a 
harmonious system.’5 But, despite the Caudillo’s encouragement, the Organic Law was 
not completed that year. Franco’s contradictory behaviour and negative attitude towards 
the future of his own regime created uneasiness among his collaborators.
Throughout 1963 and 1964, Franco was pressed constantly on the subject of the 
Organic Law. But, it was on Friday 2 April 1965 when Mariano Navarro Rubio, 
Finance Minister, openly questioned Franco about the future of the regime during a 
cabinet meeting. He was not alone. Castiella and Fraga seconded Navarro Rubio’s 
daring questioning. In fact, Fraga intervened by saying that, ‘even though he thought of 
himself as the last (ultimo) of the Ministers, he felt right to beg Franco, on behalf of 
thirty million Spaniards, to explain his plans for the future’. The Caudillo agreed with 
Fraga’s suggestion but he claimed to need some more time.6 Franco’s hesitation in 
giving a proper answer prompted Fraga to tell the Caudillo that, ‘there is no time to
4 Dionisio Ridruejo et at, Espana perspectiva, 1972, (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, 1972), p. 25-41.
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spare and I beg you to make use of what time we have’. To which Franco responded, 
‘do you think I do not realize? Do you think I am a circus clown?’.7
This pressure on the Caudillo hastened to his decision finally to promulgate the 
long-awaited LOE or Spanish Constitution. Of the three drafts presented to him in the 
1950s, Franco chose the one by Carrero and Lopez Rodo. Fraga’s version advocated 
‘European freedoms, political associations and a Chamber elected by universal
o
suffrage’. On these grounds, Fraga’s draft was obviously refused. Incidentally it was 
Fraga himself who, as Minister of Information, launched an impressive campaign in 
favour of the referendum of the LOE that was to be held on 14 December 1966. There 
was not, however, a campaign favouring the ‘NO’ vote. Fraga’s Ministry spread the 
idea that a ‘NO’ vote was a vote for Moscow. And, as if  the propaganda machinery of 
the regime was not enough, the Caudillo himself appeared on television for the first time 
to ask Spaniards to vote ‘YES’ in the Organic Law referendum. What with blanket 
support by the media, the gratitude felt by some towards the Caudillo, and fears of 
reprisal felt by others, an impressive and unprecedented turn-out of eighty-eight per cent 
of the electorate was secured of which over ninety-five per cent voted ‘Yes’.9 Such a 
spectacular result did not surprise Franco: he had expected it. The international press 
spread rumours that the referendum had not been cleanly conducted which led Franco to 
comment on the undemocratic nature of the press even in the face of truth.10
The so-called ‘Constitution’ completed the institutionalization of the regime, and 
confirmed the Monarchy as its future form, but it failed to clarify the identity of
5 Discursos y  mensajes del Jefe del Estado, (1960-1963), (Madrid: Ediciones Espanolas, 1964).p. 241.
6 L6pez Rodo, Memorias I, pp. 519-20.
7 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 135. Translation taken from Preston, Franco, pp. 721-22.
8 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 86.
9 Preston, Franco, pp. 729-31. See also, Amodia, Franco's political legacy, p. 47.
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Franco’s successor or the future of the Movement. In other words, the most important 
issues for the nation were still unanswered. According to Stanley Payne, the law 
resolved the existing contradictions between the six Fundamental Laws, and eliminated 
traces of Fascist terminology within the regime. But, ‘no basic changes were introduced, 
thus maintaining the structure and mechanisms on whih the regime had long rested.’11 
That was ‘the adoption of a democratic appearance, obviously only superficial, but good 
enough to guarantee the survival of the regime and to adopt the peculiar nature of an
19organic democracy.’ In other words, the LOE was the culmination of a series of
‘cosmetically’ democratic laws such as the Carta Magna of social justice in Spain, the
so-called, Fuero de los Espanoles, (approved in 1945), the Referendum Law and the
Reforms of the Cortes, approved in 1946 and 1947, respectively.
The most optimistic members of Franco’s regime, however, had reasons to
believe that he was willing to modernize it. In accordance with the LOE:
The legal vitality and political vigour of the regime, [and] its adaptation to the current needs 
[...] provides, allows and advises completion and perfection of the fundamental legislation. 
[...] The additional dispositions aim to introduce the precise modifications in the already 
promulgated Fundamental Laws in order to [...] perfect and accentuate the representative 
character of the political order, that is the basic principle of our public institutions.
Among the main modifications, the law established:
The inclusion in the Cortes of a new group of procuradores familiares, chosen by the heads of 
family and married women, in accordance with the principle of equality of the political rights of 
women; to extend the representation to other Colleges, Institutions or Associations; [...] and in 
general, emphasize the authenticity of the representation.13
Despite the promising tone of modernization, Franco’s idea was quite the 
opposite. The LOE did not allow the creation of political parties although, as the
10 Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1976), pp. 489- 
90.
11 Stanley Payne, The Franco Regime, 1936-1975 (London: Wisconsin, 1986), p. 514. See also Dominguez Ortiz, 
Historia de Espaha, p. 214.
12 Jorge de Esteban & Luis Lopez Guerra, De la Dictadura a la Democracia. Diario de un periodo constituyente 
(Madrid: Universidad Complutense, Facultad de Derecho, Section de Publicaciones, 1979), p. 22. See also, Preston, 
Franco, p. 729.
13 BOE, Ley Organica del Estado, 10 January 1967 (Publication date: 11 January 1967).
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Caudillo asserted ‘the exclusion of political parties should not in any way imply the 
exclusion of the legitimate contraste de pareceres [and] the critical analysis of the 
governmental solutions’.14 Which was another way of saying that nothing had changed 
because Spaniards had no way to express their points of views on governmental 
policies. The only substantial novelty of the LOE was the emergence of the figure of a 
President of the Government, which represented a timid yet important step towards a 
more modem political system (although in effect no president was appointed until 
1973). According to Franco, however, ‘the most important innovation of this law is to 
consider that political life must develop within an orderly fashion’ within the 
Fundamental Laws. ‘This measure’, he explained, ‘perfects the already very advanced 
Estado de Derecho.'15 Such a statement was a contradiction in itself since a dictatorial 
system cannot be, by definition, an Estado de Derecho or a democracy, and, given the 
many restrictions in human rights imposed by Franco’s regime, Spain could be anything 
but a democracy.
The restrictions of the LOE, however, did not prevent there being a short period 
of hope among the most progressive members of the Movement, who saw the law as a 
platform for the introduction of at least some reforms. Among these was that of 
achieving greater popular participation in national affairs, and their principal goal, the 
legalization of a ‘legal opposition’. In other words, the regime would support the 
legalization of political associations that had been created within the boundaries of the 
Movement.16 At the end of the 1960s, it was believed that the success of a law of 
political associations - albeit a limited law - was closer to being achieved than at any 
time before.
14 Quoted in Ferrando Badia, El regimen de Franco, p. 156.
15 Quoted in Ibid., p. 138.
16 Ibid., p. 209.
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The approval of the LOE in 1967 was followed by the Law of Family 
Representation, the Law of Religious Freedom and the Organic Law of the Movement 
and its National Council.17 Throughout the 1960s Manuel Fraga and Fernando Maria 
Castiella worked together on the idea of creating a proposal for religious freedom in 
Spain. Not surprisingly, such a proposal was condemned by the most conservative 
sector of the regime. Franco’s right hand man, Admiral Carrero Blanco, openly accused
1 ftboth Mimsters of ‘apertura a siniestra’ or ‘opening to the Left.’ Domestically, this 
incident brought to public attention the existing internal factions of the regime, that is 
the inmovilistas and aperturistas. Internationally, this incident exacerbated the tension 
between the Catholic Church and the regime, since the Vatican had on a number of 
occasions advised Franco about the urgent need for reform over issues like the 
Caudillo’s privilege of appointing bishops at will.19 On 28 June 1967, Castiella’s
90efforts were rewarded when the Law of Religious Freedom was finally approved. 
Without underestimating the importance of this law, which obviously meant an 
unprecedented opening up of the regime towards more modem religious attitudes, and 
represented a breakthrough in the relations between Church and State, I concentrate on 
the Law of Family Representation and the Organic Law of the Movement. These two 
laws have a direct connection to the subject of this thesis as they refer to the relation 
between the regime and the population, and the latter’s participation in state affairs.
17 BOE, Ley que regula la participacion familiar en Cortes; Ley Organica del Movimiento Nacional y  su Consejo 
Nacional, and Ley que regula el ejercicio de la libertad religiosa. 28 June 1967. (Publication date: 1 July 1967). 
The Movement’s National Council merely acted as a consultative body for the national and international policies of 
the country. When the Cortes were created in 1942, the National Councillors became members of the Cortes, that is 
procuradores, and the Council became a ‘high chamber’ (like the Senate), but still with limited competences. See 
Bardavfo & Sinova, Todo Franco, pp. 154-5.
18 Fraga, Memoria breve, pp. 115-7.
19 Preston, Franco, pp. 718-9.
In search ofthe'Third Way’? (1967-1969) 107
3.2. The Law o f Family Representation
On June 28 1967 the LOE institutionalized the first of the ‘natural’ channels of 
participation, that of the family. The Law of Family Representation had a twofold 
objective. On the one hand, it was to complete the organic system of representation 
through natural entities (family, syndicate and municipality), and, on the other hand, to 
‘democratize’ these channels -  namely the family one - by giving them greater 
representation.21 The Law established that, out of a total of 560 procuradores, 108 
(20% of the total number) would be from the family sector, or procuradores familiares. 
There would be two procuradores familiares for each province - regardless of the
99number of inhabitants - who would be chosen in an unprecedented direct, fair and 
secret ballot of adult men, heads of households and married women. The number of 
voters amounted to a total of 16,415,139.23
So far as the voting system was concerned, the approval of the Law of Family 
Representation was one of the most ‘democratically’ advanced steps taken by the 
Spanish regime in terms of participation. Hence many of the potential familiares - as 
they were commonly known - regarded this sector as a possible platform for the 
introduction of reforms. The election offamiliares was, according to an editorial of the 
daily Monarchist ABC, ‘the first truly political election in the thirty years [of the 
regime]’. The editor argued that, although Spaniards had had the opportunity to vote in
20 A summary of the content of the speeches that, in relation with the project of the law of religious freedom, 
Fernando Herrero Tejedor, and Tomis Allende y Garcia-Baxter gave at the Cortes is in ABC, 27 June 1967.
21 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 50, November 1967, p. 24. See also Martin Oviedo, “La representation politica”, 
p. 244.
22 It is interesting to note that the total amount of members of parliament differs in each of the sources consulted. The 
amounts given oscillates between 548 and 565, and consequently, the amount of procuradors. See next footnote as 
an illustrative example.
23 In 1967 the 548 members of the Cortes, elected or appointed, were divided into various groups: 25 deputies for 
professional associations; 150 for the Syndicates - workers and employers (elected through indirect elections); 113 
representing the 9,032 municipalities, and 53 provincial councils; 108 representing the families (only sector elected 
through direct elections), another 110 procuradors were ex-officio - cabinet, university rectors, and so forth - and 24 
of them were appointed by Franco. The government was not accountable to the Cortes. See Juan J. Linz, “From 
Falange to Movement-Organization”, pp. 169. See also, Cuadernos para el Dialogo, Nos. 47 & 48, August-
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the Referendum of 1966, and also regularly voted in syndical and municipal elections, in 
neither of these was a representative chosen for the Cortes. For instance, in the 
Referendum of 1966 Spaniards voted for or against the LOE. On the other hand, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, in the syndical elections the election of a candidate was internal 
and, the elected workers’ representatives did not have a saying in national politics but 
only in professional matters. The same applied to the municipal elections where the 
concejal, or town councillor, was merely an administrative position, and therefore 
carried no political responsibility.24
Yet, the Law of Family Representation did not escape the critics. Some believed 
that because the ballot was restricted to heads of household, adult men and married 
women, it excluded an important number of Spanish citizens, especially women. The 
monthly Cuadernos para el Dialogo, for instance, argued that the electoral norms 
regulating the Law of Family Representation were restrictive and discriminatory. 
Even old-time apologists for the system of family representation, such as Laureano 
Lopez Rodo and Federico Silva, believed that this system was insufficient. They agreed 
on the need to open a path for the opposition (they were probably thinking of a 
controlled, moderate, opposition to the regime rather than a real opposition as 
represented by the Socialists or Communists) to participate in national politics, and they 
therefore favoured the establishment of a pluralist order.
The eligibility to become a candidate for the post of familiar was one of the 
factors that clearly demonstrated the lack of democratic representation. Apart from a list 
of administrative requirements that the candidate had to fulfil, - like being connected by
September 1967, pp. 12-14. For a detailed chart of the composition of the Cortes see Amodia, Franco’s political 
legacy, pp. 97-100.
24 ABC, 23 March 1967, p. 32. This view had been similarly supported by Ruiz Gim6nez years earlier. See A.C.N. 
de P., Boletin No. 783, 15 September 1964. Lecture also published by Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 18, March 
1965, pp. 5-12.
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birth and/or residence to the provinces they were representing - the candidate had to 
meet at least one of the following conditions. They had either to be, or have been, a 
procurador; or be nominated by five procuradores; or be nominated by seven regional 
deputies; or, alternatively, they had to collect the signatures of no less than one thousand
heads of family or married women (or 0.5% of the provincial census) in support of his
11candidacy in the province in which they wished to stand.
More than sixty per cent of the candidates to familiares were, anyway, either 
current procuradores (or had been in previous legislatures) or enjoyed official support. 
As a result, their few independent opponents rarely defeated them (the exception being 
the candidate Juan Manuel Fanjul Sedeno, who was voted in despite being an 
independent candidate). This was particularly evident, as they had to finance their 
own campaigns. Those candidates who were supported by official funds, or by a 
powerful pressure group, generally succeeded in their candidacy. Understandably, there 
were many citizens who, unable to collect several million pesetas for the electoral
9Qcampaign, had no real chance of candidacy, let alone election. As far as one can see, 
it was clear that the candidatures, although officially open to everyone, were destined for 
the privileged Francoist elite. Thus, the renowned and most democratic law so far, that
25 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 50, November 1967, p. 24
26 Lopez Rodo, Memorias II, p. 149.
27 BOE, Ley sobre las normas de las elecciones a procuradores familiares, 26 June 1967 (Publicacion date:); ABC, 
31 March 1967.
28 Amodia, Franco’s political legacy, p. 109. According to Cuadernos para el Dialogo, however, the number of 
procuradors with parallel official posts was 80 per cent o f the total. Thus, in 1967 out o f 108 procuradores, 31 had 
been directly designated to posts in the local, provincial, or central administration; 36 were active militants of the 
FET y de las JONS, or provincial councillors of the Movement, current holders or ex-holders of syndical, and 
Movement posts. None of these were included in the previous section; 3 procuradores of the then current 
Legislature, which was about to expire, and were not included in previous groups; 4 Presidents and directors of the 
family associations, at national or provincial level, not included in previous groups; 3 second lieutenants, not 
included in previous groups; 4 directors of the Cajas de Ahorro, and of the National Health Service, not included in 
previous groups; plus 24 of other professions. The addition of these six groups gives a total of 81 procuradores, in 
other words, 80% of the total. See Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 50, November 1967, p. 26. For more details on 
Manuel Fanjul see alsoBardavio y Sinova, Todo Franco, p. 250.
29 Eduardo Alvarez Puga, “Los ‘familiares’, una limitada apertura”, in Dossier Mundo, September-October, 1971, pp. 
9-12. The familiar Eduardo Tarragona claimed to have spent 2,037,049 pesetas (around £ 12,000) in his campaign in 
Barcelona. See Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 50, November 1967, p. 22.
In search o f the ‘Third Way’? (1967-1969) 110
of family representation, collapsed from within since its basic constituents, the registry 
for candidates to familiares, was not accessible to everyone.
The election of the familiares was announced for the 10 October 1967. One of
the most positive aspects of this election was that it brought to the Cortes a large
number of aperturistas of the so-called ‘generation of Prince Juan Carlos’ (that is those
bom shortly before, during or immediately after the Civil War - the Prince was bom in
1938). Among them were young figures such as Adolfo Suarez, Alfonso Osorio,
Fernando Abril Martorell, Tomas Allende, Pio Cabanillas, Rodolfo Martin Villa,
Gabriel Cisneros and Marcelino Oreja. This new breed of moderate Francoists,
although fully integrated into the regime, was to play a decisive role in the success of
the transition to a democratic system.30 Thus, many familiares were regarded as
 ^1
aperturistas with a few exceptions such as Jaime Capmany. Yet, the familiares, like 
the other groups in the Cortes, were not independent of the Francoist executive. As seen 
above, a substantial number of familiares held parallel official posts within the 
administration, which tied them to the will of the executive, thereby diminishing their 
decision-making power.32 Amando de Miguel argued that in an authoritarian system, 
like the Spanish one, the procuradores (in general) could never - as a minority group - 
have become an autonomous power by themselves. However, at an individual level the 
procuradores may have enjoyed special privileges because they belonged to other 
spheres of power.
30 Lopez Rodo, Memorias II, p. 118.
31 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999.
32 The procurador Juan Manuel Fanjul complained about the lack of power of the procuradores to speak to the 
cabinet. He argued that Franco’s Ministers had massive power which made it impossible to use the normal objections 
and interventions that could be used by other procuradores in order to secure debates in favour of proposal or 
against. Dossier Mundo, September-October 1971, p. 74.
33 According to Amando de Miguel, the spheres of power the familiares belonged to were the following: 18% had 
important posts in public limited corporations; 26% claimed to have important decorations; 40% appeared in Who’s
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A group of around sixty familiares who resented their lack of decision-making 
powers at the Cortes decided to organize their meetings outside Madrid, away from the 
Cortes, although the executive had full knowledge of their movements. On 20 January 
1968 they met in Pamplona, and later in cities like Salamanca, Zaragoza and Barcelona. 
They earned the nickname of Cortes trashumantes, or ‘the wandering Cortes’.34 The 
government stopped authorizing these meetings, and their adventure soon came to an 
end. These meetings had become very popular because the press wrote about them, and 
it was through this publicity that people began to learn of political affairs unknown to 
them until then. In September of that same year a meeting of familiares in Ceuta was 
halted by the Interior Ministry, which would not authorize it. From then on, their 
meetings were held at the Cortes behind closed doors. The regime stopped these 
meetings as well because they addressed political problems where the Cortes merely 
dealt with technical problems. It was believed that ‘political discussions’ should not be
'y c
on the procuradores’ agenda. So, if political discussions were not allowed by the 
Spanish population or even by procuradores en Cortes, on whose agenda were they 
allowed? The familiar Eduardo Tarragona resigned in protest at the lack of trust shown 
by the executive.36
The initial enthusiasm and interest that had emerged from the meetings of the 
familiares faded away due to tight control and lack of independence. A situation that 
also affected prospective candidates for the 1971 elections. Thus, in 1967 there were
Who; 65% had already been procuradores in previous legislatures; 67% had university degrees; and 72% had 
managerial positions. Thus, de Miguel argued that, regardless of their success in being elected or re-elected 
familiares they still belonged to a powerful minority. See FOESSA, Informe Sociologico 1970, Chapter 5, p. 35.
34 Some observers also called this group of familiares ‘ Cortes Gastronomicas\ since they regularly met in a 
restaurant in Madrid. See Don Quijote, No. 3, Madrid, 24 October 1968, p. 5.
35 Mundo, l-VIII-70, p. 22..
36 Garcia Escudero, Historia de la epoca de Franco, pp. 126-127. Strong reactions by some familiares against the 
suspension of the Ceuta meeting can also be seen in Don Quijote, No. 5, 7 November 1968, p. 4.
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328 candidates for 108 seats, whereas in 1971 the number of candidates declined to 250. 
According to Jose Amodia, the understanding among some prospective candidates that 
the family sector was not an engine for change within the regime - as it initially 
appeared to be -, prompted feelings of disillusionment and a lack of interest that led to 
the decrease in the number of candidates.37 There were also other reasons, however. In 
1975, Alfonso Osorio declared his intention not to stand as candidate for Santander 
again because he disagreed with the way ‘the electoral system has worked until now’. In 
other words, not allowing the defence of ideological positions, but merely personal 
ones.38
As a group, the familiares may not have exerted great influence upon the regime, 
yet they achieved something perhaps more important. According to Alfonso Osorio, the 
familiares managed to make the ‘well informed man-in-the-street’ aware of the 
existence of a progressive current within the regime willing to modernize the political
39system.
3.3. The Organic Law o f the Movement
As we can see, the first attempted institutional reform based on the ordinances of 
the LOE failed to bring the long-awaited increase in real public participation in national 
politics. Although the system of suffrage was the most democratic so far, the 
overwhelming majority of the familiares candidates came from the Francoist pool. In 
other words, no real chance was offered to the common citizens who were not directly 
attached to the Movement to pursue a seat as familiar. The same line followed the
37 Amodia, Franco's political legacy, p. 107.
38 Informaciones, 11 Octubre 1975, p. 9.
39 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999.
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reform of the Movement itself, which was perhaps the most controversial of those 
reforms approved on 28 June 1967.
The initiative to reform the Movement was not new, however. As seen in 
Chapter 1, in 1956 Jose Luis Arrese, in his capacity of Minister-Secretary of the 
Movement began to work on the political reform of the regime, that is the separation of 
the State and the government. According to Linz, Arrese attempted ‘to give the 
Movimiento a more permanent, institutionalized, and perhaps democratized role in the 
constitution of the state’. But, although his ‘proposals represented a revolutionary 
change in the system’, these changes insisted on continuity.40 Arrese’s proposal failed 
but the wish to reform the Movement remained, particularly among the aperturistas. 
But, it was not until 1967 that the new Organic Law of the Movement was finally 
approved.
Article 1 of the new Organic Law of the Movement and its National Council of 
1967 - which had allegedly been drafted as early as the spring of 195841 - the National 
Councillors specified:
in virtue of that established in the LOE, the National Movement, communion of the Spaniards 
in the Principles promulgated by the Fundamental Law of 17 May 1958, states [that] the 
political order [is] open to the totality of the Spaniards and, for the best service to the 
homeland, promotes political life in a regime of ordered concurrence of opinions 42
In case there was any doubt, the then Minister-Secretary of the Movement Jose 
Solis, confirmed that ‘the Movement is the antithesis of a political party, because it is 
the expression of the whole society rather than the anarchization, and diversity of a party
40 Linz, “From Falange to Movement-Organizacion”, pp. 153-155.
41 See Garcia Escudero, Historia de la epoca de Franco, p. 130. The project of this Law could have been elaborated 
by Fernando Herrero Tejedor, then Vice-Secretary General of the Movement, in the early 1960s. Herrero proposed a 
new definition of the functions of the Movement. Among these functions Herrero Tejedor proposed the authorization 
of family associations and also of married women within the Movement. Thus, even though this measure was 
initially approved, it was later abolished in 1965 due to violent protests in the Cortes. See Historia de Esparia: 
Ramon Menendez Pidal. Dirigida por Jose Maria Jover Zamora. Vol. XLI. Tomo 1. La epoca de Franco (1939- 
1975). Politica, Ejercito, Iglesia, Economia y Administracion.(Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1996).p. 129.
In search o f  the ‘Third Way7  (1967-1969) 114
system. The Movement is a new formula that covers the whole of the regime as the 
communion of all Spaniards, as the institution of our system of representation, as the 
organization of services for the Spanish community’.43 But, even Carrero’s protege, 
Laureano Lopez Rodo believed that the definition of the Movement contained in the 
new Law was rather regressive, and warned the Caudillo of its contradiction of the 
allegedly reformist spirit of the LOE. The new law was, according to Lopez Rodo, 
clearly regressive. It re-enforced the power of the Movement going against any possible 
modernization of the regime.44
Nevertheless, the essence of the Law revived hopes for a greater participation in 
national politics. Gabriel Cisneros wrote in Pueblo that the ‘plurality of opinions’ that 
the statute referred to undoubtedly meant the unequivocal arrival of political 
associations. A similar interpretation was given by Pedro Calvo Hernando from Nuevo 
Diario, who believed that the Law implied, ‘at least in theory’, the end of the oligarchy- 
minority phase and the freedom to constitute associations.45 Yet, outburst of hope for 
the establishment of a system formed by real political associations vanished soon. The 
National Councillor, and former National Chief of the Official Student Syndicate, Jose 
Manuel Orti Bordas, seemed to have a more accurate understanding of the meaning of 
the Law. Also in Pueblo he wrote that since ‘the Movement was open to all Spaniards, 
they all have the right and must have the opportunity to participate in its task. [Thus] 
the concept of participation replaces that of affiliation, incorporation or militancy. [...] 
If the thesis of the proposal succeeds, what are to coexist are not different ideologies.
42 BOE, Ley Organica del Movimiento Nacional y  su Consejo Nacional. 28 June 1967 (Publication date: 1 July 
1967).
43 Tiempo Nuevo, No. 32, 6-VII-1967, pp. 26-27.
44 Lopez Rodo, Memorias II, p. 202.
45 Pueblo, 19-X-1968, p. 3; Nuevo Diario, Dominical, 20-X-68, p. 9.
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but the different nuances to be found in the Principles of the Movement’.46 Yet, in real
terms even such a limited thesis would not have been easy to apply. Franco had no wish 
to alter the system of representation of the Cortes, which was organized not by political 
parties but by interests, such as those of the syndicate, municipalities, family and 
corporations.47 In any case, the function of ‘channelling within the Principles of the 
Movement the contrast of opinions (contraste de pareceres) over political action* - as 
stated in the new Organic Law of the Movement - could not be automatically applied. 
This function had to be strengthened and regulated by yet another Organic Statute of the 
Movement.
On 14 November 1968, the Second Section of the National Council met to 
discuss the second and third points of the Organic Statute of the Movement. These 
points dealt with ‘the participation of Spaniards in the Movement’, and with ‘the 
associative entities of the Movement’ respectively.48 These issues, although present for 
a long time, provoked a passionate debate insofar as they touched on one of the most 
sensitive points of the regime; that is the possibility to transform the one-party system 
into one composed of political groups. In the corridors of power the real debate 
amongst the aperturistas was, according to Gabriel Cisneros, ‘whether political 
associations would be mere artefacts within the Movement, or they would be germs of 
future political parties, within a limited pluralism’.49 Undoubtedly, as the director of the 
daily ABC  foretold in January 1970, the content of the statute started off what was going
46 Pueblo, 17-X-1968. See also Don Quijote, No. 4, 31 October 1968, p. 4.
47 Emilio Romero, Cartas al Pueblo Soberano, (Madrid: Afrodisio Aguado, S.A., 1965), p. 24, cited in Miguel, 
Informe Sociologico 1970, Chapter 5, p. 36.
48 BOE, Estatuto Organico del Movimiento Nacional. 20 December 1968 (Publication date: 4 January 1969).
49 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13 September 1999.
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to be the most polemical ‘issue’ of the beginning of the 1970s, the issue of political 
associationism.50
A total of thirty-five procuradores of diverse Francoist backgrounds discussed 
the articles of the Statute. Thus, there were old time Falangists, like the several times 
Minister of Franco, Raimundo Fernandez Cuesta; young Falangists, like Rodolfo Martin 
Villa and Miguel Primo de Rivera; and others not so involved in the Movement, such as 
Gregorio Maranon Moya. From their different perspectives, therefore, these councillors 
addressed their main question, ‘whether political associations would finally be 
allowed?’51 The climax of the debate was reached when the discussion centred on 
Article 15 of the Statute, by which the population was allowed to form associations - 
always within the ideological framework of the Movement in order to maintain control. 
Even a limited concession provoked reactions from the hard-liners. Fernandez Cuesta, 
for instance, opposed any type of association that could threaten the return of political 
parties. He argued that ‘the diversity of opinions in national politics was not new. It has 
existed in all governments of the past years without the need for associationism. [...] I 
favour the concurrence of criteria, [and] the more the better. Through associations, if 
that is the wish, but [in such a way] that those associations do not defend [political] 
ideologies, [and] do not have a political aim’.
The most orthodox Francoists shared Fernandez Cuesta’s view whose main fear 
was the revival of a party system. But, as Orti Bordas recalled, ‘the Constitution that the 
Spanish country has overwhelmingly approved does not permit political parties’.53 
Their insecurity was, therefore, not justified because Franco would never approve, let
50 El Movimienlo y  el Asociacionismo. Declaraciones del Ministro Secretario General del Movement, Torcuato 
Femandez-Miranda, al Director del Diario “ABC” el dia 11 de enero de 1970 y comentarios de prensa. (Madrid: Ed. 
Del Movement, 1970), p. 21.
51 Mundo, 30-XI-68, pp. 17-20.
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alone legalize, such a system. But, Gabriel Cisneros observed that discussions of the 
Statute were presided over by more profound fears. ‘Fear of divorce from the deep 
reality of the country, fear of disappointing the hopes [built up] around the Statute, [...] 
fear of provoking indifference among the young people, and fear of throwing legitimate 
discrepancies off the playing field, and beyond the wall of legality’.54
Cruz Martinez Esteruelas, National Delegate of Associations to the Assembly of 
Provincial Delegates of Associations, attempted to ease the tension with an explanation 
that satisfied the inmovilista side particularly. He defended the position that, unlike 
political parties, which have their own ideology, associations would be created in 
accordance with the Principles of the Movement, and within it, which meant that they 
would be only minor variations of the same ideology. In other words, there would be a 
contrast of opinions, not of ideologies. On these grounds, according to him, ‘between 
the one-party system, and the pluralism of parties, [...] there is a third way: the 
associations’.55 This may explain why Martinez Esteruelas believed that the ultimate 
power of the Movement surpassed both the single-party system and the system of 
political parties. ‘One only has to look at the world’, he said, ‘to realise that the type of 
democracy based on the classic party system is reduced to a few countries and all of 
them are under revision’.56
During the course of the debates, there was agreement not to prohibit 
associations that had electoral aims. If there were to be political associations, they 
should have electoral aims. Otherwise, according to the procurador Diego Salas
52 Jover Zamora (Dtor.), Historia de Espafia, Vol. XLI., p. 130; Eduardo Alvarez Puga, “El Asociacismo politico 
espafiol”, in Dossier Mundo, No. 1., May-June, 1971, p. 14.
53 Mundo, 21-VI-69, pp. 8-9.
54 Mundo, 30-XI-68, p. 17.
55 Ferrando Badia, Del Autoritarismo a la Democracia, p. 47.
56 Mundo, 8-VI-68, pp. 15-18; Mundo, 14-XII-68, pp. 16-17.
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S7Pombo, it would be like putting ‘doors in the countryside’ (puertas al campo). Some 
councillors even demanded a proper distinction between the terms ‘associations’, 
‘entities’ and ‘brotherhoods’. This variety of terms, however, did not prevent many 
Councillors to acknowledge the existence of new currents of thought, and consequently 
the urgent need to open the regime to those tendencies. Miguel Primo de Rivera, 
member of the Council of the Realm and nephew of the ideologist of 18 July 1936, Jose 
Antonio Primo de Rivera, was one of the most eagerly awaited speakers. Primo de 
Rivera argued that the refusal to accept the new currents of thought meant inmovilismo. 
‘The regime’, he explained, ‘is supported by the personal power of General Franco, and 
the moment he is gone, everything will collapse if there are not thriving institutions in 
place by which the political system can be supported.’
Incidentally, at that time the weekly Actualidad Espanola, linked to the liberal 
branch of Opus Dei, published a special report paralleling Primo de Rivera’s thesis with 
the title “Estos son los cerebros de la corrientes politicas", or “These are the minds 
leading the political currents”. The report discussed the existence of different 
ideological affiliations of some members of the regime. According to Jose Antonio 
Valverde, the author of the report, there were at least seven ideological groups, 
themselves sub-divided. These were the Falangists (Manuel Cantarero del Castillo), the 
Syndicalists (Jose Solis); the Christian Democrats (Alberto Ballarin Marcial); the Leftist 
Democrats (Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez); the Monarchists, who themselves were divided 
into Juanistas (Jose Maria Peman) and Carlists (Carlos Hugo Borbon de Parma); the 
Socialists (Enrique Tiemo Galvan); and finally the forces of the new generation 
(Political clubs such as Centro de Estudio de Problemas Contemporaneos, Club
57 Ferrando Badla, El regimen de Franco, p. 168.
58 Alvarez Puga, “El Asociacismo politico espanol”, pp. 8-9.
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Jovellanos, Horizonte-%0).59 It is noticeable that neither Opus Dei nor Don Juan Carlos 
appeared on this list.
After a few weeks of intense discussions, the Organic Statute of the Movement 
was approved on 20 December 1968. Jose Solis, Minister-Secretary of the Movement, 
assured the members of the National Council that; ‘with the reform of the Movement 
[...] we are to offer a possibility of political freedom within a unity of principles and 
objectives’. But, the statute allowed associations only to be created ‘for the 
development of family participation in public life, and for the defence and promotion of 
the interests of Spanish families’ (Article 13 of the Statute). Other types of associations 
permitted were those for the defence of different professions, cultural values, and so 
forth (Article 14).60 Everyone wondered what had happened to the forgotten political 
associations. In real terms, the Statute was, according to an editorial of Ruiz Gimenez’s 
Cuadernos para el Dialogo, ‘overtly restrictive, and it is to be feared that the situation 
will worsen, since the Secretary General of the Movement is empowered to draw up a 
statute of associations.’ The editorial was blunt, and surely reflected the opinion of 
many readers. Among other things, it wrote that ‘to announce [...] evolution and 
openness that does not then occur begins to be a risky and dangerous game for the future 
coexistence of Spaniards.’61
The rounds of endless debate had not yet finished. Certain ordinances of the 
Statute had yet to be redefined in order to allow the creation of political associations. 
Obviously, orthodox members of the regime took all possible steps to allow the 
existence of a network of political associations, even within the Movement. The Second
59 Actualidad Espanola, No. 854, 16 May 1968, pp. 29-33.
60 Boletin Oficial del Consejo Nacional del Movimiento, Ano XIII, Madrid 12 December 1968, No. 61, pp. 1024, 
1027-1033; BOE, Estatuto Organico del Movimiento Nacional. 20 December 1968 (Publication date: 4 January 
1969).
61 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 62, November 1968, p. 8-12.
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Section of the National Council, therefore, had to elaborate yet another law which 
determined the conditions under which the associations could be formed. Once drawn 
up, the basis of the new law had to be presented to all members of the National Council, 
then await for possible amendments, and once approved, be blessed by the Caudillo: a 
substantial time lag which could only be explained by fear for the development of 
proper opposition forces. Thus, as Amodia explained, ‘the Movement’s National 
Council could not allow any association, even when acting within the limits of the
fDofficial doctrine, to develop into a threat to the organization of the Movement’.
Meanwhile, this painfully slow process was translated into the impatience of the 
population, which itself was reflected by the press in countless articles. These articles 
were published by the most progressive newspapers and journals including Cuadernos 
para el Dialogo, Mundo, Don Quijote, YA and Madrid. According to one of these 
journals, the press itself was one of the groups covering the institutional vacuum in the 
national politics. In other words, given the lack of an official institutionalized 
opposition, the press was acting, in most cases in a moderate way, as the opposition to
f iXthe regime, which was tolerated perhaps because it had no real access to power.
3.4. The Legal Basis o f  Associations within the Movement
During three hot days in June (26, 27, and 28) 1969 the Movement’s National 
Council met to elaborate the so-called Anteproyecto de Bases del Regimen Juridico 
Asociativo del Movimiento or the Legal Basis o f  Associations Within the Movement, by 
which, as mentioned above, the procedure for the creation of political associations 
would be re-defined. Following the usual verbal battle between the inmovilistas and
62 Amodia, Franco’s political legacy, p. 138.
63 Mundo, 10-11-1968, p. 11; 17-11-1968, p. 11.
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aperturistas reflected in a total of 667 interventions, the National Council approved the 
introduction of a rather limited type of association, the ‘association of opinion’; in other 
words ‘opinion without participation’.64 On the aperturista side there were 
procuradores like Alberto Ballarin Marcial, who made a sound argument in favour of 
political associations. He claimed that, ‘we must avoid the formation of a parallel, and 
clandestine Spain, [therefore, we must] offer, not a police order to control them, but an 
alternative, a channel of integration’.65 Even Emilio Romero, director of Pueblo, the 
newspaper of the official syndicate, defended the need for political associations. ‘I am 
very afraid’, Romero said, ‘that the ground [that lies] beneath public opinion collapses if 
political access to the government is not regulated’. In contrast, the hard-liner 
Fernandez Cuesta argued that, ‘when there are associations of a political nature, 
regardless of their ideology, we have a political party, and [I] oppose that’.66
On 3 July 1969, Jose Solis presided over the session of the National Council 
during which the proposal was finally approved. Chapter XVII of the proposal dealt 
with the rather timid ‘associations of public opinion’ rather than ‘political associations’, 
which in fact were not mentioned anywhere in the proposal. During his presentation of 
the proposal to the National Council, Alejandro Fernandez Sordo, asserted that ‘the 
reality is that there is an internal dynamic in this Movement that allows, thanks to its 
political stability, an authentic evolution without involution that takes us to the 
existence of new horizons, without erosion either of the Principles, or of the
(\7Fundamental Laws [of the Movement]’. But, if  Fernandez Sordo’s statement about an 
authentic evolution was sincere, why did the council approve the ambiguous
64 Mundo, 5-VII-1969, pp. 10-12. The divisions between continuistas and aperturistas (or reformistas), which as 
mentioned in Chapter 1 dates from the mid-50’s, as it was observed by Madrid with the occasion of the LOE. See 
Madrid, “Continuistas y Reformistas ante la nueva constitution”, 29 November 1966.
65 Ferrando Badia, Del Autoritarismo a la Democracia, p. 47. See also, Alvarez Puga, “ El asociacionismo 
espanol”, pp. 16-20.
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‘associations of public opinion’, instead of the long-demanded ‘political associations’? 
Yet, the growing impatience of some members of the regime was such that, while still 
waiting for Franco’s ratification of the law they began the formation of commissions - 
as required by the Law - which would set the basis for each of their future associations 
o f ‘public opinion’.68
The first to sign its act of constitution was the so-called Action Politica, or 
Political Action, in August 1969. Among its ten promoters were aperturistas such as 
Pio Cabanillas (sub-Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Tourism), Leopoldo 
Calvo Sotelo (general director of Espanola de Explosivos), Juan Manuel Fanjul 
(procurador familiar), Jose Garcia Hernandez (National Councillor of the Movement 
for Guadalajara and procurador in Cortes), and Joaquin Viola (procurador familiar), all 
of whom had great expectations in the future of the association. It is difficult to define 
the political ideology of this association although it was supposed not to have any. But, 
while allegedly being unconditional supporters of the Caudillo, its organizers claimed to 
favour a representative, Catholic and social monarchy as ordered by the Fundamental 
Laws. The common ground of the members of this group was their great concern over 
the future of the country.69 Yet, the advocacy of a representative system ‘as ordered by 
the Fundamental Laws’ was not particularly adventurous.
The next proposal was presented by the young Falangist Manuel Cantarero del 
Castillo. The principles of his Reforma Social Espanola, or Spanish Social Reform, 
were based on the Falangist Agrupacion de Antiguos Miembros del Frente de 
Juventudes, or Group of Former Members of the Youth Front, which already had thirty
66 Mundo,, 5-VII-69, pp. 10-12S
67 Boletin Oficial del Consejo Nacional del Movimiento, Afio XIV, Madrid, 17 July de 1969, No. 65, p. 1149.
68 A special report on the first projects of associations of ‘public opinion’ was published by the team of Alvarez Puga, 
“El asociacionismo espanol”, pp. 18-20, 28-32.
69 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio ”, p. 69.
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thousand members. Thus, Cantarero, who regarded himself as ‘Falangist with a 
decisive Socialist vocation’70, had the opportunity to build perhaps the largest 
association so far. And, even though he wanted to contribute to the new system with a 
politically advanced association, he was certain that there was too much distrust and 
narrow-mindedness for it to success. That limitation could explain why four of 
Cantarero’s followers, who were themselves procuradores, voted against the statute of 3 
July 1969.71
The Christian Democrat group of the procurador Alberto Ballarin Marcial drew 
up another proposal for an association. Democracia Social, or Social Democracy, ‘will 
represent’, Ballarin declared, ‘a very much needed centrist position that will be 
constructive to our country, [where both] Rightist and Leftist extremist minorities 
abound’. Its principles, all of them socially-oriented, included the recognition of 
political plurality, freedom of religion, effective implementation of Human Rights in 
Spain, free basic education, administrative and economic decentralization of Spain into 
regions (autonomies), and the correction of the regions’ inequalities.
The ultra-Rightist Bias Pinar led the last of the four pioneering proposed 
associations. Pinar, who voted against the creation of associations at the National 
Council, claimed that this association of public opinion was created against his will. 
Allegedly, sympathizers of Pinar’s magazine Fuerza Nueva (see Chapter 2 for its 
creation) wished to form an association to defend their ideas publicly. To that end, they 
persuaded Pinar to modify his opposition to associations and create his own. The 
remnants of Spanish Ultra-Right who formed Fuerza Nueva (name also given to the
70 Rafael Herrera interviewed Cantarero del Castillo. See Mundo, 28-VI-1969. Although Cantarero was identified 
with the Falange, he defended a sort of Social Democracy within the Falange. Some of his books on the subject are, 
Manuel Cantarero del Castillo, Tragedia del socialismo espafiol: un estudio de los procesos socialistas en Espafia, 
(Barcelona: Dopesa, 1971) and Falange y  Socialismo, (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1973).
71 Mundo, 28-VI-1969.
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association) defined the ideology of their association as ‘Christian-National’, and called 
for the unity of all Falangists, as they feared that ‘the enemy is now perfectly organized, 
and if in the face of this [we] continue to be separated, divided amongst different 
associations, [we] can consider ourselves defeated’.72
There were other groups like La Comunion Tradicionalista, Distrito Centro de 
Madrid and the group led by the lawyer and civil servant at the Ministry of Commerce, 
Manuel Funes Robert. These all had the potential to become political associations. But 
the group which had the most potential for becoming an association - and the last to be 
announced during that summer - was the one created by the engineer and founder of the 
Agrupacion Cientifica Economica y  Social, Joaquin del Soto Hidalgo, at the end of 
August 1969. The association would be called Democratica-PoUtico-Social- 
Economica, an unusual name for an association whose ideals were based upon 
unconditional collaboration with the Caudillo. Public order, equality of opportunities,
* ♦ 7 aand national umty, were among the seven principles outlined in its proposal.
Meanwhile, by the autumn of 1969, the proposed Bases del Regimen Juridico 
Asociativo del Movimiento was still awaiting Franco’s signature. Observers wondered 
what was stopping the Caudillo from giving the go-ahead to a proposal that had been 
approved unanimously by the National Congress of the Movimiento. He himself had
s
stated that ‘the ideas must be debated because through dialogue emerges [...] the 
remedy that coincides with the precise solution’, although he was doing nothing to 
encourage such debate.74 While observers played with various hypotheses to explain 
this delay, they understood it was the consequence of a deep political problem. From
72 Mundo, 16-VIII-1969, pp. 10-11.
73 Mundo, 30-VIII-69, p. 8. It is interesting to note that although these associations were supposed to be merely of 
‘public opinion’, they all had clear political terms in their names.
In search o f the ‘ Third Way*? (1967-1969) 125
the approval of the proposal in July 1969 until the autumn of that year, a couple of 
events influenced the Spanish political landscape that had a direct effect on the fate of 
the proposal of political associations. The first event, and perhaps the most important of 
the two was Franco’s official appointment of Don Juan Carlos as his successor on 21 
July 1969. Later, the eruption of a financial scandal involving some members of the 
cabinet led to the second event, an inevitable government change in November.
This cabinet reshuffle clearly hindered the trajectory of the already approved 
Bases del Regimen Juridico Asociativo del Movimiento. And, although at first sight the 
actual appointment of Don Juan Carlos as Franco’s successor would not appear to be a 
factor that would change the trajectory of the approved bill, it was believed that the 
success of the campaign in favour of his candidature - principally orchestrated by 
members of the Opus Dei, and other Francoists like Torcuato Femandez-Miranda - 
could have been threatened by the existence of a legalized network of associations.
3.5. Juan Carlos: Franco’s official successor
One of the principal questions that remained a mystery for many years was 
Franco’s choice, among the Monarchist Pretenders, of a successor as Head of State. The 
Monarchists wondered which of the Pretenders, Don Juan or his son Juan Carlos, would 
succeed Franco as Head of State. Don Alfonso de Borbon (son of Don Juan’s elder 
brother, who had previously abdicated in favour of his brother Juan), and the Carlist 
branch of the Borbons were regarded as the least probable of Franco’s choices. But, the 
Caudillo had probably made his decision long ago.
74 Boletin Oficial del Consejo Nacional del Movimiento, Afio XII, Madrid 4 December 1967, No. 53, p. 918.
75 Jose Luis Alcocer, Fernandez-Miranda: agonla de un Estado, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1986), p. 54.
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In 1965, while the issue of succession was still unclear, during an interview 
given to The Times Manuel Fraga, Minister of Information, asserted that Prince Juan 
Carlos was to be Franco’s successor. ‘It is more and more accepted - the Minister said - 
that when General Franco’s regime ends, Don Juan Carlos will become King of
7Spain’. A controversial statement that, according to Preston, Fraga would not have 
made without Franco’s authorization.77 In fact, on 26 March 1966, the Caudillo 
confessed to his cousin when the latter asked him about his thoughts on succession that, 
‘anyway, [it will be] neither Don Juan nor Don Hugo; neither are on the shortlist, 
because the first wants [to establish] a liberal monarchy, and the second is not Spanish, 
whatever his followers say’.78 According to the 1947 Ley de Sucesion, Franco had a 
free hand in the choice of his successor. Yet, it was not until 15 January 1969, that, 
during a private meeting, Franco told Prince Juan Carlos that he would be the one 
succeeding him. Although it seemed that the choice had been made, Franco had not 
decided the date for the appointment. In March 1969, during a conversation with the 
Caudillo his friend general Camilo Alonso Vega insisted on the importance of 
appointing the Prince as successor. Alonso Vega’s eightieth birthday was imminent, 
and allegedly Franco’s colleague asked him to appoint the Prince as a birthday present 
for him. Although Franco was three years younger than Alonso Vega, the issue of age 
was unavoidable, and at that stage, worrying. Some weeks later, the Caudillo was 
giving direct instructions to Carrero to begin the preparations for the appointment,
70perhaps influenced by Alonso Vega’s plea.
76 The Times, 20 November 1965, p. 7.
77 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 150; Preston, Franco, p.725.
78 Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversacionesprivadas, p. 465.
79 Alfonso Armada, Al servicio de la corona, (Barcelona: Planeta, December 1983, 2nd Ed.), p. 128.
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On 8 January 1969 - following the expulsion of the Borbon-Parma family, the 
Carlist contender, from Spain - in an interview with Carlos Mendo, director of the EFE 
agency, Don Juan Carlos declared his readiness to remain faithful to the Caudillo’s 
regime and the principles of the Movement. Such a controversial declaration pleased 
the most conservative sections of the regime, namely that of Carrero and Opus Dei, 
whereas it surely deeply concerned the democratic opposition. Although the authorship 
behind the Prince’s declaration was not disclosed, Fraga cleverly hid his own name
O A  O 1
between the lines of his memoirs. Yet, Lopez Rodo implies that he wrote the text. 
The Prince’s declaration set the political course for that year, and coincided with the 
launching of the so-called Operation Principe - slyly orchestrated by Carrero Blanco 
and followed largely by the technocrats of Opus Dei, principally Lopez Rodo - which 
ultimately gave the young Prince the succession. On 21 July 1969 the victorious 
‘candidate of the Movement’ - Don Juan Carlos - became the successor to the position 
of Head of State with the title of King.82
Prince Juan Carlos, however, was in an uncomfortable position. On the one 
hand the democratic opposition did not trust him, and regarded him merely as Franco’s 
puppet. For them, the Prince’s position seemed clear to them since he had sworn loyalty 
to the Francoist Fundamental Laws as part of the list of conditions laid down in Article 
9 of the Law of Succession. On the other hand, the Prince did not have the full 
support of the orthodox Francoists, and even less of the ‘republican’ die-hard Falangists. 
Juan Carlos’ appointment was only celebrated by Carrero’s entourage and by most of
80 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 236.
81 L6pez Rodo, Memorias II, p. 382.
82 ABC  was forced to write the headlines ‘Ha triunfado la candidatura del Movimiento', which Juan Ignacion Luca 
de Tena, A B C s director, refused to accept. See Gomez-Santo, Conversaciones con Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, p. 115. 
Full details on the Operacion Principe are recorded by Laureano L6pez Rodo, one of its main organizers. See L6pez 
Rodo, La larga marcha hacia la monarquia, pp. 377-500. See also, Raul Morodo et al, Espana Perspectiva, 1970, 
(Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, 1970), pp. 29-30.
83 Amodia, Franco’s political legacy, p. 54.
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the aperturistas. Gabriel Cisneros, for instance, claims with a degree of hindsight that 
at that point they [the aperturistas] were convinced that a non-parliamentary and non- 
pluralist monarchy was totally unthinkable. He, at any rate, was convinced that the 
Prince would not favour such a system. ‘The aperturistas\ Cisneros asserted, ‘never 
wished to anticipate the process of establishing a parliamentary monarchy until the 
physical disappearance of General Franco, basically because they wished the process to 
be as undramatic as possible’. Thus, they wanted ‘to bring as much of the future as 
possible to the present’. Anyhow, Franco would halt any attempt to open up the 
regime.
Nevertheless, for some members of the democratic opposition, namely some 
Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Conservatives, Don Juan seemed to be their 
preferred candidate. Don Juan was less involved with the regime, and, therefore, less 
dependent on it than Don Juan Carlos, who had obviously been groomed by the
• 85 •Caudillo. Moreover, it was believed that Don Juan supported democracy and 
pluralism within the monarchy. Therefore, for them the reality of a democratic Spain 
lay ultimately in Don Juan’s hands, who from private council and secretariat in Estoril 
(Portugal) maintained contacts with pro-Monarchist personalities in order to promote 
his return as monarch of the country.86 Don Juan’s secretariat, which had been headed 
by the Christian Democrat, Jose Maria Gil-Robles, and by the ex-Minister of Franco’s 
first government, Pedro Sainz Rodriguez, was currently headed by the Conde de 
Motrico, Jose Maria de Areilza. Areilza had been an important ambassador for Franco 
(Buenos Aires, Washington, Paris), but resigned from his last post in Paris after the
84 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13 September 1999.
85 Mundo. 5-VII-69, p. 18.
86 Testimony of Antonio Gavilanes, 21 September 1999.
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Munich and Grimau affairs in 1963 (in future years, Areilza was to join Fraga in the 
latter’s political formation). Thus, in Estoril Don Juan received visits from many 
Spaniards concerned with the future of Spain, for at that time Don Juan was still the 
historic heir to the Spanish throne. But for Franco, that was out of the question. In fact, 
according to King Juan Carlos himself, the Caudillo’s hatred of Don Juan could have 
been because ‘Franco saw my father as the only person who could contest the legitimacy 
of his own power. [...] He must genuinely have seen him as a dangerous liberal who 
might turn everything he, Franco, had done upside down. [...] When my father said, “I 
want to be King of all the Spanish people”, Franco translated that as, “I want to be King
oo
of the victors and the vanquished alike”.’
From 1965 Antonio Gavilanes, (later president and founder of the Centro de 
Estudios de Problemas Contemporaneos in 1967), visited Don Juan, accompanied by 
Monarchist university students and professors on a number of occasions. Through the 
mediation of Don Juan, Gavilanes also maintained close contacts with Don Juan Carlos
O Q
with whom he also discussed the country’s future. In fact those who enjoyed the 
confidence of the Prince, and had talks with him were convinced of the Prince’s wish to 
establish a democratic monarchy under his reign once the Caudillo had passed away. 
Gabriel Cisneros, for instance, was said to have taken the aperturista line early on in his 
political career, as Don Juan Carlos’ democratic aspirations had been clear to him for a 
long time. Cisneros confessed that his personal political trajectory was conditioned by 
his early knowledge that the Prince would favour a democratic system after Franco.90 
Manuel Fraga, who seemed to favour the Prince as well, defended the monarchy as ‘the
87 Jos6 Maria de Areilza, Cronica deLibertad, (Planeta, Barcelona, 1985), pp. 19-21,42-44.
88 Jose Luis de Vilallonga, The King. A life of King Juan Carlos of Spain, (London: Weidenfeld, 1994), pp. 104-5.
89 Testimony of Antonio Gavilanes, 21 September 1999.
90 This conviction appears to be shared by Alfonso Osorio, Gabriel Cisneros and Antonio Gavilanes. In 1972 
Antonio Gavilanes declared in Mundo that he saw ‘in him [Prince Juan Carlos] a king of European character, adapted
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unifying and integrating State force within the inevitable plurality of [Spanish] society’ 
during a speech given at Club Siglo XXI in Madrid in November 1971.91
Yet, according to a survey carried out by the sociologist Amando de Miguel in 
1970, there was a significant part of the Spanish population that favoured a republic. To 
the question of which political system they would prefer should the position of Head of 
State became vacant: 55% of manual workers interviewed preferred a system like that 
under Franco; 23% of lawyers preferred a Borbon monarchy; but, 76% of university 
students, 53% of lawyers, 45% of office employees and 43% of medical doctors 
preferred a republic. On the other hand, another sociologist Sergio Vilar argues that 
whereas in the 1960s no one, with the exception of the Monarchists, favoured a 
‘crowned democracy’, throughout the 1970s increasing numbers of democrats accepted 
this option. For instance, in those days the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) founded 
by the Professor of Constitutional Law, Enrique Tiemo Galvan, was the first leftist
Q'Xgroup that accepted the monarchy.
In fact, by the 1970s the majority of the Spanish ruling class favoured a future 
monarchy under Don Juan Carlos, many of them, particularly the orthodox Francoists, 
believing he could guarantee the continuation of the Francoist regime. Thus, given that 
the population had no say in national politics, the ruling class decided for them even if 
the Republican option was allegedly favoured by a large number of Spanish people. On 
22 July 1968 the majority of procuradores in the Cortes voted in favour of Don Juan 
Carlos’ appointment. A day later, the Prince accepted the post and swore loyalty to both
to the new Spanish circunstances, able to produce under his Head of Stateship, a prudent and necessary political 
openness’. See Mundo, 5-III-1972, p. 15.
91 Cabezas, Manuel Fraga, p. 172.
92 Miguel, Informe Sociologico 1970, Chapter 5, p. 79.
93 Sergio Vilar, Historia del Antifranquismo, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1984), p. 461.
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the Principles of the Movement and the Fundamental Laws.94 Although the Prince’s 
entourage believed in the monarch’s democratic aspirations, as mentioned above, the act 
of swearing loyalty to Franco’s Fundamental Laws of the Movement led many others to 
regard him as Franco’s puppet. Undoubtedly, however, Don Juan Carlos’ appointment 
can be regarded as the most important event for the future of the country of all that 
occurred in the summer of 1969.
3.6. The Matesa scandal and cabinet crisis
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the summer of 1969 also saw the exposure of the so- 
called Matesa scandal, which ultimately led to the cabinet crisis that October. On 10 
August, the Maquinaria Textil del Norte S.A. (Matesa) collapsed when it was alleged 
that some members of the conservative Catholic group Opus Dei were involved in the 
misuse of government funds. These funds were used for the financing of enterprises 
abroad as well as for personal bribes.95 Various Ministers - members of the Opus Dei - 
were tainted by the scandal in the company, which happened to be directed by Juan Vila 
Reyes, also a member of the Catholic group. The Ministers affected were Faustino 
Garcia Monco (Commerce), Juan Jose Espinosa San Martin (Finance), and Gregorio 
Lopez Bravo (Industry), together with the Governor of the Bank of Spain, Mariano 
Navarro Rubio. In Carrero’s view, the Matesa Affair was ‘an unfortunate and serious 
incident which, successfully aired by the media, has caused a great disturbance in the 
public opinion’.96
94 Lopez Rodo collected a couple of anonymous (undated) letters sent to the procuradores asking them to vote 
against the designation of a successor to Franco. Lopez Rodo, La larga marcha, pp. 642-643.
95 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 71-72, August-September 1969, pp.8-9. A thorough study of the Matesa affair 
can also be seen in a special report elaborated by Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 73, October 1969, pp. 13-21.
96 Lopez Rodo, Memorias II, pp. 516, 692.
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From the Falangist sector, Manuel Fraga, Minister of Information, supported by 
Jose Solis, Minister-Secretary of the Movement, allowed the free publication of 
information related to the incident. Thus, the Spanish press gave, in an unparalleled
07way, reliable and critical information about the Matesa affair. Both Fraga and Solis 
believed that such a press campaign would benefit their own reformist plans. However,
Q Q
public disputes between members of the regime seriously offended the Caudillo. In 
fact, it was because of the rivalries between the Falange and Opus Dei members that the 
scandal was revealed. Admiral Carrero had already condemned Fraga’s Press Law for 
being responsible for a moral, religious, and political deterioration, and for the flood in 
all bookshops of Marxist works and novels of what he regarded as the most unrestrained
. . QQeroticism.
But in light of the scandal, Carrero advised the replacement of the four Ministers 
involved in the attack, that is commerce, finance, information, and Movimiento, since 
their open opposition to other Ministers of the regime was, in effect, an attack on the 
regime itself.100 Fraga categorically denied Solis’ and his own involvement in the 
campaign to publicize the scandal.101 But Carrero believed that Fraga’s propaganda had 
left a negative impression in the international community. The outcome of the incident 
was a cabinet change in which Fraga, Solis, Espinosa San Martin and Garcia Monco - 
the last two Opus Dei members - were dismissed and Lopez Rodo and Lopez Bravo 
remained in the cabinet. Under Carrero’s presidency, the newly-appointed cabinet of
97 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 71-72, August-September 1969, pp.8-9.; Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 73, 
October 1969, pp. 13-21.
98 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 23.
99 Lopez Rodo, Memorias II, p. 317; Preston, Franco, pp. 744-7.
100 Lopez Rodo, Memorias II, p. 516. On 11 September 1969, Federico Silva Mufioz, Minister of Public Works, sent 
a report to Franco about the reaction of the national and international press to the Matesa affair, which was 
characterized as ‘the most virulent that Spain has suffered in the past thirty years’. Silva’s note to Franco is 
reproduced in Ibid., pp. 682-90.
101 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 251.
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July 1969 was formed by a compact Opus Dei-linked team. Lopez Bravo was even
109promoted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Thus, on 29 October 1969, the 36th anniversary of the foundation of the Falange, 
Franco created his fifteenth cabinet with the help of Carrero, who acted as an adviser in 
the appointment of new Ministers. By this time, Franco was increasingly delegating 
responsibility to Carrero Blanco, Vice-President since 22 September 1967, who was
1 r nreally beginning to assume the role of Prime Minister. Carrero’s influence - and, 
according to Fraga, that of Femandez-Miranda as well104 - was clearly felt in this 
cabinet reshuffle, where Fraga was replaced by the Opus Dei member Alfredo Sanchez 
Bella. Solis was also replaced, but whereas until 1969 the Minister-Secretary of the 
Movement was also responsible for the syndicates, from this cabinet reshuffle onwards 
the general secretariat of the Movement and the syndical organization were split. Thus, 
Torcuato Femandez-Miranda, and Enrique Garcia del Ramal (Minister without 
Portfolio, in charge of the Official Syndicate), respectively, replaced the controversial 
Jose Solis.105
Among the other changes, Garcia Monco and Espinosa San Martin were also 
dismissed, as was Castiella, after twelve years as Minister of Foreign Affairs. By 
contrast, technocrats and members of the Opus Dei were promoted - Lopez Bravo 
becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs and Lopez Rodo remaining Minister in charge of 
the Development Plan. The controversial Catholic organization now controlled the 
Ministries of Information, Education, and Foreign Affairs, plus the four Ministries of 
Finance, Commerce, Industry and the Development Plan. Carrero’s new cabinet gained
102 For a picturesque description of Lopez Bravo in his role as Minister o f Foreign Affairs see Marciel Niedergang’s 
article in Le Monde, 4 August 1973.
103 Preston, The Triumph o f  Democracy, pp. 15,24.
104 Politicos para unas Elecciones. Manuel Fraga, p. 56.
105 Equipo Mundo, Los 90 ministros de Franco, pp.287-288.
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the nickname of ‘monocolor’ or ‘monochrome government’ because the six Ministers 
linked to the Opus Dei outnumbered the four of Falangist backgrounds although Carrero 
himself never became a member of Opus Dei.106 In other words, the ‘blue’ of the 
Falangists was replaced by the ‘grey’ of the technocrats.
The disputes over the Matesa scandal, mainly between the Falangists and the 
members of Opus Dei exposed problems of unexpected proportions within the regime. 
Preston has argued that the scandal reflected not only the fight over the spoils of power, 
but also the acute separation between the already existent currents of opinions within 
Francoism. Thus, complex network of interests developed within the regime which, like 
satellites, orbited around a common concern, which was how to survive after Franco. 
The technocrats of Opus Dei and their sympathizers believed that an efficient 
administration would permit the continuation of the regime through a peaceful transition 
to a Francoist monarchy under Don Juan Carlos. That is why they organized the 
Operation Principe although the Prince himself did not share Carrero’s plans for the 
future.107 Others, like Fraga and Solis, believed that, given the social tension and the 
increasing demands for modernization, a thorough reform of the regime was vital if it
1 ORwished to survive the transition to a post-Francoist era.
Thus, with the flood of technocrats in the new cabinet, the opening up the regime 
appeared to be guaranteed. For instance, the new Minister-Secretary of the Movement, 
Femandez-Miranda, - a Falangist by background like Fernando Herrero Tejedor and
106 The close relation between Carrero and Lopez Rodo dates from the 1950s. In those days, Carrero and his wife 
went through serious problems in their marriage - allegedly she was unfaithful and due to the epoch, and the 
condition of Carrero as Admiral of the Spanish Navy - in other words very religious and conservative -, he sought 
spiritual support to overcome his problem. Thus, he was directed to the then Professor of Administrative Law of the 
University of Santiago de Compostela, Laureano Lopez Rodo, prominent member of the Opus Dei. Through close, 
and constant assistance, L6pez Rodo seemed to alleviate the Admiral’s problems. Thus, ever since, Carrero’s 
gratefulness to L6pez Rodo was extended to many members of the Opus Dei. That may explain the significant 
number of Opus Dei members at Carrero’s cabinet. Testimony of Antonio Gavilanes, 21 September 1999.
107 Charles Powell, Juan Carlos o f  Spain. A self-made monarch (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 52.
108 Preston, Franco, p. 746-747; Amodia, Franco’s political legacy, pp. 84-86.
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Adolfo Suarez but allegedly close to Opus Dei109 - hindered a full implementation of the 
proposal of associations of ‘public opinion’ already under way. In fact, the lack of 
ratification of the approved statute did away with the already announced proposals of 
associations. The first association to announce its dissolution was the first one to have 
appeared, that was Action Politico, followed by the rest.110
As mentioned above, politically 1969 started with the launch of Operation 
Principe. In the social context, however, the year could not have had a worse 
beginning. On 25 January, Franco had declared a state of emergency in the whole 
country, in response mainly to what he called ‘minority actions, systematically directed 
towards disturbing the peace and public order of Spain. [...] The defence of peace, and 
the progress of Spain as well as the exercise of the rights of the Spanish people, a 
unanimous wish among all social sectors, [...] oblige the government to put into 
practice efficient and urgent methods in order to eradicate these actions in a definite 
way’ (que corten esos brotes y  anomalias de modo terminate). The state of exception 
was decreed for three months. This was a significant step backwards so far as 
modernization was concerned. Censorship had returned and already fragile rights 
including those of meeting, freedom of residence and expression were totally 
suspended.111
Astonishingly, in February, Carrero Blanco explained to the Cortes that, ‘the 
emergency measures cannot be in any way interpreted as restrictive of citizens’ freedom, 
because, in reality, [it] represents completely the opposite, as it has to do precisely with
109 Jos£ Luis Alcocer argued, however, that ‘it had been said that he [Femandez-Miranda] was [a member] o f the 
Opus, or that was close to it, because he had formed part of the government of 29 October 1969. Inside, and applied 
to his person, to speak of him as [a member] of the Opus only meant that he was not [part] of the Christian 
Democracy, [and] that is another issue’. See Alcocer, Fernandez-Miranda, p. 20.
110 Mundo, 24-1-1970, p. 12.
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the defence of the freedom of the Spanish population. Freedom within the law [is] what 
the government wants, because its main obligation, I repeat, is to protect the freedom of 
the population’.112 No one could complain publicly, with the exception of the 
international press, which, in general, criticized the measure. Social tension was 
therefore escalating as a result of the regime’s stance. The journalist and director of the 
regime’s newspaper Pueblo, Emilio Romero, however, in an attempt to justify the 
Francoist authorities, accused the students, economic groups, and the press, of bearing a 
‘grave responsibility’ in the application of the state of exception.113 From the last years 
of the 1960s, however, the regime had been using repressive measures against student 
revolts. From 1968, and following the incident that provoked the dismissal of the 
Minister of Education, Manuel Lora Tamayo, the regime imposed the permanent 
presence of the so-called policia universitaria, or campus police, on permanent basis.114
A year later, Raul Morodo, Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law and 
member of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), argued that the declaration of a state 
of exception had had clear underlying political reasons. There had been pockets of 
student revolts in various Spanish universities, but they had been easily controlled. 
Morodo believed that the student revolts had merely been an excuse. According to 
Morodo, the regime had sought to hold back the climate in favour of political 
modernization that already existed in the population. It was also necessary to stop the 
mushrooming of centre-right sectors - perhaps embryos of pro-democratic political 
associations - which aimed at achieving a European-like system in Spain. Thus, as 
mentioned earlier, if  this ‘opposition’ to the regime succeeded, it could threaten the
111 Morodo et al., Espafia Perspectiva, 1970, pp. 17-18.
112 Informe del Vice Presidente del Gobierno sobre el estado de excepcion, en el Pleno de las Cortes de 7 de febrero 
de 1969. See Diario de Diarios, 8 de febrero de 1969, No. 1.457, pp. C-18-21.
113 Morodo et al., Espafia Perspectiva, 1970, p. 20.
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Operation Principe. In other words, as Morodo explains, ‘the [state of] exception was 
the pre-requisite for the designation of Prince Juan Carlos,’ and therefore, the 
elimination of any group favouring a Regency solution.115
However, the speed at which Spanish society was changing would not be easy to 
hold back, nor would it be easy to satisfy the population with cheap excuses to deny its 
political participation. Thus, one could say that the first proposals of associations of 
‘public opinion’ - and indeed anything related to the issue of associations - that emerged 
after the approval of the basis, had been halted chiefly as a consequence of both 
Operation Principe and the cabinet reshuffle. Commentaries criticizing this new delay 
mushroomed in the press. The Catholic daily YA, for example, urged the new Minister- 
Secretary of the Movement to speed up the process of creating associations.116 But, 
Femandez-Miranda (ironically, the man who was going to lay the basis for the future 
democratic system in Spain) did the opposite.
The political confusion in Spain prompted a group of one hundred and twenty 
seven progressive Spanish intellectuals and professionals to send a letter to the President 
of the Government in which they listed a number of demands to him and to the whole 
cabinet. The signatories included Oscar Alzaga, Manuel Gimenez de Parga, Jose Luis 
Aranguren, Pedro Lain Entralgo, Julian Marias, Gregorio Peces-Barba, Joaquin Ruiz- 
Gimenez, Ramon Tamames, Raul Morodo, Enrique Tiemo Galvan, Miguel Boyer and 
Jesus Barros de Lis who were all part of the opposition to Francoism, especially during 
the early 1970s. The group complained that during the 1966 Referendum there had been 
no alternative to the official programme although they had requested in writing the
114 Giner, “Power, Freedom and social change in the Spanish University”, in Preston (Ed.), Spain in crisis, p. 208; 
Bardavio & Sinova, Todo Franco, p. 422.
115 Morodo et a l,  Espafia Perspectiva, 1970, pp. 22-23.
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authorization of a legal opposition. But, among other points, they urged the cabinet to 
recognize and respect truly autonomous and representative unions for both workers and 
employers. Likewise, they urged the cabinet to recognize and respect the right of 
associations, which in the Western world meant the existence of diverse political 
parties, and to legalise them through norms that would avoid their unworkable 
proliferation. Nevertheless, their disagreement with the Francoist authorities did not 
prevent the signatories of this letter declaring their readiness to collaborate so long as 
government policy moved towards a peaceful democratic coexistence among
117
Spaniards. As was to be expected, the letter was ignored.
3.7. Femandez-Miranda’s proposal fo r associations
Towards the end of 1969, Femandez-Miranda called for a meeting of the 
National Council, where he wanted to discuss a proposal for the restructuring of the 
Secretary General of the Movement. In his proposal, the Minister called for the old 
“Delegation of Associations” to be replaced by one for “Family, Political Action, and 
Participation”. Femandez-Miranda argued that if they decided to deal with the issue of 
associations in a serious way, it would have to be based on a total, absolute, and 
rigorous loyalty to the principles of the Movement and the Fundamental Laws. This 
proposal was to be presented and discussed in the Congress on 15 December 1969.
During the presentation of his proposal, Femandez-Miranda denied that the 
abolition of the National Delegation of Associations was a step backwards. On the 
contrary, the abolition of the Delegation was justified by the creation of a new 
Delegation of the Family, a National Delegation of Political Action and of Participation.
1,6 YA, 16-XI-1969.
117 The complete text of this letter was published in Cuadenos para el Didlogo, January 1970, pp. 20-21.
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According to the Minister the new Delegation ‘would remove them [the associations] 
from a ‘sewing box’ (cajon de sastre) where all associations are mixed and confused’. 
Moreover, the Minister explained that the new Delegation would be like the one 
dictated by Article 21 of the LOE. The article encouraged the ‘authentic and efficient 
participation of the natural entities, and of public opinion in political tasks. This would 
contribute to the creation, improvement and development of any necessary measures for 
the channelling, within the Principles of the Movement, of the contrast of opinions in 
political action’. Any political organization of any sort, outside of this representative 
system, would be considered illegal. The Minister promised that a blueprint of the 
proposal would be officially presented in the forthcoming months for the assessment of
liftthe council. Some councillors disagreed with the Minister’s explanations, and were 
convinced that, instead of speeding up the process of associationism, the Minister was 
actually doing the opposite. In fact, Jose Luis Alcocer, Femandez-Miranda’s 
biographer, believes that the Minister ‘was convinced that political associations were 
not going to be of any use, not even to establish a preliminary bridge to the arrival of 
parties after Franco’s death. [...] The scheme was, therefore, very clear: political 
associations with their own aims were not possible within the regime’.119
Meanwhile, four National Councillors made speeches in relation to Femandez- 
Miranda’s proposal in the Congress meeting of 15 December. They were Francisco 
Labadie Otermin, Alberto Ballarin Marcial, Luis Hertogs, and Manuel Fraga. Whereas 
Luis Hertogs lamented the lack of old-time Falangists in the National Delegations of the 
Movement, and Francisco Labadie claimed the need for pluralism as the basis of the
118 Boletin Oficial del Consejo Nacional del Movimiento, Ano XV, Madrid 4 de March 1970, No. 67, pp. 1202-1206. 
See also El Movimiento y  el Asociacionismo, pp. 14, 18, 117.
119 Alcocer, Femandez-Miranda, p. 54.
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Movement, Ballarin Marcial and Manuel Fraga clearly favoured the emergence of 
political associations.120 Thus, without underestimating Ballarin’s speech, it was the 
one given by a resentful Fraga, already ex-Minister of Information, which attracted more 
attention. Fraga took advantage of this opportunity to speak before the National 
Council, and outline his particular political programme. Some extracts of Fraga’s 
speech illustrate quite clearly the main concerns of the reformist sector, and indeed of 
many Spaniards. Among other things, he said:
The proposed text [...] suppresses the National Delegation of Associations, and does not 
include even once in all its text the word association or associations. [...] This Council has 
just approved the definitive document, that is to say, the Legal Basis of Associations Within the 
Movement precisely in its full final session of 3 July [...] Many of us in the Movement believe 
that the process of openness and political development must continue at any cost. Those men 
[who] have fought for family representation, for the freedom of ideas and their expression; 
those who have expounded the problem of freedom of religion, or those who have presented the 
Organic Law as the path towards institutionalization and openness (not to the left, but to the 
future). [...] The Organic Law entrusted us to ensure the development, the exercise of 
Spaniards’ freedoms, and to stimulate an authentic participation in political life, thus 
recognizing that this means a natural contrast of opinion. [...] Article 16 of the Fuero de los 
Espanoles recognised the right of association for legal aims. [...] These rights can be 
regulated, limited, or even suspended, but they cannot be denied. [...] Spain has today, 
because of Franco’s peace and the consequent economic and cultural progress, a very large 
sector of responsible [people]. [Spain also has] a growing middle class that is capable of 
thinking in a moderate and prudent political [way]. We are far from the experiment of 
universal suffrage a century ago, in a country where the illiteracy rate reached 90 per cent of 
the population. [...] Today a centrist policy is possible in Spain, open and decisive, which 
releases us from the traditional dialectic swerving between the right and the extreme left [...]. 
This is what the country expects, and this is what we were already giving it, and now it will not 
be denied. But, how, without associations, are we going to integrate those young generations 
that, because of age and development, are on the outskirts of the system. [...] How could the
Administration isolate itself by depriving itself of the perpetual initiative [of young
121generations], and keep the population passive?
Fraga also asserted that the problem of associationism was very serious, and therefore:
120 L6pez Rod6, Memorias II, pp. 564-5.
121 The complete speech is recorded in Manuel Fraga, El Desarrollo Politico, (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1975), pp. 267- 
274. Paradoxically a year before the speech in 1968 Fraga published a book entitled Horizonte Espanol in which, 
after mentioning all Francoist Laws, he wrote: ‘In this order of Fundamental Laws, full of flexibility, [the regime] has 
establish an organic and flexible representation through the Cortes, and the referendum system, and through the 
family associations, the unionist organizations and the municipal and regional unities.’ See Manuel Fraga, Horizonte 
Espanol, (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1968), pp. 24-25.
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No one should think that this Chamber will be the same if it withdraws before this fundamental
problem, and it swallows its own unanimous agreement of July. Neither we nor - even less -
122the country would regard, and respect it, in the same way.
Fraga described his own speech as ‘important, and of a tone hitherto
i ^
unknown.’ However, although it openly questioned fundamental issues and their 
serious consequences, the speech did not convince the councillors, and moreover 
provoked an angry comment from the Caudillo. During a private conversation with his 
cousin, Franco confessed that he was ‘hurt because the words of this ex-Minister reflect 
an inappropriate passion for someone who had held a post of absolute confidence for 
years, and who ceased for political reasons and not for poor performance’.124 Thus, 
whether or not it was due to the Caudillo’s opinion of Fraga’s speech, the ex-Minister 
lost this battle to Femandez-Miranda.
Having said that, Fraga’s message to the Council made a good impression on 
many, and received a good press in newspapers like ABC  and YA.125 But, for Emilio 
Romero, director of Pueblo, Fraga’s performance was very negative. Romero 
condemned Fraga’s passionately progressive ideas, which would have been so useful 
during his long and fruitful time at the Information Ministry. Among other comments, 
the journalist made a special reference to the repressive Press Law, and mentioned the 
amount of sanctions, fines, and closures that the Spanish press had suffered since the 
approval of this law.126
During the period between the announcement of the new proposal (December 
1969) and the presentation of the text (May 1970) the issue of political associations
122 ABC, 16-XII-1969, p. 23.
123 Fraga, Memoria breve, pp. 260-1
124 Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones, p. 552.
125 See YA, 16-XII-1969, pp. 14-17; ABC, 16-XII-l969, pp. 23-25.
126 Pueblo, 16-XIII-1969, p. 3.
In search o f  the ‘Third Way’? (1967-1969) 142
inevitably remained in the limelight. In April 1970 a group of National Councillors 
wrote a note to Femandez-Miranda signed by the aperturista Fernando Herrero Tejedor, 
a well-known supporter of associationism although strictly within the Movement. In 
this note, the councillors explained to the Minister that, even though they were aware 
that the approval of the new proposal would imply a new delay in the process of 
associationism, they still agreed to back it, but on the condition that the delay was short. 
They argued that it was neither caprice nor impatience, but rather that they were 
conscious that there was no time to lose.127
At the Cortes, on 1 April 1970 the group of procuradores familiares designated 
a commission to draft a bill on political associations. During a meeting held nearly one 
year later, on 15 February 1971, the commission agreed on the need to institutionalize 
political pluralism. In other words, they sought to apply Article 34 of the Fuero de los 
Espanoles, by which the Cortes would vote on the necessary laws for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the Fuero, like, for instance, the right of 
political association (recognized in Article 16). The majority of the familiares, more 
than any other group so far, tried to open up the Spanish political system, to have a more 
dynamic Cortes. They were not entirely successful in the task of modernizing the 
regime, although their voices were heard at the Cortes and reported in countless articles.
In March, Emilio Romero’s ‘personal radar’ told him that a proposal for the 
political associations was ready , but the blueprint was not presented to the 
Movement’s National Council until 21 May 1970, ten months after the approval of the
127 Diario de Diarios, 28-11-1970, No. 1.782; Ibid., 3-III-1970, No. 1.785; Ibid., 6-III-1970, No., 1.788. See also 
Ferrando Badia, El regimen de Franco, pp. 220-222. [I checked Madrid from 4-III-1970 to confirm Ferrando 
Badia’s reference but, as with a number of other of his references, I cannot find them].
128 Diario de Diarios, 2-IV-1970, No.1.810; Ferrando Badia, Del Autoritarismo a la Democracia, p. 53.
129 Pueblo, 11-III-1970, p. 3.
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previous proposal of July 1969. A team of four members, of which Herrero Tejedor was 
allegedly the head, had elaborated this blueprint. Although it was regarded as better 
than initially expected, it did not escape criticism.130 The Catholic daily YA considered 
Femandez-Miranda’s proposal ‘useful as a starting point’, but, ‘in general, we believe 
that the blueprint is too restrictive, and cautious’.131 The proposal had far too many 
limitations, and, like the one proposed by Solis, only allowed the creation of 
associations strictly within the framework of the Movement. Solis believed in the 
regime’s democracy - the so-called ‘organic democracy’ -, which, according to him, it
1 79would allow the unlimited participation in politics of the population. However, that 
definition was not accurate, since, as the journalist Pedro Calvo Hernando explained, an 
‘organic democracy is only open to those who think in a determined way, in other 
words, it is a discriminatory democracy’. In conclusion, according to Charles Powell, 
Femandez-Miranda’s proposal ‘was more ambitious in its ends and restrictive in its 
means than that of Solis, although Solis’ proposal prompted the emergence of various 
political associations.134
One of the fiercest critics of the Minister’s proposal was the monthly Cuadernos 
para el Dialogo, which wrote that, ‘for those who believe that Spaniards have the right 
to meet and associate freely, this proposal will not only be classified as insufficient, but 
as totally unacceptable’. The same editorial also argued that the proposal had a twofold 
objective: first, to modernize the ‘organic democracy’ for Europe with the creation of 
political associations, which would be the Hispanic equivalent of the ill-fated political
130 Diario de Diarios, 24 & 25-V-1970, No. 1.855. (Informaciones, p. 9)
131 Various articles in YA, 26, 27,28, 29 January 1970.
132 Gaceta Ilustrada, No. 744, 10 January 1971, pp. 14-19.
133 Mundo, 10-III-1973, p. 9.
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parties; and secondly, to revitalize the image of an already out-of-date, monolithic 
regime.135 Catholic groups also believed that the blueprint did not seem to respect the 
right of association as defined by the Pacem in Terris, and their many reservations 
meant the population also distrusted the proposal.
In the same way, and using their right to appeal, Alberto Ballarin and Manuel 
Fraga, together with forty-four other councillors, suggested a number of amendments for 
Femandez-Miranda’s proposal. Ballarin demanded, among other things, that the 
minimum number of members for an association be reduced to one thousand (instead of 
the proposed ten thousand). The councillor believed that in this way representation 
would be greater, and would prevent large cities, like Madrid and Barcelona, from 
having associations, which, because of their greater number of members, could 
monopolize the national scene.
Fraga’s suggestions confirmed what he had already defended during his speech 
of 15 December 1969. The ex-Minister urged prudent, but serious, conditions for real 
representation, and gave a number of suggestions of political and judicial character. 
Fraga also suggested some changes relating to the constitution, aims, and 
responsibilities of political associations. Yet, his prime complaint - probably shared by 
many - was that the great task of ‘adequately articulating the conflicting opinions, as 
well as the promotion of associationism within the National Movement’ - entmsted in 
the Statute of the Movement in 1968 - had not yet been applied.137
One may wonder whether there was a serious plan to stop the process of 
associationism, and if Femandez-Miranda was the man in charge of putting it into
134 Charles Powell, Reform versus 'Ruptura' in Spain’s transition to democracy. Unpublished DPhil Thesis. Oxford 
University, 1989, pp. 18-9.
135 Cuadernospara elDialogo, Nos. 81-82, June-July 1970, p. 3.
136 Lecture celebrated at the Institute of Social Studies of the Company of Jesus, YA, 30-VI-70, p. 19.
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effect. Yet this reasoning does not appear sound. Today, in retrospect, Gabriel Cisneros
believes that, ‘from the outset Femandez-Miranda tried seriously to take over the
process, by giving it a clearer direction.’ Cisneros - then National Delegate of Youth, a
position directly under the jurisdiction of Femandez-Miranda, Minister of the
Movement - recalls that around January 1970 during a meeting with Femandez-Miranda
that took place in the Prado de Jaramilla, they (Miranda’s team) tentatively elaborated a
statute of political associations, with the intention of setting up the basis for a limited
pluralism. However, this attempt was abmptly halted as a result of worsening relations
(distanciamiento) between Admiral Carrero and Femandez-Miranda, and evidently,
Femandez-Miranda abandoned, or at least, postponed indefinitely this possibility [of
allowing a limited pluralism] until better opportunities came (a la espera de mejores 
1oportunidades). In fact, Carrero’s persistent pressure on Femandez-Miranda 
hindered the development of a law of political associations, since Femandez-Miranda 
declined to present his new bill to the Movement’s National Council.
On these grounds, following the deadline to present suggestions for the blueprint 
there was yet another period of political stasis. But Spaniards did not give up hope, and 
those interested in politics continued to organize lectures, workshops, and so forth in 
preparation for future events. Members of the ACNP, for example, organized a lecture 
entitled, ‘The right of association with political aims’. The speaker, Juan Luis de Simon 
Tobalina, gave a clear speech, which was based mainly upon the mandate of the 
Catholic Church. Simon Tobalina underlined that the most important fact of modem 
times was the conversion of the ‘subject into a citizen’, which implied his right to
137 The Catholic daily YA published in three articles a synthesis of Manuel Fraga’s suggestions for Femandez- 
Miranda’s project o f associations. See YA, 27, 28 and 30-VI-1970. A summary of Ballarin’s suggestions was also 
published in YA, 27 and 30-VI-1970.
138 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13 September 1999.
139 Powell, Reform versus 'Ruptura ’, p. 19.
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participate in state affairs instead of obeying whatever was dictated by the authorities. 
Simon Tobalina argued that, on those grounds, political associations were needed to 
channel the wishes of the population to the state.140 Similar conclusions were reached 
during a round table discussion organized by ANEPA one year later, in November 1971. 
The speakers - Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Juan Manuel Fanjul, Rodrigo Fernandez 
Carvajal, Alfonso Garcia Valdecasas, Rafael Ruiz Gallardon, and Fernando Suarez 
Gonzalez - ‘agreed on the urgent need for political associations, of which there were no 
news, although Ministers talked about them’.141
Indeed, at that stage, it seemed incredible that the government had managed to 
freeze such an issue before such an expectant, and already restless, population. Even 
Prince Juan Carlos claimed that, ‘if the associations are genuine I agree with them, 
otherwise that is another door that closes for me’ (si las asociaciones son de verdad, a 
mi me parecen bien; de lo contrario, es una puerta mas que se me cierra)}42 For the 
future King the introduction of a network of associations would ease the transition to a 
democratic regime after Franco. Already in 1966, the Monarchist Manuel Jimenez de 
Parga had said that ‘without political parties, the monarchy would fall under the 
pressure groups that divide as much as those [political parties] and operate in an 
anonymous and irresponsible way. [...] The King must delegate the government to a 
team that truly represents all political tendencies. The Left, the Centre, and the Right 
will have to be there, in the first cabinet’.143 Yet, when the Prince spoke to Franco 
about Femandez-Miranda’s Bill of Associations of Political Action and Participation, 
then being elaborated by the National Council, the Caudillo said he would ask the 
Council to withdraw the proposal. Lopez Rodo recalls that Don Juan Carlos answered
140 YA, 30-X-1970, p. 12.
141 YA, 3-XI-1971, p. 11.
142 Pilar & Alfonso Femandez-Miranda, Lo que el Rey me ha pedido, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1996), p. 67.
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the Caudillo, ‘who can guarantee that there will be no political parties in ten years time? 
It is better to outlaw one [association] and allow the rest’.144 The Prince’s effort was in 
vain, however.
On 18 November 1971, at the opening of the X Legislative year, Franco 
reiterated his views on the subject to the Cortes. ‘All associationist proposals’, the 
Caudillo said, ‘that, marginalizing the organization of the National Movement, shelter 
the hope of returning, sooner or later, to the formation of ideological groups that would 
lead us to political parties, will never be possible.’145 Femandez-Miranda’s proposal of 
associations was ‘forgotten’ anew by Franco. An atmosphere of uncertainty 
overshadowed any hope for modernization of the Spanish political system, to the 
frustration not only of the democratic opposition but of the most progressive members 
of the regime as well.
The population demanded participation in political affairs, and as Alvarez Puga 
wrote, ‘on the Spanish political horizon of 1971, the hour of associationism seems to 
have struck. The discordant voices of those who do not wish for political 
associationism for fear of the [political] parties, or any other reason, can be counted with 
the fingers of one hand’. The journalist added that ‘nearly all newspapers and 
magazines have dedicated some of their editorials to political associationism. Also, 
there have been surveys published, [and] the stance of the public opinion with respect to 
associationism does not admit any doubt’.146
The most important sociological survey carried out in Spain was the one 
conducted by the Foessa Foundation, the so-called Informes Foessa, and directed by the
143 Indice, Nos. 214-5, 1966, p. 7.
144 Lopez Rodo, Memorias IV, p. 179.
145 Discurso de Franco ante los componentes de la X  Legislatura de las Cortes, 18 November 1971, in Mundo, 25- 
XII-71.
146 Dossier Mundo, May-June 1971, p. 25.
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sociologist Amando de Miguel. The survey of the year 1970 revealed that of those 
interviewed the majority of university students (80%), lawyers (76%), medical doctors 
(63), office and shop workers (61%) did not believe that a democratic system was 
possible without political parties. Thus, apart from A-level students and workers, who 
favoured a system with no political parties at all, the rest of the mentioned groups 
overwhelmingly preferred a pluralistic political system. Amando de Miguel, however, 
thought that there was general apathy towards politics, which could have been the result 
of the deficiency of the Spanish system itself, in terms of education, information, 
participation, and so forth. It was the young adults, especially university students, who 
were more inclined to participate in politics.147 Franco’s reluctance to open up his 
regime was such that Chapter 5 of the 1970 Foessa report, which incidentally dealt with 
the political and associative life in Spain, was suppressed by the Francoist authorities 
and never published. The Foessa Sociological Reports had a good reputation for being 
objective, and in general were acceptable to the regime. However, the controversial 
nature of the topic and the extreme transparency with which it was dealt led the 
authorities to stop its publication. This decision only confirmed Amando de Miguel’s 
view about the deficiency of the Spanish system in terms of information and education.
In conclusion, discrepancies between Carrero Blanco and Femandez-Miranda as 
well as the Caudillo’s reluctance to speed up the political reform of the country led to a 
complete stoppage in the development of political associations. In his year-end speech 
of 1971, the Caudillo reiterated his ‘continuation of the task to unite the Spaniards in
1 4Rnew forms of participation’. By 1972 the failure of Femandez-Miranda’s proposal 
was a fact. The journalist Federico Ysart published an article called ‘The failure of
147 Miguel, Informe Sociologico 1970, Chapter 5, pp. 69, 78-90.
148 Mundo, 13-1-1973, p. 10.
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political associationism’, in which he summarised the trajectory of the proposal of 
associations in terms of the words carefully used by the regime. ‘To sum up’, he said, 
‘at the outset, there was ‘pluralism’ (pluralismo); then came ‘associationism’ 
(iasociacionismo); later ‘pluriformism’ (pluriformismo) and today nothingness.’149
The consequent annoyance of the population was clear. From the Church, 
Monsignor Gabino Diaz Merchan, disciple of Cardinal Vicente Enrique i Tarancon150, 
declared before Franco himself that it is ‘everyone’s responsibility to give efficient form 
to political participation, where all Spaniards feel respected as persons, and where we 
could bring loyal contribution for the common well-being.’151 His words were ignored. 
A few days later the post of delegate of Political Action and Participation was 
eliminated, and there was no reason to believe there would be a new post instead. This 
implied the disappearance of the Delegation as a whole and the return to the form of 
representation allowed by the organic democracy: that is through family, municipalities, 
and syndicates.152
Reports in the press were painfully monotonous throughout these years of pre­
transition. The most controversial articles and interviews with political personalities 
could not avoid the issue of political participation and associations. The same articles 
appeared year after year but with a tone of desperation and frustration, which obviously
increased with time. As the Spanish ambassador Manuel Aznar Zubiragai told Manuel
1Fraga, ‘nothing happens, and that is the bad thing’ (No pasa nada, y  eso es lo malo). 
The number of members of the regime who were aware of the urgent need for reform of 
an obsolete system was increasing considerably. The political evolution of the regime
149 Mundo, 2-IX-72, p. 15.
150 Cardinal Vicente Enrique i Tarancon, bom in Burriana (Castellon) in 1907, was a leading figure within the 
Catholic Church in favour of a democratic regime in Spain, particularly influential in Spanish politics during the mid- 
1970s.
151 Mundo, 16-IX-1972, p. 10.
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was clearly being outpaced by the socio-economic evolution of the population, and this 
imbalance was destined to become a serious problem.
Conclusion
As we have seen in this Chapter, the period between 1967 and 1969 witnessed 
the emergence of a series of laws that seemed to promise the reform of the Spanish 
political system, in relation to the question of associationism. The approval in 1967 of 
the Organic Law of the State and the Law of Family Representation and the Organic 
Law of the Movement revived hopes for greater participation in national politics. Yet, 
all of them failed to modernize the system of representation. It was clear that the 
orthodox Francoists wished to delay the introduction of political associations for fear of 
losing control over the nation’s country. But, after an intense three-day debate in the 
summer of 1969 the Movement’s National Council approved a bill (the Legal Basis of 
Associations Within the Movement) by which political associations could be created 
within the boundaries of the regime. It only needed Franco’s signature, but Franco 
never ratified it. Yet, the fact that the National Council (specially the aperturista 
sector) voted in favour of the bill implied awareness for the need of greater participation 
in national politics, if only to ‘avoid the formation of a parallel and clandestine Spain’. 
Franco’s reluctance to modernize the regime proved very frustrating for the aperturista 
sector of the regime as well as for the rest of the population. For instance, one hundred 
and twenty-seven intellectuals and professionals sent a letter of complaint to Carrero 
Blanco where, among other things, they urged the cabinet to recognize and respect the 
right of association.
152 Ibid., 23-IX-1972, p. 9.
153 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 273.
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Meanwhile, during the summer of 1969, the Caudillo’s plans to guarantee the 
survival of his regime after his departure were confirmed. Following the successful 
Operation Principe, orchestrated by Opus Dei members of Carrero Blanco’s entourage, 
the Caudillo appointed Don Juan Carlos as his successor. Many believed that the future 
of Francoism was secure in the Prince’s hands although some people claimed later to 
have known at the time that the Prince already had plans to reign over a democratic 
monarchy. Yet, for many, Don Juan Carlos was merely Franco’s puppet, and therefore a 
threat to the modernization of the country. Following Don Juan Carlos’ appointment, 
the stability of the government suffered a serious setback when inner problems of the 
regime were brought to public attention during the Matesa scandal. The scandal brought 
to the limelight the acute separations of the different currents of opinion already existent 
during the regime. The regime revealed its weaknesses and that infuriated Franco.
In the autumn of 1969, Femandez-Miranda’s proposal of replacing the old 
‘National Delegation of Associations’ by one of ‘Family, Political Action and 
Participation’ (allegedly to have a better organized system of associations) was yet 
another lie to delay any reform of associative character. The debate over the approval of 
the Minister* s proposal intensified the unresolved fight between inmovilistas and 
aperturistas, and a group of Councillors sent a note to the Minister urging him not to 
delay the process of associationism. But, their plea was made in vain. Once again 
Franco ordered the council to withdraw the proposal, and the issue of associations was 
frozen. It was clear that Franco refused to advance, but it was also clear that a feeling in 
favour of reforms was now more widely spread among members of the regime, and that 
those who believed in the need for reform began to speak louder than ever.
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Chapter - 4
The positioning o f the reformists (1969-1973). Part I 
Manuel Fraga as pioneer
At the end of the 1960s a number of key regime figures emerged who defended different 
alternatives for the transition to a post-Franco society. Broadly speaking, whereas the 
reactionary ideology of Franco’s right-hand man, Luis Carrero Blanco defended the 
continuation of the regime under the reign of Don Juan Carlos, Manuel Fraga advocated 
a tightly controlled liberalization of the regime. Other promisingly progressive figures, 
who had been, or were still part of the regime, included Pio Cabanillas, Antonio 
Garrigues Walker, Alfonso Osorio, Marcelino Oreja and Jose Maria de Areilza.
Yet, as pointed out in the introduction, of these political figures it is Manuel 
Fraga who, from the end of the 1960s to the start of the 1970s, stands out as perhaps the 
most important progressive politician of the regime. In the 1960s Fraga was identified 
with the aperturistas, and in the 1970s with the reformists. In fact, an important number 
of the young reformists had been Fraga’s disciples. Following his dismissal from the 
Ministry of Information and Tourism, Fraga’s political stance in favour of the opening 
up of the regime made him the main promoter of reform and change without rupture, 
and the only serious alternative to the cabinet of Carrero Blanco. Fraga even became 
known as Fragamanlis, being compared to the Greek politician, Constantinos 
Karamanlis, who following the dictatorship of the colonels brought democracy to 
Greece.1 But, following Franco’s death in 1975, Fraga shifted to a much more 
conservative position, preventing him from becoming the leader of the transition. 
Fraga’s new conservative stance made many of his young followers leave him to join a 
centrist party, the Union de Centro Democratico (UCD). Fraga, however, was the first
1 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14-9-99. Triunfo, No. 677, 17 January 1976, pp. 8-9.
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to elaborate one of the first and most complete political programmes in 1976. This 
programme served as the political foundation of one of the main political parties formed 
by members of the regime, Alianza Popular (AP). However, Fraga’s centrist 
programme did not match the Francoist rhetoric and coalition partners he later chose for 
his AP. His main achievement was to attract the Francoists to the AP, and from there 
direct them from a dictatorial regime to a democratic one. In order to understand 
Fraga’s role in the key period 1969-1973, it is necessary to examine his earlier political 
career. Accordingly, the next section briefly outlines Fraga’s political trajectory from 
the origins of his public life until his political activities as an ex-Minister in the early 
1970s.2
4.1. Manuel Fraga’s political trajectory
The appointment of a new cabinet in July 1962 awakened interest in Spanish 
politics both at home and abroad. In France, for instance, the journalist Jean Creach 
wrote in Combat that ‘a positive step had been taken with the appointment of the new 
Minister of Information and Tourism. [...] Fraga’s creative capacity, dynamism, and 
sense of the great historical perspectives cannot disappoint the hope that the Spaniards 
have put in him’. In the United States, Fraga was regarded as ‘one of the most brilliant 
of the younger men joining the cabinet, [and] has a considerable reputation as a lawyer, 
scholar, writer, and political expert. He is widely expected to ease Senor Arias 
Salgado’s rigid censorship of the press, books, plays, films and ideas. He has been a
2 Fraga’s personality and political trajectory have been examined in a number of articles and books. Among them are 
Rogelio Baon, “Fraga y su poliedro”, in Manuel Fraga, Homenaje Academico, (Madrid: Fundacion Canovas del 
Castillo, 1997), Vol. I & II, pp. 72-119.; Jose Maria Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha. Biografia de Fraga (Plaza y 
Janes, 1985); Pilar Cemuda, Ciclon Fraga, (Madrid: Eds. Temas de Hoy, 1997). There exist various hagiographies 
o f Fraga written by Octavio Cabezas, Manuel Fraga, semblanza de un hombre de Estado. (Sala Editorial, Madrid, 
1976), and Garcia Escudero, “Aportacion de Manuel Fraga al pensamiento conservador”. For a more critical view on 
Fraga’s political trajectory see Vence, Doctor Fraga y  Mister Iribarne. Una biografia temperamental, (Barcelona: Ed. 
Prensa Iberica, 1995).
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key promoter of the Inter-parliamentary union, which has furthered friendly relations 
between Spain, and parliamentarians in the US, Britain, France, and West Germany’.4 
For Max Gallo, ‘[Fraga] Iribame’s appointment meant a triumph of a new style, a blend 
of efficiency and shrewdness. The era of liberalization had begun.’5
Fraga’s youth and energy as well as his promising reform plans clashed, 
however, with his authoritarian character. This dichotomy was present throughout 
Fraga’s ministerial life and his political life as a whole. Fraga, according to Bemaldez, 
would announce a liberal and aperturist measure but apply another one - on many 
ocassions forced by the circunstances - more reactionary and regressive.6 Proud of his 
contradictory reputation as both authoritarian and liberal, Fraga said once that ‘a 
journalist defined me best, when he wrote that, despite being bossy, during the years I 
[was in power], I ordered more freedom’.7 Fraga’s complex character stemmed mainly 
from his family and his professional life.
Manuel Fraga Iribame was bom in Villalba (Lugo) in 1922. Villalba was the 
commercial centre of twenty-nine hamlets, called parishes, where the main source of 
income was farming and agriculture. Fraga’s grandfather was a carpenter and a builder, 
and Fraga’s father a mral labourer who, like many of his contemporaries, was forced to 
emigrate to Latin America - in his case to Cuba - in search of employment. Fraga’s 
mother had twelve children, Manuel being the eldest. To Manuel, his mother Dona 
Maria personified energy and character. Fraga recognized that the firm and serious side 
of his character came from his mother, who originated in the low French Navarre. The
3 Combat, 18 July 1962, quoted in Cabezas, Manuel Fraga, p. 102; Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 34.
4 The New York Times, 13 July 1962.
5 Gallo, Spain under Franco, p. 301.
6 Bemandez, El Patron de la Derecha, p. 53.
7 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 189, 11-17 December 1976, p. 27.
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more talkative and perhaps romantic side of his character was more Galician. In 
Rogelio Baon’s view, the humble background of the future leader of the conservative 
political force in Spain is more characteristic of a socialist political leader. But in 
Manuel’s case his situation, the influence of his parents and, of course, of the social 
context helped the young Manuel to developed a more conservative political preference. 
Baon observes that being the first of twelve brothers, as well as his father’s later 
position as Mayor of their village, developed a strong sense of responsibility in him that 
would be present throughout his adulthood.9 This sense of responsibility was 
demonstrated during his time in military service where Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, 
one of his colleagues, remembered Fraga’s ability to reconcile ‘the most authentic of the 
Prussian spirit with outstanding academic knowledge’. Yet, he also remembered 
Fraga’s authoritarian proclivity that strongly marked his personality despite deeply 
human feelings that he tried to suppress’.10
At the end of 1945 Fraga gained top marks in an examination for lawyers of the 
Spanish Parliament - Letrado de las Cortes - and one year later, in 1946, gained also top 
marks at the Diplomatic School. In the summer of 1947, Fraga was posted as a 
diplomat to the Institute of Hispanic Culture. The Institute had recently been created in 
December 1946, and was directed by Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez. Fraga combined this job 
with that of State lawyer, and lecturer in the Faculty of Political Sciences at the 
University Complutense of Madrid.11 The opportunity to enter public life was given to 
Fraga by his teacher, PhD supervisor and friend, Fernando Maria Castiella, who
8 Carlos Sentis. Politicos para unas elecciones: Manuel Fraga Iribarne. Perfil humano y politico. (Madrid: Editorial 
Cambio-16, 1977), p. 31.
9 Baon, “Fraga y su poliedro”, pp. 73-5.
10 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio", pp. 15-16.
11 Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha, p. 31.
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recommended him to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Martin Artajo, for the 
post of Secretary General of the Institute of Hispanic Culture. Having already worked at 
the Institute for nearly four years Fraga seemed ideal for the job. Liking the suggestion, 
Martin Artajo offered Fraga the job, which he started in the early months of 1951. 
Although this post was more diplomatic than political, it gave Fraga the chance to meet 
members of the Spanish ruling class, and also to build important links with high-ranking 
Latin-Americans.
While Fraga’s public career was flourishing, the social situation in Spain was 
clearly deteriorating. The beginning of the 1950’s was marked by a wave of strikes and 
street disturbances not seen since the Spanish Civil War. In 1951, a ministerial change 
brought the Social Democrat Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez to the Ministry of Education 
boosting the hopes of the most progressive Spaniards, and in 1953 Manuel Fraga left the 
Institute of Hispanic Culture to become part of Ruiz-Gimenez’s team. Ruiz-Gimenez 
offered Fraga the general secretariat of the National Council of Education, presided over 
by Wenceslao Fernandez Oliveros, whose task consisted primarily of encouraging the 
participation of foreign students in Spanish cultural events.
During this period, Fraga took on an increasing number of public posts. As well 
as his position at the department of Education, Fraga became general secretary of the 
First University Assembly, member of the Spanish Commission for the Latin Union, 
director of a course in contemporary problems at the University Menendez y Pelayo of 
Madrid, and also secretary of the Spanish Commission of Co-operation with UNESCO. 
But, his duties at these posts were more bureaucratic than political. Fraga’s first real 
political post was offered to him by Ruiz-Gimenez in 1955. The Minister appointed 
Fraga Technical Secretary General of the Ministry of Education, a post that only lasted 
for a year. Following disturbances at the university, Ruiz-Gimenez was dismissed from
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the Ministry. A large part of his team followed him in solidarity, including Fraga.
Among the students arrested were Jose Maria Ruiz Gallardon, Gabriel Elorriaga, and
12Ramon Tamames, all future collaborators of Fraga’s study group GODS A. Fraga’s 
support for Ruiz-Gimenez could have alienated the hard-liners of the regime, but he was 
not yet a figure to attract the attention of the Establishment. On the contrary his energy 
and ambition, his devotion to work, his absolute fidelity to the regime of the 18 of July 
(date of Franco’s coup in 1936), and also his favourable reputation among Francoist 
personalities had made a rather good impression. Following his resignation, Fraga 
portrayed himself as a mere bureaucrat whose destiny was not in politics. This relieved 
him of any political responsibility.13 Years later, however, he noted in his memoirs that 
it was during this period that he realized politics were in fact his first priority. From that 
point on, he claimed, he committed himself to reforming the regime as a whole, as he 
believed that the reform of individual sectors would be doomed to failure.14
In the autumn of 1956, Diego Salas Pombo, Vice-Secretary General of the 
Movement, offered Fraga the post of delegate of the exterior sector of the Falange. 
Fraga refused it. His refusal, as well as pressure from other people, made the post 
disappear altogether. Fraga showed interest in the directorship of the Institute of 
Political Studies, but the position was not available. Perhaps it was Fraga’s insistence 
that made Salas decide that since the directorship was a political position he could 
create a sub-directorship responsible for the institute magazine, lectures, publications, 
and so forth. Fraga could not have the directorship, but he was appointed deputy 
director of the Institute on 18 December 1956. It was a step closer to his desired post.15
12 Baon, “Fraga y su poliedro”, p. 81.
13 Politicos para unas elecciones, Fraga, p. 40; Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha, pp. 33-4.
14 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 26.
15 Cabezas, Manuel Fraga, p. 76.
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From the beginning of his time at the institute, Fraga helped Jose Luis Arrese, 
the Minister-Secretary of the Movement, to elaborate a reform proposal for the 
separation of the State and the government. Jose Luis Arrese began to work on the 
political reform of the regime with the collaboration of the Institute of Political Studies. 
The Institute was put in charge of documenting and elaborating the texts needed to 
support Arrese’s thesis. Arrese delegated this job to young Manuel Fraga. Years later, 
Fraga explained that during his time as deputy director of the Institute, he intensively 
thought about a profound reform of the Fundamental Laws. He also sent Franco a 
report on the development of his research emphasizing its long-term implications - 
which in fact was the political reform of the regime - at a time when few dared to talk 
about such a delicate issue to the Caudillo.16
In February 1959, Fraga organized the First Congress of the Spanish Family, 
which strove for greater political participation by Spanish families in national politics. 
The congress served as a platform for the preparation of a Bill of Family Associations. 
This proposal, however, was halted by opposing interests but laid the foundations for 
the future Law of Family Representation of 1967. Fraga spent three years at the Institute 
in the course of which he was also appointed Legal Advisor to the Cortes thereby 
becoming a procurador. But resistance to Fraga’s liberal ideas came from the 
Delegation of Associations as well as from the Delegation of Syndicates, and made him 
consider moving to the Institute of Political Studies. Aware of his inability to overcome 
the resistance from the Delegation, he asked Jose Solis, then Minister-Secretary of the 
Movement, once again for the directorship of the Institute of Political Studies. Solis, 
who fully understood Fraga’s concerns, appointed him director of the Institute as soon
16 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 26. See also, Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, pp. 172-3.
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as he had the opportunity, which finally occurred in the spring of 1961. That was,
17according to Fraga, the only post he asked for throughout his political career.
#184.2. Minister Fraga, ‘representative o f the new generation '
The announcement of Fraga’s appointment as Minister of Information and 
Tourism found him at his long-desired director’s desk of the Institute of Political 
Studies in July 1962. This new post represented the peak of his political career under 
Franco, and he approached it with his usual energy and enthusiasm. During the speech 
in which he ceremonially took possession of the Ministry, Fraga defined his stance as 
follows: ‘I come to defend the honour of Spain, that it is from those who, from within or 
outside, want to sully it’.19 Moreover, as Fraga himself recalled, ‘during the ceremony, I 
declared myself Liberal, like Vives and Maranon. A significant declaration in those 
days, but problematic as it will be seen’.20
Under Fraga’s leadership, the Ministry of Information and Tourism was quite 
successful. The chaotic state of the Ministry itself was soon transformed into an 
efficient institution where there was no place for those high-ranking civil servants who 
had for years been receiving a salary but never turning up for work.21 Fraga had decided 
that ‘the information side of the Ministry would became an instrument for political 
openness, and cultural promotion, and that the tourism side would become a strategic
99sector for the social and economic development [of the country]’. During his seven 
years as Minister, Fraga devoted himself entirely to his work, and his collaborators
17 Cabezas, Manuel Fraga, p. 82; Fraga, Espana en la encrucijada, p. 188.
18 According to Fraga himself, the German Von Papen told him that he was the representative of the new generation 
of Spaniards. See Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 96.
19 Alvarez de Miranda, Del ‘Conturbenio ’ al Consenso, p. 37.
20 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 33.
21 Cemuda, Ciclon Fraga, p. 74.
22 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 33.
The positioning o f  the reformists (1969-1973). Part I. 160
regarded him as an extremely hard worker, a quality that the Minister also demanded 
from his subordinates.
For his ministerial team, Fraga chose able young men, in their early forties, with 
professional as well as academic experience, in an attempt to improve the image of the 
regime. The majority had a strong Catholic background and had previously contributed 
to Catholic journals. They clearly represented a new breed within the regime and were 
professionally more capable than their predecessors. Having said that, Max Gallo 
believes that despite their new ideas ‘these new men, who often concealed their personal 
ambitions behind a mask of disinterested technical efficiency, were the surest guarantee 
that the regime could find to ensure its continuity’. These new faces included Pio 
Cabanillas, Carlos Robles Piquer, Manuel Jimenez Quilez, Antonio Garcia Rodriguez 
Acosta and Jose Maria Garcia Escudero. Most of them, however, were to play an 
important role in the future transition to democracy.
As far as the ministerial duties were concerned the tourism side witnessed a 
spectacular transformation. Since its creation in the cabinet reshuffle of 1951 the 
Ministry of Tourism had been a mere appendix to the Ministry of Information. This was 
a section of the Ministry that was never encouraged to develop because of the regime’s 
view that the moral integrity of Spaniards should be protected from the bad habits of 
other European countries.24 Fraga’s arrival changed this pattern. His new policies and 
commitment to transform the tourist industry into one of the major Spanish industries 
contributed to an unprecedented tourist boom, which gathered pace through the 1960s 
and continues to this day. For instance, from 1962 to 1973 the number of tourists who 
visited Spain rose from 9 million to 35 million a year, thereby contributing to an
23 Gallo, Spain under Franco, pp. 301-2.
24 Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha, p. 52.
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important increase in Peseta earnings at an annual rate of 18 per cent. In fact, during 
Fraga*s ministry, tourism became the greatest single source of foreign currency for the 
Spanish economy. And, it was upon this influx of foreign currency that the financing of
Oftthe Development Plans was going to be based.
The extraordinary development of this industry contributed considerably to the 
improvement of the overall economy, and consequently helped to increase the standard 
of living of many Spanish families. According to Fraga, that achievement was, 
however, not difficult because in Spain ‘the climate is an excellent sub-secretary 
(subsecretario), and the landscape a magnificent personal secretary (secretario 
personal).’27 Furthermore, the impact of tourists on Spanish life, as Edward Malefakis 
explains, ‘although indirect and not usually susceptible to precise measurement, was 
overwhelming. Sexual mores were undoubtedly the first to be affected by their 
example, but other social attitudes soon followed. Secularism, consumerism, and all 
other aspect of the “modem” life-styles’. Likewise, ‘because of tourism, Spain was 
flooded with many kinds of foreign newspapers and periodicals, which provided at least 
for the educated elite uncensored sources of information long before the Spain won its 
freedom’.28
The information side, including radio, television and written press, also 
developed considerably during Fraga’s time in office. The quality of both radio and 
television substantially improved, and with the help of greater purchasing power, more 
Spaniards could enjoy having a TV at home. Fraga organized the opening of a large 
number of so-called Teleclubs which were village centres where people met to watch 
TV as well as play cards, domino, read papers, and so forth. Teleclubs were opened all
25 OECD Economic Survey, Spain, (May 1976), pp. 35-6.
26 La Actualidad Espanola, No.687,4 March 1965, p. 10.
27 Gaceta Ilustrada, No. 742, 27 December 1970, p. 15.
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over the Spanish regions and represented an important source for the spread of 
communication. But above all, Fraga would be remembered for his controversial Press 
Law.
When Franco offered Fraga the ministry, he warned him that ‘one of the 
problems that you will have to face is to make a good Press Law’. Fraga responded that 
‘that was what he was going to do, but not a general law of information like Arias 
Salgado had tried’. Franco seemed to agree, but confessed not to believe ‘in press 
freedom, but it is a step that many important reasons force us to take’.30 He was, 
anyway, willing to make use of indirect controls over the press.31 A Press Law had to 
be drawn up and Franco knew that he could not leave to his successor the difficult task 
of lifting press censorship.32 Instead, the difficult task fell to Fraga. Allegedly, Fraga’s 
core objective was the making of the first political reform in Spain, which could 
overturn the extant censorship laws once and for all.33 But, the journalist Pilar Cemuda, 
one of Fraga’s biographers, argues that Fraga never sought to abolish, eliminate, or 
annul censorship in a drastic way. He just wanted to slowly open the grip of the 
censors, and this he achieved.34 Incidentally, Lopez Rodo suggested to Fraga that he 
immediately eliminate censorship completely, or he would never achieve full freedom. 
But Fraga opted for applying his method of a gradual loosening until he reached the 
total and irreversible removal of censorship.35 This gradual opening did not prevent 
Fraga from dismissing the Chief of Censorship Francisco Serrano Castilla, who was 
replaced by Manuel Camacho, a public servant more to Fraga’s liking. With the help
28 Malefakis, “Spain and Its Francoist Heritage”, p. 218.
29 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 29.
30 Ibid., pp. 144-5.
31 Ibid., p. 159.
32 L6pez Rod6, Memorias I, p. 555.
33 Sentis. Manuel Fraga,p. 43; Preston, Franco, p. 706.
34 Cemuda, Ciclon Fraga, p. 75.
35 Lopez Rodo, Memorias /, p. 347.
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and agreement of Fernando Maria Castiella, Camacho removed the ‘double’ censorship 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had had since the Second World War.
After a series of drafts and no little opposition from Franco’s hard-liners, the 
Cortes finally approved Fraga’s Press Law on Friday 13 August 1965. The Law 
abolished the pre-publication censorship (censura previa) although editors and writers 
still applied a certain amount of self-censorship to their writings out of a fear. The law 
also eliminated most of the censorship instructions, such as the one that forbade the 
display of pictures of ladies’ swimming suits with ‘ladies inside them’ (con senoras 
dentro).36 The response of the population to the Press Law was well captured in a 
cartoon published in ABC  where the cartoonist Mingote cleverly expressed both surprise 
at the approval of the Law and criticism at its delay. In the cartoon an editor was 
pictured before his typewriter saying: ‘Boy! twenty-nine years waiting for this moment,
n n
and I cannot think of anything to say right now’.
Amando de Miguel while regarding the Law to be unprecedented, also 
considered it to be insufficient due to its specific limitations. A clear example was the 
famous and ambiguous Article 2 of the Law, by which ‘freedom of expression and the 
right to spread information, recognized in Article 1, will have no limitation other than 
that imposed by the Law’. In other words, the limitation will be marked by truth, moral
T O  •
and public order. Thus, rather than eliminating censorship, it substituted it with 
responsibility. The editor had to bear in mind the limitations established by the 
authorities, or face prosecution, fine, seizure of the paper or even imprisonment. 
Despite these restrictions, as mentioned in Chapter 2, according to the journalist Juan
36 Cemuda, Ciclon Fraga, p. 75.
37 Baon, ’’Fraga y su poliedro”, p. 84.
38 Miguel, Sociologia del Franquismo, pp. 77-8; Indice, No. 268, 1 May 1970, pp. 6-11.
39 John Hollyman, ”The Press and Censorship in Franco Spain”, in Iberian Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 2 (autumn, 1974), p. 
66; A summary of the Press Law are recorded in Fraga, Horizonte Espanol, pp. 293-95.
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Luis Cebrian, Fraga’s law constituted an irreversible step towards modernisation, which 
without doubt contributed to the deterioration of the Francoist foundations.40
The contradictory elements of Fraga’s character came to the surface anew in 
relation to the Press Law, tarnishing the great expectations that were raised by his 
appointment. On the one hand, he authorized a number of new progressive publications 
and there was a substantial increase in newspaper sales. Sales went from 500,000 in 
1945 to 2.5 million copies in 1967, helping to break the monopoly of information held 
hitherto by the Movement. In 1970, Spain stood fifth in world ranking for its number of 
publications 41 On the other hand, the Ministry of Information imposed four hundred 
and sixty-one administrative sanctions on journalists and publishers. Among the many 
examples are those of the evening paper Madrid which suffered four months closure; 
the magazine Destino which received fifteen sanctions and two months closure; 
Cuadernos para el Dialogo which suffered in the first six months of 1968 one seizure, 
two fines, and two administrative sanctions; and Triunfo closed down for four months. 
Ironically, Fraga was still said to believe that ‘Spain is a country of open doors where 
journalism can be exercised with freedom’.42
The reaction of the press towards the application of the sanctions was mixed. 
For instance, Madrid was given four months suspension and fined 250,000 pesetas for 
an article signed by its director, the Opus Dei Liberal Rafael Calvo Serer: ‘Retirarse a 
tiempo: no al general De Gaulle\ whereby he was accused of indirectly referring to the 
Caudillo. Most of the popular dailies, namely ABC, Informaciones, Nuevo Diario, El 
Alcazar and YA considered the sanctions inappropriate, but they stressed the differences 
in their editorial line from the Madrid's. On the other hand, Arriba and Pueblo
40 Cebrian, La Espana que bosteza, pp. 105-7.
41 Dominguez Ortiz, Historia de Espana, p. 214.
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considered the sanctions, in the words of Emilio Romero, to be well-deserved as Calvo 
Serer’s article ‘abused the freedom of the press’.43 With a divided press, not much 
progress could be made.
Fraga’s ambiguous relation with the press and with the cultural world in general 
was demonstrated even before the Press Law was passed, however. One such occasion 
had arisen on 30 September 1964 when a group of 102 intellectuals sent a letter of 
complaint to Fraga over the inaccurate information relating to miner strikes in Asturias. 
They denounced cases of torture and ill-treatment received by miners, men and women, 
at the hands of the Civil Guard. The denunciation was important as was the list of 
signatures, which included many well-known university professors, writers, and artists. 
Among them were the poet Vicente Aleixandre - later Nobel Prize winner -; Pedro Lain 
Entralgo, Professor of History of Medicine at the Universidad Complutense in Madrid; 
the economist Valentin Andres Alvarez; the philosopher Jose Luis Aranguren; the 
founder of the Partido Socialista del Interior in 1968 (later Partido Socialista Popular), 
Enrique Tiemo Galvan; the poet Jose Bergamin; and the dramatist Antonio Buero 
Vallejo.44
Fraga published this letter and his reply to it, which was addressed to the poet 
Jose Bergamin. Bergamin’s forthright tone appears to have infuriated the Minister who 
began an undeclared war against him. After a series of letters, (which Fraga decided not 
to publish as in one of them the Minister accused Bergamin of having defended the 
crimes committed by a trostkyist group), the poet had to seek refuge at the Uruguayan 
embassy in Madrid. Given that his passport had been invalidated, and its renewal
42 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 189, 11-17 December 1976, pp. 28-29; For a critical response to the government 
on its case see Triunfo, No. 676, 10 January 1976, pp. 6-7, 70.
43 El Ciervo, No. 173, July 1968, p. 6.
44 Lopez Rodo, Memorias I, p. 480.
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constantly refused ‘on superior orders’, Bergamin fled to Uruguay, and was only given a 
passport to return to Spain a few days after Fraga’s dismissal in 1969.45
Unfortunately, this case was not an isolated one. In relation to the 
aforementioned Madrid affair, Fraga also engaged in a quasi-personal dispute against its 
director Rafael Calvo Serer. The paper had been founded in 1961 by the Opus Dei 
cultural organization FACES (.Fomento de Actividades Culturales, Economicas y  
Sociales) for the purpose of preparing a post-Francoist society. In 1966 Calvo Serer 
rescued it from failure, and from then on the Madrid became one of the most important 
papers for both liberal and democrat readers. Calvo Serer’s known support for Don 
Juan alienated the pro-Francoist members of Opus Dei, namely Carrero’s entourage, 
who favoured Don Juan Carlos. Calvo also fell out with Fraga, ensuring the Opus Dei 
member would have to battle constantly to defend his newspaper from the Minister. 
The paper’s failure to support the regime line during the Burgos trials (further explained 
ahead), against members of the terrorist separatists ETA in 1970, led to its ultimate 
closure one year later and Calvo Serer’s exile.46 Calvo Serer accused Fraga on several 
occasions of being responsible for the paper’s closure.47
Dislike of Calvo Serer was perhaps the only thing Fraga and Franco’s right hand 
man, Carrero Blanco, had in common. At the outset of his ministry, Fraga enjoyed good 
relations with the Deputy Secretary of the presidency, Carrero Blanco, who even asked 
Fraga to write a prologue to his book “Spain and the Sea”. However, towards the end of 
the 1960s, their differing political views affected both their professional and personal 
relations and even halted Fraga’s political career. They engaged in a ‘battle’ which
45 Romero, Tragicomedia de Espana, p. 123; Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 189, 11-17 December 1976, pp. 28- 
29.
46 Preston, Triumph to democracy, pp. 29-31, 36.
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Carrero obviously won. On 8 October 1963 Fraga, for instance, presented the Caudillo 
with a constitutional bill for the reform of the State, which included the creation of a 
network of competitive political associations, the election of a Lower Chamber by 
universal suffrage, and he also presented the project of a Press Law. Franco rejected the 
first constitutional project and accepted the second one.48 As seen in the previous 
Chapter, two other constitutional bills were also presented to Franco. One bill had been 
elaborated by Jose Solis and Fernando Herrero Tejedor, the other one by Carrero and 
Lopez Rodo. Franco chose the Carrero-Lopez Rodo proposal. In his memoirs, Lopez 
Rodo points out the obvious differences between Fraga’s bill and the later LOE - which 
was based on Lopez Rodo’s proposal. But, reading both, it is difficult to see much 
difference. Fraga proposed the election of only the Lower Chamber by universal 
suffrage -  which was less restrictive than the LOE - by which only the family sector 
could be elected by heads of households, married women and adult men (so, no really by 
universal suffrage). The proposal still considered the family, municipality and syndicate 
as the basic structure of the State, and it contemplated the creation of association only 
under the umbrella of the Movement. Furthermore, the proposal emphasized the unity 
of religion, thereby opposing freedom of religion; and did not reform the sindical 
system, but ‘soften’ it.49
Nevertheless, in comparison to the inmovilista sector, Fraga appeared to favour 
more open and reformist policies. For instance, Carrero and his Opus Dei proteges 
objected to any venture that threatened their plans to continue the Francoist regime 
under a Don Juan Carlos monarchy. Therefore they hid behind the position that Spain’s
47 Rafael Calvo Serer, La dictadura de los franquistas, (Pans: Ruedo Iberica, 1973), pp. 264-293.
48 Fraga,Memoria breve, p. 87; Powell, Reform versus 'Ruptura', p. 16.
49 A summary of Fraga’s bill is recorded in Lopez Rodo, Memorias I, pp.397-400; Powell, 'Ruptura ' versus Reform,
p.16.
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chief problems were merely economic.50 The differences between Carrero and Fraga 
became evident following the resignation of Munoz Grandes as Vice-President of the 
Government on 22 July 1967. Rumours in the press asserted that the two contenders for 
the vacant position were Carrero Blanco and Manuel Fraga.51 Carrero was not only a 
strong contender but also the Caudillo’s distrust of Fraga ensured that he had no chance 
of the post. On 21 September 1967 Carrero was officially appointed Vice-President of 
the Government, gaining more power and influence than ever before. Fraga lost his job 
as one of Franco’s ministers in the ministerial change of July 1969. As Minister of 
Information and Tourism he had helped to relax, though not completely abolish, the 
dictatorial censorship, contributing ultimately to the regime’s demise. He also improved 
the tourist industry, which itself contributed to the population’s increased standard of 
living. In conclusion, it was a satisfactory result brought up short by his dismissal from 
the cabinet.
4.3. Fraga, the man o f the ‘Centre’
Fraga refused to accept that his dismissal from the Ministry represented the end 
of a phase in his political career, but a new opportunity only arose after the Caudillo’s 
death. Between 1969 and 1975 he occupied top positions in both the public and private 
sectors, became president of a large Spanish brewing company, sat on the executive 
boards of various firms, and taught intermittently at the University of Madrid from 1969 
until 1977. Meanwhile Franco did not renew Fraga’s seat as Councillor of the 
Kingdom, the so-called 40 de Ayete, removing him gradually from the spheres of
50 Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha, p. 53.
51 Equipo Mundo, Los 90 ministros de Franco, p. 275.
52 Fraga, Memoria breve, pp. 205-8; Preston, Franco, pp.733-34; Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 15.
53 Lopez-Pintor, “Francoist Reformers in democratic Spain”, pp. 191-2; Fraga, Memoria breve, pp. 257-375.
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power.54 With Carrero as Vice-President of the Government, Fraga’s scope for political 
manoeuvring was dramatically reduced. In fact, Fraga remembered the period between 
1969 and 1975 as the time of ‘his greatest political frustration’ because the authorities 
denied him the conditions for direct action.55
Franco had praised Fraga’s youth, but regarded him as a man of the ‘future’.56 
There was, therefore, no chance for Fraga to return to politics as yet. But, Fraga’s 
political was career had not finished. He believed he was to be a protagonist in the 
transition to a post-Francoist Spain, although he also realized that since his dismissal 
from the Ministry of Information and Tourism he had achieved little. As a result, he set 
himself an important task: to convince others of his capability and potential to lead in 
the post-Francoist era.57 In fact, several years later, in December 1974, following a 
lecture to the Catalan political dlite in Barcelona, the audience left under the impression 
that Fraga was the only man capable of playing a role in the terribly confused period that
C O
Spain was going through. A more moderate prediction was that of the British 
historian Hugh Thomas who, also in 1974, said that any post-Francoist government 
would have to have Fraga’s presence.59
Fraga’s first opportunity to return to public notice came in April 1970 when the 
West German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walter Scheel, visited Madrid at the 
invitation of his Spanish counterpart, Gregorio Lopez Bravo. Scheel reiterated European 
demands to prominent Spanish figures of the tolerated ‘democratic opposition’ like 
Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez, Jose Maria de Areilza, Joaquin Satrustegui, Enrique Tiemo
54 Mundo, 13-XI-71, p. 9.
55 Interview with Pilar Urbano recorded in Manuel Fraga, Espana en la encrucijada, (Madrid: Eds. Adra, 1976), p. 
178.
56 Bemaldez, El Patron de la derecha, pp. 133-4.
51 Ibid.. pp. 124, 147.
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Galvan, and even Manuel Fraga. This meeting with the German enhanced Fraga’s 
progressive image, confirming his reformist position. Ironically for Fraga, the meeting 
had been simply ‘ceremonial as I do not like to exhibit national problems before 
foreigners’.60 Scheel’s visit to Spain was important as the newly-appointed cabinet, 
composed mainly of technocrats, was committed to economic liberalization and growth, 
which they believed would bring Spain closer to the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Thus, following the failed attempt of Spain to become part of the EEC, the 
Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister was making new efforts to present Spain as a modem 
country to the German Minister. Yet, the obvious deficiency of the Spanish system in 
basic human (see the Grimau affair), and political Rights (Right of free political 
associations, information, assembly, etc.) clashed with the catalogue of democratic 
requirements from the EEC.
In March 1970, Jose Maria de Areilza - Head of Don Juan’s secretariat - 
published an article in the monarchist daily ABC called The Spanish Road to 
Democracy, in which he argued that ‘it seems that recognition of Spain’s politics as 
equivalent to elsewhere in Europe is impossible’ {La homologia de Espana con la 
Europa politica es, a lo que parece, imposible). However, since the principal objective 
was the finding of a Spanish road to democracy, Areilza advanced some essential points 
of a democratic system, one of which was a government chosen by the people.61 But, 
Franco’s entourage was hard to convince. Carrero, for instance, responded, under the 
pseudonym ‘Gines de Buitrago’, to a public call for democracy in the Catholic daily YA
58 Cambio 16, 16-22 December 1974.
59 Ibid., 6-12 January 1975, p. 33.
60 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 264; Areilza, Cronica de Libertad, pp. 103-4
61 ABC, 24 March 1970.
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that, ‘rather than Spain having to adapt to Europe, Europe should imitate Francoism’. 
But Spain was not enjoying an enviable reputation.
At the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, the social situation in Spain 
was characterized by popular unrest against the dictatorship, student and worker 
demonstrations, and terrorist acts in reaction to the repressive government. One of the 
most important events, attracting national and international attention, was undoubtedly 
the so-called ‘Burgos trial’. At the end of 1970 the regime held sixteen ETA militants, 
including two priests, out of which three were sentenced to death. In those days of 
dictatorship ETA enjoyed the support of many Spaniards, but the Caudillo remained 
unmoved by the many pleas for clemency or commuted sentences, from home and 
abroad. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs warned the Caudillo on the negative 
impact abroad, and other Ministers like Carrero and Lopez Rodo did not approve of the 
death sentences. The Caudillo’s decision to have the sentences carried out alienated 
not only the Church and the democratic opposition, but also the regime reformists. On 
29 December 1970, a ‘mercy petition’ was sent to Franco from the Colegios de 
Abogados de Madrid a number of progressive political personalities, which included 
signatures from Jose Maria Gil-Robles, Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez, Fernando Alvarez de 
Miranda, Pablo Castellano, Pedro Lain Entralgo, Dionisio Ridruejo, Enrique Tiemo 
Galvan, among others. Eventually, the Caudillo granted a reprieve, restoring calm.64 
According to Preston, ‘the pardons may have been manifestations of strength, but to 
have held the trials at all was a symptom of Franco’s loosening grip.’65
62 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, pp.28-9.
63 For more details on the trial see Preston, Franco, pp. 751 -4.
64 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio”, p. 71; Bardavio & Sinova, Todo Franco, pp. 376-379.
65 Preston, Franco, p. 754.
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Luis Ramirez points out that ‘the trial against ETA’s militants became the trial 
against the regime’. The Burgos trial resulted in the international isolation of the regime 
and clarified who would stay with Franco until the end.66 Furthermore, the historian 
Jose Luis Rodriguez Jimenez suggests that the Burgos trial had a threefold effect; it 
provoked the ‘closing of ranks’ around the Caudillo; it halted the liberalization 
measures advocated by the reformists; and what was worst, it triggered the emergence of 
ultra-Right squads. Yet, the trials also had an effect on the democratic opposition,
/TQ
which became more unified than any time since the Civil War.
By that time, the degree of political consciousness of the working class was 
much greater than a few years before. So far as political participation was concerned, it 
was not only the man-in-the-street but also elements of the regime that demanded 
political associations (even if some of them wanted them to be within the boundaries of 
the Movement). Many people regarded integration with Europe as the only way to open 
the way towards political liberalization. This demand was reflected in the press. An 
editorial in the Catholic YA recorded that ‘there is not a single day in which, in one guise 
or another, the theme of associationism does not appear in the press, to the point of 
seeming to be an obsession’.69
The battle for associations became Fraga’s obsession too. Since his dismissal 
from the Ministry, Fraga had toured Spain giving lectures in his pursuit of delivering a 
progressive and centrist political programme. From 1969 to 1973, he gave, or 
participated in, a total of fifty-one lectures and workshops with the purpose of removing 
obstacles to political pluralism. This political stance, which he had publicly unveiled
66 Ramirez, “Morir en el bunker”, pp. 10, 14,19.
67 Jos6 Luis Rodriguez Jimenez, “The Extreme Right in Spain after Franco”, in Patterns o f  Prejudice, Vol. 24, Vols. 
2-4,1990, p. 87.
68 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 36
69Cuadernospara el Dialogo, No. 99, December 1971, p. 13; YA, 16-11-71.
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during his speech before the Cortes on 15 December 1969, placed him in opposition to 
the regime. His public appearances did not go unnoticed.70 He had agreed to give a talk 
at the Club Horizonte 1980, which was part of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Cientificas (CSIC), on 22 February 197171. Yet, on 15 February he was informed that 
the lecture had been cancelled due to urgent repairs of the premises. The truth, 
however, was that Jose Luis Villar Palasi and Eugenio Montes Alonso, Ministers of 
Education and Public Works, respectively, had refused him permission to use the CSIC 
Centre. This prompted Fraga’s resignation from the board of the CSIC, although he 
stayed to give his talk. His letter of resignation was published and the whole affair 
attracted great attention. Fraga’s talk, El desarrollo politico, was finally given before a 
large audience at premises belonging to the Dominican friars in Madrid. Fraga 
emphasized the need for a series of reforms equidistant from extremes of Right and 
Left, and defended the objective of such a political development; ‘a rich and full Spain 
where all Spaniards belong, [and] which must have tensions, nuances and political
79 79ideologies’. His talk was later published in a book under the same title.
During an interview with the journalist Alfonso Paso, Fraga said that ‘it is the 
time of honest men, [of those] who do not fear innovation and risk and have moral 
authority, of groups genuinely representative of all society and overall of a society just 
being bom. It is the moment of participation [...], of enthusiasm but not of boredom. It 
is [the time for] re-launching the ideal of a Spain so big and just that all Spaniards
70 Baon, “Fraga y su poliedro”, p. 87.
71 This club was registered at the Registry of Associations in May 1967 as Club 1980. It aimed at promoting and 
making medium and long forecasting studies about the consequences of the development of science and technology 
in the economic, social and cultural life. Statutes of Club 1980, 13 Mayo 1967. Registro Nacional de Asociaciones. 
Ministerio del Interior, Madrid.
72 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 277; Dossier Mundo, January 1972, pp. 16-7; L6pez Rodo, Memorias III, pp. 163-4.
73 Manuel Fraga, Horizonte Espanol, (Madrid: Heroes, 1968, 3 Ed.).
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belong.’74 The ex-Minister, however, did not clarify whether the Communists could be 
included in his idea of all Spaniards. Although Fernando Alvarez de Miranda asserted 
that Fraga was one of the few politicians of the regime willing to support a pluralist 
democracy, the lack of clarity about the legalisation of the Communist party seemed to
*JC
be a common pattern at that time. Like many of his contemporaries, therefore, Fraga 
was sceptical of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) because the Communist’s support 
for a democracy after Franco was still unknown to many. Open advocacy in favour of 
the PCE would have categorized Fraga as being on the left of the democratic opposition, 
and Fraga was still a long way from a purely democratic ideology.
Another unclear point was that of political parties or associations. When the 
journalist Mariano del Mazo asked Fraga which of the two options he preferred, the ex- 
Minister answered that, ‘my motto is reform, and that requires a tactic of ordered 
transition. Any statute of associations is good to start with, so long as the associations 
are sincere [he uses “good faith political associations”].’ It was clear that Fraga was 
willing to initiate a political association within the boundaries of the Movement, a 
position that changed over time. A few years later, as it will be explained in Chapter 6, 
he advocated a network of political associations outside the Movement. What Fraga 
made clear to Del Mazo, however, was his position towards the idea of a centrist policy 
in Spain,
The centre in Spain is the possible line between the inmovilista Right and the utopian Left. In
any case, I believe, and that’s how I put it in books and lectures, that what is necessary in Spain
are a policy of reforms. The revolutionary measures imply revolution that means risk
[aventura] and a revolutionary dictatorship. Inmovilismo has no exit either, nor political future,
nor truly economic development, nor social justice. In the middle grounds remains difficult but
necessary field of reforms. [,..]The Centre Policy is not only the most convenient, but also the
76one that the majority of Spaniards wish for.
74 Gaceta Ilustrada, No. 742,27 December 1970, p. 18.
75 Alvarez de Miranda, Del 'conturbernio ’ al consenso, p. 37.
76 Cabezas, Manuel Fraga, p. 282.
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His conviction that a centrist policy was the right one was such that he even 
defined himself as a man of the Centre.77 In November 1971 Fraga gave, according to 
Rogelio Baon, one of his most important speeches. The lecture took place at the Royal 
Academy of Moral and Political Science under the title of ‘Social change and political 
reform’. The lecture contained the doctrinal and ideological material that Fraga 
presented throughout the early 1970s.78 A few months later, on 10 March 1972, Fraga 
gave a speech in Barcelona called, specifically ‘Theory of the centre’, in which whilst he 
acknowledged the inevitability of change, he stressed the moderate meaning of the term 
Centre. ‘The attitude of the centre’, he said, ‘therefore, is neither conservative nor
revolutionary, but reformist. The established order is not repudiated, but it is not
accepted unconditionally either; the centrist [man] wishes to transform it selectively (in 
other words, in specific sectors) and gradually (<evolutivamente), in other words, in a
4
progressive way and without violence.’79
Following the Barcelona lecture, Fraga claimed that his copyright of the ‘theory
O A
of the Centre’ was clear. Gabriel Cisneros defends this claim, and although one
• • R1cannot say that Fraga invented the term ‘centre’, he definitely put it into circulation. 
The tireless ex-Minister took every opportunity offered to him to explain his political 
stance. Fraga participated in a round table organized by ANEPA about ‘the Church and 
State in Spain’. Here he supported an amicable separation between Church and State 
and advocated a religiously plural society with its different traditions. But these
77 Ibid., p. 282.
78 Baon, “Fraga y su poliedro”, pp. 86-87.
79 The content of the lecture “Teoria de Centro’ delivered in the Centre Mundo on 10 March 1972 was recorded 
together with other pieces of lectures in Fraga’s Legitimidad y  Representation, (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1973), pp. 213- 
257. This quote can be found in Ibid, pp. 240-41. See also Mundo, 18-111-1972, p. 11.
80 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 286.
81 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros, 13-9-99.
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moderate ideas would only be possible, Fraga said, if one was at the centre of the 
political spectrum.82
In retrospect, however, it is difficult to attribute the idea of a ‘centre party’ solely 
to Manuel Fraga although he may have been the first one to put it into circulation. 
Many observers had already understood that in order to have a peaceful transition to a 
post-Francoist society the only solution was to take a centrist position. As early as 1956 
a group of students led by Jesus Barros de Lis and Jose Gallo had created a clandestine 
association called Union Democrata Cristiana which they defined as a ‘centrist party’.83 
On the other hand, Rafael Calvo Serer believed it was actually the Professor of Derecho 
Politico, Juan Ferrando Badia who developed the idea of a ‘political Centre’ while he 
collaborated with the newspaper Madrid. As a Minister of Information Fraga affirmed 
that Ferrando would never become a professor because of his advocacy of political 
associations. Years later, in 1977, an angered Calvo Serer complained that ‘Fraga had 
the audacity, not to say the impertinence, to affirm that he had been the first one to talk 
of the political centre in Spain’.84
Incidentally, in 1968 Calvo Serer himself had already published a book entitled 
Espana ante la libertad, la democracia y  elprogreso, where he explained the idea of the 
political centre. Here he argued that ‘the regime is accepted for it is the legal system, 
but at the same time one wants to correct it, amend it, and transform it in order to match 
the changing reality, in other words, make it evolve. The centre stays to the Right of the 
opposition outside the regime’. Thus, he added, ‘if the authoritarian formula, the 
military dictatorship, and the democratic extreme are unviable, [then] the gradual
82 Asociacion para el Estudio de Problemas Contemporaneos, El Estadoy la Iglesia en Espana, (Madrid, 1972); pp. 
29-39. See also Asociacion para el Estudio de Problemas Contempor&neos, La participacion politico, (Madrid, 
1973).
83 Tusell & Calvo, Gimenez Fernandez, pp. 268-269.
84 Rafael Calvo Serer, Mis enfrentamientos con el poder, (Barcelona: Plaza y Jands, 1978), p. 273.
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evolution, via the reformist way that the centre represents, is the preferable (the gradual 
evolucion por la via reformista representa el Centro)’} 5
Fraga’s reformist ideas, however, never stopped him from being close to Franco
o r
and admiring his work. In 1970, for instance, Fraga had claimed to have ‘the highest 
regard for his Excellency the Head of State. [...] [He] has been, and [still] is, a great 
leader who on many occasions has sacrificed his personal life, and his interests to the 
service of the Fatherland’.87 Also, in his book Horizonte Espahol Fraga reiterated his 
admiration for Franco’s system. ‘With the nationalist victory’, he wrote, ‘this last 
quarter-century has seen the greatest period of peace, order and prosperity since the 
reign of Charles HI. With Franco’s guidance the country is moving in an orderly way 
towards solving all its economic, social, administrative, political and international 
problems’.88
The ex-Minister, therefore, never really wished to break with the regime in order 
to establish a democratic system, but to keep its best elements and introduce the 
necessary legal reforms to evolve a new system in Spain. In fact, Pilar Cemuda argues 
that it was the reactionary attitude of his fellow Ministers, such as Carrero, that made 
Fraga appear more liberal than he really was. It is pointless to claim - Cemuda insists - 
that Fraga wanted to democratize the regime from within, as he felt comfortable on the 
inside. Moreover, Fraga did not raise his voice in protest when there were occasions to 
do so such as political repression in demonstrations, persecutions of individuals in the
85 Rafael Calvo Serer, Espana, ante la libertad, la democracia y  el progreso, (Madrid: Guadiana de publicaciones, 
1968), pp. 314-317, 333.
86 See for example Fraga’s comments on Franco and the regime in Jose Maria Gironella y Rafael Borras Betriu, 100 
Espanoles y  Franco, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1979), pp. 190-192.
87 Gaceta Ilustrada, No. 742,27 December 1970, p. 16.
88 Fraga, Horizonte Espanol, p. 15. Another propagandist book in favour of the regime was an earlier work of 
Manuel Fraga titled A si se gobierna Espana, (Madrid: Oficina de Informacion Diplomatica, 1949).
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cultural world, application of the death penalty, and so forth.89 Furthermore, Bemaldez 
observes that Fraga was really in the regime, not as Liberal as his supporters claimed. 
Fraga fully belonged and never distanced himself from the regime’s abuses. Fraga’s 
wish to reform the regime was sincere but insufficient and, according to Bemaldez, far 
from tmly democratic in spirit.90
Nonetheless, Manuel Fraga went around the country presenting his reformist 
political ideas. Lectures were not, however, the ideal place for discussions in a relaxed 
and open manner. Fraga needed a solid platform where he could explain in a consistent 
way his political ideas. On these grounds, in the early 1970s Fraga attempted the 
publication of a newspaper, which could reflect his ideas about the centre. In his 
memoirs Fraga records a meeting with Jose Maria de Areilza, Dario Varcarcel and 
Carlos Mendo on 26 November 1970 which marked the beginning of the conversations 
to create El Pais. On 15 February, and following a conversation with the same people, 
he wrote that ‘the operation El Pais continues’. At the end of August 1971, Fraga 
records a conversation with Ortega Spottomo about El Pais. ‘It will be’, Fraga said, ‘a 
Liberal and independent daily, equidistant from inmovilismo and Marxism.’91 Later, 
the former mayor of Madrid and one of Fraga’s most faithful supporters, Juan de 
Arespacochaga recorded that, ‘in November 1972, and because of Fraga’s wish, [I] had 
my first contact with Ortega Spottomo, Perez Escolar and Carlos Mendo to contribute to
09the subscription for El Pais. ’
According to the above information, it appears that the idea of El Pais had 
emerged from initial conversation between Manuel Fraga, Areilza and Dario Varcarcel.
89 Cemuda, Ciclon Fraga, pp. 70-71.
90 Bemaldez, El Patron de la derecha, pp. 129, 152.
91 Fraga, Memoria breve, pp. 274, 277, 280. Further conversations about El Pais are recorded in Ibid., pp. 281, 290, 
294.
92 Juan de Arespacochaga, Cartas a unos Capitanes, (Madrid: INCIPIT Editores, 1984), p. 210.
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Yet, the confusion arises when the launch of the newspaper finally materialised in May 
1976. The magazine Cambio-16 referred to Jose Ortega Spottomo as ‘the father of the
93operation’, and Manuel Fraga was merely one among four-hundred other shareholders. 
Furthermore, Areilza records the launching of the newspapers and also refers to Ortega 
Spottomo as the main promoter.94 In May 1973, Ortega Spottomo visited Fraga at his 
London embassy. Ortega, as Fraga recalls, ‘has come to ask me to accelerate the 
process of registering the newspaper, and also to accept Juan Luis Cebrian’s candidature 
for the directorship, rather than Carlos Mendo [Fraga’s proposed candidate]. Cebrian 
had been included on the shortlist and was agreed to be the most suitable for the post.’95 
It is not clear why Fraga was asked to agree on the name of the director if he had not 
been one of the main promoters, or at least an important participant in the operation. 
The newspaper was finally launched in May 1976, and ironically, became one the most 
important platforms for criticism of Fraga’s AP.
By 1971, and alongside the operation El Pais, Fraga had also matured the idea of 
forming his own political group with a reformist and centrist tendency, as Rogelio Baon 
asserts, with the ‘pretentious’ intention of leading the Second Restoration. To this end, 
the tireless ex-Minister had gathered together a number of people interested in his 
proposals and with whom he created a couple of teams.96 Fraga wanted these political 
groups to be ready for the creation of a political association in the event of their 
approval. The most important was a study group called Gabinete de Orientacion y  
Documentacion, S.A. (GODSA), which was finally created in 1973 (this group deserves 
special attention because it was a pioneering group formed by aperturistas and young 
reformists of the regime). Fraga’s group developed a proper political programme that
93 Cambio-16, 4-10 February 1974, pp. 16-17. The names of eighty-eight shareholders are recorded in Ibid., p. 17.
94 Areilza, Cronica de libertad, pp. 187-8.
95 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 327.
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served as the basis for the future AP. (This group is studied in more detail in Chapter 
6). Fraga’s decision to form a political group, however, seemed to be ‘out of fashion’. 
According to Alfonso Osorio, the level of enthusiasm to form political associations that 
had existed in 1969 had vanished by 1970, by which time he, like many other observers, 
preferred to ‘wait and see’.97 In fact, while Fraga created a political study group, other 
people preferred to organize dinners to discuss politics.
Conclusion
Following his departure from the Ministry of Information and Tourism (1962- 
1969), Manuel Fraga Iribame had set off on a political trajectory of his own. Fraga 
became the ‘man of the Centre’, and was regarded by many as the only politician 
capable of providing an alternative to Carrero Blanco’s cabinet. Fraga advocated a 
centrist policy of reforms including the right for Spanish people to freely associate. But 
Fraga had started his policy of reforms already, while Minister of Information and 
Tourism. On the information side, Fraga’s main achievement was the approval of the 
Press Law in 1966. Although some criticized its restrictive character, the Press Law 
contributed to the deterioration of the Francoist foundations by opening the frontiers of 
information. Equally important was Fraga’s performance on the tourism side. Under 
Fraga’s leadership tourism witnessed a spectacular transformation becoming one of 
Spain’s most important industries.
His authoritarian character, however, tarnished Fraga’s reputation as ‘hard- 
worker’ and aperturista. His reformist mantra contrasted with a series of 
incomprehensible decisions that he took as Minister such as to seize, to fine and to close
96 Baon, “Fraga y su poliedro”, p. 86.
97 Lopez Rodo, Memorias III, p. 64.
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down a number of newspapers and journals, whose launching had been authorized by 
him. The only time Fraga’s reformist side overshadowed his authoritarian side was 
between 1969 and 1975. From 1969, Fraga travelled around Spain delivering 
progressive speeches in favour of political reform and the introduction of a system of 
political associations. He secured the support of many young reformists, who became 
part of his study group later on. Moreover, from 1973, and while Spanish ambassador 
in London, Fraga was regarded by many as the only politician capable of bringing 
democracy to Spain. Yet, Fraga appeared more Liberal than he really was. As it is 
further explained in Chapter 7, Fraga advocated a tightly controlled liberalization of the 
regime, not a democratic regime. His wish to reform may have been sincere, but was 
also insufficient.
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Chapter - 5
The positioning o f  the reformists (1969-1973), Part II 
Juan Carlos as catalyst
By the end of the 1960s it was generally acknowledged that Franco’s regime would not 
fall of its own volition, but would probably collapse after the Caudillo’s death. Unlike 
its neighbour Portugal, Spain did not have a strong generation of young progressive 
military officers who could lead the transition to a democratic regime as happened in 
1974. Many considered that the only logical option to ensure a peaceful post-Francoist 
transition was gradually to reform the system whilst meeting the demands of the 
population and the times. For some, the appointment of Prince Juan Carlos as Franco’s 
official successor was a step forward, but the political future of Spain was still obscure 
at the beginning of the 1970s. The Caudillo’s age should have prompted him to prepare 
the country for his stepping down, but it did not. On the contrary, Franco did not appear 
concerned by this issue. In fact, as the American Ambassador to Spain, Samuel Eaton, 
recalls, ‘.. .there was an unconscious, lingering popular suspicion that he would never 
die.’1 It was the members of Franco’s own regime, who were left to re-organize 
themselves and unofficially establish the possibilities for the country’s future. However, 
given that political associations had not yet been approved, these Spaniards, and more 
specifically the aperturistas and reformists, had to find other ways to meet and discuss 
the political problems of the country. These were through means such as lectures, 
workshops, but mainly ‘political dinners’ that became very fashionable in the early 
1970’s.
During the period covered in this Chapter the divergence between points of view 
regarding the future of the country emerging amongst members of the regime became
1 Eaton, The forces offreedom in Spain, p. 1.
The positioning o f  the reformists (1969-1973). Part II. 183
more evident. According to the Spanish historian Jose Maria Jover, during this period 
there was a moderate group -  probably a reference to the aperturistas and reformists - 
that stood between the members of a speedily growing democratic opposition, and the 
inmovilistas. Thus, the disappearance of a sharp divide between the regime and its 
opposition helped make possible the political reform which, orchestrated by the 
Institutions of the regime, took place after the death of the Caudillo. Also, the quasi- 
official positioning of Prince Juan Carlos in favour of a democratic regime was, 
undoubtedly, what conditioned many members of the regime to take positions in the 
reformist side.
5.1. The years o f the ‘political dinners’
‘If we organize dinners it is because, unfortunately, that is the only way to 
contrast different [political] opinions’.3 These words of Antonio Gavilanes, President of 
the Centro de Estudios de Problemas Contemporaneos, recorded in May 1972 clearly 
expressed the frustration felt among the progressive circles of the Spanish society in the 
face of the regime’s reluctance to approve political associations. Dinners or private 
gatherings where people met to discuss political issues could be organized either by a 
registered association, or by private initiative. The early 1970s seem to have been the 
peak time of these gatherings, but as we have seen in Chapter 2, private meetings dated 
from much earlier.
In the early 1970s there were a number of groups which, among their activities, 
organized colloquiums and political dinners. These groups included the Circulo de 
Estudios Juridicos, directed by the Catalan lawyer Pedro Rius, primarily dedicated to
2 Jover Zamora (Dtor.), Historia de Espana, Vol. XLI., p. 145.
3 Mundo, 6-V-1972, p. 9.
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legal topics although it blended law and politics; the Club Horizonte 1980, directed by 
Enrique Larroque; the ANEPA; and the Club Siglo XXI. (The last two were close to the 
regime).4 Antonio Fontan, director of the newspaper Madrid, also organized regular 
political dinners participated in by members of the editorial boards of Madrid, friends of 
the newspaper, and members of the study group Juan Ruiz, such as Miguel Herrero de 
Minon.5 At a more personal level, Herrero de Minon also records in his memoirs 
political dinners he had with several friends in the early 1970s. Herrero met Alejandro 
Nieto, Lorenzo Martin Retortillo, Jose Maria Maravall, Jose Torreblanca and Father 
Jesus Aguirre, among others, fortnightly at the restaurant La Ancha in Madrid. During 
these dinners they enjoyed a ‘lively and interdisciplinary debate where each of [us] were 
enriched and enriched the rest, and, I suspect’, Herrero writes, ‘[we also] rehearsed 
classes, reports and, in Aguirre’s case, one of his outstanding Sunday morning sermons 
[which he gave] at the church of the University City.’6
Despite the political activities of these individuals and groups, and surely other 
unrecorded collectives, the group that transformed the political dinners into a 
fashionable event was the Centro de Estudios de Problemas Contemporaneos.1 
Antonio Gavilanes, President of the centre, was the main organizer of these dinners, 
which were paid for by the guests themselves. Gavilanes believed that given the 
Spanish penchant for chatting over long lunches and dinners - known as tertulias in 
Spain - political dinners would be successful. Observers like Gavilanes realized that 
Franco’s regime would only end with his demise. Franco’s delicate health and advanced 
age led to repeated predictions of the imminent end of the regime. Different political
4 Mundo, 17-1V-1971 pp. 9-10.
5 Herrero de Minon, Memorias de estio, pp. 47-8.
6 Ibid., p. 54.
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possibilities for the future of Spain were constantly tabled, but the absence of political 
associations and parties impeded legal political encounters. Gavilanes, therefore, 
thought of political dinners as a temporary substitute for political associations.
The objective of these dinners was ‘to unite people from different ideological 
and political persuasions around the simple and polite dialogue of a table with the aim 
of contrasting opinions, detecting political positions, and searching for common 
ground’. ‘We thought’, Gavilanes recalled, ‘that there was a huge political vacuum, and
o #
that the Spanish political class was in need of greater sociability’. Despite the veracity 
of this statement, however, ‘greater sociability’ in political matters was precisely what 
the hard-liners of the regime had been trying to avoid. Hence Gavilanes’ gatherings 
were regarded by some as part of the opposition to the regime perhaps because of the 
presence of some members of the opposition. Gavilanes denied this, ‘but [on the 
contrary] we want evolution and to support the succession of Prince Juan Carlos as a 
unique alternative of political coexistence in the country’.9 Today, Gavilanes recalls 
that people of different political ideologies usually frequented the activities organized by 
the association. Therefore these events did not follow his personal monarchist line but a 
more progressive one.10
The dinners attracted political personalities from both the clandestine opposition 
and the regime (such as Emilio Romero) alike, particularly those identified with the 
aperturista side. Among these were personalities such as Jose Maria de Areilza, 
Manuel Fraga, Jose Solis, Alfonso Osorio, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Marcelino 
Oreja, Alberto Ballarin, Pio Cabanillas, Juan Manuel Fanjul, Miguel Herrero de Minon, 
Albert Reguera Guajardo, Gabriel Cisneros, Jesus de Esperabe y Artiaga, Fernando
1 Mundo, 17-IV-1971 pp. 9-10.
8 YA, 27-111-1971, p. 12.
9 La Vanguardia Espanola, 21-VI-1972; Informaciones, 28-VI-1972.
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Suarez, Emilio Romero, Ramon Areces, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Carlos Argos, Jesus 
Aguirre, Eduardo Tarragona, and Manuel Escudero Rueda. Gavilanes, however, never 
managed to persuade Adolfo Suarez to attend the dinners; during those years, Suarez 
remained extremely cautious in political circles, and would send his personal secretary, 
Carmen Diez de Rivera11, instead. There was an important group of political 
journalists, including Jose Oneto, Miguel Angel Aguilar, Luis Gonzalez Seara, Pilar 
Cemuda, Lorenzo Contreras, Ramon Pi and Juan Ferrando Badia, who would often 
attend. Members of well-known and well-to-do families such as the Fierros, as well as 
members the clandestine opposition, were also frequent participants in the colloquiums 
and lectures (Their names have been previously given in Chapter 2). Although some 
participants, especially those from the clandestine opposition, did not support the 
monarchic option, their common concern for the future of the country justified their 
meetings.
Diplomatic representatives of embassies like the United States, France, 
Germany, Italy and Great Britain also frequented the centre’s activities. The imminent 
end of Francoism attracted the interest of the foreign representatives who wished to 
know how Spaniards were preparing themselves to face the future. Their attendance at 
these dinners and lectures was an effective way for them to meet people both from the 
clandestine groups and also from the aperturistas. Some of these diplomats were also 
present at the colloquiums on General Moscardo Street, but there their presence was less 
frequent and more discreet. On one occasion a young Dutch diplomat told Gavilanes 
that the Spanish Interior Minister had called the Dutch ambassador to warn him about 
the presence of his diplomat at the colloquiums. The Dutch diplomat feared he would
10 Testimony of Antonio Gavilanes, 21-9-99.
11 Moran, Suarez, p.232.
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be declared persona non grata if seen again at these events.12 One may wonder why 
Franco did not stop these dinners, given their level of political openness. Gabriel 
Cisneros, one of the permanent participants at these forums, maintained that Franco 
understood that if he prohibited the dinners, he would be denying the reality of society, 
and this he could not do.13
The themes for discussion at the dinners ranged widely; the economy, the 
military problem, succession, the Movement, Spain’s participation in Europe, via 
political associations, justice and liberty, to more social issues such as women in 
society, theatre, culture, the press and the Church. The conclusion drawn on some of 
these issues were: on the Movement: ‘that the fundamental principles of the Movement, 
as part of the Spanish Constitution, should be respected by all’; on Associationism: ‘that 
there is an urgent need to put it into practice’; on Participation: ‘equally urgent at all 
levels’; and on Succession: ‘full acceptance of Prince Juan Carlos’ designation as 
successor, and support for his person and status.’14
The success of such political dinners led three journalists to write a book titled 
Los Cenocentristas}5 The book, which had evidently been written in a rush, gathered 
the opinions of some of the participants about the dinners and the political situation in 
Spain, which in those days was mainly characterized by unrest and political confusion. 
Gavilanes assured the readers that those who attended the dinners were at the centre 
politically and ideologically. It was clear in those days that Spanish society would not 
tolerate any extremism. Spaniards did not want to put their well-being at risk or those
12 Testimony of Antonio Gavilanes, 21-9-99.
13 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13-9-99.
14 Mundo, 5-II-1972, p. 14
15 Mariano del Mazo et a l,  Los 'Cenocentristas'. Radiografla Politica de unas cenas (Bilbao, 1970).
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commodities - house, car, refrigerator, television set - that had lain beyond the means of 
their parents and they had acquired with great effort.16
Initially the dinners started with a few politicians, intellectuals, and journalists, 
normally no more than twenty or thirty, who met at the restaurant “Jai Alai” in Madrid. 
These informal encounters, never recorded in newspapers, aimed at discussing public 
issues and finding a point of understanding. They hoped that the so-called ‘concurrence 
of opinions’ established by the Fundamental Laws, which they were then rehearsing in 
private, could later become an open discussion among friends and acquaintances at the 
Cortes. The privacy of these meetings ended, however, when they were moved to the 
restaurant ‘Maite-Commodoro’ in Madrid due to the increase in the number of guests. 
(Apart from anything else, the privacy of these meetings would end because it was 
popularly believed that the owner of the restaurant had been once romantically linked to 
Admiral Carrero Blanco). On the one hand, the incorporation of provincial leaders such 
as Eduardo Tarragona, Fernando Suarez, Jesus Esperabe, two ex-Ministers (namely Jose 
Solis and Fraga Iribame), and one ambassador raised the quality of the talks as it 
brought together an interesting variety of points of view.17 But, on the other hand, 
according to Fraga, the increase of participants made dialogue difficult. Also, the fact 
that the speaker had to stand up in the middle of his dinner was not only inconvenient, it 
transformed the ‘informal’ dinner into a more formal meeting. As a consequence, Fraga 
decided not to attend any more of these dinners.18
Like Fraga, there were many that believed that national politics should be 
conducted publicly, not behind closed doors. Ironically, Antonio Gavilanes himself 
confessed to ‘personally opposing] these political dinners [...] [because] I find it absurd
16 Mundo, 31-VII-71, p. 11; Testimony of Antonio Gavilanes, 21-9-99.
17 Mazo et al., Los 'Cenocentristas', pp. 13-14.
18 Fraga, Memoria breve, pp. 278-9.
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that Spaniards have to meet at dinners to talk about politics, and contrast [their] 
opinions. [...] The desirable [thing] would be that all these discussions could happen at 
the Spanish Cortes’.19 For some, such dinners came to replace the old tertulias, or 
meetings at famous cafes, which were common in earlier years. But in general, many 
felt that the dinners, with the mixing of the different political families of the regime and 
their surprising agreement on many issues, demonstrated that something had changed. 
Thus, as Areilza explained, ‘the political dinners, even with their rigorous and 
unavoidable limitations on numbers of people, and of themes, demonstrated one thing 
overall: the unquestionable anxiety of many establishment people have over the future 
stages of the Francoists Institutions.’ In other words, the dinners emphasized a political 
vacuum of which the population was already conscious.20
As would be expected, the hard-liners of Fuerza Nueva criticized this new 
‘fashion’ of ‘political’ lunches or dinners. For Bias Pinar’s followers, the participants of 
these dinners were:
Generally people who owe their names to the regime but criticize it over the salmon or the 
Castillian beef although very ‘intellectually’ as corresponds to their high personalities or 
academic titles. [...] It is curious [to find] that some of those gentlemen are ex-Ministers or 
dignitaries whose own actions or inaction helped structure the State, without disagreeing with 
it. [...] Many of them are procuradores, the way to the floor of the Cortes is open to them, and 
yet, curiously, we do not hear them speak. Perhaps because it is more comfortable not to 
confront those who can dismiss them, and because dinners and lunches are more elegant for the 
minorities than the assembly hall (salon de sesiones).21
On the contrary, the familiar Alberto Ballarin Marcial said that, for instance, the 
Centro de Estudios was ‘perhaps the only place for political discussion in Spain’, and
99‘that its precious function could not be abandoned.’ The Centro de Estudios might 
indeed have been the most publicly known, but as seen above, there were many forums
19 Mazo, et al, Los ‘Cenocentristas’, p. 25.
20 Ibid., pp. 13-19,44,81-82.
21 Fuerza Nueva, No. 227, 15-05-71.
22 Cambio-16, December 1972, p. 25.
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of this type. Gabriel Cisneros (a regular at these dinners) recalled that in those days, the 
same people frequented all these places; in other words, people with different 
backgrounds but with a common goal of modernizing the country. The only difference 
between the various participants was their level of openness towards those identified as 
real opposition to the regime (Socialists and Communists), or towards the figures who, 
although coming from the Francoist ranks, like Dionisio Ridruejo, Joaquin Ruiz- 
Gimenez, Jose Maria de Areilza, among others, had distanced themselves considerably 
from the regime.
The centrist and supposedly moderate spirit of the dinners did not prevent the 
political differences of some of the participants from developing into personal rows. 
During a dinner organized by Gavilanes’ association Emilio Romero, director of the 
official syndicalist newspaper Pueblo, engaged in a verbal dispute with the Socialist 
Jesus Prados Arrate that nearly became a physical fight.24 But such problems did not 
only concern the guests. In 1972 an internal dispute among members of the association 
led to the provisional replacement of Antonio Gavilanes by Andres Reguera, ex- 
procurador and closely linked to the Christian Democrat Federico Silva Munoz, as 
President of the Centro de Estudios. Later on, the board of directors of the association 
elected a new council and appointed the procurador Alberto Ballarin as the new 
President. They also decided not to subscribe to a specific political tendency since the 
purpose of their meetings was democratic coexistence. After a few years in the 
limelight and a series of internal disputes as well as constant warnings from the Ministry 
of Interior, the association was dissolved in 1973. Although it did not escape the 
criticism of political journalists like Emilio Romero, it was Romero himself who in
23 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13-9-99.
24 Cambio-16, December 1972, p. 25. Incident corroborated by Antonio Gavilanes, 21-9-99.
25 YA, 5-IV-1973.
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1970 awarded the Cenocentristas the ‘Annual Popularity Prize’.26 Gavilanes’ 
contribution to this period was important so far as he helped those concerned with the 
political future of Spain to meet and discuss politics and exchange opinions.
5.2. The position o f Prince Juan Carlos
The support of Antonio Gavilanes and members of his Centro de Estudios for 
the figure of Don Juan Carlos was not commonly shared by other political groups, and 
indeed many Spaniards, despite his appointment as Franco’s successor in 1969. The 
main reason was a general belief that the Prince was a mere follower of the Caudillo, 
and it was not at all certain that the future King would accept a democratic system 
(although those who knew him personally believed otherwise). Franco, seconded by the 
Carrero-Lopez Rodo tandem, wished the continuation of his regime after his death 
under the monarchy of Don Juan Carlos.27 But, the Prince did not share these plans. In 
fact, before he swore the Principles of the Movement in July 1969, Don Juan Carlos 
asked Femandez-Miranda about the meaning of his commitment. He wanted to make 
sure that, by swearing the Francoist laws, the country’s future would not be chained to 
inmovilismo. Femandez-Miranda explained the Prince that despite the acclaimed 
‘permanent and inalterable’ nature of the ‘Law of Fundamental Principles’, Article 10 of 
the Law of Succession (one of the Fundamental Laws) said that the laws can be 
abolished and reformed. He assured the Prince that reform was possible as long as it 
was done with the mandates established by the Fundamental Laws.28
26 Testimony of Antonio Gavilanes, 21-9-99.
27 Ruth Berins Collier, Paths Towards Democracy, (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), p. 129.
28 Pilar & Alfonso Femandez-Miranda, Lo que el Rey me ha pedido, pp. 63-66.
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Don Juan Carlos, however, was given few chances to put forward his political 
views.29 One of these few occasions happened in January 1970 when the Prince agreed 
to be interviewed by Richard Eder, journalist of The New York Times. In the article 
called ‘Juan Carlos looks to a Democratic Spain’, published on 4 February 1970, Eder 
unveiled Prince Juan Carlos’ previously unknown political stance. According to this 
article, the Prince had ‘begun to let his acquaintances know that he does not accept the 
role apparently chosen for him: that of docile successor’, [and that] he has no intention 
of presiding over a dictatorship. [...] He insists that only under some form of democracy 
will he have any real chance of remaining King of Spain. [...] “I am Franco’s heir”, he 
told a visitor not long ago, “but I am Spain’s heir, as well”.’
The article alleged that members of the European royal families, namely King 
Baudouin of Belgium and the exiled King Constantine of Greece, had been advising 
Don Juan Carlos on how to deal with a changing society. They insisted on how 
important it was ‘to break out of the court, meet workers, farmers, students and 
professionals.’ However, the Prince was controlled by Franco’s cabinet, which took 
care not to allow the Prince to participate in public affairs. Years later, the King 
admitted in an interview that it was difficult to specify the moment that he felt free to 
take initiatives. He explained that ‘it was one thing to act without the consent of the 
general and quite another to do so without consulting the opinion of the top brass of his 
entourage. Still, we could say that I began to shoulder my responsibilities at the time of 
the general’s first illnesses.31
Speculation over a possible change in the succession question emerged in 
December 1971 when Franco’s eldest granddaughter Maria del Carmen Martinez-
29 Femandez-Miranda recorded several occasions where the Prince showed a clear pro-democratic stance. See Ibid.,
pp. 66-68.
30 The New York Times, 4 February 1970, pp. 1,14.
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Bordiu, became engaged to Prince Juan Carlos’ first cousin (son of his uncle Don 
Jaime), Don Alfonso de Borbon Dampierre. Don Alfonso’s alleged loyalty to Franco 
and to his regime divided the country down the middle, between those who favoured the 
Prince, and the regime hard-liners who welcomed the possibility of Franco’s 
granddaughter becoming Queen of Spain. It appears that for some time ultra-Rightist, 
and other members of the regime, entertained the idea of Don Alfonso coming to the 
throne. Franco’s real thoughts over this affair were never entirely clear, but those really 
close to the Caudillo (including the Prince himself) believed that Don Alfonso never 
represented a real danger for the Prince. In relation to this issue, Don Juan Carlos 
explained that he was confident because, ‘Franco never went back on decisions he had 
made.’32
In his article, Eder claimed that, according to a visitor to the Prince, who had 
talked to him at length, Don Juan Carlos ‘does not disavow General Franco, but he does 
not feel himself committed to all of the leader’s political baggage.’ Since his 
designation as successor, Eder explained, the Prince had been widening his circle of 
visitors to the Zarzuela Palace, where the Royal family resided, as an attempt to pierce 
his political isolation. Among his new visitors Don Juan Carlos included a range of 
figures from the regime as well as a number of independents, a couple of foreign 
journalists, and even some members of the opposition. It seemed that the Prince had 
expressed to his recent visitors his wish ‘to get across the message that he will work to 
open up Spain’s restrictive political life but cannot say so publicly until General Franco 
steps down or dies.’33 Moreover, it seems that the American President Richard Nixon
31 De Vilallonga, The King, p. 157.
32 Jover Zamora (Dtor.), Historia de Espana. Vol. XLI., p. 153. See also, De Vilallonga, The King p. 165.
33 The New York Times, 4 February 1970, pp. 1,14.
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had advised the Prince not to oppose Franco’s regime publicly, but to rely on the 
prospect that the Spanish population would appreciate his youth and positive image.34 
Thus, in 1969 at Don Juan Carlos’ request a young and relatively unknown Adolfo 
Suarez was appointed director-general of the national television studios and took direct 
charge of improving - quite successfully - the public image of the Prince. Under 
Suarez’s direction, Spanish television devoted only limited coverage to the wedding of 
Franco’s granddaughter to Don Alfonso de Borbon.35
The Prince, however, ignored Nixon’s advice not to oppose Franco publicly. 
During a lecture given at the hall of residence ‘Antonio Rivera’ in Madrid, Don Juan 
Carlos delivered a hopeful, although carefully drawn, message for the future of the 
country. The Prince expressed to the university students his wish ‘to become, one day, a 
King who looks with security and hope to the future that we all must build together, 
with our own strength. [...] With generous comprehension of the past, without 
forgetting the best essences of our most glorious tradition, but improving every day. 
[...] You must be sure that I will not be a dike that prevents progress, but a channel 
through which it will proceed in orderly fashion.’ Alvarez Puga wrote that although 
brief and concise the Prince’s statements were personally written by him and reflected
- I / '
his own personal stance.
The Prince’s statements, however, became more explicit in the autumn of 1972. 
During an official trip to Germany, Don Juan Carlos was asked whether he wished to 
see Spain enter the EEC with all the political consequences that that implied. To the 
gratifying surprise of many, the Prince responded positively. He said he favoured it 
because he believed it to be for the good of both Spain and Europe, but he emphasised
34 Powell, Juan Carlos o f  Spain, p. 51.
35 De Vilallonga, The King, p. 70; Powell, Juan Carlos o f  Spain, p. 70.
36 Dossier Mundo, January 1972, pp. 15-6.
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that the moment had to be right as a hasty entrance could be dangerous for many. The 
political consequences were, among other things, the establishment of a democratic 
system as a condition for membership of the Community. The Prince’s declaration 
boosted the hopes of many Spaniards who wished for a democracy. The political 
magazine Cambio-16 reported that in economic circles the Prince’s declaration was 
regarded as ‘the blessing of the first cornerstone of a new and great political economic
- I T
alternative for the liberalization [of the Spanish economy] in future years’.
Meanwhile the Prince had allegedly shown interest in the possibility of using the 
Fundamental Laws for the transformation of the regime into a democratic system. 
Areilza transmitted the Prince’s idea to a group of young professionals of democratic 
tendencies. This group commissioned the study of the aperturista possibilities of the 
Francoist laws from a team of lawyers headed by Jorge de Esteban, Professor of 
Constitutional Law. The outcome of the research was quite positive as, according to the 
researchers, ‘in order to achieve a democratic and peaceful evolution of the country, the 
best way is to exploit all the possibilities offered by the Organic Law of the State and 
the rest of the Fundamental Laws’. In their opinion, the introduction of political 
associations in the Spanish system was not only advisable, but also represented the 
‘condition sine qua non of Spanish democracy’. The study was published under the 
title, Desarrollo Politico y  Constitucion Espanola. Femandez-Miranda told one of the 
authors that they had written a ‘very important book’, which he had read ‘in great 
detail’.38
37 Cambio-16, 7 October 1972.
38 Quoted in Powell, ElPiloto del cambio, pp. 80-3.
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The idea of an authoritarian monarchy advocated by Franco and the Carrero- 
Lopez Rodo tandem was, therefore, not shared by the monarch although the relation 
between Prince Juan Carlos and Admiral Carrero was good. Don Juan Carlos had even 
proposed Carrero’s name for the presidency of the government. Lopez Rodo recorded 
that on 3 June 1970 during a private conversation with Franco the Prince had insisted to 
the Caudillo on the need to make use of the Organic Law of the State of 1967 and its 
complementary Laws (Law of Association, Electoral Law, Sindical Law, etc), and to 
start the functioning of all the Institutions by beginning with the appointment of a 
President. The Prince told the Caudillo that ‘I would not like the Crown to have to 
appoint a President of the Government for the first time’. Franco answered that he 
would do it, but despite the Prince’s insistence it took the old General nearly two more 
years to act.39 Don Juan Carlos favoured Carrero’s candidature for two main reasons. 
On the one hand, the Prince knew that after thirty years of loyalty to the regime Carrero 
was Franco’s own favourite candidate; and on the other hand, he was convinced of 
Carrero’s loyalty to the crown as well. Carrero had told the Prince that if Franco 
appointed him President, when the Caudillo died, he [Carrero] would put his post at the 
King’s disposal in order to leave the monarch free hands.40 Years later the King 
asserted that ‘Carrero wouldn’t have agreed at all with that I had decided to do. But, I 
don’t believe he would have opposed the King’s will openly. [...] He’d just have 
resigned’.41
On 4 June 1973 Franco told the Prince of his decision to appoint Carrero 
President. The Prince intervened in the selection of Ministers for the new cabinet. 
Fraga recorded in his memoirs that ‘everyone believes that the Prince’s influence has
39 Lopez Rodo, Memorias III, pp. 49, 75, 385.
40 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
41 De Vilallonga, The King, p. 161.
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played a positive role, within the possibilities, in the crisis [ministerial change]’.42 In 
fact the cabinet seemed so close to Don Juan Carlos that he had apparently said that ‘all 
[the cabinet] needs is the label of “government of La Zarzuela”.’ The cabinet included 
Torcuato Femandez-Miranda, Laureano Lopez Rodo, Jose Maria Lopez de Letona, Jose 
Maria Gamazo, Fernando de Linan and General Juan Castanon de Mena. The new 
Interior Minister, Carlos Arias, was perhaps the least liked by the Prince 43 There was, 
however, an important absence. Fraga, the man who represented reformism, had not 
been included in the cabinet. Once again his political differences with the newly 
appointed President kept him out of office.
5.3. Fraga, Ambassador to London
Before the cabinet reshuffle of 1973, and his appointment as President of the 
Government, Carrero offered to appoint Fraga Procurador en Cortes, but the ex- 
Minister refused the post. Nevertheless, before Carrero was appointed President and 
despite his ‘tolerated opposition’ to the regime, Fraga had managed to be included in the 
terna, or shortlist of three candidates, for the presidency. Fraga did not achieve his 
ambition of becoming President, but he accompanied Carrero and Raimundo Fernandez 
Cuesta in the terna, and achieved an important second place behind the Admiral, “after 
a good job by [Pio] Cabanillas”.44 Fraga had allegedly already offered ministries to 
various personalities when Carrero’s appointment was officially announced on 8 June 
1973.45 Press comments on Franco’s choice generally took the following line:
42 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 296;
43 Powell, Juan Carlos o f  Spain, p. 60.
44 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 295; Lopez Rodo’s book includes a copy of the letter which the President of the Council 
o f the Reign sent to Franco with the shortlist of candidates for the Presidency of the Government. Lopez Rodo, 
Memorias III, p. 666.
45 Allegedly, Fraga offered Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo the ministry of Public Works as the ‘potential’ Minister told 
Fenando Bau Carpi. L6pez Rod6, Memorias III, p. 230.
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Fernandez Cuesta was the past, Carrero the present, and Fraga the future.46 Despite his 
failure to become President Fraga tried, again through his friend Pio Cabanillas, to 
become Minister - of either interior or foreign affairs - in Carrero’s new cabinet. Again 
he failed. Apparently, prior to the election for President, Fraga and Carrero had already 
met and discussed their views on the political reality of the country. During the course 
of the conversation Fraga realized that his views were contrary to those of Carrero. He 
believed that was why Carrero did not include him in his new cabinet and offered him 
an embassy instead 47
The idea of sending Fraga to London came from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and Fraga’s former rival in the cabinet, Laureano Lopez Rodo, who thought of Fraga as 
the ideal man to boost Spain’s relations with Great Britain. Yet, the truth was that Fraga
ASwas seen as ‘an uncomfortable’ figure by the regime. The most orthodox members of 
the regime believed that Fraga’s presence in Spain might threaten their plans to 
implement an authoritarian monarchy after Franco. When Lopez Rodo consulted 
Franco, the Caudillo perhaps sensing Fraga’s scepticism over the offer, asked ‘but, will 
Fraga accept it?’ to which Lopez Rodo answered affirmatively 49
Fraga was willing to go abroad only if the government accepted the following 
conditions. These were: (i) to remain in Britain two years; (ii) to appoint his own 
advisor (Francisco Jose Mayans) and information attache (Carlos Mendo); (iii) to finish 
his opus La Espana de los afios 70; (iv) not to dismiss his collaborators from their 
positions as civil servants; to be allowed opportunities for publication in the Movement 
press; and (v) to establish the incompatibilities of being part of an association as well as
46 Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha, pp. 137-8.
47 Sentis. Manuel Fraga, p. 58.
48 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14-09-1999.
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having a position in the Administration.50 On 10 August 1973 Lopez Rodo informed 
Fraga that the cabinet had accepted his requests. His friend Gabriel Fernandez de 
Valderrama officially offered an embassy to Fraga, on behalf of the government. Fraga 
was asked to choose between London and the United Nations. He chose Great Britain, a 
country for which he had always had great admiration. In September Fraga’s 
ambassadorship had already obtained the placet from the British government. Prior to 
his departure, on 19 September 1973, Fraga went to see Prince Juan Carlos. The Prince 
praised Fraga’s progressive attitude, and confessed that more than once he had had to 
tell those who criticized Fraga to keep quiet. Such regal support must have eased 
Fraga’s departure, at a time when his participation in Spanish politics was still 
uncertain.51
Fraga accepted the prestigious post expecting Carrero to remain President at 
least for another five years, and knowing that, while Franco was alive there would be no 
chance for any political changes. In other words, there would be no opportunity for the 
creation of an important political organization outside the Movement. Thus, Fraga’s 
inability to act while Carrero was President and Femandez-Miranda Vice-President led 
him to take the decision to depart. Had the ex-Minister remained in Spain, he would 
probably have burned the sails of his own ship. Time abroad would benefit him. 
Having said that, in those days Fraga tried to unite a group of people - among them 
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Pio Cabanillas, Alfonso Osorio, Pedro Areitio - to be prepared 
to stand as an alternative to Carrero’s government. Federico Silva Munoz declared his 
willingness to lead an alternative option to the regressive Carrero-Lopez Rodo’s cabinet.
49 Lopez Rodo, Memorias III, p. 428; Preston, Franco, p. 734.
50 Following Franco’s death, Fraga confessed to Lopez Rodo that he only wanted to be in London for two years 
because this was the time he calculated Franco would last. See L6pez Rodo, Memorias IV, p. 201.
51 Fraga, Memoria breve, pp.296-98.
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But, Silva’s ultimate insecurity about the project prevented any possibility or political 
change. Fraga sought to develop opportunities with different allies but nothing worked. 
The ex-Minister had to wait for a few years to return to the government. His efforts to
C 'i
avoid being forgotten were, however, considerable.
Fraga’s official appointment as ambassador to London was received with 
surprise in Spain, as his final decision had not been revealed even to his closest friends. 
An annoyed Pio Cabanillas told Fraga, ‘next time, let us know’.54 Abroad, the 
international press commented on Fraga’s appointment with interest. The Daily 
Telegraph described Fraga as a ‘strong anglophile and an academic who regards himself 
as a man of the centre, politically’. The paper also wrote that Fraga ‘has been devoting 
his talents and energy towards the creation of a Liberal centre group’. The newspaper 
expected Fraga to argue the case of Spanish sovereignty of Gibraltar ‘more vehemently 
than hitherto’.55 The ex-Minister, and new ambassador, arrived in London on 9 October 
1973.
According to Bemaldez, Fraga’s performance at the London Embassy was 
neither good nor bad but simply non-existent.56 It was obvious that he was there on a 
transitional basis. His ambitions were not diplomatic, but political. He was aiming for 
a position in the government as a Minister, or even better, as a President. Yet, it is only 
fair to say that although Fraga did not acquire Gibraltar for Spain, he did sign some 
important agreements with the British government. The first agreement provided the 
Spanish community in Britain (about 58,000 in those days) with the benefits of Spanish
52 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13-9-99; Federico Silva Munoz, Memorias Politicos, ( Barcelona: 
Planeta, 1993), pp. 304-6.
53 Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha, p. 123.
54 Lopez Rodo, Memorias III, p. 444.
55 The Daily Telegraph, 17 September 1973.
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Social Service (equivalent to the NHS) in Britain, and likewise for the British citizens 
living in Spain. The second agreement avoided the double taxation to both Spanish and 
British in Britain and Spain, respectively.57 For Fraga, the London experience was quite 
useful. Two years at the embassy, ‘was a period for reflection; removed from Spain, yet 
close, at such an important time, and with the time to study such an important 
democratic model as offered by Great Britain’. Thus, despite his temporary ‘political 
exile’58 in London, and the duties related to the post of ambassador, Fraga enjoyed a 
time of relaxation, and took time ‘to read, think, and sleep’.59
The distance between Great Britain and Spain did not seem to be an impediment 
to Fraga’s political career. In Spain he was still considered by many to be the ‘great 
white hope’, the Fragamanlis, the ‘referente de la reforma\ of change without rupture. 
His importance was such that in London he received personalities of all political 
tendencies. Fraga was expected to be of great importance in the future of Spain once 
Franco had died.60 Having said that, unexpected events led to the belief that Fraga 
would return to Spain earlier than planned.
In December 1973, a few months after Fraga’s departure to London, the terrorist 
Basque separatist group ETA assassinated President Carrero Blanco. Carrero’s 
unexpected death left a feeling of fear and confusion within the bunker, and an ever 
greater feeling of restlessness in Spain itself.61 The bunker’s hope of Carrero ensuring 
the continuation of Francoism suddenly vanished. Observers believed that Carrero’s
56 Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha, p. 151.
57 Cambio-16, 17-23 November 1975, p. 24.
58 On 10 May 1975, and during a meeting with Don Juan de Borbon, Fraga toasted for what he considered to share 
with the Prince’s father: “for what it is common to us: living in exile”, to which Don Juan responded: “ you call this 
living in exile living in this palace as an ambassador?”. See Lopez Rodo, Memorias IV, p. 121.
59 Sentis. Manuel Fraga, pp. 59-60.
60 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14-09-1999.
61 The term bunker or bunker was coined by Luis Ramirez. See Luis Ramirez, “Morir en el bunker” Horizonte 
Espanol, No. 1, 1972 (Ruedo Iberico). As Preston explains, the bunker was formed by the hard-liner Falangists 
entrenched in the bureaucracy, the police and the Army, who would defend the dictatorship to the bitter end. See Paul
The positioning o f  the reformists (1969-1973). Part II. 202
62death broke the inertia of the Spanish regime creating a ‘dislocation’ in national life.
In turn, and despite the Prince’s trust in the Caudillo, Carrero’s disappearance brought 
uncertainty even over the question of succession. Juan Carlos, whose appointment had 
largely been possible thanks to the intervention of Carrero, and especially the Opus Dei- 
linked Minister, Lopez Rodo, would have to deal with the supporters of his first cousin 
Don Alfonso de Borbon. Yet, the Prince lacked the necessary support. At Carrero’s 
death the Prince had lost his main ally, and although the technocrats still believed in 
Juan Carlos’ cause, their power in the cabinet was nearly non-existent. Carrero’s aim of 
leading the transition from Franco to Juan Carlos in a peaceful atmosphere seemed now 
unlikely to be fulfilled.63
On 22 December, Franco told Admiral Pedro Nieto Antunez of his decision to 
make the old Admiral President. Consequently Nieto Antunez contacted potential 
collaborators for his proposed new cabinet. Among others Nieto Antunez asked Fraga to 
be the Vice-President, and Lopez Bravo the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.64 A probably 
well-informed Pio Cabanillas warned Fraga that Nieto’s appointment was extremely 
doubtful.65 The election for the new President aroused expectations among those who 
aspired to become Head of Government. Among them was Manuel Fraga who, from 
London, saw his name shuffled among the candidates for the post. The political moment 
was of great importance, and Fraga believed that there was potential for change in the 
Spanish political scenario. On the one hand, Carrero - the main guarantor of Franco’s 
regime - was gone; on the other hand, it was more evident than ever that Franco’s age
Preston (Ed.), Spain in crisis. The evolution and decline of the Franco regime (London: Harvester, 1976), 
introduction.
62 Cambio-16, 25 February-2 March 1974, p. 27.
63 Paul Preston, “Spain in Crisis: the assassination of Carrero and its aftermath”, in Iberian Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 1, 
(spring, 1974), p. 34.
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could not secure the continuity of the regime for much longer. Fraga’s time was coming 
closer, but the moment was not yet right.
The task of finding a suitable successor to Carrero became more complicated 
than expected. The interim Prime Minister and Prince Juan Carlos’ former tutor, 
Torcuato Femandez-Miranda, was regarded as the most logical candidate for the 
presidency. Femandez-Miranda not only enjoyed a close alliance with the Prince, but 
also a reputation as a reformer. The future successor of Franco, Prince Juan Carlos, had 
not been asked his opinion in such a crisis, but during a meeting with Franco, the Prince 
took the opportunity to put his opinion forward by suggesting the name of Femandez- 
Miranda for the post of Prime Minister.66 However, to the suggestion of Femandez- 
Miranda becoming Prime Minister a member of the regime answered: ‘it would be a real 
disaster. God forbid! (Dios no lo quierd)\ Among the names of those considered by the 
Caudillo were military officials such as General Castanon de Mena, and from within the 
Movement reformist figures such as the conservative Catholic Federico Silva Munoz, 
and Opus Dei members Lopez Bravo and Lopez Rodo. Yet, none of these names 
satisfied the bunker.
After some hesitation, Franco reduced the list of twelve names to five. These 
were Admiral Pedro Nieto Antunez, Torcuato Femandez-Miranda, Manuel Fraga, 
Carlos Arias Navarro and the liberal businessman Antonio Barrera de Irimo. Franco 
was under great pressure from his personal circle, including his wife who never seemed 
to have intervened in her husband’s political affairs before. Dona Carmen Polo told 
him: ‘they are going to kill us all like Carrero. We need a hard Prime Minister. It has to
64 Preston, Franco, p. 763.
65 Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha, pp. 143-4.
66 Victoria Prego, Asi se hizo la transicion, (Circulo de Lectores: Barcelona, 1995), pp. 68-9.
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be Arias; there is no one else’.67 Thus, under pressure from his entourage and suffering 
from an uncomfortable cold, Franco chose his last Prime Minister. It was not his friend 
Nieto Antunez, as he would have liked, but Arias Navarro who was ‘imposed’ on him. 
At that stage, Franco was perhaps too tired to fight.68 Once President, Arias had initially 
proposed Fraga as Minister of Foreign Affairs but Franco refused. The Caudillo wanted 
Lopez Rodo to continue in the post, thereby leaving Fraga in London until his final 
return two years later. Fraga was allegedly sent to London with the intention of keeping 
him away from Spanish politics, but in practice, the new ambassador was not only kept 
very well informed about all the ins and outs of the Spanish political life, but was even 
part of them.
In the wake of Carrero’s disappearance, as Preston argues, ‘the changing 
economic situation together with the destruction of Franco’s well-laid plans for the 
future convinced many on the right that their survival depended on giving change before 
it was taken by force’.69 Indeed, the Admiral’s death did rush some on the right into 
taking positions on a safer haven. But, as seen in the previous Chapters, there were also 
moderates of the regime who were advocating different degrees of change well before 
Carrero’s death. Fraga himself merely continued working on the projects he had begun 
before his departure to London. As it is studied in more detail in Chapter 6, one of his 
main projects was the preparation of his political study group GODS A.
Conclusion
In the early 1970s, Antonio Gavilanes’ Centro de Estudios de Problemas 
Contemporaneos organized a series of dinners which became popular forums for
67 Preston, Franco, p. 764.
68 For a detailed account o f Arias’ appointment see Prego, Asi se hizo la transicion, pp. 59-68.
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political discussions. The guests at these dinners denounced the absence of possibilities 
to meet and discuss politics legally. Political dinners became a temporary substitute for 
political associations. The variety of topics discussed and the different backgrounds of 
the guests - from aperturistas and reformists of the regime, and procuradores in Cortes, 
to members of the clandestine opposition, as well as representatives of foreign 
embassies, journalists, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, etc. -  turned these dinners into 
popular events. Gavilanes’ contribution to this period was important so far as he helped 
those concerned with the political future of Spain to meet and discuss political issues 
and exchange political opinions in view of the imminent end of the Francoist era.
The political dinners of the early 1970s coincided with the (quasi-official) 
political positioning of Prince Juan Carlos. Through several interviews conducted by 
foreign journalists and published abroad, the Prince hinted at his intention to reign over 
a European-style democratic regime, which implied his acceptance of a pluralistic 
society. Yet, Francoist authorities had frozen the issue of political associations. 
Franco’s entourage was determined to fight against the pressing demands for reform, but 
an unexpected incident rocked the stability of the regime. Carrero Blanco, guarantor of 
the continuity of the regime, was assassinated by ETA. The aperturistas and reformists 
of the regime as well as the democratic opposition knew the regime would not survive 
much longer after Franco’s death. Many started to prepare themselves for a Spain 
without him. From London, for instance, Manuel Fraga hastened the formation of a 
political study group in order to prepare the imminent transition. It was clear to an 
important part of the regime that a system of reforms was not only necessary to satisfy
69 Paul Preston, “The Dilemma of Credibility: The Spanish Communist Party, the Franco Regime and After”, in 
Government and Opposition, N. 11, winter 1976, p. 80.
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the demands of the time and the population, but was also unavoidable, 
was now on the new President, Carlos Arias, and his new executive.
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Chapter - 6
The beginning o f  a long end (1973-1976)
By June 1972 Prince Juan Carlos was already manifesting his impatience regarding the 
regime’s lack of initiative about reforming the political system. The Prince declared 
that, in view of the persistently negative attitude of the regime towards modernization, 
he would have to make the changes himself.1 A year later, in June 1973, the 
appointment of Admiral Carrero Blanco as President of the Government had only 
confirmed the Prince’s fears. Carrero’s cabinet brought no changes. Carrero may have 
served the Caudillo well as Chief of General Staff for years, but the Admiral did not 
have the necessary qualities to act as President of the Government, especially at a time 
when he was so far removed from the society he was presiding over.2 Thus, despite the 
presence of known Juancarlistas in the cabinet, fear of threatening the stability and 
continuation of Franco’s regime beyond the Caudillo’s death halted any attempt to 
reform the authoritarian system. One of the key, and most controversial, issues of those 
years was the question of political associations, which was still unresolved. On 20 
December 1973 Carrero’s cabinet was due to hold a meeting where he would announce 
his final decision on the issue of political associations. The meeting never took place 
because the Admiral was assassinated on the morning of that day. In an interview, Cruz 
Martinez Esteruelas claimed that, anyway, the Admiral’s plans were to oppose the 
creation of associations.3
Having said that, soon after Carrero became President he had appointed a joint 
committee of the cabinet and the National Council to study the problem of political 
associations. The research was halted by the Admiral’s death, but the newly appointed
1 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 287.
2 Jover Zamora (Dtor.), Historia de Espana, Vol. XLI p. 150.
3 Powell, Elpiloto del cambio, p.76.
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President of the government, Carlos Arias Navarro, rescued it and made the issue of 
political associations one of the most important points of his programme.4 On these 
grounds, the hopes of the regime reformists for a future Law of Political Associations 
did not entirely vanish. On the one hand, a speech made by Carlos Arias on 12 February 
1974 boosted hopes for public participation in political affairs and, on the other hand, 
the Prince’s frequent, although discreet, forward-looking declarations did not go 
unheard among the political class.
Don Juan Carlos’ discretion, however, always made it difficult to guess his real 
political tendencies. In 1975 Newsweek wrote of the Prince:
Right-wingers suspect he is too liberal; his father complains that he “thinks like a Fascist”. 
Chatting with moderates, the Prince advocates reform. When he plays backgammon with 
members of the upper crust, he talks like a bom “ultra”. His aides maintain that he must pay lip 
service to Franco’s principles. But the upshot is that no outsiders know his ideas with 
certainty.5
Away from the public eye, from the early 1970s the Prince began to build up 
contacts with members of the semi-opposition6 to the regime, as well as the clandestine 
democratic opposition, at a time when few people dared to contact him openly. He was 
aware of the need to become acquainted with members of all political tendencies with 
no exceptions. Don Juan Carlos had regular contact with ‘covert democrats’ such as 
Inigo Cavero, Marcelino Oreja and Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez, who were or had been 
linked to the regime, and also with members of the still-clandestine Socialist party. For 
instance he met Javier Solana on a number of occasions, and it was through him as well 
as other Socialists that the young secretary-general of the Socialist party, Felipe
4 Ferrando Badia, Del Autoritarismo a la Democracia, p. 54.
5 Fay Willey, Amaud de Borchgrave and Miguel Aroca in Newsweek, 3 November 1975, p. 10.
6 Juan Jos6 Linz regards ‘those groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group that are willing to 
participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime’ as being part o f the semi-opposition. ‘This 
attitude’, Linz argues, ‘involves partial criticism and some visibility and identity outside the inner circles of 
participants of the political struggle’. See Linz, “Opposition in and under an authoritarian regime”, p. 191.
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Gonzalez, was kept informed of the Prince’s plans.7 Contact with Santiago Carrillo, 
secretary-general of the PCE, however, was more complex. The Prince’s father, Don 
Juan de Borbon had already established contacts with the Communist leader in 1974, 
but according to Charles Powell ‘the Prince could not seek his [father’s] help in this 
matter [that of arranging an interview with Carrillo].’8 Carrillo lived in exile and could 
only be reached through a third, and independent, person. Don Juan Carlos sent his 
friend Manuel Prado y Colon de Carvajal to Romania to ask, on the Prince’s behalf, the 
Communist President Nicolae Ceaucescu to act as Don Juan Carlos’ messenger in this 
delicate mission.9 Thus Santiago Carrillo learnt from Ceaucescu the Prince’s intention 
‘to recognize the Spanish Communist party along with all other political parties when he 
came to the throne’.10 But, Carrillo proved hard to convince.
Also in 1974, and coinciding with Franco’s first illness, Carrillo met the 
Caudillo’s nephew, Nicolas Franco Pasqual del Pobil -  member of Franco’s Cortes -  for 
lunch in Paris. The meeting had been organized by Jose Mario Armero and Carrillo’s 
friend, the millionarie Teodulfo Lagunero. Nicolas Franco wanted to ascertain 
Carrillo’s opinion about the inminent transition in Spain. The Communist leader did 
not suspect that Nicolas Franco had not been sent by his uncle, but by Prince Juan 
Carlos. Carrillo learned it years later.11
Despite his efforts, lack of trust in the Prince and his alleged future plans was 
widespread among those who were not close to Don Juan Carlos, and that included
7 Don Juan Carlos recalled that Joaquin Solana used to enter the Prince’s residence with his motorbike helmet on to 
avoid being recognized. De Vilallonga, The King, p. 73.
8 Powell, Juan Carlos o f  Spain, p. 69.
9 Elias Andres & Victoria Prego, La Transicion. Video No. 9, La dimision de Arias Navarro, (April-June 1976).
10 De Vilallonga, The King, pp. 73-77.
11 Testimony of Santigo Carrillo, 29 November 2001.
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Carrillo.12 The Prince’s meetings and declarations, however, although most private and
always discreet, surely boosted the expectations of the most progressive of the political
classes for the possibility of forming political associations in the near future. In 1971,
Manuel Fraga had already declared that ‘he sincerely believe that the Prince of Spain
11represented a legitimate hope for more and more Spaniards’.
On these grounds, progressive members of the regime started taking the 
necessary steps for the future transition to a democratic system. As seen in Chapter 2, 
there were political groups that stood as a mild opposition to the regime. But, broadly 
speaking, at the start of the 1970s, according to Rodolfo Martin Villa, two major 
reformist groups emerged from the regime. On the one hand, there was Manuel Fraga 
and his group, and on the other hand the young reformists who gathered around the 
Tacito group. As we shall see later, in general, members of these groups were linked in 
various degrees to the regime, were university educated, enjoyed elite positions in either 
public administration or the private sector, and the overall majority belonged to a 
financially comfortable social class. These two groups were perhaps the most important 
collectives, which, from the regime’s side, played the leading role in attempting to bring 
political liberalization, reform and, eventually, the introduction of the democratic system 
in 1977. Yet, whereas Fraga opted for leading his own group and defining his group’s 
political strategy himself, the young reformists of Tacito preferred a more collegiate 
approach.
12 On 22 November the leader of the Communist party declared on the Austrian television that although Don Juan 
Carlos had sent him emissaries, he had told them that he would not recognize him [Don Juan Carlos] as King of 
Spain. L6pez Rodo, Memorias IV, p. 188.
13 Manuel Fraga, “La monarquia como forma de Estado”. Conferencia pronunciada en el Club Siglo XXI de Madrid 
el 25 de November de 1971, in Monarquia y  representacion, (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1973), p. 297.
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From 1972 until 1975 some twenty young National Councillors and 
procuradores familiares - members of the two aforementioned groups - met on a regular 
basis at a flat that the notary Rafael Ruiz Gallardon owned in Nunez de Balboa Street in 
Madrid. Rafael Ruiz Gallardon gathered a heterogeneous group of political 
personalities including Marcelino Oreja, Enrique Sanchez de Leon, Rodolfo Martin 
Villa, Jose Maria Orti Bordas, Andres Reguera and Gabriel Cisneros, who acted as 
secretary (significantly, these personalities came together again in Suarez’s Union de 
Centro Democratico during the transition period in 1977). This group, which acted as 
‘an informal legal consultant group’, had, according to Marcelino Oreja, a common 
objective, which was to introduce reforms that could lead to a democratic regime.14 It is 
worth emphasizing again that in those days, when aperturistas and reformists referred to 
a ‘democratic regime’ they usually meant a German-type of democracy that is without 
the Communist Party. Indeed, it is very difficult to guess how many, if any, of them 
advocated a full democracy at the beginning of the 1970s. Members of this collective 
were part of a group of thirty-nine signatories to a letter that was sent to the Caudillo. In 
this letter they carefully demanded a number of changes in the system including 
openness towards Europe, the interpretation of the Movement as the promoter of new 
and more ample channels of political participation, and a just understanding between 
Church and State.15 The signatories included Marcelino Oreja, Carlos Argos, Eduardo 
Navarro, Gabriel Cisneros, Fernando Bau, Antonio Castro Villacasas, Enrique Sanchez 
de Leon and Jose Miguel Orti Bordas.16
14 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros, 27 September 1999; Testimony of Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, 17 May 2000; Martin 
Villa, Al servicio del Estado, p. 49.
]S Mundo, 27-1-1973, pp. 10-11.
16 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000; Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros, 27 September 1999; Martin Villa, Al 
servicio del Estado, p. 49.
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As mentioned in Chapter 4, since his defenestration in 1969, Fraga pursued the 
idea of elaborating a centrist political programme that could serve as the basis for the 
creation of a political association in the event of their being approved. Well before his 
departure to London as ambassador in the autumn of 1973, Manuel Fraga had already 
set up the basis for the creation of a study group, the so-called Gabinete de Orientation 
y  Documentation, S.A. (GODSA). This study group would eventually elaborate the 
political manifesto of Fraga’s first serious political platform. At the same time, Tacito 
was the group formed in 1973 by young reformists of Christian Democrat tendency. 
Both groups emerged out of the moderate side of the regime and most of their members 
played an important role during the transition to democracy in the mid-1970s. An 
examination of their emergence and development is essential to understand their 
political stance, and their dealings with both inmovilistas and the democratic opposition 
after Franco’s death.
6.1. The creation o f GODSA
As seen in Chapter 2, given the impossibility of forming political parties or even 
associations, the main purpose of study groups and discussion forums was for people to 
exchange opinions and talk politics. But, few of these groups had aspirations to become 
proper political associations. GODSA, however, was created with the sole purpose of 
building the foundations for a political association and perhaps eventually for a political 
party. According to Lourdes Lopez Nieto, GODSA was ‘an embryo of an authentic 
party’, and years later it became Fraga’s ‘most solid platform for political activities.’17
17 Lourdes Lopez Nieto, Alianza Popular: estructura y  evolucion de un partido conservador (1976-1982), (Madrid: 
CIS, 1988), p. 18.
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In 1971, the young lawyer Carlos Argos met Fraga in the latter’s office in
Madrid through a common friend. During the conversation they realized they shared a
common belief, that of the need to arrive to a democratic system without breaking with
the Francoist regime. That was the key. Argos agreed with Fraga in that,
The essence of democracy is that politics responds to the wishes of all citizens. For them, they 
must have opportunities to formulate their preferences, to express them before the government, 
and the rest of the citizens - through individual or collective action -, and that they [their 
preferences] are considered in a non-discriminatory way. [...] In order to make all this 
possible civic rights in matters of opinion, expression, associations, suffrage, etc. must be 
established.
On those grounds,
The transition from hegemonic systems [...], when tradition and experience are missing must
be unhurried and prudent. The best way to prepare it [the transition], is from within from the
very centres of power, which implies a great capacity for vision and [a high degree] of 
18concessions.
In those days, Carlos Argos was part of a collective called Equipo XXI, which 
emerged from university circles. This collective had been created around 1968-9, and 
was formed by progressives including Antonio Cortina, Luis Santiago de Pablo, Pedro 
Lopez Jimenez, Luis Apostua, Rafael Perez Escolar, Dionisio Ridruejo, Juan Velarde, 
Fernando Baeza, Martinez Esteruelas, Enrique Tiemo Galvan, Luis Gonzalez Seara and 
Carlos Argos himself. They wrote pro-democratic articles in the magazines Indice and 
Criba. According to Juan de Arespacochaga, it can be said that some members of this 
initial group formed the nucleus of GODSA.19 Parallel to the Equipo XXI there were 
also ‘young teachers and brilliant students’ including Jesus Aparicio Bernal, Gabriel 
Cisneros, and brothers Fernando and Manuel de la Sota, whom Fraga had met at 
university, and who shared his political ideas. They all joined the ex-Minister in his
18 Manuel Fraga, “Cambio social y reforma politica”, in Legitimidad y  representation, pp. 50-1, 56; Testimony of 
Carlos Argos, 14 September 1999.
19 De Arespacochaga, Cartas a unos capitanes, p. 209.
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quest to form a serious political group for the future.20 In the autumn of 1973, when 
Fraga was posted as Ambassador to London he delegated the direction of the study 
group to Antonio Cortina.21
The study group was officially formed in May 1974, and given the lack of a 
proper law of political associations, Fraga’s team registered GODS A as a commercial 
company.22 As Carlos Argos recalls, there were many government controls, especially 
from the Interior Ministry and even the Civil Guard, which GODSA members wanted to 
avoid. Furthermore, the Law of Associations 1964 imposed a series of limitations 
regarding the activities and organization of the association with which the GODSA 
members disagreed. They advocated reformism ‘that rejects the rupture [with the 
regime], [and] demands the starting point of a truly unequivocal democratic process.’24 
The headquarters of the new society were established in the Calle de los Artistas of the 
modest Cuatro Caminos neighbourhood of Madrid. GODSA was registered with an 
initial capital of five-hundred thousand pesetas distributed in shares of one thousand 
pesetas each. The first administrative council of GODSA was formed with Rafael Luna 
Gijon as President, and Jose Luis Cortina Pietro, Luis Santiago de Pablos, Javier 
Calderon Fernandez, Gabriel Cisneros, Florentino Ruiz Platero and Juan Jose Rodriguez 
Navarro as council members. Nicolas Rodriguez Gonzalez acted as secretary. All of 
them were company shareholders.25
20 Manuel Fraga, El Canon giratorio. Conversaciones con Eduardo Chamorro, (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1982), p. 58; 
Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14 September 1999.
21 Fraga, Memoria breve, pp. 296-7.
22 Statutes of Gabinete de Orientacion y  Documentacion, S.A.. Registro Mercantil, Madrid. Fraga confirmed that 
before he went to London, the group was still in an initial phase of formation. Testimony of Manuel Fraga, 28 April 
2001 .
23 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000.
24 Statement made by the GODSA member Rafael Perez Escolar during the presentation of their political party 
Reforma Democratica on 25 February 1976. GODSA, Boletin, No. 0, June 1976, p. 17.
25 Statutes o f Gabinete de Orientacion y  Documentacion, S.A. See also GODSA, Boletin, No. 4, October 1976, 
special Dossier, pp. 13-17.
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Broadly speaking, Fraga’s collaborators were young, between their early 
twenties and forties, and mainly university-educated. The majority of GODSA 
members were lawyers and academics, but there were also a few civil servants and 
others who worked in the private sector. There was a widespread reformist and liberal 
political tendency and, as Carlos Argos asserts, there was an important sector of 
GODSA which, mainly because of the emphasis that the Francoist - or Falangist - 
system of education put on social issues, was bordering on Social Democrat. There 
were three main characteristics common to all GODSA members, and perhaps to most 
of the regime reformists. These were the generational factor, the advocacy of a 
democratic system (probably similar to the German type of democracy), and the belief in 
the positioning of Spain within the European system. The majority of GODSA 
members did not have links with the Francoist administration and although some like 
Jesus Aparicio Bernal and Gabriel Cisneros were part of it, they were identified with the 
reformist branch of Francoism. The acclaimed forward-looking political line of this 
collective, however, only attracted the collaboration of a handful of people with Leftist 
tendencies like the Catalan Francisco Guillamon Vidal. Guillamon is the only known 
example of someone at leadership level of GODSA who had had direct connections 
with Socialist ideas, for which he even suffered a prison sentence.27
According to Gabriel Cisneros, GODSA was created to achieve two clear 
objectives. The first was the accumulation of papers such as social and political studies, 
which could culminate in a political manifesto. To this end, members of GODSA 
worked in close collaboration with the sociologist Amando de Miguel and Salustiano 
del Campo, former students of Fraga, who had worked extensively on sociological
26 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000.
27 A more comprehensive profile of Fraga’s team can be found in GODSA, Boletin, Nos. 8-9, January 1977, pp. 24- 
27.
The beginning o f  a long end (1973-1976) 216
studies such as those commissioned and published by the FOESSA Foundation. 
GODSA’s reports were also based on the collective work La Espana de los anos 70, 
which consisted of thorough studies of the economy, society and politics of the country 
analysed by experts in different fields. Under Fraga’s own direction La Espana de los 
anos 70 was published in the early 1970s. The second objective was the amassing of 
names of professionals, elite civil servants, military men and so forth, who could have 
enough political interest to take part in a possible political party at the time of the 
transition principally at a provincial and regional level.28
The official statutes of the company - found at the Registro Mercantil de Madrid 
- confirmed the first objective. The official purposes of the company were the 
following: (i) the elaboration of public opinion studies through surveys or other research 
methods in order to determine the characteristics of the social strata and analyse the 
market for the launching of commercial products; (ii) the acquisition, elaboration and 
sale of all types of reports, studies, statistics and in general any documents of economic 
or social character; (iii) the diffusion of such documents, through the publication of 
bulletins; (iv) and in general, any other preparatory or complementary activity to the 
ones mentioned above.29
But, as Carlos Argos explains, these points were just the cover for the real aim of 
the group which was the elaboration of studies of the reforms needed to modernize the 
Spanish system.30 Furthermore, like some of the groups studied in previous chapters, 
such as CEISA and the Centro de Estudios de Problemas Contemporaneos, the second 
objective of Fraga’s group was intentionally not mentioned in the official statutes of the
28 The documentation service of GODSA is so complete that it was used by Alianza Popular and it is still used by the 
Popular Party. Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13 September 1999 and 27 September 1999.
29 Statutes of Gabinete de Orientacion y  Documentacion, S. A.. The statutes of the society were elaborated by Nicolas 
Rodriguez Gonzalez in May 1974. See GODSA, Boletin, No. 4, October 1976, p. 14.
30 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000.
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company. Internal documentation reveals that under the heading ‘immediate action 
programme’ the ‘fundamental objective’ of the group was to find popular support on a 
national basis. They wished to raise greater support among all sorts of people, 
regardless of their status, but who identified with the GODSA’s ideology, in order to 
have a political team able to meet possible future electoral calls. The strategy to follow 
would be determined by the outcome of GODSA’s surveys and studies. Initially, 
GODSA members believed that the success of the Madrid headquarters would be 
positively reflected in the growth of provincial and regional branches of GODSA, and
■i i
would attract a larger number of supporters than it did.
Fraga formed another base in Barcelona where members of the so-called Club 
Agora, the Catalan equivalent to the Equipo XXI, had also been elaborating studies close 
to Fraga’s political ideas. Initial contacts with the Club Agora dated from as early as 
November 1971, although the merger of the club with GODSA was finally organised in 
1973-4 by Manuel Milian and Francisco Lopez Penalba. The premises of the Club 
Agora, (once fused with GODSA the Catalan club kept its original name) were 
inaugurated by Manuel Fraga on 4 December 1975, when the ex-minister was visiting 
Barcelona to attend the second ‘Manuel Fraga Iribame Award’ for journalists. The club 
set up branches all over the Catalan region. Juan Echevarria Puig became President, but 
his subsequent appointment as director general of the National Post Office obliged him 
to leave the presidency. Juan Jose Folchi Bonafonte succeeded him as President. Like 
many other societies, one of the main functions of Club Agora was the organization of 
lectures and ‘political’ lunches and dinners paid for the guests themselves. Their 
meetings aimed at discussing social and political problems affecting Spain and their
31 Godsa-Madrid. (Madrid: 1975).
32 Fraga, Memoria breve, pp. 284,287. Testimony of Carlos Argos Garcia, 14 September 1999.
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possible solutions through a modem and progressive prism based upon Fraga’s own 
political thoughts.33
Back in London, Fraga combined his duties as ambassador with those of a sort 
of shadow politician. During the weekend of the 9 and 10 March 1974 Fraga held an 
intense workshop with Carlos Argos, Antonio Cortina, Manuel Milian and Luis 
Santiago de Pablo in London. They agreed to speed up the elaboration of a political 
manifesto given that the end of Franco’s regime seemed to be imminent.34 On these 
grounds a series of study commissions were set up to research the current problems of 
Spanish society and to elaborate possible solutions to them. A team of members of 
GODSA and Club Agora elaborated the so-called ‘Appeal for Democratic Reform’, or 
Llamamiento para la Reforma Democratica, the political manifesto of the group. Yet, 
the ‘Appeal’ was a preliminary summary of the ‘White Paper for Democratic Reform’, 
or Libro Blanco para la Reforma Democratica, their magnum opus.
Meanwhile, under Fraga’s direct command, the Spanish embassy received a 
stream of Spanish visitors who enjoyed the ‘most celebrated Spanish restaurant in 
London’. Fraga organized regular working lunches (for six to ten people) and hosted 
eventual social dinners (for up to forty-five people) for representatives of embassies, 
ministries (both Spanish and British), and people of the world of finance, economics,
7^politics, media, and so forth. The occasions were financed by the ambassador, who
33 GODSA, Boletin, No. 0, June 1976, pp. 22, 31-2. A list of members of the directive council of the Club Agora can 
be found in Ibid., p. 31.
34 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 318;
35 The Llamamiento was finally published in February 1976. GODSA, Boletin, No. 4, October 1976, Dossier 
especial; GODSA, Boletin, No. 7, December 1976, p. 7.
36 According to Francisco Jose Mayans, Fraga’s advisor at the embassy, the Spanish embassy had already earned that 
reputation with the Marquis o f Santa Cruz, previous Ambassador. The Marquis had an excellent cook who was 
admired by the best connoisseurs. Testimony of Francisco Jose Mayans, 21 June 2001.
37According to Cambio-16, there were often weeks in which the Spanish embassy might host up to ten official 
lunches and dinners, as well as large cocktail parties of up to 1,000 guests. The ambassador would attend all of these 
functions. Cambio-16, 17-23 November 1975, p. 24. Mayans, however, recalls a maximum of 600 people in a 
macro-reception In any case, these large venues happened occasionally, perhaps once or twice a year and on very 
special occasions. Testimony of Francisco Jose Mayans, 21 June 2001.
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apart from his own salary had a budget to meet these expenses, called Gastos de 
Representation. In the case of Fraga, as Mayans recalls, he spent to the last peseta of 
his own salary to fulfil his duty as representative of Spam.
Among the visitors and friends who kept the ambassador informed of the ins 
and outs of Spanish political life was Pio Cabanillas. Cabanillas worked faithfully on 
behalf of Fraga and, in his capacity as Minister of Information, managed strategically to
• IQplace some of Fraga’s young supporters in various positions in Anas’ administration. 
Many visitors were political personalities identified with the most extreme political 
tendencies including Alvaro de la Iglesia and Ramon Tamames, both members of the 
Spanish Communist party -  it is believed that Fraga was well aware of Tamames’ 
affiliation to the Communist party. Around 1976, after a long friendship they distanced 
themselves from each other, perhaps once Tamames’ affiliation to the party became 
publicly known. Their visits did not necessarily imply that they shared political views 
with the ambassador, but many visitors certainly wanted to be able to count as a friend 
the man expected to have great importance in post-Franco Spain.40
Despite the variety of Fraga’s visitors, acceptance of the Communist party was 
still a divisive issue amongst most progressive Spaniards. Allegedly, Tamames’ 
proposal for negotiations with all the members of the opposition, including the Spanish 
Communist party (Tamames was present in several GODSA meetings despite not being 
part of the company) was rejected by many of Fraga’s collaborators. From then on, 
Fraga’s friendship with the professor of economics cooled.41 According to Gabriel 
Cisneros, GODSA members in general believed that although a democratic process
38 ibid.
39 These men were Leon Herrera (Sub-Secretary of Interior [Gobernacion]); Manuel Jimenez Quilez (Director 
General o f Informative Co-ordination of the Ministry of Information and Tourism); Antonio Garcia Rodriguez- 
Acosta (Vice-Secretary General of the Movement); Manuel Romay Beccaria (Sub-Secretary of the Presidency); Juan 
Jose Ros6n (Director General o f Radio and Television); etc. See Laureano Lopez Rod6, Memorias IV, p. 22.
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could not be fulfilled without the presence of the Spanish Communist party, the risk of 
accepting such a challenge appeared to be greater than it finally was.42 Such a belief 
was not uncommon amongst the reformists given that the position of the Communist 
party towards a post-Francoist Spain was still unknown in the first half of the 1970s. 
Yet, as Carlos Argos argues, it is difficult to get an absolutely unanimous view over an 
issue in a collective of several hundred people. He believes that there must have been 
only a few who disagreed with the rapprochement with the Communists, but there was a 
general feeling in favour of legalising the clandestine party 43 As will be explained in 
Chapter 7, in 1976 both Fraga and the GODSA member Rafael Perez Escolar stated that 
‘political pluralism does not admit exception’, ‘the Communist Party will have a role in 
Spanish political life* 44
Felix Pastor Ridruejo, one of the GODSA founders, knew many members of the 
Spanish Communist party, and was therefore well-informed on their activities. Pastor 
Ridruejo recalls that in 1965 members of the PCE contacted him through Jose Jimenez 
de Parga who asked him to be the Notario (lawyer) of the Communists. They needed 
help in their battle for legal recognition. Pastor Ridruejo argues that the Communists 
wished to gradually become part of society and to stop living clandestinely 45
Pastor Ridruejo duly acted for the Communists. Thus, he had frequent contacts 
with party members like Maria Luisa Suarez and Cristina Almeida, and also with 
members of the Socialist Party who approached him for the same purpose. As the 
transition drew near, some Communists, who knew Pastor Ridruejo professionally and 
personally and of his role in GODSA, expressed their wish to establish contacts with
40 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14 September 1999.
41 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 330.
42 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros, 27 September 1999.
43 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000.
44 GODSA, Boletin, No. 2, August 1976, p. 8.
The beginning o f along end (1973-1976) 221
Fraga’s future political party. A meeting took place in Paris, between a few members of 
the Communist party and Felix Pastor although the latter did not go as a GODSA 
representative but on his own, as he did not want to involve Fraga’s group in the 
meeting. 46 Their meeting seems to have been symbolic as there are no records of 
collaboration between GODSA and the PCE or the democratic opposition.
6.2. The emergence o f the Tacito group
Parallel to GODSA’s appearance, there emerged another study group - or a 
group of political thinkers in this case - of young Christian Democrats. Tacito was the 
name of a group formed by forward-looking young people linked, directly or indirectly, 
to the Catholic pressure group Asociacion Catolica Nacional de Propagandistas 
(ACNP) and its Christian Democrat philosophy. Abelardo Algora, President of the 
ACNP since 1965, and Alfonso Osorio agreed on the need to unite the Christian 
Democratic forces in an attempt to work together for the future of the country. For that 
purpose, in the autumn of 1972 Algora organized a meeting in the Centre of University 
Studies of the ACNP, which was attended by a number of young Propagandistas 
including Eduardo Carriles, Landelino Lavilla, Inigo Cavero, Jose Luis Alvarez, 
Marcelino Oreja, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Enrique de la Mata, Jose Manuel Otero, 
Serafin Rios, Jose Maria Belloch, Andres Reguera, Jose Luis Ruiz Navarro, Luis 
Jaudenes, Fernando Arias-Salgado, Alejandro Royo-Villanova, Fernando Alvarez de 
Miranda, and Juan Carlos Guerra Zunzunegui.47
Tacito was eventually created in May 1973, and its members used their 
collective identity to sign influential articles, written individually, or by a team, and
45 Testimony of Felix Pastor Ridruejo, 17 May 2000.
46 Ibid.
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published initially in the Catholic newspaper YA (close to the ACNP and the Catholic 
Editorial). Their first article was published in YA on 23 June, and from then on articles 
were reproduced in another nineteen regional papers.48 Besides their main demand for 
freedom of political association, Tacito also advocated the incorporation into the 
Spanish juridical system of the rights and freedoms contained in the Human Rights 
Declaration of the United Nations: freedom of religion; sovereignty for the people; a 
bicameral system where the legislative chamber would be elected by universal, secret 
and direct suffrage; independence of the judicial system; recognition of the peculiarities 
of the various Spanish regions; freedom to form trade unions; and integration into the 
European Community.49 In fact, the latter issue was of particular importance to the 
group as many Tacito members had been part of the AECE; some had even held 
positions of leadership.50
Although distinctively Christian Democrat, their progressive line of thought 
soon attracted the collaboration of people who were not linked to the ACNP such as 
Gabriel Cafiadas.51 Yet, Alvarez de Miranda recalls that, in an attempt to unite the 
representatives of the different Christian Democrat political groups, Algora firstly 
invited Federico Silva, Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez and Jose Maria Gil-Robles (son), who for 
various reasons did not turn up.52 On the one hand, as Marcelino Oreja recalls, Silva 
wanted immediate participation in the cabinet because he believed reform had to be 
carried out by the government and quickly, and therefore, he regarded Tacito as a
47 Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 24; Fernando Jauregui y Manuel Soriano, La otra historia de UCD, (Madrid: Emiliano 
Escolar Ed., 1980), pp. 41-42.
48 The collection of articles written by the group and published in various newspapers are compiled in Tacito 
(Madrid: Iberico Rueda de Ediciones, 1975). A list of regional newspapers where Tacito articles appeared can be 
seen in Ibid., p. 51. See also, Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 25.
49 A.C.N. de P., No.4, 1975, p. 15; Tacito, pp. 46-8.
50 Cambio-16, 6-12 January 1975, p. 26.
51 Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 24.
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useless exercise; Gil-Robles was too attached to his father’s idea that Christian 
Democracy had to be a strong political party which he believed would gather enough 
votes to become the major group of the Centre-Right. Ruiz-Gimenez was too involved
r  • 53with Cuadernos para el Dialogo to contemplate being part of another collective. 
Furthermore, despite their Christian Democrat background, Ruiz-Gimenez and Gil- 
Robles (father) advocated full democracy whereas the members of Tacito favoured a 
German-type of democracy (without the Communist Party).54
Tacito members were driven, according to one of its members, by ‘the wish that 
our country [could] organize itself to live by a pluralistic democratic system, where all 
opinions have a place, and that [we could] arrive at it [a pluralistic democratic system] 
through evolution, reform and change [...], but not through destruction, revenge or a 
jump into the abyss (salto al vacio).’55 Yet, they did not support -  certainly before 
Franco’s death -  the legalization of the Communist Party. In September 1974, for 
instance, Tacito members declared their repudiation of Fascism and Communism or any 
other form of totalitarianism.56
Many Tacitos were close to Prince Juan Carlos, both in age and at a personal 
level. Meetings with the Prince were, therefore, comfortable and frequent. The Prince 
would listen and sometimes give hints of what he would like them to do for him.57 
There were Tacitos who also had personal contacts with the Prince’s father, Don Juan 
de Borbon. That was the case of Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, who was appointed
52 Alvarez de Miranda, Del “contubernio ”, p. 72.
53 Testimony of Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, 27 May 2000.
54 Ruiz-Gimenez in the table round “Reforma o Ruptura”, in Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 148, January 1976, p. 
654. Gil-Robles advocated the legalization of the PCE if only to avoid the party growing bigger underground. See 
Triunfo No. 690, 17 April 1976, p.20.
55 Guadiana, No. 5,19-25 May 1975, p. 9.
56 Tacito, “Puntualizaciones” (20 September 1974), p. 307-9.
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member of Don Juan’s private council by Don Juan himself in 1964. The majority of 
the Tacitos had either worked in the Francoist administration or had strong links to it, 
and their university education had brought them to important positions. But, Tacito 
members were not close to the General-Secretariat of the Movement unlike some 
GODSA members namely Gabriel Cisneros.58 There were diplomats such as Marcelino 
Oreja (National Councillor) and Rafael Arias Salgado; State Council Lawyers 
(Letrados) such as Landelino Lavilla and Juan Antonio Ortega y Diaz Ambrona; State 
Lawyers (Abogados del Estado) such as Alfonso Osorio and Jose Manuel Otero Novas; 
and economists and engineers working for the private sector. Overall, ninety people 
were part of Tacito at one time or another, some of whom were to be amongst the most 
prominent figures on the right in the post-Francoist transition (especially Marcelino 
Oreja, Alfonso Osorio, Calvo Sotelo, Enrique de la Mata and Andres Reguera Fajardo 
who became ministers under King Juan Carlos’ monarchy).59
What began in mid-1973 as a meeting of friends to discuss the political situation 
of the time became an organization with a coherent ideology and solid structure. As one 
Tacito member explains, ‘the imperative need for democratic evolution and the wish to 
construct a just, ordered and pluralist society brought them together’ (understandably 
without the Communist Party as yet).60 However, according to Alfonso Osorio, Tacito 
was not the embryo of a political association like GODSA at an early stage, but a group 
of political thinkers whose members had a common political ideology and different 
political experiences. Tacito did not have a political manifesto like GODSA’s, but that 
was not their main difference. As Osorio argues, what really differentiated them was
57 As we shall see later in the chapter the Prince expressed his concern to Alfonso Osorio for the convenience of 
having a strong progressive political force which could lead the transition. See Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 33.
58 Guadiana, No. 12, 7-13 July 1975, p. 18.
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that Fraga’s team advocated the drawing of a constitution prior to democratic election, 
whereas Tacito wanted the opposite.61 Having said that, on 23 July 1974, Tacito tried to 
create an association called Centro de Estudios Comunitarios under the umbrella of the 
Law of 1964 in an attempt to form a moderate group, which could be ready for post- 
Franco Spain. Jose Luis Alvarez, Jose Luis Ruiz Navarro and Eduardo Carriles 
presented the paperwork for the legalisation of the group at the Interior Ministry in the 
summer of 1974. Yet, by January 1975, leaders of Tacito had still not received approval 
for the Centro de Estudios Comunitarios. The proposal failed.
In the meantime, six months after Tacito was created, Carlos Arias Navarro 
became the new President after the assassination of Admiral Carrero. Arias appointed 
various Tacito members at the secondary level of his government as under-secretaries 
whence they started to exercise some influence. Thus, the Tacitos Marcelino Oreja, 
Gabriel Canadas and Royo Villanova joined the progressive Pio Cabanillas, while the 
economist Jose Ramon Lasuen and Luis Jaudenes became part of Antonio Cairo’s team. 
Landelino Lavilla was appointed to a senior post at the Ministry of Industry. Given 
their powerful relations in the banking and industrial world, the Tacitos became very 
influential in Francoist circles. Also, their committed Catholicism, undoubtedly, made 
their visiting card more welcome. The Tacitos ’ public relations activities, such as 
political dinners and public lectures, attracted a wide and influential section of the
59 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999; Powell, “The ‘T&cito’ group”, pp. 250-2; Charles Powell, 
“Crisis del franquismo, reformismo y transition a la democracia”, in Javier Tusell et al. (Eds.), Las Derechas en la 
Espana Contemporanea, (Madrid: UNED, 1998), p. 249.
60 A.C.N. deP., No.4, 1975, p. 15.
61 ABC, 21 January 1975; Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999; It is interesting to note, however, that 
the alleged differences did not prevent Jos6 Luis Alvarez from being part of both collectives which suggests that such 
differences were not so marked.
62 Jauregui & Soriano, La otra historia de UCD, p. 42. Tacito refers to the attempt to legalize an association in 
Cambio-16, 6-12 January 1975, p. 27.
63 Powell, “The ‘Tacito’ group”, p. 259.
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economic, social and political establishments. Tacito, therefore, became a pressure 
group that Arias could not ignore.64
On 12 February 1974 President Arias introduced an unprecedented reformist 
programme for a ‘controlled opening-up of the system’ in a long-awaited speech. The 
so-called ‘spirit of 12 February’- the first televised address of a Head of Government in 
Spain - was elaborated by Gabriel Cisneros and also by Antonio Carro and Pio 
Cabanillas, Ministers of the Presidency and Information, respectively. The Tacitos 
Marcelino Oreja and Gabriel Canadas were invited to work under Cabanillas, and Jose 
Ram6n Lansuen and Luis Jaudenes under Carro.65 Arias’ speech incorporated the new 
assumption of ‘concrete compromises with concrete time location’ to the political 
language of the time. Thus, according to Cisneros, the official announcements would 
include specific dates for example ‘before 31 May, the government...’, whereas before 
this speech no such precise time was given. This point was particularly important since 
the Statute of Associations, which was to be proposed in December that year, was also 
to be elaborated, as Cisneros points out, in the same terms. The Caudillo responded 
favourably to Arias’ speech but he made two amendments. Firstly, Franco requested the 
elimination of one clause that designated young Prince Felipe successor to his father 
prince Juan Carlos, in case of his father’s disappearance. This measure, Cisneros 
explains, was adopted because Franco had designated only one successor, and had made 
no provision for subsequent Heads of State. But they forgot that Prince Felipe - then 
still a young child - had no sworn loyalty to the Principles of the Movement, and that
64 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, pp. 56-7.
65 Powell, “The ‘T&cito’ group”, p. 259. During an interview Gabriel Cisneros assured me that he had been the sole 
author of Arias’ ‘spirit of 12 February’. Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13 September 1999. Yet, Alfonso 
Osorio explained in his memoirs that Arias was advised by Antonio Carro, Luis Jaudenes (both Tacito), and by 
Gabriel Cisneros. See Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 27.
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was an essential requirement to become Franco’s successor. Secondly, so far as political 
associations were concerned, the Caudillo told Arias to ‘leave the door half-open’.66
The ‘spirit of 12 February’ attracted national as well as international interest, and 
consequent comments on the speech were published in the most important newspapers. 
For instance, according to Henry Giniger, the correspondent of The New York Times, 
Arias ‘promised Spaniards wider and freer participation in government and union affairs 
than they have known in the thirty-five years since the Civil War’. The premier also 
said that ‘national consensus in favour of the regime had been achieved up to now 
through the leadership of General Franco. But in the future, he said, it would have to be 
expressed through participation’.67 Later, Plo Cabanillas confirmed that ‘Arias’ 
message was centred around the word “participation” in the political life of the nation 
[meaning “popular participation’”]’. The Francoist discourse avoided delicate terms 
like “democracy” and “political parties”. This is why the magic word was
• • • / : o“participation”.’ In practice, however, if there were to be any participation it would be 
quite limited. Arias’ government combined promises of liberalization with the violent 
repression typical of Franco’s dictatorship although some warned the President of the 
negative consequences of such a regressive attitude. Indeed, Osorio warned President 
Arias that his group would support only a cabinet committed to change. The Tacitos’ 
influence opened Arias’ eyes to the growing opposition, and forced him to acknowledge 
that, if  his government was to survive, some degree of reform had to be attempted.69 
This time the President seemed more inclined to allow the creation of political 
associations even if restricted to within the boundaries of the regime.
66 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13 September 1999.
67 The New York Times, 13 February 1974, pp. 1,4.
68 Prego, A si se hizo la transicion, p. 84.
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Meanwhile, in April 1974, the peaceful overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship 
at the hands of the Portuguese armed forces boosted the hope of the Spanish population 
who saw the Portuguese case as an example to follow. The collapse of the Portuguese 
dictatorship was followed by the overthrown of the Colonels in Greece. The Spanish 
regime was, therefore, the last dictatorship left in Western Europe. Inside the Spanish 
army, a few officers publicly announced the creation of the so-called Union Militar 
Democratica (UMD) on 31 August 1974, based on earlier ideas of the progressive 
military group Forja.10 Captain Jose Antonio Dominguez had declared in Paris in 1975 
that ‘the UMD was an organization bom to fight for the political transformation of the
71country to a democratic regime’. These officers, who amounted about two-hundred 
and fifty, wished to guarantee that the army would not be an obstacle for a transition to a 
democratic regime. As Major Julio Busquets recalls, ‘the UMD was founded because 
[we] were deeply concerned about the possibility of a clash between the army and the
77population’. Their attempt to detach the army from its alliance with Francoism had 
little impact within the bulk of the military. Dominguez’s declaration, however, aroused 
a great interest among the democratic opposition. Following the arrest of a number of 
UMD members, the association dissolved in 1977.73 The triumph of the Right-wing of 
the military over the democrats of the UMD would affect the entire process of the 
transition to democracy.
69 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 57.
70 Forja or ‘Forge’ was the name given to a military group led by Captain Luis Pinilla and formed by Catholic Cadets 
created in 1948. They launched and run military journals on professional and political subjects, and although not 
subversive, constituted a body of critical opinion within the army. The Francoist government, however, put an end to 
Forja 's activities in 1950. See Paul Preston, The Politics o f  Revenge. (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 141.
71 Quoted in Prego, Asi se hizo la transicion, p. 266.
72 Julio Busquets’ testimony in Andres & Prego, La Transicion. Video No. 3. La influencia de la revolucion de los 
claveles. (April-September 1974). For the number of members see Prego, Asi se hizo la transicion, p. 214.
73 Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to democracy, pp. 22-23; Prego, Asi se hizo la transicion, p. 268.
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Meanwhile, a divided democratic opposition made an attempt to unite forces. 
The leadership of the PCE, politicians linked to Don Juan de Borbdn (Rafael Calvo 
Serer and Antonio Garcia Trevijano), were followed by the Socialists of Tiemo Galvan, 
the Carlists of Carlos Hugo, and some smaller Leftist parties. These parties formed the 
so-called Junta Democratica, which was presented in Paris on 30 July 1974. The Junta 
demanded a ‘democratic break’ (ruptura democratica)74 with the regime as well as the 
formation of a provisional government; political freedom; the legalization of all political 
parties, without exception; freedom of trade unions; recognition of the rights of 
manifestation, assembly and association; freedom of press; judicial independence; 
separation of Church and State; recognition of the historical characteristics of Galicia, 
the Basque Country and Catalonia; a referendum to decide the form of State: Republic 
or Monarchy; and political neutrality for the armed forces.75 Later on, other Left wing 
groups that decided not to join the Junta -  the Spanish Socialist Party of Felipe 
Gonzalez, the Social Democrats of Dionisio Ridruejo, the Democratic Left of Joaquin 
Ruiz-Gimenez, Catalan and Basque parties, some parties of the radical Left, and the 
Carlists of Carlos Hugo, who had left the Junta -  formed the Plataforma de
• n(\Convergencia in July 1975.
74 The idea of ruptura with Franco’s regime has always been part of the democratic opposition to Francoism. Yet, in 
1974 the Socialists coined and put into circulation the term ‘democratic rupture’ or ruptura democratica to underline 
their objectives. Ruptura democratica involved the devolution of sovereignty to the population in order to decide the 
political, economic, social and syndical system that it preferred (including also the question of republic or monarchy). 
That also involved the inevitable opening of elections, the annulment of the current legislation and the approval o f a 
political amnesty. Later on, in 1976, the democratic opposition referred to a ‘negotiated democratic rupture’ as a 
dialectic process by which government (or rather the reformist sector of the regime) and opposition negotiated a 
programme of reforms. Incidentally, the ‘negotiated-democratic-rupture’ formulae chosen by the Adolfo Su&rez’s 
government made the peaceful transition to a democratic system possible. See Cambio-16, 12-18 April 1976, pp.37- 
8 .
75 Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, pp. 195-206. Andres & Prego, La Transicion. Video No. 3. La 
influencia de la revolucion de los claveles. (April-September 1974); Preston, “The dilemma of Credibility”, p. 82.
76 Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, pp. 195-206. As we will see in Chaper Six, these two blocks, the Junta 
and the Plataforma, got together in March 1976.
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In the spring of 1974, Arias was trapped between Franco and the die-hards - who 
blamed Arias for the problems with the democratic opposition and condemned his high 
degree of tolerance - and the reformists. In fact, as Samuel Eaton recalls, ‘there were 
rumours of continuing differences between Franco and Arias with a corresponding 
enhancement of Arias’ image as a true, though modest, reformer battling against the 
odds.’77 Social problems such as labour militancy, and terrorism, increased
no
considerably thereby exerting great pressure on the government. But, as Don Juan 
Carlos acknowledged years later, ‘Arias didn’t have the necessary vision to face up to 
the radical changes the Spaniards were demanding. All the same, he realized that 
Francoism could not continue once Franco was gone, so he undertook various “liberal” 
reforms which were only for show and didn’t satisfy anyone.’79 Don Juan Carlos’ 
feeling was shared by many in high political circles. After talking with a number of 
personalities including Nieto Antunez, Juan Jose Roson, Antonio Carro and Martin 
Villa, Fraga concluded that the general feeling was that Arias’s government was not 
interested at all in applying any political reform, despite the famous ‘spirit of the 12 
February’.80
Fraga and his collaborators also coincided in the view that Franco and his 
political system could not resist popular pressure much longer. The delicate health of 
the Caudillo on the one hand and the feeling of unrest and discontent among Spaniards 
on the other hand, were clear signs that the regime was coming to an end. Their concern 
was communicated to Prince Juan Carlos with whom they discussed their reformist 
programme on a number of occasions. Incidentally, Bemaldez states that the Prince 
received the entire GODSA group on 27 June 1974, but Gabriel Cisneros has denied this
77 Eaton, The forces offreedom in Spain, p. 10.
78 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 5 6.
79 Vilallonga, The King, p. 163.
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claim. Cisneros recalled that they had had regular private encounters with Don Juan 
Carlos, either individually or in small groups of two or three, but never as a group. In 
any case, it would not have been wise of the Prince to meet a political group, which was 
not yet legally recognized.81
On 9 July 1974, Franco fell ill and was taken to hospital. Don Juan Carlos was 
asked to take over as Head of State on a temporary basis -  the period known as 
interinidad - and although the Prince disagreed with the idea he finally accepted. As he 
explained later, ‘I knew all along that I had to accept it. If I refused to become Head of 
State when illness put the General out of action there would be a power vacuum, and 
other people might be tempted to fill it. [...] Having said that, I accepted with 
reluctance.’82 Tacito criticised the decision to make the Prince temporary Head of State 
in one of their weekly articles. Ten days after Franco’s admission to hospital, his 
health worsened, which led to considerable social tension. During these days Ultra- 
Right squads violently attacked all sorts of citizens, from relatives of ETA terrorists to 
respectable professionals - one of the cases being the brutal aggression against six 
Spanish lawyers and two Venezuelan journalists.84 The uncertainty over the future of 
the country exacerbated the division between continuistas and aperturistas/Tciormists. 
Yet, the precedent had been set. Franco was mortal and Spaniards, especially the 
Prince, had seriously to prepare themselves for a future without the General.
80 Bemdldez, El Patron de la Derecha, p. 148.
81 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros, 13 September 1999. This statement was also confirmed by Carlos Argos. Argos 
told me that he personally had several long discussions with Prince Juan Carlos at the Palacio de la Quinta where 
Argos told the monarch about the need for reform and the work of his group on this direction. Testimony of Carlos 
Argos, 14 September 1999.
82 Vilallonga, The King, p. 163; L6pez Rodo, Memorias TV, pp. 56-8,59-60.
83 Tacito, “La Interinidad” (26 July 74), pp. 277-9.
84 Triunfo, No. 676, 10 January 1976, p. 71.
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6.3. Arias Navarro's Statute o f  Political Associations. The ‘Triple Alliance ’
In April 1974, and in view of the arrival of a possible law of political 
associations, General Lieutenant Garcia Rebull had already declared that, ‘as a 
Falangist, I don’t accept associations of any kind. The associations are a dangerous
or m
devil for the entire society. No, I don’t believe the subject will succeed’. Yet, to his 
surprise, the Francoist Cortes eventually approved Arias’ Statute of Political 
Associations by Decree-law on 21 December 1974.
Arias had ordered the elaboration of two drafts for the Statute of Political 
Associations already in February 1974. One draft was commissioned by Arias’ Minister 
Antonio Carro from the Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, directed by Juan Antonio 
Ortega Diaz-Ambrona. The other draft was entrusted to a group of councillors of the 
Movement’s National Council. As Ortega Diaz-Ambrona’s recalls, his group 
‘elaborated a draft where the Statute reflected the acceptance of all political tendencies 
common in Western Europe (perhaps not the Communist party as yet) and, therefore, 
the freedom of political association’. By contrast, Ortega adds, ‘the aim of the 
councillors’ draft was not to emphasize the freedom of associations for the Spanish 
people’, but to enhance the political forces integrated in the Movement. It was clear that 
the draft prepared at the Instituto was too adventurous for Arias and, as expected, the 
President chose the draft proposed by the councillors. During a conversation with Jose 
Utrera, Minister Secretary-General of the Movement, in November that year, Franco 
still insisted that the Minister write a document whereby the Movement retained the 
legal authority to authorize, control, sanction or dissolve any association that might be 
created in the future.86
85 Nuevo Diario, 28 April 1974, p. 2.
86 Andres & Prego, La Transicion. Video No. 4. La derrota del aperturismo (September-December 1974).
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Despite the approval of the Statute by the Cortes, the real challenge rested in 
Arias’ hands who still had to obtain the Caudillo’s ultimate blessing. Jose Garcia 
Hernandez, and first Vice-President of Arias’ cabinet, possibly fearing trouble ahead, 
told Arias that ‘if he [Franco] does not sign it, we better organize a fancy-dress party’. 
After many struggles the Caudillo allowed the ‘go-ahead’ of political associations. As 
Lopez Rodo put it, ‘after seven years of thinking [over and over] about the issue, which 
appeared and disappeared like the Guadiana [river], Franco finally signed the Decree- 
law of 21 December 1974 by which the Statute of Political Associations was approved’ 
(Tras siete anos de darle vueltas al tema y  de que este apareciera y  desapareciera como
on
el Guadiana...).
The text was based to a great extent on the old proyecto de bases approved by 
the National Council in July 1969, and consisted of thirty articles divided into six main
oo
sections. These were freedom of association, competence in associative matters, 
constitution of political associations, the regime and the functioning of associations, 
federations and the disciplinary regime. The Statute read that ‘all Spaniards, older than 
eighteen, have the right to associate freely for political activities without discrimination. 
[But] The exercise of this right is regulated by the National Movement’. The core of the 
problem was threefold. Firstly, popular participation had to respect the so-called 
‘inorganic democracy’ of the regime; secondly, political associations would be instituted 
only within the community of the Movement; and thirdly, the recognition, suspension
87 Lopez Rodo, MemoriasTV, pp. 96-7; L6pez Rodo, La larga marcha, p. 473.
88 Martin Merchan, Partidos Politicos, pp. 100-1. Jos6 Solis, however, believed that these proposals of 1969 and the 
statute o f 1974 were different things, and incomparable because they respond to different situations of Spanish life. 
According to him, the statute was an improved and perfected version. See Gentleman, No. 24, 1-15 January 1975, p. 
29.
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and dissolution of political associations lay ultimately at the National Council’s 
discretion.89
As expected, comments on the new statute were varied. On the one hand, 
Francoist hard-liners reiterated their rejection of any attempt to form associations. On 
the other hand, Alfonso Osorio gave a different reaction. The Tacito member disagreed 
with the limitations and cautions of the statute although he believed that one should 
create a political association under the conditions of the statute if only to attempt a 
political reform from within. Yet, his Tacito collaborators, mainly those attached to 
Marcelino Oreja and Pio Cabanillas, completely disagreed.90 In fact, the majority of the 
Tacito members stood against the statute. They thought that Arias’ statute was ‘the 
statute of the anti-associationists and betrayed the spirit of 12 February’. They believed, 
therefore, that ‘the text must be modified to be accepted’.91 As we shall see later, 
Tacito1 s stance towards the new Statute of Political Associations was ultimately to 
provoke a schism in the group.
Prior to its approval, however, hope for a generous Statute of Political 
Associations disappeared when the press announced a string of twenty resignations of 
progressive political figures from high administrative positions. On 28 October 1974, 
Pio Cabanillas was asked to resign from the Ministry of Information and Tourism by 
Arias, who himself followed direct orders from the Caudillo. Cabanillas’ mistake had 
been his ‘loose’ hand, which had led to an unparalleled level of press liberalization. The 
alarm had been raised a few months earlier, more specifically on 28 April 1974, by the
89 Cambio-16, 9-15 December 1974, pp. 10-11.
90 Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 32.
91 ‘El Estatuto de Asociaciones’ (article published on 6 December 1974), in Tacito, pp. 351-54.
92 The politicians who resigned in solidarity with Cabanillas and Barrera de Irimo included: from the INI, Francisco 
Fem&ndez Ordonez, Rafael Perez Escolar, Miguel Boyer, Joaquin Solchaga; from the Ministry of Information and
The beginning o f  a long end (1973-1976) 235
Falangist hard-liner Jose Antonio Giron, who published a manifesto - popularly known 
as ‘Gironazo' - in the daily Arriba where he denounced the ill-use of Arias’ speech by 
the ‘infiltrated Liberals’. Giron was clearly referring to Antonio Carro and Pio 
Cabanillas, the latter accused of directing a ‘dangerous press policy’. Yet, such a level 
of press liberalization boosted the success of independent and critical publications such 
as the magazines Cuadernos para el Dialogo and Cambio-16, which stood as serious 
critics of the current situation.94 Cabanillas’ dismissal represented a clear hit to 
aperturismo from President Arias. This regressive move infuriated the democratic 
opposition, and especially Tacito, who condemned his decision and praised the 
coherence of work of both ex-ministers. In an article published by Tacito a few days 
later, they stated that the dismissal of the forward-looking Cabanillas and the 
consequent resignation of Barrera de Irimo as well as the rest of the civil servants meant 
that ‘a political line died yesterday’.95
Despite these disappointing dismissals, there was considerable expectation 
amongst the reformists about the Statute of Political Associations even prior
to its approval. In December (8-9) 1974, the press published a series of articles 
about the alleged creation of a ‘Triple Alliance’ between Fraga, Areilza and Federico 
Silva.96 The origins of this alleged alliance can be found, as Alfonso Osorio recalls, in a 
private conversation he held with Don Juan Carlos. The Prince expressed his concern 
about the need for a political association capable of attracting all sectors of the regime in
Tourism, Marcelino Oreja, Ricardo de la Cierva; from TVE, Ros6n Perez, Juan Luis Cebrian; and several others from 
the from the Treasury Department. For a full list see Cambio-16, 18-24 November 1974, pp. 6-8.
93 Cambio-16, 13 May 1974, pp. 22-5; Cambio-16, 6-12 January 1975, p. 23. See also Prego, Asi se hizo la 
transicion, pp. 127-134.
94 Alvarez de Miranda, Del “contubernio ”, p. 78.
95 “Tacito enjuicia el momenta politico” (article published on 31 October 1974) in Tacito, p. 333\Cambio-l6, 11-17 
November 1974, pp. 10-19.
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an attempt to conduct a real transition to a parliamentary monarchy. Therefore, given 
that there was already an organized democratic opposition, it was very convenient to 
form a powerful group of moderate Francoists outside the umbrella of the Secretariat of 
the Movement. The Tacito leader promised the Prince that he would deal with the 
matter personally.97 The Prince reiterated his concern to Lopez Rodo during a 
conversation on 31 October 1974. His words to the Opus Dei member were allegedly, 
“we have to organize the Right and count also on the Left”. According to Lopez Rodo, 
the Prince asked him to lunch with Fraga, Areilza and Fernandez Miranda, and to make 
sure that the fact of this meeting was publicized.98 Santiago Carrillo recalls that on 
wondering whom the leader of the regime reformists was, he arrived at the conclusion 
that it was Prince Juan Carlos himself. The Prince ‘had surreptitiously gathered some of 
them [reformists] together, waiting for the time when Franco would not be in control. 
[...] He was prepared to introduce democracy if it allowed him to keep the crown’.99 
Although Carrillo suspected this before Suarez became president, the Communist leader 
confirmed it when Suarez came to power.100
Faithful to the Prince, Osorio began a series of talks with Fraga, Areilza, Silva 
and Jose Trillo as well as with other political figures at the beginning of December 
1974. Fraga was, according to Osorio, quite enthusiastic about the idea of a political 
partnership, but expressed his scepticism about Silva’s willingness merely to join, and 
not lead the formation. In fact, while Areilza and Fraga understood the need for such an 
alliance, and agreed to be part of it, Silva seemed to hesitate although he finally
96 Federico Silva recalled having learned about the alleged alliance through the press, and thought it was a canard. 
Federico Silva Munoz, Memorias Politicos, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1993), pp. 302-3. See also Gentleman, No. 25, 15- 
30 January 1975, p. 15; Cambio-16, 27 January- 2 February 1975, p. 15.
97 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999; See also Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 31.
98 Lopez Rod6, La larga marcha, p. 473.
99 Santiago Carrillo, “The Consensus-building Role of the Communist Party”, in Threlfall, Consensus politics in 
Spain, pp. 54-5.
100 Testimony of Santiago Carrillo, 29 November 2001.
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accepted.101 Fraga, however, was still in London although his duties at the London 
embassy did not prevent him from leading GODSA and the Club Agora, and from still 
being present on the Spanish scene. But, he still counted on the assistance of various 
collaborators. For instance, Carlos Argos recalls that in December 1974 (coinciding 
with the ‘Triple Alliance’), they [Fraga’s followers] organized the so-called ‘Manuel 
Fraga Iribame Award’ for the best journalist. They wanted to keep Fraga’s name in 
vogue in Spain and also remind people of Fraga’s Press Law. The prize consisted of 
cash, although they had none. So they organized an exclusive dinner in Monjuit, 
Barcelona, which would be charged at more than the real cost, thereby contributing the 
difference to the prize. A jury would choose the best article, and the prize would be 
presented by Manuel Fraga himself who would travel from London to attend the event. 
This trip also gave Fraga the opportunity to establish contacts with a number of 
personalities from all spheres of Catalan society from Cardinal Jubany and the Abad of 
Montserrat to people of the business and banking world. Jose Maria Santacreu, 
allegedly the main organizer of Fraga’s visit to Catalonia, organized a lunch with 
personalities such as the banker Jordi Pujol, the sx-familiar Eduardo Tarragona, Pau 
Roig, Ibanez Escocet and Sebastian Auger to whom the ambassador reiterated his idea 
of the centre.
The extraordinary marketing campaign organized by Fraga’s collaborators 
attracted great publicity. The Catalan press recorded in detail Fraga’s movements in the 
Catalan City, and the award ceremony attracted an important number of political 
personalities, journalists and businessmen. There were various ministers of Arias’ 
current cabinet such as Antonio Carro, Minister of the Presidency; Pio Cabanillas, 
Minister of Information and Tourism; and Cruz Martinez Esteruelas, Minister of
101 Osorio, Trayectoria , p. 34-6.
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Education. Following the prize-giving ceremony, Fraga gave an eagerly-awaited speech 
in which he was expected to unveil his views on the possible formation of a political 
association. But he did not. Allegedly, one businessman commented that although 
‘Fraga has not said enough, he is the only man capable of playing a role in this terribly 
confused situation’.102 Others, like Alejandro Rodriguez de Valcarcel critizised Fraga’s 
flamboyance for travelling to Catalonia ‘as if he was the President of the Government’ 
(en plan de Presidente del gobierno).
Soon after Fraga’s visit to Catalonia, on 30 December 1974 Fraga met the Prince 
at the embassy in London. During their meeting, the Ambassador shared his political 
views with the Prince, and as a result of this encounter, on 31 December Fraga sent a 
carefully written letter to President Arias in which he included the draft for a political 
association that had been designed by his group GODSA. For Fraga, an association had 
to have a series of unquestionable conditions in its programme such as the advocacy of a 
parliament with a principal chamber elected by universal suffrage, the incorporation of 
the basic civic rights of the western world, freedom of trade unions and an amicable 
separation of Church from State, all under the monarchy of Don Juan Carlos. 
According to the Ambassador, political associations with an unclear stance towards 
democracy (understanding ‘democracy’ as a democracy without the Communist Party) 
would not succeed, and he believed that it was important to make his position clear 
before his return to Madrid.104 Later, on 14 January 1975 Silva met Arias Navarro to
102 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14 September 1999; Cambio-16, 16-22 December 1974, p. 24; John Gilmour, Manuel 
Fraga Iribarne and the Rebirth o f  Spanish Conservatism, 1939-1990, (Cerdigion, Wales: Edwin Mellen, 1999), p. 
84.
103 L6pez Rodo, Memorias IV, p. 96.
104 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 341; Fraga’s detailed political programme was published in ABC in a series of articles 
between October and November 1975. These articles were “Cambio y Reforma” (1 October 1975); “La Reforma 
Religiosa” (4 October 1975); “La Reforma Militar” (15 October 1975); “La Reforma de las Autonomias” (18 
October 1975); “La Reforma Educativa” (24 October 1975); “La Reforma Econdmica” (29 October 1975); “La
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whom he explained the idea of the alliance. Arias’ response was quite favourable, and 
even told Silva that in the event of the three politicians forming an association - of the 
type the government was seeking which was purely under the orthodox framework of 
the Movement - he would be willing to hand over power to them within a period of six 
months, or after the current legislature of the Cortes.105 Even Cardinal Tarancon 
appeared to favour the idea. ‘I understand’, he told Osorio, ’that it is a project for 
national coexistence. [So] a light is lit for the future of Spain’.106
But, the alliance had not yet amounted to anything. On 21 January 1975, the 
daily ABC published an interview with Alfonso Osorio in which the Tacito pushed the 
idea of the alliance. Osorio stated that, in his opinion, if  progressive associations were 
successful - as he was convinced they would be - they would considerably reduce the 
potential followers of a revolutionary option. He also recognized that, despite the 
limitations of the statute, ‘we have to try to walk as far as we can in this tight suit, and 
see if by using it we can manage to adapt it to our national body’. On these grounds, he 
declared his willingness to be part of an association that represented the positions of
107Areilza, Fraga and Silva in a joint alliance. Osorio’s public statement initiated a 
chain of press comments about the alleged partnership. According to Cambio-16, the 
three ‘progressive’ leaders were to create an association of a moderate-democratic- 
centrist tendency, and the various private meetings of these politicians led to the rumour 
that their alliance was based on their wish for a constitutional reform, and their support
10Sfor the monarchy of Prince Juan Carlos. The press showed great enthusiasm for what
Reforma Social” (2 November 1975); “La Reforma Juridica” (7 November 1975); “La Reforma Politica” (12 
November 1975). These articles are reproduced in Manuel Fraga, Un Objetivo Nacional, (Barcelona: Dirosa, 1976,3 
Ed.), Parte septima, pp. 137-95. See also Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 363; Diario deDiarios, 29-30 May 1975, p. 1.
105 Silva Muiioz, Memorias Politicos, pp.302-07.
106 Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 33.
107 ABC, 21 January 1975; Osorio, Trayectoria , pp. 34-5; Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 346.
108 Cambio-16, 27 January- 2 February 1975, p. 16.
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seemed to be a progressive political association with the potential to be a serious 
alternative to Arias’ government.
In the meantime in a conversation with Silva, Fraga had told the Christian 
Democrat that they had three options to choose from. First, to continue being part of the 
monolithic regime; second, to create the associationism of the Movement; and third, to 
create a plurality of associations in order to unite the reformists for ‘when the Marxist 
groups come’. They both rejected the first two options and favoured the third.109 On 22 
January, Fraga met President Arias and some other members of his cabinet - namely the 
three vice-presidents, Garcia Hernandez, Licinio de la Fuente and Cabello de Alba, the 
Minister-Secretary of the Movement (Utrera Molina), and the Minister of the Presidency 
(and close friend of Fraga), Antonio Carro. During this meeting, according to Antonio 
Carro, President Arias offered Fraga the leadership of a new association called Union 
del Pueblo Espanol which the government planned to create, and which would come 
into being in the event of Franco’s death or retirement.110 Yet, when Fraga reiterated his 
intention to be only part of an association created according to the conditions he had 
previously listed in his letter of 31 December to the President, Arias backed down. 
Years later, as Juan de Arespacochaga recalls, Adolfo Suarez told him [Arespacochaga] 
that ‘Fraga is far to the Left of what the Union del Pueblo wants to be’.111 It was clear 
that Franco would never accept Fraga’s conditions. In fact, when Arias showed Fraga’s 
proposal to Franco, the Caudillo allegedly asked ‘which country does he think he is 
writing for?’. Fraga was later told that his proposal was ‘undoubtedly the good and 
desired one’ but not advisable for that moment. To be applied, however, the proposal
109 Silva, Memorias Politicos, pp. 306-7.
110 Gilmour, Manuel Fraga, p. 86. According to Cambio-16 Solis also offered Fraga the presidency of the UDPE.
See Cambio-16, 8-14 September 1975, p. 13. The daily Informaciones wrote that the project of the UDPE, initially 
called Alianza para el Pueblo, had been orchestrated by government high officials, namely Jose Utrera Molina, and 
already existed in embryonic form by 12 January 1975. See Informaciones, 12 July 1975, p. 7.
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would have had to be seriously ‘pruned’, which the Ambassador refused to do.
Incidentally, as explained later, this document was later published unaltered with the
* 112 title Llamamiento para una Reforma Democratica.
During a lunch organised by Club Siglo XXI on 24 January, which attracted more
than three hundred personalities, Areilza expressed his support for Fraga by claiming
that he would follow Fraga anywhere.113 In contrast, Silva’s utter silence irritated
Fraga’s followers. According to Osorio, Marcelino Oreja’s group led by Pio Cabanillas
refused to support Silva because to do so jeopardised the alliance. By the following day,
it was already clear already that the adventure of the ‘Triple Alliance’ had finished
before it had even began.
The truth, however, was that even though Fraga, Silva and Areilza had very
similar political backgrounds and ideas, they were not sufficiently compatible to create a
joint association. The core problem was their personal ambition (personalismo),
although there seemed to be other drawbacks too. Silva, never very enthusiastic about
collaborating with Fraga, told his two co-leaders that he was not sure whether they were
all heading in the same direction. Silva wanted to update the offer of leadership that
Fraga, Pio Cabanillas, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Osorio and Pedro Areitio made to him
back in 1970 after his resignation as Minister of Public Works. But, in those days,
according to Manuel Fraga, Silva was already in a very conservative position and
refused their offer.114
Silva had not realized that in 1974 the situation had changed, and Fraga had
more supporters than him. This new alliance had to be on a basis of equality. So Silva
1,1 De Arespacochaga, Cartas a unos capitanes, p. 211.
112 Fraga, Memoria breve, pp. 346-47.
113 Ironically, a few weeks earlier Areilza had told Silva that he had spoken to Fraga about politics only once, it was
on the phone and Fraga had even expressed his displeasure to Areilza for an article the latter had written in ABC. 
Silva Munoz, Memorias Politicos, p. 303.
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backed down. Areilza, who proved to be the wisest, foresaw that the natural force of 
things would reunite them again in the near future although admitted not to comprehend 
why an alliance between the three could not succeed at that moment.115 Finally Fraga 
excused himself by saying that his GODS A collaborators, namely Rafael Perez Escolar, 
Carlos Argos and Antonio Cortina, were inclined to lead a Center-Left political 
formation. The Ambassador’s stepping back was mainly the result of both the 
Caudillo’s refusal to accept his conditions, and fear of the project becoming a new 
version of Miguel Primo de Rivera’s disastrous Union Patriotica. Fraga believed that 
the type of political association the government wanted to organise would not last more 
than a month after the Caudillo’s death.116 Allegedly, Don Juan Carlos told Lopez Rod6 
that ‘on its knees, the government had begged Fraga to promote an association, and 
Carro had considered it a success that Fraga had limited himself to saying that he would 
postpone his decision until October’.117 But, the Caudillo would never have approved 
Fraga’s conditions on the grounds of their excessive liberalism. Furthermore, it is not 
known whether Franco agreed with the choice of candidates for the associations 
because, even though he appreciated Silva’s diligence and Fraga’s intellectual and 
administrative capacities as well as his will, the Caudillo did not have the same opinion 
of Areilza. Franco said that ‘in other times, not so long ago, that man (Areilza) was one
1 1 Q
of the cruellest opponents of democracy’.
It is interesting to note that Prince Juan Carlos’ initial idea to unite the moderate 
forces of the regime was cunningly appropriated by President Arias. Yet, Arias’ version
114 Testimony of Manuel Fraga, 28 April 2001.
115 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999; Osorio, Trayectoria , p. 36.
116 Osorio, Trayectoria , p. 36; Powell, “Crisis del franquismo”, pp. 260-26l;L6pez Rod6, Memorias IV, p. 101.
117 L6pez Rodo, Memorias IV, p. 106.
1,8 Jose Utrera Molina, Sin cambiarde bandera, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1990), p. 246.
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was doomed to failure. The Prince wished for an association independent of the 
Movement, whereas Arias wished to form an association strictly within it. Some 
believed that Fraga’s attitude represented a positive service to Spain. His withdrawal 
from the associations’ project exposed the real plans of the government. While the 
Spaniards were demanding pluralistic democratic participation at all levels, it was clear 
that Arias’ government was not willing to apply the necessary reforms to transform the 
dictatorship into a democracy. On the contrary, Arias was willing to do anything 
available to secure the continuation of the regime.119 The notion that Fraga was the 
‘saviour’, capable of resolving the political crisis, however, was not shared by all 
members of the government. On 11 February 1975, Jose Utrera Molina called fourteen 
people to Arias’s office, including Arias himself, Emilio Romero, Jesus Fueyo and Jose 
Solis, with a view to forming an alternative association to that of Fraga, under the name 
of Alianza para el Pueblo. This plan did not prosper either.120
Thus, despite the failure of the ‘Triple Alliance’, and lack of interest by the 
population, the associationist fever did not fade away. Antonio Gavilanes attempted to 
organize an association, with the name of Democratic Change or Cambio Democratico. 
Allied with Gavilanes were lawyers and economists including Evaristo de Leon, Paulino 
Basco Plaza, Alvaro Domecq, Concepcion Garcia, Luis Guzman, Jose Lopez Nieto and 
Manuel Perez y Perez. Gavilanes’ group presented the minister of the presidency with 
the group’s programme, which was made public during a press lecture. Cambio 
Democratico claimed to be a Centre-Left group close to the Social Democrats, who 
among other things demanded the reform of the Fundamental Laws; the introduction of 
universal suffrage from the age of eighteen; juridical and not political control over the
119 Cambio-16, 28 April - 4 May 1975, p. 31; Cambio-16, 31 March-6 April 1975, p. 25.
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associations; and free, independent and representative syndicates. Despite his initial 
enthusiasm, the refusal of the National Council to authorize the association did not 
surprise Antonio Gavilanes. To start with, the name itself reflected the aims of the group
clearly enough. Years later, Gavilanes became a member of the Spanish Socialist
, r 121 party.
By the spring of 1975 a total of ten political associations were constituted under 
Arias’ statute. These were Reforma Social Espanola, ANEPA, Falange Espanola de las 
JONS, Nueva Izquierda Nacional, Alianza del Trabajo, Partido Social Regionalista, 
Partido Agrario Espanol, Partido Laborista, Union del Pueblo Espanol and Partido
1 99Proverista. Although these associations claimed to advocate a democratic system, 
their mere acceptance of Arias’ statute, and their willingness to be registered, brings into 
question the type of democracy that they envisaged. Of all these political associations, 
the most significant was the Union del Pueblo Espanol (UDPE). The creation of the 
UDPE was orchestrated by the Spanish government to safeguard the credibility of Arias’ 
statute and also the interests of the Francoist class by guaranteeing the continuity of the 
regime. On those grounds, it attracted the participation of the Francoist elite, and hence 
it was described as the ‘party of continuity’.123
The leadership of the party was entrusted to Fernando Herrero Tejedor, who had 
just been appointed Minister-Secretary of the Movement in March 1975. Herrero had 
taken over the leadership of the UDPE from its initial promoter Jose Utrera Molina, and 
registered the association in the spring of 1975. Herrero had been officially
120 Lopez Rod6, Memorias IV, p. 105; Gentleman, No. 28, 1-15 March 1975, pp. 9-11.
121 Testimony of Antonio Gavilanes, 12 April 2000; Guadiana, No. 7, 2-8 June 1975, p. 15; Triunfo, No. 19 June 
1976, p. 43.
122 Martin Merchan, Partidos Politicos, p. 100; Programmatic details of several of these associations can be found in 
Triunfo, No. 699, 19 July 1976,pp. 39-41; L6pez Rod6, Memorias IV, p. 108. Allegedly, Juan Antonio Samaranch, 
President of the Diputacion de Barcelona, wanted to create a political-sportive association within the Movement in 
order to channel political interest in the sport world. See Cambio-16, 6-12 January 1975, p. 18.
123 Cambio-16, 4-10 August 1975, p. 10.
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commissioned to establish contacts with Dionisio Ridruejo’s Social Democrats, Antonio 
Garcia Lopez’s Social Democrat party and Llopis’ Historic Socialist party in order to 
create a strong Social-Democratic collective which could compete with the remainder of 
the Socialist and Communists groups.124 But, the attempt failed. UDPE advocated ‘a 
democracy fully enhancing human values of coexistence, freedom and equality of social 
and economic opportunities without the loss of what we have managed to achieve so 
far’ (a democracy without the PCE). But, despite the reformist statement, Jose Maria 
Lopez de Letona, expressed his concern about the low number of ‘authentic first rank 
politicians, known entrepreneurs, prestigious professionals, intellectuals and political 
youths’ in the association, and even worse, the absence of ‘what has been called 
“aperturismo”. ’125
In fact, although Herrero was regarded as an aperturista and was said to be a true 
advocate of modernizing the regime, his vision was somewhat limited. Herrero 
favoured the creation of three major associations but primarily on the Centre-Right of 
the political spectrum. Herrero did not want to have a Leftist opposition. In fact, he 
wanted the opposition to be on the Right and to be formed by Fraga, Areilza and Silva 
(the failed ‘Triple Alliance’).126 His ideas, however, did not bear fruit. On 23 June 
1975, the Minister of the Movement died in a car accident. The Caudillo, who learnt the 
news while attending a bullfight, was visibly moved, although paradoxically, as Preston 
explains, Franco saw the accident as providential as it proved to him that political
1 77associations did not have ‘divine approval’.
124 Michael Buse, La Nueva Democracia Espanola. Sistema de partidos y orientacidn de voto (1976-1983), (Madrid: 
Uni6n Editorial, 1984), p. 39.
125 Letter from Jos6 Maria L6pez de Letona to Francisco Herrero Tejedor recorded in Lopez Rodo, Memorias IV, pp. 
493-95.
126 Jorge Reverie, “Desintegracion de un regimen”, in Santos Julia et al, Memoria de la Transicion, p. 46.
127 Preston, Franco, p. 774. Full details of the minister’s accident can be found in Cambio-16, 23-29 June 1975, pp. 
14-5.
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The leadership of the party was briefly occupied by the man who also succeeded 
Herrero at the head of the Movement, the Falangist Jose Solis. Herrero’s protege 
Adolfo Suarez, who had been Vice-Secretary General of the Movement with Herrero, 
resigned the post because of his differences with Solis. Yet, Suarez continued his work 
with the UDPE eventually becoming its president on 12 June 1975. Suarez’s 
appointment was followed by further changes. For instance, the Movement’s National 
Council approved the UDPE’s new board of directors, which was publicly announced 
on 28 July 1975. The new vice-presidents of the party were Alberto Ballarin Marcial, 
Javier Carvajal Ferrer, Francisco Labadie Otermin, Carlos Pinilla and Noel Zapico 
Rodriguez.128 During that summer the UDPE had already collected the 25,000 
signatures needed for it to be officially registered as a political association, and had
1 OQbranches m more than fifteen provinces. Allegedly there had been plans for the 
immediate incorporation of Franco’s entourage into the UPDE. Thus, the fact that the 
UPDE aspired to become the political association of Francoism, in other words another 
‘Movement’, discouraged the participation of progressive politicians.130 One may think 
that such a Francoist association could have harmed Suarez’s future career, but quite on 
the contrary, this post gave Suarez the opportunity to become familiar with the people 
and internal structure of the Movement. Therefore, the post at the UDPE together with 
Suarez’s good relations with Prince Juan Carlos, and his political contacts with people 
like Torcuato Femandez-Miranda, proved essential for his later appointment as 
Minister-Secretary of the Movement in Arias’ second cabinet. In turn, this appointment 
represented the beginning of Suarez’s meteoric political career.131
128 Triunfo, No. 671, 9 August 1975, p. 49.
129 Cambio-16, 4-10 August 1975, p. 10.
130 Guadiana, No. 9, 16-22 June 1975, p. 10; Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 72.
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Back to the approval of the statute; Arias’ statute was not the only way of 
creating a political collective. In the summer of 1975, Luis Apostua wrote in YA that the 
constitution of a political group could be done in four different ways. The first way was 
by creating clandestine political parties, as the Communists, Socialists, Nationalist 
Basque and Catalan parties and various Christian Democrat parties had done, regardless 
of their illegality; the second way was by creating political associations under the 
already mentioned new Statute of 1974; the third method was that applied by Jose Maria 
Gil-Robles, which involved the registration of an association under the Law of 
Associations of 1964 (even though a few months after the presentation of the required 
paperwork for the Federation Popular Democratica, the Interior Ministry had still not 
answered Gil-Robles’ petition); and the fourth way was the application of the Law of 
1951 for the creation of commercial companies.132 However, none of these alternatives 
could provide the expected freedom of political association. The main debate, therefore, 
was between choosing Arias’ statute or waiting for real freedom of association. This 
debate appears to have been a determining factor in the split of Tacito in 1975.
6.4. Split in the Tacito group. The emergence o f FEDISA
According to Alvarez de Miranda, ‘the Tacitos abandoned the [political] game 
after Pio Cabanillas’ dismissal in October 1974, and the approval of the Statute of 
Political Associations by the Movement’s National Council on the following 16 
December.’133 Disagreement over Arias’ statute was one of the main reasons for the 
splitting of the Tacito group into several groups. The first to break away was the
131 Buse, La Nueva Democracia, p. 39
132 Quoted in Diario de Diarios, 13-14 July 1975, pp. 1-2. According to Luis Apostua, the idea of forming a 
commercial company for political purposes was not original since Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez had already chosen the 
same method seven years before. See Ibid, p. 1.; The Times, 18 June 1975, p. 1.
133 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio ", p. 72.
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centrist group led by Marcelino Oreja. Oreja’s group opposed Arias’ statute and
insisted that their action was in response to the need ‘to contribute to the preparation of
a democratic pluralistic alternative, which crystallises the consensus of ample sectors
who desire evolution without trauma.’134 The second was the more conservative
Alfonso Osorio and his adherents. Osorio, one of Tacito'% main leaders and founders,
had declared himself in favour of creating an association under Arias’ statute. Osorio’s
decision stood in clear contradiction to the position of the rest of the Tacitos, and led to
his leaving the group. Finally, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda and Inigo Cavero -  more
identified with the Left -  withdrew from Tacito to form the Izquierda Democratica with
Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez.
Aware of Osorio’s position, Federico Silva asked him to form an association
with him. In March 1975, they set up the Union Democratica Espanola (UDE), which
would be based upon their common Christian Democratic ideals.135 The Osorio-Silva
tandem attracted the attention of the press, as the association gathered a number of
respectable politicians including Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Enrique de la Mata, Jose
1Almagro, Andres Reguera, Jose Jimenez Mellado and Alberto Monreal Luque. The 
UDE claimed to be ‘open to all Spaniards who wanted to participate - under the basic 
principles of coexistence - in the process of the renovation of Spain’. The association 
was also committed to a non-traumatic transition to democracy, and therefore to the 
application of as many reforms as necessary to achieve that goal. For that purpose, 
UDE’s programme defended the idea of a democratic regime and the free formation of
X7>A Cambio-16, 24 February-2 March 1975, p. 13.
135 More than the specific decision of backing Arias’ statute, Osorio believed that the incorporation into Tacito of 
many people with no links with the A.C.N. de P. broke the initial homogeneity of the group. Testimony of Alfonso 
Osorio, 21 September 1999; Silva, Memorias politicos, pp. 337-340; Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 
1999.
136 Allegedly, prior to the formation of the UDE, Federico Silva and Alberto Monreal Luque planned the creation of 
an association called Accion Social Popular with the support o f the Hermandades del Trabajo. Yet, the members of
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associations (for workers and patrons) as well as an evolutionist interpretation of the
Francoist Fundamental Laws, in other words, a constitutional reform. However, some
of their proposals, especially for constitutional reform, had already been repudiated by
1the Caudillo and had even precipitated Fraga’s withdrawal from the ‘Triple Alliance’.
This may explain why the UDE was not legalised until Osorio was Vice- 
President of Suarez’s government in 1976. In the summer of 1975, representatives of 
the association explained to the press that their decision to postpone the official 
registration of the UDE was due to their wish to know more about the norms of the 
Statute of Political Associations regarding the electoral process.138 But, as Osorio 
acknowledges today, the truth was that they had never intended to legalize the UDE but 
merely to organise themselves for better times. Thus, for a long time they deliberately 
remained in a very ambiguous position. One day they would show willingness to 
present the paperwork to the Interior Ministry, while the next day they would apparently 
change their minds. They disliked the Law because it was ‘absolutely limited and 
within the Movement’s organisation, and therefore, political parties did not have
1 'XQslightest chance of emerging from it.’ This assertion seems to contradict his own 
previous statements to the press, where he wholeheartedly defended the participation 
within the statute although acknowledging its limitations. In fact, Osorio agreed with 
his fellow Tacitos about the inappropriateness of the statute, which was the main reason 
for the splitting of the group.
the brotherhoods did not back up the idea, and the plan did not succeed. See Gentleman, No. 26,1-15 February 1975, 
p. 15.
137 Cambio-16, 9-15 June 1975, pp. 38-39; Cambio-16, 31 March-6 April 1975, p. 12.
138 Informaciones, 15 July 1975, p. 8.
139 Testimony of Alfonso Osorio, 21 September 1999.
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In February 1975, during a visit to Madrid, Fraga had met various Tacitos 
(Marcelino Oreja, Gabriel Canadas, Juan Antonio Ortega Diaz-Ambrona and Juan 
Carlos Guerra); various members of his own GODS A group (Rafael Perez Escolar and 
Jose Luis Alvarez); Areilza, Pio Cabanillas, Antonio de Senillosa, Francisco Fernandez 
Ordonez as well as other representatives of the moderate Right. During the meeting, 
they discussed the country’s political situation, and the possibility of forming an 
association with a democratic programme (it is doubtful that they included the 
legalization of the Communist Party on the agenda) outside the Statute of 1974.140 At 
this time, Tacito members believed that the possibilities for action from inside the 
regime were exhausted, and for that reason they knew their group to be illegal.141 On 
these grounds, whereas the attempt of the ‘Triple Alliance’ led to the creation of the 
officially backed UPDE, the failure of such an alliance led the aforementioned 
personalities to form the Federacion de Estudios Independientes (FEDISA).142
FEDISA was created as a commercial society by a total of seventy-five people, 
(see footnote) linked by different degrees with the so-called ‘civilised Right’ in mid-July 
1975.143 The creation of FEDISA demonstrated the failure of Arias’ statute, and the 
differences between the ‘official’ and the ‘real Spain’.144 In fact, what FEDISA really 
demonstrated was that the ‘official Spain’ was not united. Areilza recalls that during 
their firsts meetings, they realized an enormous, and unorganized political void existed. 
Hence there was an urgent need to adjust the language, programmatic principles, style 
and organisational norms of the Spanish political system to the current European
140 Cambio-16, 24 February-2 March 1975, p. 13.
141 Guadiana, No. 12, 7-13 July 1975, p. 18.
142 Statutes o f the Federacion de Estudios Independientes, S.A., (FEDISA). Registro Mercantil, Madrid.
143 The list o f members included also Luis Gonzalez Seara, Marcelino Oreja, Ricardo de la Cierva, Pio Cabanillas, 
Fuentes Quintana, Juan Carlos Guerra Zunzunegui, Landelino Lavilla, Otero Novas, Manuel Fraga, among others. 
For a complete list of the seventy five scholars who formed FEDISA see, Cambio-16, 21-27 July 1975, p. 17.
144 Powell, “The ‘Tdcito’ group”, p. 261 Jnformaciones, 11 July 1975, p. 7; 12 July 1975, p. 6.
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political sectors of similar tendencies, in other words the ‘civilised Right’.145 According 
to Fraga, the reformist sector of the regime was so disorganized that FEDISA 
symbolized ‘the ambiguities and lack of solidarity of the democratic Right.’146
In a public communique, FEDISA’s representatives explained that, ‘although the 
promoters have different political ideologies, they agree that the guarantee of public 
freedom, and the organization of formal democracy, are necessary minimum conditions 
for peaceful national coexistence.’ FEDISA was created with the purpose of building a 
space where people could study, reflect upon and discuss political and economic 
problems affecting Spain.147 FEDISA and GODS A had comparable objectives, which 
posed the question of whether there was a need for two groups of similar characteristics. 
But, Carlos Argos argues that there were people who did not want to join Fraga’s 
GODS A because of their personal ambitions. Thus, even if Fraga was part of FEDISA, 
he was not the leader but merely a member of the collective.148 In fact, the organization 
of FEDISA was very democratic. The capital of the company was divided into one 
thousand shares of four thousand pesetas each, and its presidency changed every six 
months in strict alphabetic order among those who were part of the council of advisors. 
Thus, ‘all those who are on the council accept both to be presided over by, and to 
preside [over] the rest, respecting the meaning of team work and team discipline.’149
Jose Solis, the new Minister-Secretary of the Movement, reproved FEDISA for 
using the mechanism of public limited companies for political ends, and accused its 
members of constituting ‘a fraud for the country.’150 But, FEDISA was not the only 
political commercial society constituted in Spain. In fact, Rafael Arias Salgado, son of
145 Areilza, Cronica de libertad, p. 170.
146 Manuel Fraga, En busca del tiempo servido, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1987), p. 18.
147 Triunfo, N o .668,19 July 1975, p. 65
148 Testimony o f Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000.
149 Informaciones, 11 July 1975, p. 7.
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Franco’s 1950s Minister of Information, asserts that there were at least three companies 
of the same sort. He argues that the reaction of the regime was probably the result of the 
tense political situation.151 This time the fear lay, perhaps, in the composition of the 
company. FEDISA represented perhaps the most significant negative response the 
regime had received from people of nearly all the groups that had collaborated with it,
1 S')including ex-ministers, and also men of high professional calibre.
Under the circumstances, a meeting between Jose Solis and Fraga was scheduled 
for autumn 1975. The government seemed eager to start afresh and try to make 
FEDISA a Centre-Right association similar to the failed ‘Triple Alliance’. Prior to the 
meeting, Jose Solis had declared that Fraga seemed willing to participate, but after 
seven hours of debate, they were back to square one. Fraga reiterated his opposition and 
that of FEDISA as a collective, to participating in a ‘political associationism within the 
framework of the current statute’.153 As Areilza explains, FEDISA could only work as a 
nucleus for the formation of a modem and European-style Right-wing party in Spain 
given that the group wanted an unambiguous pact, which could lead to a democratic and 
pluralistic nation.154
FEDISA did not succeed, but it set an important precedent, and represented a 
blow to Arias’ limited reforms. The variety of political tendencies in FEDISA made 
accord among its members difficult. But, there were other factors that prevented 
FEDISA from succeeding. According to Arias Salgado, the lack of representatives of 
the democratic opposition failed to attract the bulk of progressive political society to the
150 Cambio-16, 21-27 July 1975, p. 17;Cambio-16, 18-24 August 1975, p. 8.
151 Guadiana, No. 15, 23-29 July 1975, p. 14.
152 Ibid., No. 31, 3-9 December 1975, p. 24; Informaciones, 11 July 1975, p. 7..
153 Cambio-16, 18-24 August 1975, p. 8; Cambio-16, 8-14 September 1975, pp. 12-13; Solis’ comment was quoted 
in Guadiana, No. 18, 3-9 Septiembre 1975, pp. 10-12.
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company.155 FEDISA also lacked organizational force, which would have made the 
company into a serious political group. But, the uncertainty surrounding the ultimate 
fate of the regime (and of the country itself) meant the company had been formed too 
speedily, which may have contributed to its ill-organization. Areilza explains, ‘there 
was neither time nor [social] peace to prepare a [political] party; to create a climate of 
opinion that could mobilise the middle-classes towards an electoral channel capable of 
attracting the majority of the voters.’ FEDISA was eventually dissolved at the 
beginning of the Monarchy since some of its members were to be potentially part of the 
new government, namely Areilza, Fraga and Oreja. The group failed, according to 
Areilza, ‘for being excessively advanced [for its time]’. Incidentally, FEDISA’s ideas 
and agenda reappeared one year later, more precisely in October 1976, in the Partido 
Popular, which was to be an essential part of the Presidential Union de Centro 
Democratico}56
Meanwhile, the political and social situation in Spain was clearly deteriorating. 
Among the main problems Arias had to deal with were the crisis in the Spanish enclaves 
of the Sahara region and terrorism. On 26 August 1975 Franco had signed a new anti­
terrorist decree which even covered anti-regime tactics from the democratic opposition. 
The decree was applied straight away, and several death sentences were passed in early 
September. Yet, worse was still to come. On 26 September 1975 the Caudillo 
confirmed five deaths sentences on ETA terrorists during a ministerial cabinet. The 
execution of the five provoked a wave of national and international protests against the 
Spanish dictatorship. Franco had utterly ignored the many petitions for clemency from
154 Areilza, Cronica de libertad, p. 170.
155 Guadiana, No. 31, 3-9 December, p. 24; Diario de Diarios, 13-14 July 1975, p. 3.
156 Areilza, Cronica de libertad, p. 170; L6pez Nieto, Alianza Popular, p. 18.
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all over the world, among which was a personal petition from Pope Paul VI. The 
international community adopted a number of extreme measures to warn the Spanish 
authorities of their refusal to support a government advocating these policies. On 1
• * • 157October, the European Commission resolved to suspend negotiations with Spain. 
Yet, the Francoist regime had paid no attention to the pleas and carried out the 
executions. It was fortunate that Don Juan Carlos was not substituting Franco 
temporarily as Head of State at that time, as the executions would have irreversibly
1 Sftdamaged the democratic credibility of the Prince.
The turmoil over the capital punishments did not stop there. In October, as The 
Times recorded, ‘Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez, in his capacity as President of the National 
Commission of Peace and Justice, which had links with the Church, and fourteen other 
members of the organization wrote individual appeals to the standing committee of the 
Cortes urging it to examine the (anti-terrorist) decree of August 26 for alleged illegal 
provisions.’ The pressure was such that the Madrid Bar Association had approved a 
commission to study the case, and determine the possibility for annulling the decree on 
constitutional grounds.159 The Spanish population was witnessing the imminent end of 
the dictatorship.
6.5. The transition
As the autumn approached, the level of uncertainty about post-Francoist Spain 
was feverish. Franco’s health was seriously worsening, and some politicians were 
trying to secure a place in the impending new cabinet. Manuel Fraga returned from 
London on 18 November 1975, just forty hours before the dictator’s death. A gathering
157 Triunfo, No. 676,10 January 1976, p.71.
158 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000.
159 The Times, 13 October 1975, pp. 1, 6.
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of hundreds of followers, organized by Carlos Argos and Antonio Cortina, welcomed 
the ambassador at Barajas airport. Later, accompanied by a small group of collaborators 
including Argos, Cortina and Juan de Arespacochaga among others, Fraga went to La 
Paz Hospital were Franco had spent the past few weeks. The ambassador left hospital 
barely ten minutes later. He believed that Franco would not last much longer and 
therefore there was no time to waste. He called his collaborators for a meeting next 
morning at nine o’clock. They had to prepare themselves for the transition.160
Despite his adherents’ doing everything humanly possible to keep him alive, and 
with him the regime, Franco finally died in the early hours of 20 November 1975. The 
Caudillo died perhaps with the conviction that, as far the law was concerned, ‘all is 
lashed down, and well lashed down’ (todo ha quedado atado y  bien atado), and that, 
therefore, his wish that a Francoist monarchy be installed would only be one step away. 
But, his successor chose not to carry out the task entrusted to him.161 Two days later, on 
22 November the Prince was crowned as King Juan Carlos I of Spain, thereby becoming 
Head of State and restoring the monarchy to Spain after forty-four years.
During his sermon at the coronation ceremony, Cardinal Tarancon urged the new 
monarch, among other things, to make sure that truth, life, justice, love and peace 
prevailed in Spain. But, most important for our study, Tarancon warned the monarch 
that the Church would demand respect for human rights, and the implementation of a 
system of public participation in political affairs.162 Before the procuradores at the 
Cortes, the King reiterated his ‘promise to observe and enforce the Fundamental Laws 
of the Kingdom and to keep loyal to the Principles of the Movement’. After praising the 
‘exceptional figure’ of Franco, the King referred to need to make ‘deep reforms’ in
160 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14 September 1999; De Arespacochaga, Carta a unos capitanes, p. 211.
161 Santos JuliA et al, Memorias de la Transicion, p. 82. Translation of Franco’s expression taken from Preston, 
Franco, p. 748.
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order to achieve a ‘free and modem society’. Among other things, the King mentioned 
the Church and the armed forces, but surprisingly he did not talk about the 
Movement.163
In a private interview with the journalist Amaud de Borchgrave, Don Juan 
Carlos had already asserted that he wished his monarchy ‘to be the symbol of national 
unity and reconciliation’. According to the journalist, ‘He is determined to be King of 
all the people. [.. .and] the restoration of real democracy is his professed goal’.164 These 
thoughts were the beginning of a new era. The royal swearing-in ceremony that took 
place on 27 November just confirmed this feeling. The ceremony was attended by 
representatives from many of Royal Houses as well as many Heads of State. It was a 
significant welcome for a monarch whose country had not been as welcoming to world 
leaders since the end of the Civil War.165
The King became Head of State, but not Head of the Government as from 1973 
the role of Head of Government and the Head of State had become independent from 
each other. Likewise, the King did not become Head of the Movement as it also became 
part of the presidency in 1973. This meant that the King, like Franco during the last 
years, had to have the approval of the government, the National Council or of the Cortes 
fully to implement his decisions, although in Franco’s time that ‘limitation’ had been 
merely symbolic. Notwithstanding, the King still had significant freedom of 
governance.166 For the first time, as the King himself recalls, ‘for a whole year I was the
162 Guadiana, No. 31, 3-9 December 1975, pp. 14-15.
163 Charles Powell, Espaha en democracia, 1975-2000, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 2001), p. 145.
164 Newsweek, 3 November 1975, p. 8.
165 Details on the coronation ceremony are recorded in Cambio-16, 1-7 December 1975, pp. 5-15; Cambio-16, 8-14 
December 1975, pp. 20-23.
166 Prego, A si se hizo la transicion, pp. 365-67.
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sole master of my words and actions. I used those powers first and foremost to assure 
the Spanish people that in future it was for them to express their will.’167
Now that the Caudillo had passed away the Spanish people expected the King to 
form a new executive capable of transforming Spain into a modem and progressive 
country. For that purpose the monarch had to get rid of the old Francoists, and appoint 
young figures with a wish to establish a truly democratic system. That task, however, 
proved to be arduous. The monarch’s first duty was to choose a President of the Cortes 
and likewise a President of the Government. But, the election of the right people 
seemed to be a juggling act since any mistake could jeopardise the success of the entire 
process. Understandably, the international press showed concern and interest in the 
delicate situation Spain was in. The main international newspapers dedicated their 
attention mainly to the potential candidates for the post of President of the Government, 
the so-called presidenciables. According to the British The Times ‘the “evolutionists” 
seem to look increasingly to the present ambassador Senor Manuel Fraga as their leader. 
[...] If Senor Fraga is to play the “Karamanlis” role for which his supporters cast him,
1 fiRhe will have to be the first Minister chosen by Juan Carlos on his accession.’ The 
Germans believed that Don Juan Carlos would have to choose between Arias, Fraga, 
Areilza and Diez Alegria for President of the Government. But, Walter Haubrich, 
journalist of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zgeitun, dedicated five columns to Areilza 
who, according to the journalist, displayed a mixture of conservative and liberal 
attitudes.169 In America, the magazine Newsweek also considered Areilza, ‘a reasonable 
liberal ex-diplomat’, to be ‘the leading candidate to succeed Arias’.170
167 De Vilallonga, The King, p. 177.
168 The Times, 6 October 1975, p. 13; Triunfo, No. 677, 17 January 1976, p. 8; Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14 
September 1999.
169 Cambio-16, 1-7 December, 1975, p. 35.
170 Newsweek, 10 November 1975, p. 9.
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In Spain observers seemed to have similar opinions, but it was the Fraga-Areilza 
tandem, both members of FEDISA, who were regarded as the most likely for the post. 
Either Fraga as President, and Areilza as Vice-President, or vice versa, could work 
because of their good working relationship and similar political views. Also, they both 
had the international support that Spain needed at that moment. Areilza had given 
lectures and interviews all over Europe, in which he took the opportunity to express his 
concerns about the fate of Spain, and his wish for a peaceful transition to a democratic 
system. For instance, the Giornale d ‘Italia recorded Areilza’s conviction that the 
authorities were not going to take irresponsible risks.171 Besides the candidatures of 
Fraga and Areilza other names were considered as presidenciables, including Jose Solis, 
Pio Cabanillas, Torcuato Femandez-Miranda, Fernando Maria de Castiella and Garcia 
Valdecasas. Observers, however, did not rule out the possibility of a completely new 
name for the post.172
According to Bemaldez, from 20 November to 4 December, Fraga believed in 
his chances for the presidency, and for that reason prepared himself for it.173 On the 
afternoon of 20 November 1975, Prince Juan Carlos received Fraga, only hours after the 
Caudillo’s death. During their meeting, Fraga did not miss the opportunity to hand the 
Prince a ‘note’ in which the ex-Ambassador defended ‘ the principle of reform and the 
need not to lose one minute in undertaking [them]’. But, according to Fraga, this would 
only be possible with ‘a government which, because of its composition and undoubted 
leadership, will leave no doubts [...], and will not give excessive opportunities to either 
inmovilistas or aperturistas.’ Yet, the Prince must have made it clear to Fraga that he
171 Cambio-16, 24-30 November 1975, p. 24.
172 Cambio-16, 1-7 December 1975, p. 40.
173 Bemandez, El Patron de la Derecha, p. 154.
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did not want to rush, but rather to gain time.174 Bemaldez believes that, ‘the note was 
like a guide for the transition of the dictatorship to a sort of democracy. [The note was], 
more in line with what Fraga himself tried with Arias Navarro in the first government of 
the monarchy than what was subsequently successfully achieved by the Suarez- 
Femandez Miranda tandem, and then Suarez alone.’175 Fraga had already published a 
series of articles in ABC in which he made proposals for the necessary reforms that 
Spain needed in those days. These proposals formed the core of Fraga’s book iUn
17 ( \Objetivo National’ .
Fraga, however, was not the only one interested in the outcome of the crisis. 
There was such a climate of expectancy and confusion in the top political circles that 
even Don Juan Carlos had made miscalculations. On 30 April 1975, in a conversation 
with Lopez Rodo, the Prince had told him that, ‘Arias is not a man for my first 
government, or Fraga, or Silva, because he [the latter] is “denominational”. In 
monarchies there are no denominational parties.’ The Prince avoided revealing his 
plans to Lopez Rod6, but the latter learnt through Fernandez de la Mora that the Prince
1 77had also ruled out Lopez Rodo’s name from his list of possible cabinet members.
Don Juan Carlos eventually renewed Arias’s appointment as President of the 
Government, which was announced to the existing cabinet on 5 December 1975. The 
Spanish population, who could not help wondering why Arias was staying on as 
President, did not understand his decision.178 The monarch, who was planning to carry 
out the political modernization, could not afford to alienate the hard-liners of the regime 
hence changes had to be introduced at a slow pace. The survival of the monarchy would
174 Fraga, En busca, p. 15.
175 Bem&ldez, El Patron de la derecha, pp. 153-4.
176 See footnote 102 of this Chapter.
177 Lopez Rodo, Memorias IV, p. 118.
178 Prego, Asise hizo la transicion, p. 368; Cambio-16, 15-21 December 1975, pp.4-8.
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depend on the success of the transformation of the Spanish political system, but this 
would require some time.179 In fact, as Pilar and Alfonso Femandez-Miranda write, 
‘Arias had been re-appointed but this was no more than a delay, a short wait until the 
right moment for his replacement would arrive’.180
Conclusion
The assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco in December 1973 marked the 
beginning of the long end of Franco’s regime. At that time, in fact, two major political 
groups had emerged into the Spanish political scene directly from the reformist sector of 
the regime; i.e. Manuel Fraga’s study group, GODSA, and the young aperturistas group, 
Tacito. GODSA was created in 1973 with the sole purpose of building the foundations 
for a political association and perhaps eventually for a political party. In fact, this study 
group would eventually elaborate the political manifesto of Fraga’s first political party. 
Forward-looking young people linked, directly or indirectly, to the ACNP and its 
Christian Democrat philosophy also created Tacito in 1973. Their aims were very 
similar. Both groups wanted to arrive at a democratic system by reform and without 
breaking with Franco’s regime.
By the time these two groups were well consolidated, the Francoist Cortes 
approved Arias’ Statute of Political Associations by decree on 21 December 1974. Out 
of Prince Juan Carlos’ initial idea uniting the moderate forces of the regime, the 
government attempted the creation of a political association under the leadership of 
Manuel Fraga, Jose Maria de Areilza and Federico Silva. In Fraga’s view, an 
association could only succeed if its programme contained a series of unquestionable
179 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 78.
180 Pilar & Adolfo Femandez-Miranda, Lo que el Rey me ha pedido, p. 144.
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conditions. The conditions included a parliament with a principal chamber elected by 
universal suffrage, the incorporation of the basic civic rights of the western world, 
freedom of association and trade unions and a friendly separation of Church and State, 
all under the Monarchy of Don Juan Carlos. By early 1975, it was clear that the 
government would not accept these conditions. The adventure of the ‘Triple Alliance’ 
finished before it had even started.
Following the failure of the Arias plan, some seventy-five people linked in 
different degrees with the regime, including members of GODSA and Tacito, created a 
commercial company, FEDISA, in July 1975. Its creation demonstrated the failure of 
Arias’ statute, and the differences between the so-called ‘official’ and the ‘real Spain’. 
FEDISA was perhaps the most important negative response the regime received from 
personalities who came from nearly all groups that had collaborated with it. Therefore, 
it is worth emphasizing that despite their advocacy of a German or Western-type of 
democracy, which excluded the presence of the Communist Party, FEDISA’s demands 
for reform stood in clear contradiction with the regime’s politics. The regime’s strict 
adherents, however, remained reluctant to give concessions.
In the midst of a social crisis, and with an important part of the regime in favour 
of a peaceful transition to a German-type of democratic system, the Caudillo died on 20 
November 1975. Prince Juan Carlos took over as Head of State and was crowned King 
two days later. There was general acclaim for the changes from not only the Spanish 
population and the democratic opposition, but also from the regime reformists. To 
everyone’s surprise and disappointment, however, King Juan Carlos re-appointed Arias 
as President of the Government. The profound political changes the monarch was 
planning to introduce had to be done at a slow pace. The monarch could not alienate the 
hard-liners of the regime; therefore, Arias would have to stay on although not for long.
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Chapter - 7
From dictatorship to democracy (1976-1977)
The Spanish economy had been undergoing a serious crisis since the early 1970s. The 
consecutive Development Plans (1964-7, 1968-71, and 1972-5) encouraged industrial 
production, but neglected agriculture, consigning it to a secondary position.1 Investment 
was channelled into industry, thereby increasing the importation of raw materials, 
especially oil. But despite the oil crisis of 1973, which hit the world economy, the 
Spanish authorities continued to import energy as if  nothing had happened. In 1974 
Spain trebled imports of oil and other sources of energy from 79.9 billion pesetas to 
225.8 billions, but the government did not transfer these extra costs to the consumer, for 
whom energy prices hardly increased. Furthermore, a new international trade structure 
favoured newly industrialized countries such as Mexico and Brazil, and the Far East, 
enabling them to produce at lower costs, and therefore sell the final product more 
cheaply. Spain was, thus, left with fierce competition and stockpiles of expensive 
products, huge debt, escalating unemployment and rampant inflation.2
Carlos Arias Navarro’s second presidency, which began in December 1975, was 
welcomed with ‘the greatest agitation of the past thirty years’. Indeed, through most of 
1976 workers of various sectors (such as metal, construction, banking and insurance, 
public services - including Madrid’s underground and buses, and Barcelona’s firemen, 
the post office, the telephone company - and others) from all over the country took to 
the streets in demonstrations demanding greater salaries. In the first three months of
1 From 1963 to 1973, industrial production in Spain, with the exception of the textile industry, surpassed the average 
of the twenty-four developed countries quite comfortably. This spectacular growth slowed down in 1973, year of the 
historic oil crisis. Jover Zamora (Dtor.), Historia de Espafia, Vol. XLI., p. 496. See graphs 13 and 14, pp. 497-8.
2 By 1977 Inflation had risen to 26 per cent. See Harrison, The Spanish economy, pp. 14-9,46-7.
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1976 alone, a total of 17,731 strikes were recorded nationwide. One of the most 
disruptive strikes was that of the underground workers in Madrid, which paralysed the 
capital for four days in January 1976.184 In Spain, the government had banned the right 
to strike, but strikes had nevertheless been taking place since the 1960s. By 1974, with 
the Communist Trade Union, Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and the Socialist Union 
Socialista Obrera (USO) occupying the headquarters of the official syndicate and the 
strike committee, the number of strikes increased substantially. In any case, whereas 
in the 1960s the workers’ protest had been characterised by demands for salary rises, in 
the 1970s the workers’ demands had been clearly politized.186 As Santiago Carrillo 
recalls:
Strikes were the only political weapon we could use as an instrument of pressure. [...] I believe 
that all those strikes contributed to exerting pressure. In the end [the strikes] gave the 
reformists of the government the strength they lacked [...] [the strikes] were their argument to 
the Ultras.187
The general discontent of the population was also reflected in the national press, 
which in many cases - in magazines like Cambio-16, Cuadernos para el Dialogo, 
Triunfo, Sabado Grafico, Guadiana and newspapers like the newly created El Pais, 
Informaciones, YA -  had adopted adopted a critical tone towards the government in the 
early 1970s. Furthermore, regional discontents - mainly in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country - and the escalation of attacks by the terrorist Basque group ETA put even more 
pressure on the government. According to a survey conducted by Cuadernos para el 
Dialogo in December 1975, a great number of Spaniards ‘advocated popular sovereignty 
with the demand for the establishment of democracy “from below”; fundamental public 
freedoms (political parties, syndicates, freedom of expression and assembly); together
183 Cambio-16, 19-25 January 1976, pp. 8-13.
184 Ibid.pp. 8-13; Cambio-16, 26 January-1 February, pp. 26-29; Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 210.
185 Andr6s & Prego, La Transicion. Video No. 2 El Espiritu del 12 de February. (February-March 1974).
186 Ibid.; See also Sebastian Balfour, “El movimiento obrero desde 1939”, in Institut de Ciencies Politiques i Socials, 
No. 24, Barcelona, 1990, p. 8.
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with a demand for amnesty as the decisive key for a pluralistic and tolerant 
coexistence’.188 As the Chilean political scientist Carlos Huneeus points out, the
189population increased their demands for freedom and change as the 1970s advanced. 
Popular pressure was high, but Arias seemed reluctant to cave in. On the contrary, 
workers’ demonstrations, which continued throughout the seven months of Arias’ 
second presidency, were met with authoritarian violence resembling the old days of the 
dictatorship. Professor of philosophy Carlos Paris felt that, ‘at the moment, the 
principal contradiction of [political] authority is determined [on the one hand] by the 
inheritance of the dictatorship, with its power groups and ideological schemes, and on 
the other, [by] the real needs of the country, in total opposition to the perpetuation of 
[the dictatorial] situation.’190 That contradiction was to be present throughout Arias 
Navarro’s second presidency, leading only to further social tension.
Meanwhile the opposition was increasingly becoming a pressure lobby but, 
behind an appearance of unity, it remained acutely divided.191 As will be explained 
later, in March 1976 various groups within the democratic opposition joined forces 
against the government and called for rupture with the Francoist regime. The Socialist 
Luis Yanez-Bamuevo defined ruptura or democratic rupture as ‘the alternative that 
offers least risk of social commotion, chaos or anarchy’.192 But, the regime had always 
equated the concept of rupture with violence, anarchy, trauma and disorder. The success 
of the rupturist option implied the inevitable destruction of all Francoist institutions and 
laws. Hence, the moderates of the regime also believed it was necessary to apply an
187 Andres & Prego, La Transicion. Video No. 8. El Primer Gobierno de la Monarquia. (January-March 1976).
188 Some of those interviewed were Rafael Arias Salgado, Manuel Diez-Alegria Frax, Joaquin Garrigues Walker, Jose 
Maria Gil-Robles, Raul Morodo, Juan A. Ortega y Diaz-Ambrona, Joaquin Satrustegui and Enrique Tiemo Galvdn. 
See Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 147, December 1975.
189 Huneeus, La UCD, p. 49.
190 “Mesa redonda: Ruptura o Reforma”, in Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 148, January 1976, p. 17.
191 Powell, Elpiloto del cambio, p. 152.
192 Cambio-16, 12-18 April 1976, pp. 36-7.
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urgent reform package in order to prevent the success of the rupturist option proposed 
by the democratic opposition. The moderates also feared a reaction by the armed forces 
that would halt any rupturist attempt and risk leading the country into another civil war. 
But at the heart of the problem was, in fact, the rupturist threat to the monarchy, and the 
return of the revolutionary and Moscow-directed Communist party.
More than at any other time during the Franco period, the quest for the political 
survival of the members of the regime - more than the regime itself, which was clearly 
in its final days -was now real. Given the aperturistas, and reformists’ refusal to accept 
the rupturist option, they had to work out an alternative to it, and there was no time to 
lose. This chapter is a broad study of the failure of Arias and his cabinet to apply a 
programme of reforms. During its seven months of existence Arias’ government did 
nothing but exacerbate the popular demands for change, in contrast to Adolfo Suarez’s 
cabinet which transformed the political system in less than one year. The success of 
Suarez’s reforms was the result of a combination of factors. These included the long­
standing preparedness of the aperturista/reformist sector of the regime for a post- 
Francoist era. In an attempt to avoid the consequences of a rupturist victory, some 
reformists had elaborated the basis for a transformation into a democracy from the high 
reaches of the regime (a number of reformists became part of Suarez’s cabinet). Also, 
the influence exerted by the democratic opposition as well as the population at large, the 
press, the unions, and even some members of the Catholic church, not only accelerated 
the government’s initiative but also helped to guarantee the implementation of a 
minimum programme of reforms. Before Suarez’s successes, it is important to study 
Carlos Arias’ second government and its failure within only seven months of its 
appointment.
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7.1. Arias ’ second presidency
Following Franco’s death, Arias’ re-appointment displeased the opposition and 
most of the forward-looking Francoists as much as it pleased the Francoist bunker. But, 
according to Carr and Fusi, given that the King had to choose one of the three 
candidates proposed by the Council of the Realm, he may have accepted Arias’ re-
• * 1 9 3appointment ‘in view of the impossibility of obtaining a liberal president from it’. 
King Juan Carlos could not afford to alienate Franco’s hard-liners; hence changes had to 
be introduced at a slow pace. The first step was the appointment of a new cabinet, 
whose composition the King had prepared in advance. The monarch had included both 
continuistas and reformists without first asking Carlos Arias, who felt that the new 
cabinet had been imposed on him.194 The continuistas were represented by two military 
figures, Admiral Pita da Veiga (navy) and General Fernando de Santiago y Diaz de 
Mendivil (national security and defense). The aperturistas consisted of Manuel Fraga 
(Interior and first vice-presidency), Jose Maria de Areilza (Foreign Affairs), Antonio 
Garrigues (Justice), Alfonso Osorio (Presidency) and to some extent Jose Solis 
(Labour), whom Areilza regarded as being closer to the inmovilistas.195 Adolfo Suarez 
became Minister Secretary-General of the Movement. Such a position would give 
Suarez the opportunity to build up the necessary alliances within the Movement that, 
later on, would enable him to act as mediator between the Francoist machinery and the 
opposition.
Before officially accepting the Interior Ministry, Fraga consulted his GODSA 
collaborators and asked their opinion about the post. They advised him not to accept it.
193 Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 208.
194 Prego, Asi se hizo la transicion, p. 369. The Times in Britain wrote that the King had opted for a ‘gradual 
openness [...] balancing the weight between the reform and the continuation of the regimen’. The Financial Times 
also regarded the new cabinet as reformist although it did not forecast a very optimistic economic situation for the 
near future. A summary of comments in British newspapers can be found in Arriba, 13 December 1975.
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They warned him of the difficulty, and the short life of such a position, as to enter a 
government with Arias meant failure. But Fraga did not listen. They were under the 
impression that Fraga had made up his mind even before he had spoken with them. 
According to both Argos and Cisneros, Fraga was not driven by pride or thirst for 
power, but more by a sense of duty. He had been asked to serve the country at a crucial 
time and he could not refuse.196 Despite the King’s choice of ministers, Arias (who 
probably wanted to keep Fraga at a distance) suggested Fraga became Education 
Minister. Fraga refused the offer and demanded a higher post, and he got it. He became 
first Vice-President for Internal Affairs and Interior Minister probably -  as Fraga 
believes - because of the King’s mediation.197 He knew he was accepting an ‘extremely 
difficult ministry’. Nevertheless, he believed that the Interior Ministry was an 
appropriate platform from which to introduce the necessary changes to make the 
anticipated reforms possible. ‘I understood’, Fraga said years later, ‘that if a Liberal 
held the post [of Interior Minister] things could be done -  and were done later -  in 
relation to [public] order, which at the same time, would not compromise the reform
198process .
7.1.1. Fraga, Minister o f the Crown
Prior to his appointment as Interior Minister, Manuel Fraga had published a 
series of reform plans in the daily ABC, in October 1975, which encapsulated his 
objective of making ‘the necessary continuity compatible with the inevitable
195 For a complete list of the new cabinet see L6pez Rodo, Memorias IV, pp. 194-5, nota (1). See also Boletin Oficial 
del Consejo Nacional del Movement, Ano XXI, Madrid 21 April 1976, p. 1855.
196 Testimony of Gabriel Cisneros, 13-09-1999;Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14 September 1999; Cemuda, Ciclon 
Fraga, pp. 121-22. It is interesting to note, however, that when King Juan Carlos asked Fraga to be part o f Suarez’s 
cabinet a few months later, Fraga refused. This time Fraga’s feeling of dislike and distrust towards Suarez 
outweighed his ‘sense of duty’. Later Fraga explained that ‘ [I] came to conclusion that I had more important things 
to do’. See Sentis, Politicos para unas elecciones, p. 66.
197 Powell, Espana en democracia, pp. 146-147; Cemuda, Ciclon Fraga, p. 121.
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reforms’.199 Jose Manuel Otero Novas, director of interior policy under Fraga, recalls 
that the Minister refused to accept the proposal for radical reform which had been 
elaborated by his ministerial team, and suggested a more moderate proposal instead. 
Fraga’s reform consisted of: ‘a small “touch-up” of the Law of the Cortes 
(Parliamentary Law), establishing a bicameral system, whose Upper Chamber would 
contain the “organic representatives” (municipality, family and syndicate), leaving the 
Lower Chamber to those chosen by universal suffrage. Initially, [Fraga] disappointed 
us. But, [he] convinced us that that it was a possible option and that it would lead to the 
same objective we longed for.’200 Fraga believed that the holding of elections would 
conflict with the current laws and, above all, would not be accepted by the armed forces. 
Therefore, his priority was to introduce partial legal and institutional reforms but within 
the ambit of the Fundamental Laws.201 According to Areilza, Fraga’s document would 
have been valid for merely one year, and would have opened the door to negotiations 
with the European Community.
In reality, those proposals did not seem to offer much change and contrasted 
dramatically with the plans of the democratic opposition. According to the Socialist 
Luis Yanez-Bamuevo, the democratic opposition wanted ‘to constitute a provisional 
government which [in turn] would call for the election of a constituent Cortes’ 
immediately. On those grounds, the opposition regarded Fraga’s plans as ‘a reminder
198 Sentis, Manuel Fraga, p. 66.
199 Fraga, Un Objectivo Nacional, p. 194.
200 Ricardo de la Cierva, La Derecha sin Remedio, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1987), p. 339.
201 Powell, El piloto del cambio, p. 142.
202 Areilza, Cronica, p. 41. As Alberto Aza, member of the Foreign Minister’s private office (1975-6), recalls Areilza 
was also ‘promoting the most inadequate and incomplete plan for democracy, in which elections would eventually be 
held for an assembly which would, in turn, decide which parties of the Left would be allowed to stand in some future 
election. Areilza was doubtful whether the Socialist Party would be permitted to take part in the process and asserted 
that under no circumstances would it be possible for the Communist Party to do so.’ Aza adds that ‘the aperturista 
speeches intimating changes yet using Francoist language, [...] seemed to me neither credible nor encouraging’. See, 
Alberto Aza, “Adolfo Suarez’s Stewardship of the Transition -  A Memoir”, in Threlfall, Consensus Politics in Spain,
p. 28.
203 Cambio-16, 12-18 April 1976, pp. 36-7.
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of totalitarian methods that were believed to have been overcome’.204 In any case it 
was clear, as Powell points out, that although Fraga’s proposals may have been 
appropriate for Spain in 1974-1975, in 1976 they were already obsolete.205 Spain 
urgently required a new programme of reforms.
Nevertheless, at the outset of his new post Manuel Fraga seemed more eager 
than ever to implement his planned reforms. In light of the wave of demonstrations, 
Fraga announced several governmental plans. The first programmatic communique of 
the new executive, which had been elaborated by Fraga and approved by the Cortes on 
25 December 1975, stated that ‘the government will set in motion the necessary 
improvements and reforms to accommodate our political, administrative and syndical 
institutions to the economic, social, cultural and political developments [ ...]’. A few 
days later, on 2 January 1976, Fraga declared to The New York Times that ‘the Spanish 
government will proclaim an amnesty but only a few changes in the Penal Code and the 
anti-terrorism Law. We are going to do it, but carefully. We need a law, we cannot 
improvise. We are not going to do it under pressure, nor in response to Communist 
propaganda.’207
Hope for change soon faded away, however. On 28 January 1976 Arias 
delivered a speech to the Cortes which made clear that under his presidency there would 
be no possibility of moving ahead. Arias’ reforms contemplated the legalization of 
political parties (with the exception of the PCE and regional separatists), the 
implementation of the right of association and assembly, and the creation of a two- 
Chamber Parliament. Yet, the reforms did not include an electoral law or the possibility
204 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 166, 3-10 June 1976, p. 15.
205 Charles Powell, “La Reforma que no fue”, in Julia et al, Memoria de la Transicion, p. 138.
206 Sevilla Merino, “La intervention de AP en el proceso constituyente de 1978”, PhD Thesis, p. 19.
207 Quoted in Arriba, 2 January 1976, p. 11. The Minister reiterated this stance a few weeks later in London, although 
there he confirmed his belief that the Communist party had to be left out of the legal framework of the political game.
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of elections. Arias planned to establish a ‘democracia a la espanola’ or Spanish 
democracy: a monarchic and representative democracy where there would be no place 
for terrorism, anarchism, separatism and Communism.208 Torcuato Fernandez Miranda, 
President of the Cortes, believed that Arias’ speech ‘should be the starting point of a 
close relationship between the government and the Cortes in the effort for reform’.209 
But, the historian John Coverdale argues that ‘the speech disappointed even the most 
moderate reformists by its vague and inconclusive character and by its failure to put
9 1 nforward a concrete plan and a definite timetable’.
Jose Maria de Areilza, Minister of Foreign Affairs, regarded the content of the 
speech as very important, and believed that Arias destroyed it by wrapping it in 
appalling Francoist rhetoric combined with threats, unnecessary limitations and praise 
for the deceased dictator. The speech, according to Areilza, conveyed a mixture of 
confusion and ambiguity, which reflected contradictions within the government. For 
Herrero de Minon, however, there was more to it than that. According to him, ‘nothing 
was said of the freedom of [political] parties, syndical pluralism, autonomy of the 
regions [...]*. A few weeks after the speech, Arias confirmed what everyone had 
suspected. The president openly acknowledged his wish to continue the Francoist 
system, and his intention to fight Spain’s foes, who ‘have begun to show their faces and
911are a crouched and clandestine minority in the country’.
Following Arias’ speech, perhaps in an attempt to restore some credibility to the 
government’s plans for reform, Fraga highlighted the good points of the president’s
That, according to Fraga, was not abnormal, since Germany had taken twenty years to legalise the Communist party. 
See Cambio-16, 9-15 February 1976, p. 11.
208 Cambio-16, 2-8 February 1976, pp. 6-10; Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 211.
209 Pilar & Alfonso Femandez-Miranda, Lo que el Rey me ha pedido, p. 180.
210 John Coverdale, The political transformation o f  Spain after Franco, (New York: Praeguer, 1979), p. 39.
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speech and removed the Francoist rhetoric in an interview in The Times. Fraga 
confirmed that ‘the Spanish people will take part in a referendum with the objective of 
approving the creation of a new parliamentary system that would take the place of the 
current Cortes or organic democracy. Also, [the Spaniards] will declare via a second 
referendum whether they want reforms in the system of constitutional monarchy or not. 
[...] The new electoral law will imply elections exclusively by universal suffrage’. The 
president of the nation, however, would not be the leader of the winning party, but 
someone chosen by the Council of the Realm.212 Fraga’s plans would be hard to 
implement, however, because Arias refused to introduce any reforms, and Torcuato 
Femandez-Miranda was sceptical of Fraga’s capacity to impose his will on a very
911stubborn Arias.
Fraga’s efforts to reform the system, however, were not easily trusted. The 
journalist Jose Antonio Novais wrote in Guadiana that he expected the man of today 
Fraga to be different from that of the 1960s. ‘Let us give him credit’, Novais wrote, 
‘and let us try to forget the Fraga of the 1960s. [...] [because] since his years in London 
an image of a man has emerged who claims to believe in democracy.’214 But, Fraga’s 
allegedly democratic project was generally regarded as being very ambivalent and 
limited. The journalist, Carlos Elordi, asserts that Fraga wished to negotiate the reforms 
with the various ideologies of the regime, keeping the opposition in the wings and quiet, 
awaiting concessions from above. Given the social and political situation of the country
91 Sthat plan was doomed to fail. Fraga gained a reputation as duro or ‘tough’. 
Furthermore, he allowed the use of police charges to break up groups of strikers -
211 Jose Maria de Areilza, Diario de un ministro de la (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), pp. 73-6, 81-4; Herrero
de Miiion, Memoria, p. 65.
212 Quoted in Cambio-16, 9-15 February 1976, p. 11.
213 Pilar & Alfonso Femandez-Miranda, Lo que el Rey me ha pedido, p. 213.
214 Guadiana, No. 33, 17-33 December 1975, p. 13.
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thereby replicating the repression used during Franco’s time - and even declared war on 
ETA which provoked the emergence of ultra-rightist hit-squads. The government’s 
repression did not eliminate the number of workers and students’ conflicts but rather it
*717increased them.
His collaborators, namely Jose Manuel Otero Novas and his team, warned the 
minister that his reputation was deteriorating rapidly, and advised him to change his
718authoritarian attitude and carry on with the reform project. But Fraga did not seem to 
listen. A clear dichotomy between reform and repression plagued Fraga throughout his 
political career and was to characterize his performance once again.
Away from the public eye, however, Fraga appeared ready to compromise, and 
tried to get close to the democratic opposition. Fraga’s secretary in the Interior Ministry, 
Carlos Argos, recalls having ordered, on behalf of the Minister, civil governors of 
different provinces to release from prison without bail, people who had been imprisoned 
for various minor offences such as the distribution of propaganda pamphlets. The lists 
of detainees were given to Argos by the Minister-Advisor of the German Embassy, 
members of the Socialist party and its union, and the Union General de Trabaj adores
710(UGT). At the same time, Fraga made contacts with representatives of the 
democratic opposition in an attempt to build bridges between them and the government. 
For instance, three days after Fraga’s appointment as Interior Minister he contacted 
Marcelino Camacho, the leader of the Communist-linked CCOO, through Felix Pastor 
Ridruejo with the collaboration of Carlos Argos and Pedro Lopez Jimenez. Fraga’s
215 Carlos Elordi,” El largo inviemo del 76”, en Memoria de la Transicion, p. 123.
216 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, pp. 82-3.
217 Maravall, Dictaduray disentimiento, p. 262.
2,8 Cierva, La Derecha, p. 341.
219 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000.
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messengers were charged with announcing the minister’s forthcoming plans for the 
legalization of the unions. Fraga asked Camacho for patience and pmdence in order not 
to provoke the hard-liners of the regime. The outcome of the meeting was satisfactory. 
However, new demonstrations and revolts organized by the CCOO at which Camacho
990was present, prompted Fraga to have the unionist leader detained once again.
Fraga also contacted the president-in-exile of the Catalan Generalitat, Josep
Tarradellas, some ‘historic Socialists’, who had lived in exile in Mexico, and Felipe
221Gonzalez with whom the minister dined at Miguel Boyer’s house, on 31 April 1976. 
Allegedly, as Powell recounts, Fraga proposed to Felipe Gonzalez an updated version of 
the Pacto del Pardo (whereby the conservative Canovas and the liberal Sagasta had 
taken turns in power in the nineteenth century), but he rejected it. Thus, although Fraga 
advocated the participation of the main political parties, he did not think the 
Communists should be included in the first phase of the transition.222 Fraga wished to 
have a strong Socialist party in order to have a weak Communist party. He based his 
argument on the German example (Germany took twenty years to legalise the 
Communist party)223
Fraga’s view of the PCE, however, seemed to shift constantly from one position 
to another. For instance, at the beginning of 1975, Fraga met the Socialists Enrique 
Tiemo Galvan and Fernando Moran at the Spanish embassy in London. As Tiemo 
Galvan recalls, when he mentioned the problem of the Communist party, Fraga said that 
he ‘would not mind having talks with the Communist party, and that he believed that its 
presence was convenient - or necessary, I cannot recall the word - for the transformation
220 Testimony of F61ix Pastor Ridruejo, 17 May 2000.
221 Cemuda, Ciclon Fraga, pp. 126-27; Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14 September 1999; Powell, El piloto del 
cambio, p. 34. For Fraga’s version on the dinner with Felipe Gonzalez see Fraga, En busca, pp. 44-46. Fraga 
authorized the celebration of the XXX Congress of the Socialist trade unionist Union General de Trabajadores 
(UGT). For more details on the XXX Congress of UGT see Cambio-16, 26 April-2 May 1976, pp. 8-11.
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or change of the Spanish regime. [...] Fraga’s words sounded deeply democratic [...] 
[He] appeared as he is intellectually: a Liberal with conservative ideas’.224 By February 
1976, however, social tension was mounting in Spain and the clashes between the 
government and the population were becoming an everyday event (Fraga blamed the 
Communist leaders for encouraging their followers to take to the streets). For this 
reason, Fraga declared on Mexican television that ‘at this moment, the most important 
names of the PCE are more linked to Moscow than to Madrid’, and, therefore, the 
government could not allow participation in national affairs of those groups that wanted
99fito destroy freedom.
Paradoxically, in June 1976, the journalist Cyrus Sultzberger published in The 
New York Times Fraga’s statement wherein the minister declared that one day the 
Communist party could be legalised in Spain. The Minister, however, left it clear that it 
will not be possible before the next elections. This statement provoked a chain 
reaction. GODS A member Felix Pastor explains that Fraga’s remark was actually 
prompted by a previous remark made along similar lines by Rafael Perez Escolar, 
president of GODS A. Perez Escolar declared that ‘sooner or later, one must predict that
998the Communist party will have a role in Spanish political life’. As founder of 
GODSA, Fraga may have felt the need to support its president Perez Escolar, but such a 
reasonable statement was very daring in those days. President Arias asked Fraga to 
publicly deny the declaration, but Fraga refused. Instead, Fraga met some members of 
the military elite to explain the meaning of his words, although General Fernandez 
Vallespin, Jefe del Alto Estado Mayor, believed Fraga would legalise the PCE sooner
222 Powell, “La ‘Reforma’ de Arias”, in Julia et al.,Memoria de la Transicion, pp. 140-141.
223 Fraga, El Canon giratorio, p. 68.
224 Tiemo Galvan, Cabos sueltos, pp. 443-4.
225 Fraga, El Canon Giratorio, p. 69.
226 Quoted in Arriba, 25 February 1976, p. 6.
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than everyone realised.229 In fact, Fraga had allegedly accepted an initial draft of a 
constitutional reform elaborated by Otero Novas, which presumed the participation of 
the PCE party.230 But, in light of Fraga’s meeting with the military, Jose Maria de 
Areilza recorded in his diary that he was under the impression that Fraga had made a 
pact with some members of the armed forces. According to Areilza, Fraga wanted to 
secure their support for his candidature for the presidency in the event of Arias leaving. 
A few days later, Areilza’s suspicion seemed to be confirmed. On 14 April, he wrote 
that Fraga’s pact with the Right-wing military was self-evident and was damaging his 
reformist-Liberal attitude to which he should have stuck from the beginning. Ricardo de 
la Cierva points out that Fraga’s twofold strategy - that is reformist and authoritarian -
i
certainly did not please the King.
Meanwhile, on 25 February 1976 members of Fraga’s group GODSA presented 
their preliminary ‘Appeal for Democratic Reform’, and with it their new political 
platform, Reforma Democratica (RD). The official presentation took place before more 
than two-thousand people - the majority were younger than forty-five - in Madrid. The 
political commentator Ramon Pi described the presentation of RD in Madrid in the 
following terms: ‘last night in Madrid there took place one of the most brilliant displays 
of efficient politics that has ever happened, anywhere. The embryo of a truly political 
party, Reforma Democratica, was presented in public in the Eurobuilding Hotel’.232 RD 
was introduced as ‘a movement of the middle classes, of professionals, of people who 
want to keep Franco’s conquests but who also want reform’. During the presentation
227 Fraga, En busca, p. 50.
228 GODSA.Boletln de Information, No. 2, August 1976, p. 8.
229 Fraga, El Canon Giratorio, p. 68.
230 Cierva, La Derecha, pp. 341-2.
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they expressed their eagerness to unite all centrist forces, and their refusal to ally with 
Marxist groups. Rafael Perez Escolar claimed that ‘our appeal tries to reach a formula 
of compromise between the tendencies of the centre-right and centre-left. [...] Thus, we 
will create the structures that correspond to a truly political party’. The wish of the 
group, as Antonio Cortina announced, was to ‘achieve a democracy for Spain in the 
shortest possible period, and with the least risk’.233 Juan de Arespacochaga, member of 
the group, recalls that those present at the event advocated ‘a peaceful and orderly 
transition with neither undue haste nor changes in the current system, merely reforming 
it in order to keep the best of it. This was surely the wish of the middle class that the 
regime itself had created.’234
Fraga, welcomed by spontaneous applause, turned up towards the end of the 
event and sat amongst the audience. As mentioned above, the philosophy of this 
political group was based around the person, and upon the reformist and centrist ideas of 
professor Fraga. Yet, his responsibility as Interior Minister prevented Fraga from 
presiding over the presentation of RD. That may explain why members of GODSA 
stressed that ‘Minister Fraga has no relation with Reforma Democratica at this 
moment’. Having said that, during the presentation of RD in Barcelona, Rafael Perez 
Escolar, after praising some of Manuel Fraga’s political statements, and perhaps in an 
attempt to show the democratic character of the group, commented that Fraga ‘is one 
[member] more in RD. [...] Leadership must be won democratically within the 
parties’.235
231 Areilza, Diario, pp. 126, 146; Cierva, La Derecha, p. 342; Rogelio Baon questions whether Fraga made a pact 
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In Barcelona, the Club Agora organized the double launching of the 
Llamamiento para la Reforma Democratica and of the Partido Reforma Democratica 
de Catalunya (RDC) before an audience of five hundred on 2 March 1976. The studies 
and work of the Club Agora became RDC’s political platform and its members [Club 
Agora9s] the main promoters of the Catalan party. The presentation event was followed 
by presentations of RD in Alicante, Leon, Tenerife, Las Palmas, Pontevedra, La Coruna 
y Baleares, all where Fraga’s sympathisers had created groups affiliated to GODSA. 
The presentation of GODSA’s Llamamiento in the various cities was well received by 
the national press.236 By promoting their manifesto Fraga’s RD became the first 
political group of reformists with a moderate and progressive project for the future of 
Spain. Yet, a series of incidents that occurred during the months of March through May 
of 1976 contributed to damaging Fraga’s reformist image and questioned his abilities as 
leader of the transition.
The first incident broke out in Vitoria (The Basque Country) on 3 March 1976, 
although it had its roots on 9 January 1976. On that day, the metal company, Forjas 
Alavesas, demanded the renovation of the agreement with the council of entrepreneurs 
specially on three points: (i) higher salaries, (ii) reduction of working hours (iii) and 
social improvements (pensions, social security, etc.). Other companies and a large 
number of students soon supported the initiative led by Forjas Alavesas. On 3 March, 
while Fraga was away in Germany, a mass strike saw the intervention of one-hundred 
and eighty armed policemen resulting in five deaths and a large number of injured 
among the demonstrators. Due to Fraga’s absence, Adolfo Suarez, in his capacity as
236 Ibid., pp. 28-32.
237 For more details on the incidents see “Vitoria. Informe de las Comisiones Representativas”, Dossier Gasteiz in 
Cuadernos d e , Iberico, No. 51/53, May-October 1976, pp. 188- 202.
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substitute Interior Minister, dealt with the problem in a masterly way. In fact, as Osorio 
recalled, this incident allowed Suarez to show not only his capacity for governance, but 
also made him a realistic candidate for the presidency.238 Following the incident, the 
magazine Mundo Diario put forward some questions that seemed to be in everyone’s 
mind. It questioned the failure of the lengthy negotiation between workers and 
employers in Vitoria, and in light of that, also questioned the effectiveness of the 
obsolete syndical organization. But most importantly, it highlighted a fundamental issue 
by asking whether the current social tension was the result of a deeper problem caused 
by the lack of recognized platforms for dialogue.239 Fraga’s miscalculation to travel 
abroad during such conflictive times proved fatal for his reputation.
The second incident broke out a few days later, on 17 March 1976, when 
different groups within the Left wing opposition - those who had formed the Junta 
Democratica (July 1974) and the Plataforma de Convergencia (July 1975) - came to an 
historic agreement. The still illegal Socialist, Communist, and various Christian 
Democrat parties, joined forces with other smaller Left-wing parties, in the so-called 
Coordinacion Democratica, ‘Democratic Co-ordination’ - popularly known as 
Platajunta. The promoters of the Platajunta aimed at creating ‘a unitary organism of all 
the opposition at all levels’.240 Yet, despite the appearance of unity, the Platajunta 
failed to truly reconcile Socialists and Communists. Even then the Communists 
believed that the Socialists would participate in an election without the PCE. The 
Platajunta also failed to improve relations between the Socialists led by Tiemo Galvan 
and those led by Gonzalez.241 Nevertheless, for the government the Platajunta told of 
the unity of the Left. Fraga informed his fellow ministers of the historic agreement, and
238 Alfonso Osorio interviewed by Victoria Prego in Julia, Santos et al, Memoria de la transicion, p. 107.
239 Cited in Triunfo, No. 685,13 March 1976, p. 64.
240 Cambio-16, 29 March-4 April 1976, p. 6.
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of his decision to arrest the leaders of the Platajunta after their announcement at a press 
conference of Communist participation. Some ministers including Jose Solis, Antonio 
Garrigues, Carlos Robles Piquer (Fraga’s brother-in-law), Adolfo Suarez and Alfonso 
Osorio, advised Fraga not to take such a precipitate course.242
As Areilza records, after the meeting with Fraga (at which Areilza was not 
present), one of the ministers commented that ‘Fraga had designed a plan to counter­
attack the meeting of the Platajunta with seizures of newspapers, warnings, threats 
against foreign correspondents and telegrams to foreign embassies in Spain. This 
reaction was similar to Carrero’s to the Munich declaration (of 1962)’. According to 
Areilza, ‘if Fraga went along with the idea of throwing himself against the Platajunta, 
he would be committing ‘political suicide’. Furthermore, Fraga’s reaction would create 
two antagonistic groups, which some have argued would lead us first to a coup d ’etat, 
and second to a republic’.243 Areilza’s declaration reflects the level of tension present in 
those days, and although Fraga did throw himself against the Platajunta, Areilza’s 
prediction was not confirmed. On 4 April, the PCE organized an illegal demonstration 
in Madrid. Fraga ordered the arrest of some of the participants who were imprisoned 
until the beginning of May. Allegedly, Fraga told his fellow ministers that ‘until the 
first of May they are mine, from the second [of May], they are yours’. About this 
declaration Areilza recorded in his diary, ‘this man manages some people’s freedom like 
it was merchandise’.244
The final incident took place in Montejurra (Navarra) at the annual meeting of 
the Carlists. Allegedly, the Francoist authorities had been unaware that fifty Carlists 
with machine-guns had been hiding in the forest for several days. During the gathering,
241 Powell, Espana en democracia, p. 157.
242 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 86.
243 Areilza, Diario, p. 120.
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there were serious clashes between Don Carlos’ followers, and those of Don Sixto, both 
Carlist Pretenders to the throne. The result was a number of deaths, and some injured. 
On this occasion, Fraga was in Venezuela, and once again it was Adolfo Suarez who 
dealt with the situation with his by now habitual calm and efficiency.245 Moreover, the 
Valencian lawyer Emilio Attard asked Fraga to ensure that the police exercise restraint 
in controlling an imminent amnesty demonstration in Valencia in which some of 
Attard’s friends would be involved. Regardless, Fraga argued that it was the 
demonstrators who had to be careful, not the police ‘because [otherwise]’, Fraga said, ‘I 
am going to smash them to a pulp’ (porque los voy a moler a palos).246
Fraga lost the opportunity to demonstrate his long-proclaimed Centrist and 
moderate attitude, although he remained faithful to his beliefs. ‘I am a man’, he had 
declared a few months before the cabinet crisis, ’who has been described as Liberal in 
philosophy and authoritarian in character (temperamento). I believe that democracy 
needs strong leadership. A strong man must establish freedom. That is why I do not 
think that that [description] is derogatory’.247 Fraga also believed that ‘to govern is to 
order; but not in just any way whatsoever: it is to govern with authority, in other words, 
legitimately, in the name of order, for the good of all.248 His ambiguous attitude would 
not end here. Later, the creation of his political party Alianza Popular (AP) dismantled 
once again his theory of the Centre and long-professed wish for reform.
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7.1.2. Arias ’ failed reform
From the appointment of the new cabinet, as mentioned before, the main 
reformist Ministers Manuel Fraga, Jose Maria de Areilza and Antonio Garrigues 
advocated urgent implementation of reforms. Time was running against them and the 
population was clearly getting impatient. But, although Arias was also aware of the 
need to introduce some kind of change, it was clear that the President wished to delay 
the elaboration of a proper reform programme. Adolfo Suarez, Minister of the 
Movement, suggested to Arias the creation of a joint Commission (Government- 
National Council) for the study of general political reform. The Commission would 
deal with the reform of three specific laws: the Constituent Law of the Cortes (or 
Parliamentary Reform), the Law of Succession and the Law of Political Association.249 
Arias had already refused an initial proposal by some ministers for the creation of a 
royal commission to elaborate a reform plan, perhaps for fear of losing control over the 
reform. But this time the president accepted Suarez’s suggestion. Arias would preside 
over it, but the project would have to be shared between Fraga (Interior Minister) and 
Femandez-Miranda (President of the Movement’s National Council), thereby reducing 
Fraga’s influence on the reforms. Thus Fraga was put in charge of Parliamentary 
Reform and, in conjunction with Suarez, of the Law of Political Associations. 
Femandez-Miranda was to oversee reform of the Law of Succession. The outcome of 
the proposals was to be presented publicly, and voted on, in a referendum in October.
The commission, which was formed by a total of eighteen members of both the 
government and the National Council, and three secretaries, met for the first time on 11
247 Quoted in Arriba, 2 January 1976, p. 11.
248 Triunfo, No. 680, 7 February 1976, p. 63.
249 Suarez’s suggestion stemmed from an initial idea of Femandez-Miranda during his tenure as Minister o f the 
Movement. As Suarez told Osorio, it was very convenient to be on good terms with Femandez-Miranda, who 
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February 1976.250 At that meeting Femandez-Miranda surprised everyone by claiming 
that the Law of Fundamental Principles was a law like any other one, hence it could also 
be amended. Fraga did not disagree with Femandez-Miranda’s idea, but he believed 
that the current Cortes would never accept that proposal.251 There seemed to be a 
disparity of opinions amongst members of the commission that affected the 
implementation of the reform. In fact, with reference to the last meeting of the 
commission, which took place on 21 April, Femandez-Miranda recalled that ‘the 
meeting was getting more complicated without clear conclusions. [...] The commission 
suffered from three great defects: (i) [it] desired to reform much [while] keeping 
everything; (ii) it lacked clear ideas; (iii) [it] ignored the King’s tme position. [...] From 
the beginning, its work was impractical and [that] could not but complicate the 
situation. But, it seemed no one realized it. [...] The outcome was a collection of
9 O » *unconnected proposals, [hence] unviable as reform [proposals]’. Having said that, 
the commission achieved some of its goals. Firstly, on 29 May the Cortes approved 
Fraga’s proposal for a Law for the Regulation of the Right of Assembly and 
Manifestation, and secondly, the Cortes also approved the Law for the Right of Political 
Association.253
The proposal for the Law for the Right of Political Association had been 
elaborated by Juan Santamaria and Eduardo Navarro from the ministries of the Interior 
and the Movement, respectively. Originally the proposal was to be presented to the 
Cortes by Manuel Fraga, but Arias opposed the idea and asked Osorio to present it 
instead. Osorio in turn refused, although he proposed Adolfo Suarez, Minister of the
Miranda - allegedly following instructions from the King - campaigned for Suarez’s candidature to the presidency of 
the government. Osorio, De Orilla, pp. 56-7; Powell, “La Reforma que no fue”, pp. 138-9.
250 Pilar & Alfonso Femandez-Miranda, Lo que el Rey me ha pedido, p. 403, footnote 90.
251 Osorio, De Orilla, p. 65.
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Movement, to deal with the issue. Finally, on 9 June, less than one month before the 
dissolution of the cabinet, Suarez presented the proposal to the Cortes. Among its most 
interesting points, Suarez said that,
[Political] pluralism, sirs, is not an invention of this historic moment, neither should this 
government run into it like someone who runs into something artificial. On the contrary, the 
very State, which we serve, was bom plural. And, many of the men who are here have 
understood some time ago the need to create a new order for the diversity of opinions. [...] Our 
society, independently of subjective criteria, is plural. And, if we contemplate the national 
reality with a minimum of sincerity, [we] have to agree that, apart from that theoretical 
pluralism, [there] already exist organized forces. To deny it, would be to insist on an absurd 
blindness (nos empenariamos en una ceguera absurda si nos negaramos a verlo). Those 
forces, whether called parties or not, exist as a public fact, are seen in the media, are present at 
intellectual levels and in the working base and even influence professional organizations. [...] 
Does there not exist, even at a popular level, a minimum tacit agreement with regard to change 
without risk, to a deep and ordered reform, to political pluralism, to a chamber chosen by 
universal suffrage, to the existence of political groups which channel ideological participation, 
to the popular freedoms of expression, assembly and demonstration, to an economic system 
able to harmonise the creative forces of private initiative with greater levels of justice so that 
the optimum socialisation of development results? [...] Let us simply, sirs, remove [the] drama 
from our political [life]. Let us elevate to the normal political level what is common in the 
street.254
According to the journalist Victoria Prego, Adolfo Suarez ‘delivered a 
memorable speech with a few essential virtues: he does not raise his voice with burning 
enthusiasm at the end of a brilliant phrase, he does not get pompous, everything he says 
is understood, he is direct, and above all, [Suarez] describes a social reality which is
“J C C
exactly the one present in Spain at the moment.’ According to Triunfo, the speech 
‘rated Suarez as the most aperturista of Arias’ ministers [and it was] an authentic 
speech characteristic of a president of the government’.256 That achievement was, in 
Alfonso Osorio’s view, what led to Suarez being regarded as a potential candidate for
7 57the presidency.
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Adolfo Suarez succeeded in persuading the Francoist Cortes which approved the 
law with 338 affirmative votes to 91 against, and 25 abstentions. On 16 June 1976 the 
government announced that the law came ‘to regulate the right of political association 
with ample and flexible criteria [...] The exercise of this right will not find other 
limitations than those demanded in a democratic society in the interest of national 
security, of public constitutional order, and of respect for the rights and freedoms of all 
citizens, consequently proscribing only those associations that are categorised as illicit 
in the Penal Code’. This Law was, therefore, ‘inspired by scrupulous respect towards 
the reality of political pluralism [...] The groups, associations, or political parties [...] 
registered under the Law will have a guarantee of participation, in a regime of liberty, 
justice and equality in the always renewed collective task of constructing a more just, 
free and democratic Spain’. The content of the law was unprecedented, but the 
Cortes still had to approve the reform of Articles 172 and 173 of the Penal Code in order 
to legalize political parties - with the exception of the Communist party. Despite all his 
efforts, the Minister of Justice, Antonio Garrigues, could not convince the Cortes, which 
ruled against the reform of Penal Code. The consequences of such a negative ruling 
were evident. The newly approved Law for the Right of Political Associations was 
basically pointless.
Arias reluctantly applied some timid reforms which, as Preston explains, ‘had 
the merit of drawing the fire of the die-hard Francoists, which allowed the ultra-Right to 
discredit itself in the eyes of the remaining components of the Francoist elite’. But, the 
inefficiency of his programme pushed Francoist bureaucrats and businessmen, like 
Joaquin Garrigues, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez and the Tacitos into the opposition
258 B.O.E., Ley del Derecho de Asociacion Politica, 14 June 1976 (Publication date 16 June).
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camp.260 The Caudillo’s entourage felt the threat from the aperturistas and their 
reformist plans. In fact, in May Francoist hard-liners - including the ex-ministers 
Admiral Nieto Antunez, Jose Antonio Giron, Raimundo Fernandez Cuesta, Jose Utrera 
Molina, General Juan Castanon de Mena - sent Arias a note, which was signed by one 
hundred and twenty-six people, accusing the ministers of ‘continuous transgressions 
departing from the democracy (Estado de Derecho) inherited from Franco’.
Carlos Arias proved incapable of confronting (i) the growing pressure of the 
democratic opposition and of the regime’s moderates and (ii) the pressure coming from 
the regime hard-liners.262 As the journalist Carlos Elordi summarises, ‘the seven 
months of Carlos Arias Navarro’s government were the longest of the transition. It was 
time lost on the way towards democracy, an exhausting prolongation of the past, with 
the same faces, anxieties, [and] uncertainty. But there was a difference: Franco was not 
[there] anymore.’263 In contrast, Paul Preston argues that the Arias experience was of 
crucial importance in many respects, and therefore a ‘necessary evil’.264 A peaceful 
transition to democracy required the leadership of someone who could deal with both 
the bunker and the opposition, and Arias proved not to be the right person. For this 
task, the King’s man was Adolfo Suarez, even though at that moment the opposition 
saw him as another continuista of Franco’s regime.
7.2. Adolfo Suarez, President o f the Government
Hope for a progressive government which could control the economic and social 
crisis, and also introduce a democratic system in Spain, faded away when the relatively
260 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, pp. 53, 89.
261 It is interesting to note that one the signatories was Perez Pillado, who happened to have died more than a month 
before the letter was even written. Triunfo, No. 695, 22 May 1976, pp. 89-90.
262 Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 196.
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unknown Minister of the Movement, Adolfo Suarez, was appointed president as a 
replacement for Carlos Arias in July 1976. His appointment came as a surprise even 
amongst those well-connected in political circles although, allegedly, the King 
considered Suarez as the possible president of his government well before his 
appointment.265 Adolfo Suarez’s name was the last one on a shortlist of six candidates, 
but thanks to the work of Torcuato Femandez-Miranda, following instructions from the 
King, managed to convince the Councillors of the Consejo del Reino to include the 
name of Suarez in the final terna. Femandez-Miranda’s task was relatively easy given 
that Suarez was a ‘man of the regime’. In the last round Suarez got only twelve votes 
after Gregorio Lopez Bravo with thirteen, and Federico Silva with fifteen votes. Despite 
the result, Don Juan Carlos appointed Suarez President of the Government. 
Following Suarez’s appointment, Femandez-Miranda famously declared: ‘I have 
delivered to the King what he has asked me for’, thereby confirming the royal 
involvement in the election.
Victoria Prego agues that the initial idea of choosing Suarez had originated from 
Femandez-Miranda, who regarded Suarez as an energetic and decisive young man 
without a political agenda and without the prominence of Fraga or Areilza. In fact, 
Suarez fit the ‘blueprint’ (retrato robot) that Femandez-Miranda and Miguel Primo de
264 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, pp. 53-90
265 According to Cambio-16, the American embassy knew of Suarez’s appointment from April. Allegedly, during his 
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Rivera, councillor of the National Movement and of the Council of the Realm, had 
thought of as the ideal president of the government. The new president would have to 
achieve the challenging goals of (i) applying reform from above: whereby the 
government had to elaborate a Law of Political Reform which, once approved by the 
Cortes, would be ratified by the Spanish people in a national referendum. In this way, 
general elections could be held with time left to organize political parties and dictate the 
norms regulating the elections; and (ii) reform from below: whereby the Spanish people 
could elect to the Parliament their representatives whose first objective would be the 
drafting of a new Constitution.270
Arias’ inability to lead the transition had become clear soon after his 
appointment. Thus, from the beginning of Arias’ second presidency, Femandez- 
Miranda studied his candidate Suarez in great detail and, on a number of occasions, 
feared his ambition for power. Femandez-Miranda wondered what was more important 
for Suarez, his desire to serve the country or his willingness to command. By June the 
social situation was becoming unbearable and Arias remained deaf to popular demands. 
In June, the King finally decided to intervene and asked for Arias’ resignation. At that 
stage, the person who best fitted the blueprint for the presidency was Suarez. Years 
later, the King acknowledged that he appointed Suarez,
Because he was young and modem. Because his roots lay in Francoism, and he couldn’t be 
suspected of wishing to introduce excessively radical changes which would have been 
unacceptable to certain sectors of our society. Adolfo had been within the Francoist fold 
throughout his career, like all Spaniards in public office at that time. He had been Secretary- 
General of the Movement, and later, at my request, director-general of the national television 
company, where he did a good deal for my image as Prince of Spain.271
Like many others, Suarez had had a successful administrative career under the 
regime but, politically speaking, he was generally unknown to the Spanish public. In
270 Pilar & Alfonso Femandez-Miranda, Lo que el Rey me ha pedido, pp. 228-9; Miguel Primo de Rivera interviewed 
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those days the limelight was focused on two reformist ministers of Arias’ second 
government, namely Jose Maria de Areilza and Manuel Fraga. Yet, there were a 
number of reasons why neither of the two ministers was chosen to replace Arias. On the 
one hand, Fraga had been the main representative of the aperturistas for a time, but 
Fraga recognised that he could not expect to be Arias’ successor. As Pilar Cemuda 
recalls, he believed that what really frustrated his likelihood for the post was his
979declaration over the legalisation of the PCE party. Yet Fraga was not the ideal 
candidate to lead the transition principally because he had been one of Franco’s 
ministers. Also, as seen earlier, during his tenure as Interior Minister Fraga displayed an 
authoritarian character, which over-shadowed his reformist image and contributed to 
him being ruled out as a potential candidate for president. One of the main requirements 
to lead the transition was to be able to negotiate with the opposition, and Fraga had 
demonstrated his inflexible position when meeting democrats like the leader of the 
Socialist party Felipe Gonzalez. ‘That interview’, Gonzalez recalls, ‘was very tense. 
[Fraga] set out his programme and I mine. Both were completely antagonistic. [But]
97^Fraga’s position was “take it or leave it”. One cannot have a dialogue like that.’ On 
another occasion, Fraga told Felipe Gonzalez that the Socialists might be legalized in 
eight years but the Communists never. Allegedly, Fraga made clear to Gonzalez that ‘I 
(Fraga) represent power and you are nothing’.274
In contrast, Areilza appeared to be the ideal candidate. Among other things 
Areilza travelled the world promoting the idea of a new democratic Spain; he was an 
experienced diplomat with extensive foreign relations (Areilza had been Franco’s 
Ambassador to a number of countries, such as Argentina, the USA, and France); he was
271 De Vilallonga, The King, p. 70.
272 Fraga, En busca, pp. 52-3; Cemuda, Ciclon Fraga, p. 138.
273 Cambio-16, 23-29 August 1976, pp. 12-3.
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part of the Spanish aristocracy (by marriage); and also he had many contacts with the 
democratic opposition. As the journalist Carlos Elordi recalls, a few weeks after his 
appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Areilza had already announced his 
readiness to authorize a passport for Carrillo should he apply for one. Thus, although 
Areilza, as Carr and Fusi write, ‘seemed the incarnation of the civilised Right’, the ex- 
minister had been an important member of Don Juan de Borbon’s private council, and 
therefore, not the right person to preside over Don Juan Carlos’ cabinet. 
Furthermore, unlike Fraga, Areilza did not have the necessary political backing that 
might support his candidature as president. Areilza, however, was so convinced of his 
triumph that, on the day of the presidential election, he had gathered a group of friends 
and journalists and, even put champagne in the refrigerator to celebrate his victory. 
Ironically, he was the first to inform journalists of Suarez’s victory, who was alone at 
home without family or journalists.277 To everyone’s amazement, neither Areilza nor 
Fraga survived even the first round of the election.
Although the King did not choose Fraga or Areilza for the post of president, the 
monarch valued them and wished them to be part of the new executive. Suarez, who 
wanted Areilza for the new government, phoned Areilza but the latter did not want to 
make an immediate decision. After talking with Fraga, who had already expressed to 
the King his wish not to continue, Areilza decided not to continue either.278 Neither 
Fraga nor Areilza accepted positions in Suarez’s team. As Victoria Prego argues, the 
refusal of both ministers to collaborate in Suarez’s government was the first obstacle for 
the new president. Areilza’s loss was significant, but politically speaking, Fraga’s loss
274 Attard, Vida y  Muerte, p. 49; Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, pp. 86-7.
275 Elordi, “El largo inviemo del 76” in Julia et al, Memoria de la Transicion, p. 123.
276 Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 217.
277 Cemuda, Ciclon Fraga, p. 139.
278 Jose Maria de Areilza, Cuadernos de la Transicion, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1983), pp. 15-6.
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was the greatest. Fraga, as Osorio recalls, ‘had important influence amongst regime 
reformists and [we] had to count on them’.279 For his part, Fraga received a phone call 
from the King himself, but the ex-minister confessed to the monarch the impossibility of 
continuing. Fraga ‘did not have any confidence in Adolfo Suarez, or in his capacity to
9 fincommand in the crisis’. The truth was that Fraga was resentful. During a 
conversation with Eduardo Chamorro, Fraga admitted that Suarez’s appointment 
‘inspired in him feelings of frustration’. Fraga’s experience and the time he had 
invested in preparing the reforms were now wasted and the reform was left in ‘feeble 
and hardly-prepared hands [...], hands of those who never showed any interest in it’.281 
But the ministers’ refusal to join a new ministry did not imply their departure from 
politics. On the contrary, this period marked the beginning of a new, although separate, 
political trajectory.
Meanwhile, Fraga was busy promoting his political group abroad. Reforma 
Democratica (RD) was presented as a ‘Spanish political party’ in Paris on 28 June 1976. 
The RD delegation, which travelled to the French capital, comprised Rafael Perez 
Escolar, Felix Pastor Ridruejo, Luis Santiago de Pablo, Manuel Milian, Juan Jose 
Folchi, Gabriel Elorriaga, Francisco Aguilera and Antonio Abeijon. They held two 
workshops with French politicians where among other things they discussed: (i) the 
political and economic situation in Spain and abroad; (ii) French trade-union 
organization; (iii) political parties of the Left; (iv) market economy and (v) public 
administration. They also met Branko Lazitch, an expert in Communist studies, with 
whom they talked about the current position of the Communist party, its international
279 Prego, A si se hizo la Transicion, p. 502. Osorio’s cite in Ibid., p. 502.
280 Fraga, En busca, p. 53.
281 Fraga, El Canon Giratorio. p. 75.
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strategy, Euro-Communism and also syndical issues. The GODSA delegation stressed
the pro-European vocation of the group, and their wish for an early incorporation of
282Spain into the European Community, for which they asked for French support. RD’s 
moderate programmatic content appeared to be clearly progressive for the time, and it 
attracted financial support from powerful groups, which, Felix Pastor Ridruejo, although 
never entirely sure of their origins, believes were following official American political 
strategy.283 Thus, from time to time, Pastor Ridruejo travelled to Paris to collect money 
from the premises of the magazine Est-Ouest. The amount of money given varied, but 
was always small quantities of two, three or five million pesetas. The quantities were 
small because the peseta was very controlled in those days, and large amounts could not
9 JM
have been hidden easily.
In August 1976, following the trip to France, Fraga’s RD presented a Libro 
Blanco, or white paper, which contained the ‘political programme of reformism’. It was 
a collective work compiled by more than one hundred people who were organized in a 
dozen specialized study commissions. The majority of these collaborators were active 
members of or sympathisers with RD. This collective ‘has put their humble effort at the 
service of an analysis of the state of the nation at this present time.’ During several 
months, the commissions identified the issues at stake, which they studied and discussed 
together. The White Book was an ‘open book’ which launched an initial and, therefore,
- j o r
not a complete doctrine. Furthermore, as Pastor Ridruejo explains, the white paper 
‘is not the programme of the party, [it is] only a basis for discussion’. The paper was 
to have three main sections each dedicated to the proposed political, economic and
282 GODSA, Boletin, No. 1, July 1976, pp. 13, 15.
283 This information has been denied by Fraga. Testimony of Manuel Fraga, 28 March 2001.
284 Testimony of Felix Pastor Ridruejo, 17 May 2000.
285 Libro Blanco para la Reforma Democrdtica, (Madrid: GODSA, 1976), pp. 7, covers.
286 GODSA, Boletin. No. 5, December 1976, p. 12.
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social reforms. But, incidentally the chapter dedicated to ‘political reform’, which was
non
going to be written by Fraga, was not included in the book. Some of the issues 
addressed were human rights, foreign policy, national defence, inequality, agriculture 
labour policy; syndicalist reform, and fiscal and monetary systems. Thus, through the 
white paper Manuel Fraga proposed: the introduction of constitutional reform; the 
effective establishment of a reformed and reformist monarchy; establishment of political 
forces created under a system of free political associations although channelled by 
existing Francoist law; the recognition of political sectors ranging from the Christian 
Democrats to the democratic and evolutionist Socialists; and the achievement of the
98Qeconomic model of the industrialised countries.
Fraga’s centrist group appeared to be a moderate option although it was quite 
progressive in areas such as education, health and women issues. For instance, as far as 
women’s issues were concerned, four women’s members of the group, namely Tony 
Quiroga, Maria del Carmen Martin Rubio, Teresa Fernandez and Sibila Pironte, stood in 
favour of divorce, free contraceptives and even abortion. They agreed, however, that the 
issue of abortion was very delicate and cases should be treated individually and with 
great care. Sibila Pironte even considered abortion essential in situations such as rape 
and fetus malformation.290 Manuel Fraga was responsible for the inspiration and 
promotion of the white paper but, owing to his duties as ambassador, had little direct 
participation in it. The nearly five-hundred page volume was of considerable
287 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 14 September 1999.
288 GODSA, Boletin, No. 3, September 1976, p. 13.
289 Cambio-16, 1-7 December 1975, p. 40; GODSA, Boletin, Nos. 8-9, January 1977, p. 6.
290 GODSA, Boletin, No. 7, December 1976, p. 6.
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importance as it represented the basis for a new centrist platform, Reforma 
Democratica, arguably the political ground behind the creation of Fraga’s AP.291
Meanwhile, from the democratic opposition through to many aperturistas and a 
great share of the population, the majority of the Spanish people regarded President 
Suarez as a mere Francoist. They all questioned his ability to bring democracy to Spain. 
In fact, Suarez’s presidency of the regime-supported UDPE categorised him as on the 
side of the continuistas. Ramon Tamames, speaking on behalf of the Communists, 
considered Suarez’s appointment to be a ‘historic mistake’, while the Socialists thought 
Spain had entered a ‘cul-de-sac’.292 This feeling was shared even by some of Suarez’s 
own future collaborators such as Ricardo de la Cierva and Rafael Arias-Salgado. De la 
Cierva wrote an article titled ‘Que error, que inmenso err o f  or ‘What a mistake, what a 
formidable mistake!’ wherein he described Suarez’s government as ‘the first Francoist 
government of post-Francoism’. For his part, Rafael Arias-Salgado wrote in Cuadernos 
para el Dialogo an article titled ‘El Apagon’ or ‘The Blackout’. Furthermore, 
‘disillusionment and surprise’ characterised the response of the international press to 
Suarez’s appointment. For instance, in Britain The Observer wrote that, “Suarez lacks 
all qualities the King was believed to be looking for when [he] decided to challenge the 
Francoist bunker [...] [Suarez] lacks experience [...], is a man of the system, with his 
roots firmly rooted in the ideology of the old regime’.294
291 Soluciones para una decada. Libro Blanco de Alianza Popular. (1981), p. 1; Fraga claims that RD was actually 
the first embryo of AP. However, in reality, RD was a centrist party whereas AP was clearly on the right of the 
political spectrum. Fraga, En busca, p. 37. Testimony of Carlos Argos Garcia, 14 September 1999.
292 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 167, 10-16 July 1976, pp. 24-5.
293 Javier Pradera, “El Despegue de la Reforma”, in Julia et al, Memoria de la Transicion, pp. 150-1 ;De la Cierva’s 
article can be found in El Pals, 8 July 1976, p. 11; “El Apagon” in Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 167, 10-16 July 
1976, pp. 14-17 (this article was signed by Pedro Altares). Arias-Salgado recognises his mistake of judging Suarez 
so early. See Bums, Conversaciones sobre la derecha, p. 323.
294 Quoted in Cambio-16, 12-18 July 1976, pp. 17-18.
From dictatorship to democracy (1976-1977) 294
Having said that, there were at least two very different people who did not 
dislike the idea of Adolfo Suarez as President. One of them was Carlos Arias who, as 
Preston argues, supported Suarez’s appointment if  only because it meant that neither 
Areilza nor Fraga would be president.295 The other one was, paradoxically, Santiago 
Carrillo. The Communist leader saw Suarez on television defending the Law of 
Political Association in June 1976 and thought that Suarez’s language and reasoning 
were not typical of a Fascist but rather of a democrat. As Carrillo recalls today, he also 
knew that Suarez’s father and grandfather had been republicans, and also that he had a 
relative who lived in Paris and was a member of the PCE. In addition, Suarez’s image 
of a young and energetic man, whose past had not been tarnished by the Civil War, led 
Carrillo to believe in his possibilities to conduct the transition. A few days after 
Suarez’s appointment, Carrillo wrote in Mundo Obrero that ‘Suarez’s government could
7Q7take the negotiation to a point that will lead us to the Ruptura Pactada\ The 
Ruptura Pactada was an intermediate position between rupture and reform, an 
agreement between the reformists and the democratic opposition. Incidentally, Suarez’s 
cabinet adopted this formula successfully to transform the dictatorship into a 
democracy.
7Q51Suarez’s new executive was officially presented on 7 July 1976. Gonzalo 
Fernandez de la Mora, president of the Union Nacional Espanola, commented that the 
members of Suarez’s cabinet ‘are young people, intelligent and prepared...’ whereas the
295 Preston, Triumph o f  Democracy, p. 93.
296 It is interesting to know that Carrillo believed in Su&rez’s possibilities to conduct the transition successfully better 
than Areilza’s. Carrillo had known Areilza personally since 1969, when the latter had established contatcts with him. 
Areilza was considered as one the possible leaders of the transition, but Carrillo did not believe in his capacity to face 
the Francoist system. Testimony of Santiago Carrillo, 29 November 2001; Prego, A si se hizo la transicion, p. 498.
297 Testimony of Santiago Carrillo, 29 November 2001; Quoted in Prego, Asi se hizo la transicion, p. 499.
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journalist Luis Maria Anson believed that ‘the new government is going to run into 
great difficulties in the Cortes as well as in its dialogue with the opposition, due to the 
eminently monochrome character of its members’.299 In general, however, comments 
such as ‘Francoist puppies’, a government of ‘second-rank politicians’ and a 
‘government of sub-secretaries’ seemed to be in all surveys.300 Fernandez de la Mora 
was right, however. The new ministers were young (having an average age of forty-
O A 1
four), politically well-prepared (seven of them were members of Tacito) , most of 
them identified with the reformist sector, and their ability and willingness to work soon 
bore fruit.
7.2.1. A brief account o f Suarez’s main reforms
On 9 July the newly-appointed cabinet met for the first time, and some days later 
the Cortes approved by 245 to 175 the government’s proposal for the reform of the 
aforementioned controversial articles of the Penal Code. Only nineteen parties were 
registered under the Law of 14 June, which would become effective as of September 
1976. The democratic opposition had strongly criticised the new law despite the 
reform of the Penal Code. Later on, in anticipation of the upcoming elections, the 
government approved the Royal Decree of 8 February 1977, which re-structured the 
mechanism of constitution of an association under the ‘principle of freedom’ and 
eliminated the preventive control of the administration for the register of parties.303 The
298 For a complete list of Suarez’s cabinet see L6pez Rodo, Memorias IV, p. 262. A complete list of the new cabinet 
members and some comments by political of different tendencies can also be found in El Pais, 8 July 1976, pp.l, 8- 
10.
299 Triunfo, No. 703, 17 July 1976, p. 65.
300 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 168, 17-23 July 1976, p. 16.
301 The Tacito Ministers were Eduardo Carriles (Treasury), Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (Public Works), Landelino Lavilla 
(Justice), Enrique de la Mata (Syndicates), Marcelino Oreja (Foreign Affairs), Alfonso Osorio (Presidency) and 
Andres Reguera (Information and Tourism). See Powell, “The ‘Tacito’ group”, p. 265.
302 For a list of the nineteen parties see, Martin Merchan, Partidos Politicos, p. 101.
303 B.O.E., Real-Decreto sobre Asociaciones Politicas (8 February 1977); Martin Merchan, Partidos Politicos, pp. 
104-5; Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio", pp. 112-3.
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approval of this decree led to the mushrooming of registry applications for political 
parties with the Interior Ministry. The doors were finally open to all political parties 
except those, which discriminated against certain citizens, and those subjected to 
international discipline and whose programmatic objectives could include the 
introduction of a totalitarian system. Attention was thereby focused on the PCE.304 
Suarez’s own government did not plan to include the PCE in the first general elections, 
but - as we shall see later in this section - a series of events altered the government’s
• • • i n cinitial plans in favour of it.
Meanwhile, a few days after the presentation of the new executive, Suarez 
announced his intention of holding a series of talks with representatives of all political 
ideologies of the country from Right to Left, including representatives of the terrorist 
group ETA. The range of existing political groups was extremely wide. According 
to a study carried out by the professor of sociology Miguel Martinez Cuadrado, which 
was published by Cambio-16, there were more than two-hundred political groups within 
twelve different ideological currents. Broadly from Right to Left these ideological 
currents were: Ultras (including Mariano Sanchez Covisa, Bias Pinar), extreme-Right 
(Antonio Oriol, Jose Antonio Giron, Emilio Romero), Associations of the Movement 
(Raimundo Fernandez Cuesta, Leopoldo Stampa, Federico Silva, Manuel Cantarero), 
Reformists (Manuel Fraga, Jose Maria de Areilza, Pio Cabanillas, Marcelino Oreja, 
Gabriel Canadas), Confessional Liberal-Christian Democrats (Rafael Calvo, Jose Maria 
Gil-Robles, Jose Maria Ruiz-Gimenez, Antonio Canellas), Conservative Regionalism
304 Martin Merchan, Partidos Politicos, pp. 102-3; Alvarez de Miranda, Del “contubernio", p. 113.
305 Osorio, De Orilla, pp. 152-3, 309-23.
306 According to a recent article, the president of the Basque Nationalist party, Xavier Arzalluz, recalls that 
representatives of the politico-military branch of ETA negotiated the surrender of weapons in exchange for the
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(Carlos Hugo Borbon, Antonio Munoz Peirats, Jordi Pujol, Miquel Roca), Liberal 
Centre (Joaquin Garrigues Walker, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez), Advanced 
Regionalism (Josep Andreu i Abello), Socialists (Felipe Gonzalez, Enrique Mujica, 
Enrique Tiemo Galvan, Raul Morodo, Antonio Rojas Marcos), Communists (Santiago 
Carrillo, Marcelino Camacho, Enrique Lister), other Leftist groups and ultra-Leftists. 
The political landscape appeared very confusing, but according to Martinez Cuadrado, 
the full establishment of democracy would regulate the different political options and 
the choice of parties could then become more definite.
The government’s theoretical intention to contact the different political currents 
of the country was soon put into practice. On 12 July, Suarez’s meeting with Jose Maria 
Gil-Robles (son) of the Federation Popular Democratica, initiated the first round of 
talks. During July and August Suarez held talks with a number of political personalities 
but one of the most anticipated and remarked on interviews was the one Suarez held
1AO
with the young leader of the Socialists, Felipe Gonzalez, on 10 August. The 
interview lasted three hours and seemed positive, although Gonzalez recognized that 
‘the negotiation will be difficult’. Yet, compared to his meeting with Manuel Fraga, the 
Socialist leader regarded Suarez as someone with whom it was possible have a 
dialogue.309 Suarez also established contacts with the Communists. On 28 November 
1976, Santiago Carrillo told Jose Maria de Areilza that he [Carrillo] ‘had established a 
permanent and secret link with president Suarez who [had been] taking and bringing 
authorized news of the situation [already] for three months’. A bilateral meeting
release of ETA prisoners in May and April 1977 with Adolfo Suarez and Juan Jos6 Roson. Xabier Arzalluz, 
“Txiberta” in Gaia, 2 September 2000.
307 Cambio-16, 2-8 February 1976, pp. 30-33.
308 Su&rez held talks with Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Luis Gomez Llorente, Felipe Gonzalez, Emilio Romero, 
Jose Ramon Lasuen, Joaquin Satrustegui, Enrique Fuentes Quintana, Enrique Tiemo Galvan, Carlos Ollero, Joaquin 
Ruiz-Gimenez, Raul Morodo, Jose Maria Ruiz Gallardon, Gonzalo Fem&ndez de la Mora, Josep Pallach, Jordi Pujol,
Heribert Barrera and Joan RaventosCambio-16, 26 July-1 August 1976, p. 14; Cambio-16, 16-22 August, pp. 6-8; 
Triunfo, No. 707,14 August 1976, p. 65. See also Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio", p. 109.
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between Suarez and Carrillo did not take place until 26 February 1977 when, away from 
the public eye, Jose Mario Armero - the secret link - organised a private encounter at his 
house.310
In the meantime, on 16 July, the government also announced a list of its 
immediate plans. Apart from the announcement of a long-sought amnesty (which did 
not cover ETA terrorists but only political prisoners), Andres Reguera, Minister of 
Information, told the press that ‘the government clearly expresses its conviction that 
popular sovereignty rests with the people, and it proclaims its determination to work in 
the instauration of a democratic political system based on the guarantee of civic rights 
and freedoms, the equality of political opportunities for all democratic groups and the 
acceptance of real pluralism.[...] The government wishes to make a public expression of 
its respect for the corrientes de opinion, in the conviction that neither goodwill nor 
democratic spirit are the exclusive patrimony of any group’. The government also 
announced its intention to call a general election before 30 June 1977, and a preceding 
referendum to ask the population for its decision on the constitutional reform. The first 
step was, therefore, the approval of a new political reform only after which the holding 
of a democratic election would be possible. Suarez’s immediate plan seemed 
satisfactory but the opposition did not trust the government straight away.311 Yet, hardly 
one month after the appointment of the cabinet a representative of the democratic
309 Cambio-16, 23-29 August 1976, pp. 12-3.
310 Areilza, Cuadernos, p. 74; Testimony of Santiago Carrillo, 29 November 2001; Lopez Rod6, Memorias IV, pp. 
266-7; Osorio, De Orilla, p. 313.
311 Quoted in Prego, A si se hizo la transicion, pp. 512-13. The complete declaration is recorded in Osorio, De Orilla, 
pp. 157-9.
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opposition commented that ‘for the first time in forty years, the opposition is losing the 
initiative. If this carries on like this, the government is going to give us a surprise’.
The first surprise came on 8 October 1976, when the Movement’s National 
Council, guarantor of the purest essence of the dictatorship, approved the government’s 
proposal for political reform. In broad lines, the proposal aimed (i) to hold elections for
a bicameral Cortes through universal, direct and secret ballot; (ii) to elaborate electoral
111norms, and (iii) to grant the freedom to form political parties. The opinion of the 
National Councillors was informative, however. The Francoist Cortes was the main 
challenge that the government had to face and, given its history of halting any reformist 
attempts previously proposed, Suarez searched for support in the Spanish establishment 
before presenting the proposals to the Cortes. For instance, the President invited 
members of the military elite to discuss his reform proposals with them. The meeting 
was successful although the only condition the military demanded was that the PCE 
would not be legalized. As Carlos Huneeus points out, it is important to stress that 
president Suarez had not made an agreement with the military in relation to the 
legalisation of the PCE. When six months later the party was legalized - as we shall see 
later - Suarez was accused of breaching an agreement that never existed.314 As 
Fernando Abril Martorell, Minister of Agriculture and Suarez’s close friend recalls, 
Suarez ‘told them [...] that he would not legalise anything that was impossible. [...] 
Carrillo had to retouch the statutes of the PCE to make it purely Spanish. In that way, 
[it] already fulfilled the necessary requirements. ’315 Suarez also discussed the reform 
proposals with many politicians of different tendencies, and on 10 September he
312 Quoted in Cambio-16, 16- 22 August 1976, p. 6.
313 Herrero de Minon, Memorias, pp. 99-100.
3,4 Moran, Suarez, p. 310; Huneeus, La UCD, pp. 107-9.
From dictatorship to democracy (1976-1977) 300
appeared on television to explain the basic content of the political reform proposal to the 
population. It was important to let the Spanish public know of the government’s plans 
quickly, and television was the fastest and surest way to reach a large number of 
households.
Meanwhile, the author of the juridical reform and president of the Cortes, 
Torcuato Femandez-Miranda, engaged in the task of forming parliamentary groups to 
discuss the reform proposals. The groups were formed by members of the UDPE; 
members of Manuel Fraga’s newly created AP, of which Cruz Martinez Esteruelas was 
the spokesman (Fraga was not a member of the Francoist Cortes); and the Francoist 
hard-liners Raimundo Fernandez Cuesta, Pilar Primo de Rivera and Bias Pinar who 
gathered around the so-called Action Institutional. These groups made up for less than 
half of the 531 members of the Cortes, the rest being either independent of these groups 
or supporters of the government’s proposal.316 AP members demanded, among other 
things, a majority system, refusing the government’s proposal for a proportional system 
in the Lower Chamber. As Alfonso and Pilar Femandez-Miranda point out, the Right­
wingers believed that a majority system would guarantee their power by an absolute 
majority. Politicians like Manuel Fraga wholeheartedly advocated this system, 
especially following his ambassadorship in London. But, an English-style majority 
system would have divided the country again between Left and Right, and the 
government had to avoid that situation if they wanted reforms to succeed.317
On 18 and 19 November those procuradores in favour of and against the 
government’s reform plans defended their proposals in the Cortes. For instance, Cruz
315 Fernando April Martorell interviewed by Nativel Preciado, in Julid et al, Memoria de la Transicion, p. 207.
316 Josep Carles Clemente, Historias de la transicion, 1973-1981. El fin del apagon. (Madrid: Fundamentos, 1994), 
pp. 70-1.
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Martinez Esteruelas defended the position of the AP group, and Fernando Suarez and 
Miguel Primo de Rivera, among others, the government’s position. As president of the 
Cortes, Torcuato Femandez-Miranda negotiated with both the government and the AP 
members to achieve consensus. Finally, on 18 November the Francoist Cortes 
overwhelmingly approved the reform proposal. Out of the 531 members of the 
Francoist Cortes, 425 voted in favour and 59 against (mainly the Ultra-Right sector) 
with 13 abstentions.318 By voting in favour of this reform the Francoist Cortes accepted 
their own dissolution and the implementation of a democratic system in Spain.
Historians, such as Charles Powell and Jose Casanova, among others, believe 
that it was the reformists who imposed their solutions on the democratic opposition. 
Casanova argues that,
It is clear that the opposition had nothing to do with this project [Law of Political Reform].
While one should not minimise the role which the pressure of the opposition may have played
in forcing this option upon those in power, the fact is that, once the Suarez government decided
upon this option, all the initiative, which since Franco’s death seemed to belong to the
opposition, now passed into the hands of the government. It should also be evident that the
institutionalization of such an option could be put into effect only by those incumbents or
powerholders who were willing and able to use their institutional roles and legal power within
the regime in order to force this option upon those forces of the regime which were unwilling to
319change and upon those forces of the opposition unwilling to accept reform from above.
In turn, Charles Powell agrees that ‘neither the reformists nor the rupturists would have 
achieved their goals on their own, but it was the former who largely imposed their 
solutions on the latter.’320 Technically, it was the government - in this case mainly 
formed by reformists - who successfully made possible the Law of Political Reform. But, 
Suarez’s cabinet responded to an imperative demand for change coming from the 
democratic opposition and the population as a whole, especially university and labour 
sectors, intellectuals, professionals and the Church. Thus, in order to avoid the victory
317 Pilar & Alfonso Femandez-Miranda, Lo que el Rey me ha pedido, p. 333-6.
318 El Pals, 3 November 1976, p. 13; El Pals, 19 November 1976, pp. 1, 8-9.
3,9 Jose Casanova, “Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain’s transition to democracy”, in Social 
Research, No. Vol. 50, No. 4 (winter 1983), pp. 940-1.
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of the rupturist option proposed by the democratic opposition, which would imply the 
destruction of all Francoist institutions, laws and, above all, their own political 
destruction (some reformists would sincerely advocate democracy whereas others would 
merely seek it for their political survival), the reformists had to speed up the elaboration 
of an alternative proposal.
The transformation of the dictatorial regime, by its own members, was, however, 
not an improvised decision. Throughout the 1960s some aperturistas had advocated the 
introduction of humble changes in the political system (with the exception of a handful 
of aperturistas who, from the mid-1950s, had proposed the implementation of a 
German-European type of democracy in Spain- without the Communist Party). At the 
beginning of the 1970s the idea of this type of democratic system was more widely 
accepted amongst them, and even amongst more conservative sectors of the regime. 
The most illustrative example would be the approval by the Francoist Cortes of the Law 
of Political Reform in November 1976, which did away with the old structure of the 
regime. The ultimate success of the government’s alternative was possible thanks to (i) 
the will of King Juan Carlos to support the political reform or at least, as the Socialist 
Alfonso Guerra said, his attitude ‘not to oppose what was evident: the arrival of 
democracy’.321 And (ii) an early awareness among aperturistas (1950s and 1960s) and 
later reformist (late 1960s and 1970s) circles of the need to reform the regime. By 1976 
they had managed to extend their advocacy of reform to more conservative sectors of 
the regime. Furthermore, older aperturistas had passed on their ideas to a younger 
generation of politicians many of whom were now part of Suarez’s cabinet.
320 Powell, Reform versus ‘Ruptura p. 321.
321 Alfonso Guerra interviewed by Soledad Alameda in Julia et al Memoria de la Transicion, p. 234.
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7.2.2. Suarez and the democratic opposition
Prior to the approval of the reform proposal, Suarez discussed his proposals with 
a stubborn democratic opposition, which had amalgamated in the so-called Plataforma 
de Organismos Democraticos on 23 October. Members of the democratic opposition 
agreed to negotiate with the government, although they demanded the immediate 
formation of a democratic government, the abrogation of all Francoist laws and called 
for elections. These demands, however, could not be met at that moment. Yet, Suarez’s 
intelligent policy, as the historian Juan Pablo Fusi points out, of speeding up the reform 
process and getting closer to the opposition succeeded in (i) dividing the opposition and 
(ii) making the desired negotiation with the opposition (the so-called Ruptura Pactada)
o')')
possible. Thus, at the end of September Christian Democrats (namely Joaquin Ruiz- 
Gimenez), Social Democrats and Liberals gradually detached from the Coordinacion 
Democratica (formed in March 1976), and from the rupturist option. As Carlos 
Huneeus points out, the Centrist and Right-wing members of the Coordinacion 
Democratica evaluated the proposal with care because they knew that the King and 
members of Tacito were behind it.323
By contrast, Communists and Socialists refused to accept the government’s 
proposals and campaigned for abstention from the popular referendum for the Reform 
Law scheduled for 15 December. They did not believe the Francoist hard-liners would 
allow the government to proceed with the reform proposal without reducing its scope, 
but to their surprise the Francoist Cortes approved it by an impressive majority.324
Their opposition to the government’s proposal was even heard at the European 
Community. On 23 November 1976, Felipe Gonzalez presented a resolution to the
322 Juan Pablo Fusi, “La Reforma Suarez”, in Julia et al., Memoria de la Transicion, pp. 164-5.
323 Cambio-16, 26 December 1976, p. 29; Huneeus, La UCD, p. 119.
324 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 178,25 September-1 October 1976, pp. 15-17.
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European Parliament asking for their support in the Spanish opposition’s battle against 
the Law of Political Reform. But Gonzalez’s petition did not succeed. On 2 December 
a member of the European Parliament, Maurice Faure, advised that the Parliament 
remain in contact with the Spanish government, thereby ignoring Gonzalez’s petition. 
The European Parliament did not seem convinced of the effectiveness of Gonzalez’s 
rupturist thesis, especially after the Francoist Cortes had voted in favour of reform. 
Yet, at the beginning of December, Gonzalez’s party ratified their defiance of the 
government line when during the XXXVII congress of the Socialist party held in Madrid 
‘they reaffirmed their class character, [...] Marxist and democratic’.
As Carlos Huneeus points out, such a radical position placed Gonzalez’s 
Socialists to the left of the Communists. But their campaign against the government’s 
line came to nought. The people ratified the decision of the Cortes in the referenda on 
15 December 1976. Of the 77.4 per cent of the electorate that voted, 94.4 approved of 
the reform proposal. This extraordinary victory demonstrated the failure of both the 
extreme Right and the democratic opposition. Having said that, other Socialist 
parties, namely the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) of professor Enrique Tiemo 
Galvan and the Izquierda Democratica (ID) of Joaquin Ruiz-Gimenez, played a 
mediating role between the government and the opposition.
A different line was taken by the PCE, which seemed less radicalised than that 
of the Socialists. These were days when the cold war still prevailed, and not many 
people realised that the Spanish Communists of the 1970s differed quite a lot from those 
of the 1930s. On 28 July 1976 during the first public congress of the PCE’s central 
committee held in Rome, both Santiago Carrillo and Dolores Ibarruri assured their
325 Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 60.
326 Huneeus, La UCD, pp. 137-8.
327 Abel Hernandez (Ed.), Fue posible la concordia. Adolfo Suarez, (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1996), p. 60.
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audience that their party was not under any international mandate. ‘We are’, Ibarruri 
said, ‘internationalists, [and have] solidarity with the all countries that fight for their 
national freedom’. Ibarruri asserted that the PCE’s goal was to achieve democracy.329 
Later, the Communists declared in Paris that, ‘should King Juan Carlos accept the 
democracy that the Spanish people want in our country, the PCE will not oppose the 
monarch’.330 In fact, the Communists had already adopted a policy of national 
reconciliation in 1956, which involved democratic freedom, political amnesty, and a 
policy beyond the politics of revenge. As Santiago Carrillo argues, ‘this background 
will explain why the PCE, in its conduct during the transition, gave consummate proof 
of its commitment to democratization’.331
The PCE was very well-organized and had an important influence on the 
working classes, especially through their syndical group CCOO, as well as on 
intellectuals and the middle classes. Felix Pastor Ridruejo asserts that, there was also a 
general feeling amongst the people of the Right that the legalization of the PCE was a 
positive step. Its members demonstrated a high degree of moderation when taking 
part in demonstrations and popular gatherings. The positive result of the referendum 
implied the calling of democratic elections for the first time since the 1930s. But, no 
one believed that the Communists would participate in the elections of 15 June 1977.
There were other groups that also stood against the referendum. For instance, 
representatives of a large number of Catholic associations considered the referendum to 
be ‘the fruit of a pact between the government and the anti-democratic Cortes without
328 Ibid., pp. 120-1.
329 Cambio-16, 9-15 August 1976, p. 14.
330 Cited in Cuadernos de Ruedo Iberico, No. 54, November-December 1976, pp. 63-4.
331 Carrillo, “The Consensus-building Role of the Communist Party”, in Threlfall, Consensus politics in Spain, pp. 
53-4.
332 Testimony of Felix Pastor Ridruejo, 17 May 2000. Bemaldez, El Patron de la Derecha, p. 189; Fraga, En busca, 
pp. 49-50.
333 Huneeus, La UCD, pp. 125.
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the participation of the population and the democratic opposition’, and therefore, 
unacceptable.334 Technically, that was true, but the most moderate members of the 
democratic opposition understood that the approval of the reform proposal by the 
Francoist Cortes was an unprecedented opportunity to make a peaceful transition to a 
democratic system.
Meanwhile the reformists had already began creating political formations in 
autumn 1976. The imminent arrival of elections led them to the emergence of new 
political alliances amongst, elaboration of programmatic manifestos and proselytism 
around the country. Two political parties stemmed directly from the regime, Manuel 
Fraga’s AP and Adolfo Suarez’s Union de Centro Democratico. These parties covered 
the Centre-Right and Right of the Spanish political spectrum. Literature on the origins 
of both parties as well as the general history of Spain is quite extensive, but a brief 
explanation of the creation of these parties will serve to illuminate the 
aperturistas/reformists’ long journey to the polls.
7.4. Fraga’spolitical U-turn. From ‘Reforma Democratica’to ‘Alianza Popular’
In a letter circulated in GODSA’s bulletin, Fraga explained how he ‘dedicated 
August [1976] to meditate over the situation created for us [GODSA], and for me in 
particular, after the July crisis. The first [thing] I had to decide was whether to continue 
or not in political action. [...] I arrived at the conclusion that for the time being I had a 
duty to continue [given] the problems our country [will] have to face in the next two 
years. [...] The second [thing] I have clearly seen is that the service we [GODSA] can
334 Cambio-16, 26 December 1976, p. 8.
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render to the country is the creation of an important political force’ (Fraga’s 
emphasis).335
Thus, during the summer of 1976 the ex-minister also met people at dinners and 
political gatherings for future political alliances. In August Fraga and Pio Cabanillas 
attended a political gathering in Galicia. The participants in that meeting, which Fraga 
considered to be one of the ‘democratic Right’, were the future workforce of AP and 
Union de Centro Democratico.336 Following this meeting, as Cambio-16 reveals, 
Manuel Fraga, Pio Cabanillas and Jose Maria de Areilza ‘will meet in La Coruna to 
prepare a political strategy for the autumn. [...] [They] have decided to strike a balance 
after Arias’ downfall’.337
On 8 September Suarez invited Fraga to dinner to discuss and explain the 
government’s reform plans. One might think that despite Fraga’s refusal to accept a 
ministry, Suarez would have liked him to participate somehow in the reform project. As 
mentioned already, Fraga had refused to collaborate with Suarez. Yet, to Fraga’s 
amazement, Suarez offered him the Presidency of the Competence Tribunal. ‘A post’, 
Fraga wrote in his diary, ‘with no category; a third degree retirement.’ Fraga, who 
already had other plans, politely refused.338 As Rogelio Baon points out, ‘Suarez’s 
clumsiness in wanting to retire Fraga from politics, spurring on Fraga’s hurt pride, led to 
an insuperable enmity [between them] ’.339 Indeed, Fraga’s unfortunate conversation 
with Suarez may have fuelled Fraga’s already strong determination to create a powerful 
political party through which he could ascend to the presidency of the country. His 
Reforma Democratica already had 12,000 militants and around 170,000 sympathisers,
335 GODSA, Boletin, No. 3, September 1976, pp. 3-4.
336 Fraga, En busca, p. 56.
337 Cambio-16, 9-15 August 1976, p. 5.
338 Fraga, En busca, p. 58.
339 Baon, “Fraga y su poliedro”, p. 94.
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but he lacked the necessary funds.340 As already mentioned, Fraga’s controversial 
statement favouring the legalisation of the Communist party did not go unnoticed. Felix 
Pastor Ridruejo recalls having received two anonymous communiques, but given that 
the money RD was receiving through Paris was believed to come from American 
political interests, the communiques may have had the same origin. One communique 
stated that Fraga’s declaration meant the end of his political career. The other 
communique announced the cut in funding that had been providing RD with money.341 
Under the circumstances, Fraga had to find political partners who could attract financial 
support for RD.
During his meeting with Pio Cabanillas and Jose Maria de Areilza, which took 
place on 13 September, Fraga tried to attract them to his political group but failed. 
Cabanillas seemed to agree with Fraga’s thesis concerning the existence of a Francoist 
social base (what they have called Franquismo Sociologico), a general desire for peace 
and order and, therefore, the urgency to create a great Conservative Party. Fraga 
insisted that known Right-wing figures such as Federico Silva (although clearly 
Christian Democrat), Laureano Lopez Rodo, Cruz Martinez Esteruelas and Gonzalo 
Fernandez de la Mora would accept the reform and they (Cabanillas, Areilza and Fraga) 
would have to accept them as “travelling companions” (companeros de viaje). For his 
part, Fraga considered his own place to be on the Right, and claimed that the ‘Union of 
the Right’ would be positive since they would transform it into a ‘civilised Right’. 
Also, Fraga was convinced that the establishment powers would accept this coalition. 
At the end of the meeting, Fraga handed Areilza and Cabanillas the draft of a 
programme-manifesto for a political party and asked for their comments. The party was
340 Cambio-16, 19 July 1976, p. 21.
341 Testimony of Felix Pastor Ridruejo, 17 May 2000.
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to be called Alianza Popular, and he begged them for a prompt response as the 
presentation of the party could be organized in the next few days. Such a union would 
imply a detachment from Suarez’s political strategy, but Areilza disagreed, as he 
believed that Suarez’ reform plan was both a good one and plausible.342 Anyway, 
Areilza and Cabanillas were already embarked on another political adventure, the 
formation of the Partido Popular. Fraga, therefore, had to find other partners for his 
project.
The solution to Fraga’s problem came soon, however. He was convinced that 
the alliance of several associations of the Movement would definitely attract both 
financial backing and a large share of the electorate (according to contemporary surveys 
around sixty-six per cent of Spaniards would give their vote to the alliance343) and, in 
any case, a strong coalition would require a strong leader. Fraga was convinced that 
there was a potential electorate who believed that a strong regime was the only 
government capable of both safeguarding their interests, and implementing effective 
solutions for the social problems brought on by democracy. These social problems, 
such as urban vandalism, student demonstrations, regional unrest, terrorism, 
unemployment, and economic crisis, among others, which had in fact been endured by 
Spain since the latter part of the 1960s, could only be solved by a strong authority.
Given these considerations, on 15 September Fraga began formal talks with 
several politicians of the various associations of the Movement, including Federico 
Silva, leader of a Christian Democrat group; Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora; and Cruz 
Martinez Esteruelas, who led a faction of the UDPE, a political association created by 
Herrero Tejedor and later presided over by Adolfo Suarez; and Raimundo Fernandez
342 Areilza, pp. 42-4; Cambio-16, 30 August-5 September 1976, p. 6-9.
343 Cambio-16, 27 September-3 October 1976, p. 15.
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Cuesta, who led the Frente Nacional Espanol (FNE). The idea was for the creation of a 
sort of Federation de Asociaciones del Movimiento (FAMO). The project seemed 
promising since, allegedly, a consortium of entrepreneurs led by Idelfonso Fierro had 
offered an initial two-thousand million pesetas and an additional thousand million per 
annum to finance a conservative party. Furthermore, it appeared that several banks, 
such as Coca, Fierro, Popular, Banesto and Central, were also willing to support the 
coalition of Right-wing parties. In fact, prompt support from the banking world was 
possible since three of Fraga’s new partners had close links with several banks. For 
instance, Monreal Luque, vice-president of the Silva’s UDE, was vice-president of the 
administrative council of the Banco Coca; Lopez Rodo was linked to the Opus Dei’s 
Banco Popular, Atlantico, etc.; and, Martinez Esteruelas was close to Banca March. In 
addition, international support for the proposed conservative party was provided through 
Silva Munoz who had links with the German Christian Social Bavarian Party of Josef 
Strauss. International support could also come from the United States since, as 
Cuadernos para el Dialogo points out, Kissinger was said to be willing to support the 
union of moderate parties. In fact, American assistance already provided to the UDPE 
could be transferred to the new alliance.344
Fraga had informed members of Reforma Democratica of his contacts with other 
political leaders. The objective of these meetings was that of creating a political force 
which could defend reform against the continuismo and ruptura options. On 23 
September Fraga met Laureano Lopez Rodo with whom he discussed the drafting of a 
possible manifesto.345 To facilitate this, on 28 September members of the National
344 Fraga, En busca, p. 58; Cambio-16, 27 September-3 October 1976, p. 15; Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 108, 
25 September-1 October 1976, pp. 18-19.
345 Lopez Rodo, Memorias IV, pp. 274-5.
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Administrative Council of RD gave Fraga a vote of confidence to form a political 
alliance, and agreed to legalise RD under the Law of the Right of Association of 14 June 
1976. In that way, the group applied for its registration on 2 October 1976.346
Following further contacts, Fraga finally announced the creation of his group. 
On 9 October seven prominent Francoist personalities united their political groups in the 
AP. AP was a federation of small parties of similar ideological tendencies centered 
around the most established party, the RD, under the leadership of Manuel Fraga. These 
personalities and their groups were Federico Silva’s Accion Democratica Espanola, 
(ADE)347; Laureano Lopez Rodo’s Accion Regional (AR)348; Licinio de la Fuente’s 
Democracia Social (DC)349; Manuel Fraga’s RD350; Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora’s 
Union Nacional Espanola (UNE) ; Enrique Thomas de Carranza’s ANEPA ; Cruz 
Martinez Esteruelas’ UDPE . This collective became popularly known as the
346 GODSA, Boletin, No. 3, September 1976, p. 5. See also, Ibid., No. 4, October 1976, Dossier especial p. 15.
347 Silva left the UDE due to his decision to join Fraga’s AP, and a few weeks later created a new party, Accion 
Democratica Espanola. See Silva, Memorias Politicos, pp. 337-47. ADE was officially registered on 27 January 
1977. Registry of Political Parties. Interior Ministry, various documents under Accion Democratica Espanola, No. 
35.
348 L6pez Rod6 created Accion Regional together with Jose Maria Ruiz Gallardon and Jose Maria Guitian, which was 
registered on 4 December 1976. The party was dissolved on 4 March 1977 when, together with five parties of AP, it 
united in a single block. Registry of Political Parties. Interior Ministry, various documents under Accion Regional, 
No. 32.
349 De la Fuente joined AP as an independent and created Democracia Social which, curiously, was registered and 
cancelled on the same day in March 1977. Licinio de la Fuente, Valid la pena, (Madrid: Edaf, 1998), pp. 274-5; 
Registry of Political Parties. Interior Ministry, various documents under Democracia Social, No. 243.
350 Members of Reforma Democratica applied for its legalisation on 2 October 1976, which was finally approved on 
29 December 1976. Ministerio del Interior, various documents under Reforma Democratica, No. 15.
351 Fernandez de la Mora’s UNE was re-registered under the new law on 4 October 1976. Registry of Political 
Parties. Interior Ministry, various documents under Union Nacional Espanola, No. 3.
352 Around mid-1976 there was a schism within ANEPA. Rodriguez de Varcarcel’s party was divided into a 
conservative group led by Thomas de Carranza, and a moderate group led by Jos6 Ramon Alonso y Rodriguez 
Nadales. Later on, and once part of AP, Carranza’s group was registered as Centro Popular on 2 November 1976. 
Incidentally, a few months later, Carranza’s group changed denomination once again. On 7 March 1977, Carranza 
registered a new party as Union Social Popular, perhaps with the remains of Centro Popular (although the 
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Magnificent Seven or Los Siete Magnificos. The King considered the alliance ‘an 
explosive mixture’.354
Apart from the UDPE and RD, the remaining groups that formed AP were all 
ephemeral (fantasmales). In March 1977, five of these parties united around Fraga’s 
RD thereby becoming a single block, and together with Silva’s ADE and Fernandez de 
la Mora’s UNE became the Partido Unido de Alianza Popular?55 The seven leaders 
signed AP’s political manifesto on 9 October 1976. As is explained later, RD’s initial 
centrist programme was wrapped in a nostalgic Francoist rhetoric transforming it into a 
very conservative manifesto away from Fraga’s long-preached moderation. AP’s 
fourteen-point manifesto included the unity of the Patria, defence of public order, 
defence of the family, support of the Monarchy, promotion of education, science and 
culture, the strengthening of free enterprise and a market economy and the defence of 
‘public morality’. Jose Maria Ruiz Gallardon considered the manifesto to be ‘a serious 
and elaborate document with power for a [political] appeal (llamamiento). Its 
approaches and the solutions that it offers make of the Alianza Popular a Conservative 
Party’. In the Manifesto, the seven leaders claimed to share the philosophy of the 
populist, centrist and conservative European Centre parties. They declared that the 
current Spain, with its defects and virtues, was the starting point and, therefore, they 
refused any rupturist option. Thus, their aim was to create a political force based on 
‘perfecting continuity’ (continuidadperfectiva) and ‘responsible reform’.357
354 Lopez Rodo, Memorias IV, pp. 276-8; Federico Silva Munoz, Memorias Politicos, pp. 347-9.
355 Jorge de Esteban and Luis L6pez Guerra, Los partidos politicos en la Espafia actual, (Barcelona, 1982), p. 162. 
See also Baon, “Fraga y su poliedro”, p. 95.
356 Quoted in Alvarez de Miranda, Del “contubernio ”, p. 114.
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AP opted for the so-called continuismo reformista, in other words it offered
358continuity with limited reform, a similar approach to that of Anas Navarro. 
Therefore, the majority of the Spanish press regarded Fraga’s proposal as insufficient 
and unacceptable. For instance, Triunfo compared it with ‘a catalogue of the country’s 
illnesses: those illnesses which were already present or being sowed when the 
signatories were ministers and could have cut their root. Or perhaps they could not’. So 
if they did not solve the country’s problems before, who could believed they would
-1 CQ
solve them now. El Pais followed a similar line, and added that AP was nothing but 
the alliance of the shadows of Francoism: that is an amalgamation of Opus Dei, Catholic 
Action, Falange and corporativism. The Spanish Right was represented by the same
“X a hfaces and the same ideas, which did not bring much hope and enthusiasm.
The administrative council of RD had given Fraga a vote of confidence for 
making a political alliance, but the result was disappointing. Carlos Argos wrote in the 
GODSA bulletin that ‘the men who militate in RD must demonstrate and point out that 
the AP’s manifesto has not meant any contradiction with the ideological schemes that 
we have strictly kept from the Llamamiento para la Reforma Democratica until 
today.’ Today, Carlos Argos declares that, in fact, he disagreed with Fraga’s choice 
of partners and believed that RD had actually nothing to do with the new AP. Argos 
admits that he continued with Fraga out of respect for his person and their personal 
friendship. He recalls that many people, including him, warned Fraga of the mistake of 
forming a coalition with such Right-wing politicians, but Fraga did not listen. Fraga’s 
stubbornness resulted in most RD members leaving the party. For them, Fraga’s U-turn
358 El Pais, 10 October 1976, p. 8; In his Un Objetivo Nacional Fraga had already advocated the solution ‘continuity 
with reform’. See Fraga, Un Objetivo Nacional, p. 194; Sevilla Merino, La intervencion de AP en el proceso 
constituyente de 1978, PhD Thesis, p. 22.
359 Triunfo, No. 716, 16 October 1976, p. 11.
360 El Pais, 10 October 1976, p. 6.
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to the Right was clear. In fact, Fraga was an isolated progressive member in a very 
conservative party.362 According to El Pais some of Fraga’s followers from the Balearic 
Islands expressed their discontent in a communique which read that ‘according to their 
judgement, such alliances are not acceptable since they are in contradiction with the
• 363position that this group has promoted and, in good faith, proselytized’.
Members of Silva’s UDE and even some of Fernandez de la Mora were also 
highly disappointed by AP’s regressive character. Allegedly, a Christian Democrat was 
said to be happy with Silva’s inclusion in AP because in that way it was left clear where 
Christian Democracy started and where neo-Falangism ended.364 On 6 October 1976, 
UDE members held a meeting to decide whether to unite with the Equipo de la
' i / ' r
Democracia Cristiana or with other Right-wing forces. As Silva records, during a 
meeting of the Spanish Christian Democratic forces held at the Hotel Ifa, in Madrid, he 
attempted to form an alliance with the Equipo that failed. Gil-Robles always blamed the 
Right-wing forces of the Spanish Christian Democracy for being “collaborationists” 
with the regime (Silva had been Minister of Public Works with Franco). According to 
Gil-Robles ‘to accept these people would mean a total loss of prestige for [the Spanish] 
Christian Democracy in the eyes of the world’. In these circumstances, Silva proposed 
the incorporation of UDE with Fraga’s AP, but the UDE members were unanimous in
361 GODSA, Boletin, No. 3, September 1976, p. 5; Ibid, No. 4, October 1976, pp. 2-5.
362 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000; According to Anxel Vence, Carlos Argos referred to AP’s leadership 
as ‘a wax museum’. See Anxel Vence, Doctor Fraga y  Mister Iribarne, (Barcelona: Ed. Prensa Iberica, 1995), p. 
216. Richard Gunther, El sistema departidospoliticos en Espana: genesis y  evolucion, (Madrid: CIS, 1986), p. 97.
363 El Pais, 30 September 1976, p. 12.
364 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 181, 30 October-5 November 1976, pp. 20-1; Cambio-16, 4-10 October 1976, 
pp. 12-3.
365 The Equipo de la Democracia Cristiana was formed by the Izquierda Democrata Cristiana (IDC) with 
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Verdejo; and the Union Democratica del Pais Valenciano (UDPV) led by Vicente Ruiz Moraval. See Osorio, De 
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their negative response. Silva, however, decided to join AP, leaving the majority of the 
UDE members under Osorio’s leadership.366 Although Silva provided funds from the 
Banco Espanol de Credito and from CAMPSA (the Spanish petrol company), his 
departure did not affect the financial situation of the UDE since a number of its 
members including Alfonso Osorio, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Andres Reguera, Bau Carpi 
and Ignacio Gomez Acebo, could also provide funds from various sources including
'icn
banks and private companies.
The Christian Democrat Federico Silva found in AP personalities of the Falange, 
Opus Dei, and even the Ultra-Right (Thomas de Carranza was a founding member of 
Bias Pinar’s Ultra-Right party Fuerza Nueva). Such a collection of conservative groups 
undermined AP’s acclaimed centrist tendency.368 In February 1976, for instance, 
Fernandez de la Mora had declared that the term ‘centre is nothing substantive, an 
accidental location, a resultant opportunism, a residue’. Before that, De la Mora had 
advocated the ‘return to the 18 of July before the party system (partitocracia), class 
struggle, separatism and the parity with Europe’.369 Also, bitter disputes with Opus 
Dei-linked personalities, namely Laureano Lopez Rodo, which led to Fraga’s own 
dismissal from the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1969, seem to have been 
forgotten.
Fraga complained that Suarez stole his idea of the centre but, as Carlos Argos
-17A
recalls, the truth was that Fraga abandoned the centrist position when he created AP. 
Rogelio Baon believes that Fraga had realized (perhaps during their conversation on 8
366 Silva, Memorias Politicos, p. 345. Gil-Robles is quoted in Osorio, De Orilla, p. 216.
367 Cuadernospara el Dialogo, No. 181, 16-22 October 1976, p. 18.
368 A brief background of the ‘Magnificent Seven’ can be found in Rafael L6pez-Pintor, “Francoist Reformers in 
Democratic Spain: The Popular Alliance and the Democratic Coalition”, in Howard Penniman and Eusebio Mujal- 
Leon, Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979 and 1982. A study of the National Elections. (AEI, 1985), pp. 191-196.
368 Lopez Rodo, Memorias IV, p. 276.
369 Quoted in Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 181,16-22 October 1976, p. 18.
370 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000.
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September) that Suarez wanted to play the moderate card, and because he did not want 
to be left without a political place Fraga turned to Francoist society.371 By allying 
himself with the rest of the AP founders, Fraga was implicitly renouncing a reformist 
position that he himself had defended in lectures, interviews, articles and books for 
years.372 Fraga probably believed that RD’s centrist manifesto would work for AP, but 
the outcome was completely the opposite. Following the presentation of AP, Cuadernos 
para el Dialogo wrote, ‘the miracle has happened: the government can now boast of 
having an opposition in the Right, which allows it to play the role of the centre in public 
opinion.’ Fraga had created AP six months before the creation of UCD, therefore, he 
could have continued his centrist pose by allying himself with true reformists. Yet, 
finance - provided by the alliance with first-rank Francoists - and a potentially large 
electorate seemed to be more appealing than a truly moderate political force with no 
finance or electorate guaranteed.
Still, Fraga’s political U-turn was, perhaps, not completely unexpected. In May 
1976, Cuadernos para el Dialogo already regarded Fraga as ‘the great mystery of the 
[political] situation. [Fraga, who was the] first reformist of the Kingdom to accede to 
power, [...] has adopted attitudes lately that weaken his reformist wish (.que difuminan 
su voluntad reformadora). His speeches are more intransigent and his policy less 
tolerant. His eagerness to carry on with a hardly democratizing reform, and his identity 
of criteria about this [reform] with president Arias would be clear symptoms of a turn to 
the Right.’ According to the journal, Fraga’s political turn was planned to calm 
Franco’s cronies, the so-called bunker. Fraga wanted to get their confidence in order to
371 Baon, “Fraga y su poliedro”, p. 94.
372 Testimony of Carlos Argos, 12 April 2000.
373 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 181, 16-2 October 1976, p. 18.
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be on the shortlist for the presidency that the Council of the Realm - formed by known 
Ultras - presented to the King in the event of Arias’ resignation or dismissal.374
During a conversation with Osorio, Fraga justified the creation of AP by saying 
that it ‘was necessary to unite forces which had some importance and identity in the face 
of Spanish individualism and regional fragmentation; that this type of alliance reduced 
to next to nothing the possibility of a coup d ’etat; and, although the alliance leaned 
towards the Right it did not lean towards the Ultra-Right, and it was not as if  he had 
gone to the Right but that other members of the traditional Right had rectified [and 
swiftly] moved towards the Centre; and that they [AP] could also incorporate other 
Centrists groups.’ However, in his relations with his new partners, at some point 
Fraga could not help acknowledging that ‘politics make strange bedfellows’.376
Fraga was certain of AP’s victory. In April 1977 according to a survey, ‘more 
than forty per cent [of voters] would vote for Alianza Popular, whereas around twenty 
per cent would vote for the Democratic Centre’?11 But, Fraga’s conviction proved to be 
wrong. Nonetheless, as the Christian Democrat Fernando Alvarez de Miranda argues, 
‘undoubtedly Alianza Popular emerged with many possibilities, and one has to 
recognize Fraga’s merit in taming - with all the defects one could ask for - a recalcitrant 
and hostile Right to the idea of democratic participation.’378 Although that was really 
the outcome of the alliance, given the initial reason for AP’s creation (funds and survey 
evidence of a possible victory of an AP-like party), one is more inclined to understand 
Fraga’s decision to form AP as an opportunistic move which could give him both the
374 Ibid., No. 158, 8-14 May 1976, pp. 14-5.
375 Osorio, De Orilla, pp. 227-8.
376 Cuadernos para el Dialogo, No. 183, 30 October-5 November 1976, pp. 20-1.
377 Cambio-16, 4-10 April 1977, p. 9.
378 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio ", p. 114.
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presidency of the government and leadership of the transition. That position, however, 
was to be filled by Adolfo Suarez.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the political spectrum, Communist sympathizers 
celebrated an unexpected event. To the surprise of the whole nation, Adolfo Suarez 
legalised the PCE on 9 April 1976.379 As Fernando Abril Martorell declares, ‘Suarez 
took the decision alone, without tutorials. Here, everyone was willing to open up the 
political system but no one dared to take the necessary steps. Arias’ government, with
-lOA
Fraga, Areilza, etc. wanted to put limits to freedom, and that is impossible.’ The 
president’s decision had not been taken overnight, however. The road towards the 
legalisation of the PCE, Rodolfo Martin Villa, Interior Minister, recalls, started towards 
the end of 1976, but it was throughout the beginning of 1977 when the president and 
some others (including Martin Villa) confirmed their decision. They came to the 
conclusion that the inclusion of the Communists in a free political society would give
ID I
the government and the political reform full democratic credibility. Other members 
of the cabinet, namely Alfonso Osorio, remained hesitant and careful about taking such 
an important decision. Yet, a bloody incident by at the hands of Ultra-nght was to 
change definitely the course of events in favour of the Communists.
On Sunday 23 January nine members of staff of a legal office were assassinated 
by an Ultra-Right group in Atocha Street in Madrid. A massive demonstration followed 
organized by the PCE and the remaining Left-wing parties. The leaders of the PCE 
made a great effort to control its militants and the demonstration marched in silence,
379 Cambio-16, 18-24 April 1977, pp. 8-12.
380 Fernando April Martorell interviewed by Nativel Preciado, in Julia et al, Memoria de la Transicion, p. 207.
381 Martin Villa, Al servicio del Estado, p. 61.
382 Osorio, De Orilla, pp. 309-323.
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pain and calm.383 The image of a revolutionary PCE was vanishing, and, according to 
Osorio, Adolfo Suarez started to question if they could contemplate general elections 
without the Communists.384 With this in mind, Suarez commissioned a survey in order 
to assess the position of the Spanish public to the legalisation of the Communist party. 
In October 1976, a similar survey showed that 25 per cent were in favour and 35 per 
cent opposed. In March, when the new survey was ready, the result showed 40 per cent
- IO C
in favour and 25 against, the rest undecided. This result proved to Suarez, among 
others, the impossibility of carrying on without the Communists. So far as the law was 
concerned, the modification of the Penal Code and the approval of a Decree-Law of 
electoral norms on 18 March 1977 (which definitely integrated the political parties as a 
key element of the constitutional regime) were not obstacles for the PCE. As mentioned 
above, Santiago Carrillo had modified the party statutes to make them compatible with 
Spanish requirements.386
As expected, the reaction to the Communist legalisation in Francoist circles was 
turbulent, and especially among the military, with Admiral Gabriel Pita, Minister of the 
Navy, resigning from his post to voice his disapproval. The legalization of the PCE 
also took the reformists by surprise. Manuel Fraga, for instance, judged the early 
legalisation of the Communists as ‘a grave political error and judicial farce’, and as ‘a
- i o n
true coup d ’etat that has transformed reform into rupture’. Alfonso Osorio also 
disagreed with Suarez’s decision but he, and those who shared his opinion, had to come
383 Victoria Prego, “La dialectica de las pistolas”, in Julia et al, Memoria de la Transicion, pp. 178-9.
384 Osorio, De Orilla, p. 309.
385 Ibid., p. 315.
386 Fernando April Martorell interviewed by Nativel Preciado in Julia et al, Memoria de la Transicion, p. 207; Martin 
Merchan, Partidos Politicos, p. 104.
387 The military elite sent a note to Suarez which encapsulates their bitter feeling for the legalisation of the PCE. 
L6pez Rod6 records a summary of the note. See Lopez Rod6, Memorias IV, pp.308-9. See also, M.A. Bastenier, “El 
camino hacia las umas”, in JuliA et al, Memoria de la transicion, pp. 201-202.
388 Hernandez, Fue posible la concordia, p. 65.
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to terms with the reality.389 Anyway, not all reformists were of the same opinion. As 
Rodolfo Martin Villa recalls, ‘Santiago Carrillo, as the general secretary of the PCE, not 
only compromised himself by recognising and respecting the [national] flag, the 
monarchic form [of State] and the unity of Spain, but also maintained a position of 
collaboration with Suarez’s first cabinets in essential [matters], in a sincere eagerness to 
contribute to the establishment of democracy in Spain’.390 In any case, as Juan Jose 
Linz argues, ‘the democratic opposition at strategic moments shrewdly alternated 
between pushing and compromising, and the democratizing process went from the 
initial modest “reform”, initiated by the government, to a reform worked out with the 
democratic opposition (reforma-pactada), to a rupture with the past negotiated with the
1Q 1
opposition (ruptura-pactada). With the legalization of the PCE, there was only one
political space to be occupied, the Centre, and one important leader without a party, 
President Suarez. The marriage proved to be ideal.
7.4. The emergence o f Suarez's ‘Union de Centro Democratico’
Adolfo Suarez created the Union Centro Democratico (UCD) on 3 May 1977, 
just a few weeks before the election of 15 June. The UCD has been defined by the 
journalist Abel Hernandez as ‘a conglomerate of forces, some from the reformists of the 
regime, and others, from the moderate opposition. Secular and Catholic Spain 
converged in the UCD. There were Liberals, Christian Democrats, Populars, 
Conservatives, Social Democrats and Independents.’392 The core of the UCD was the 
Partido Popular, which originated one year prior to the formation of UCD.393 In the
389 Osorio, De orilla, p. 321
390 Martin Villa, Al servicio del Estado, p. 75.
391 Linz, “Transitions from authoritarian regimes”, p. 28.
392 Hernandez, Fue posible la concordia, p. 77.
393 Not to be confused with Jose Maria Aznar’s party of the same name.
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spring of 1976 Pio Cabanillas and Jose Luis Alvarez called on politicians with a 
Christian Democratic background, or affinity, to create a modem centrist party with an 
ample popular base. Thus, both leaders initiated talks with members of the moderate 
opposition, namely Liberals and Christian Democrats, which had started forming 
political parties and had already been forming alliances since 1974.394 These parties 
included the Izquierda Democrata Cristiana led by Fernando Alvarez de Miranda and 
Inigo Cavero; members of FEDISA such as Manuel Fraile; the Tacitos including 
Marcelino Oreja, Landelino Lavilla, Jose Luis Ruiz Navarro, Gabriel Pena, Jose 
Rodriguez Soler and Luis Gamir; delegates of the Movimiento del Apostolado Seglar; 
Social Democrats such as Jose Pedro Perez Llorca; centrist politicians such as Oscar 
Alzaga; and the non-Francoist elements of the UDE. After a series of meetings they 
resolved to form a party with Christian Democratic roots. The new party, they decided, 
was to be named Partido Popular Independiente or Partido Popular Democratico?95
The Partido Popular (PP) was presented on 10 November 1976 in a semi-public 
event which was attended by around sixty people, including prominent political figures 
including Jose Maria de Areilza, Pio Cabanillas, Jose Luis Alvarez, Miguel Herrero de 
Minon and Jose Luis Ruiz Navarro.396 As Jose Maria de Areilza recalls, ‘the 
participants manifested the absolute need to avoid the polarization of Spanish political 
life into two antagonistic blocks [...] The Partido Popular offers an alternative [...] 
This intermediate option, essential for the stability and the consolidation of the 
democracy, demands the joint performance of Independents and Liberals, Christian 
Democrats or Social Democrats. [...] The ideological differences [...] are easily
394 Gunther et al, El sistema de partidos, pp. 109-110.
395 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio ”, pp. 101-4,Cambio-16, No. 231, 10-16 May 1976, p. 24.
396 For a list of PP members see El Pais, 12 November 1976, p. 11.
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overcome today’.397 According to Carlos Huneeus, the PP was in fact, ‘to a great 
extent, the concretion of political approaches made before by Tacito’, and despite its 
clear Christian Democratic roots members of the party classified it as ‘inter-ideological’. 
The PP was the first party formed by politicians whose origins where both in the 
Francoist regime and the democratic opposition alike.398 The PP was also the first non- 
Leftist political party publicly to propose the legalization of the PCE.399
For some time, the leader of the group had not been chosen but, according to 
Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, ‘the promoting group of the PP wanted to use the good 
image of the Count of Motrico (Jose Maria de Areilza) in the Christian Democrat 
sector’.400 But, following the first party congress on 6 February 1977, which further 
alliances transformed into the Centro Democratico (CD), Pio Cabanillas became 
president and Jose Maria de Areilza vice-president. Allegedly, they wanted Areilza to 
run for the presidency of the government but, apart from internal discrepancies, it was 
the government and its hidden agenda that was mainly responsible.401 Not only did 
Areilza stand as the main rival to Adolfo Suarez for the presidency, but also he was 
already occupying the coveted centre space. Furthermore, Areilza’s successes during 
the PP campaign worried Suarez who, by March, had not finalized the organization of 
his own political party.402 The CD was well-organized, had a superior panel of 
moderate politicians and a centrist political ideology (rooted in Christian Democracy) 
which had been inherited from the PP and previously from FEDISA and Tacito. The
397 Areilza, Cuadernos, pp. 63-4.
398 Huneeus, La UCD, pp. 154-6.
399 Areilza, Cuadernos, p. 82. A few months earlier, Tacito had written ‘[we] believe that it is better to recognise and 
admit the Communist party as an existing reality than let it manoeuvre from clandestinely’. YA, 2 April 1976. 
According to Huneeus, Alfonso Osorio disagreed with this line moving away from the activities o f the group. 
Huneeus, La UCD, p. 102.
400 Alvarez de Miranda, Del "contubernio", pp. 103.
401 Areilza, Cuadernos, pp. 91-95. 7.
402 Osorio, De Orilla, pp. 334-5.
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CD was, therefore, Suarez’s best hope and the president was not going to miss an 
opportunity to grab the leadership of the party.
The idea of the CD members that they integrate all moderate parties into one 
single force failed, however. Ironically, many Christian Democrats did not join the PP 
or the CD. More specifically, the Izquierda Democratica and the Federacion Popular 
Democratica of Jose Marla Gil-Robles (son) did not join .403 One year before the 
elections, the Equipo de la Democracia Cristiana, of which Gil-Robles’ party was a 
member, was important enough to become one of the main pillars of Spanish political 
life. But, according to the historian Javier Tusell, ‘its [Christian Democracy] 
sectarianism and identification, on occasions, with a Left which its own electorate 
repudiated, reduced it to a purely testimonial position’.404
During a dinner held at the house of Landelino Lavilla on Saturday 19 March, 
Alfonso Osorio told the other guests -  CD members Pio Cabanillas, Leopoldo Calvo- 
Sotelo, Juan Carlos Guerra, Jose Luis Alvarez, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Inigo 
Cavero, Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, Celso Garcia and the Marquis of Urquijo - that the 
government believed that Areilza wanted to substitute Suarez rather than support him. 
If that was the case and CD’s members agreed with this idea, they could go on with 
Areilza, but they should forget about government support. CD needed governmental 
support and, given the internal dissent over Areilza’s leadership, the choice was clear 405 
On Tuesday 22 March, Suarez met Pio Cabanillas and Jose Maria de Areilza. 
On following days Suarez met other CD personalities, namely Francisco Fernandez
403 Ibid., p. 338; Huneeus, La UCD, pp. 156-7. By then, Izquierda Democratica had suffered a serious set back over 
their policy towards the PCE. Some of its members, including Fernando Alvarez de Miranda and Inigo Cavero had 
left the party over their disagreement to collaborate with the PCE to form the Partido Popular Democrata Cristiano. 
Powell, Esparia en democracia, p. 157; Cambio-16, 29 March-4 April 1976, p. 7; Cambio-16, 12-18 April 1976, pp. 
16-7.
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Ordonez, Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Jose Luis Alvarez, Joaquin Garrigues and 
Ignacio Camunas. Following his meeting with Suarez, Jose Maria de Areilza was 
certain that,
Suarez did not want any sort of competitor, neither today nor tomorrow, in his presidency. Out 
of the two rivals he could have, only two worry him today: Manuel Fraga and myself. In order 
not to have two adversaries [Suarez] makes a pact with one [Areilza]. [But] what is the pact? 
The pact does not exist. In his [Suarez’s] words there is a revelation of a political purpose of 
great importance. It consists of taking a heavy majority of between 150 and 200 deputies to the 
Cortes, [who are] able to control the Parliament alone. What for? To have a lasting cabinet, to 
finish the reform, to draw up the Constitution and put into practice the necessary economic and 
social plan [...] What [political] color can that project have? Nowadays, there is no free space 
but the Centre.
A few days later, Areilza resolved to leave the PP and the CD.406
On 3 May 1977 the Union de Centro Democratico (UCD) was created under the 
leadership of the president, Adolfo Suarez. According to Manuel Nunez Perez, Adolfo 
Suarez’s UCD was an enterprise whose objective was to pass from an authoritarian 
system to a democracy in peace and with everyone’s collaboration.407 UCD was made 
up of a combination of moderate members of the Francoist regime such as Pio 
Cabanillas, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez and Adolfo Suarez (although Suarez was 
never considered part of the aperturista sector), and members of the moderate 
opposition such as Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Inigo Cavero, Joaquin Garrigues 
Walker and Ignacio Camunas. Thus, UCD was composed of a total of thirteen political 
parties which themselves were made up of smaller groups, coming to a total of forty- 
three.408 In contrast with the historic Socialists, Communists, Partido Nacionalista
404 Quoted in Gunther et al, El sistema de partidos, p. 129. See also, Ibid., pp. 125-9.
405 Osorio, De Orilla, pp. 335-6; Attard, Vida y  Muerte, pp. 39-40; Cierva, La Derecha, pp. 350-2.
406 Areilza, Cuadernos, pp. 122-3.
407 Testimony of Manuel Nunez Perez, 22 September 1999.
408 The thirteen larger parties were: (i) the Federacion de Partidos Democratas made up of nine smaller parties and 
led by Joaquin Garrigues Walker and Antonio Fontan, among others; (ii) the Federacion del Partido Popular 
consisting of seven parties and led by Pio Cabanillas, Pedro Perez Llorca, Jos6 Luis Ruiz Navarro, among others; (iii) 
Federacion Social Democrata formed by ten political parties and with politicians like Jose Ramon Lasuen; (iv) the 
Partido Social Democrata formed by six parties and led by Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Rafael Arias Salgado and 
Luis Gonzalez Seara; (v) the Union Democrata Murciana led by Antonio Perez Crespo; (vi) the Union Canaria led 
by Lorenzo Olarte Cullen; (vii) the Partido Gallego Independiente led by Jose Luis Meilan; (viii) the Partido Social 
Democrata Independiente-, (ix) the Partido Social Andaluz led by Manuel Clavero Arevalo; (x) the Accion
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Vasco (PNV) and the Catalan Convergencia I  Unio, none of the parties that formed
UCD had a long history. In fact, most of them had been created during the period of the
transition and only very few before Franco’s death.409 UCD’s political programme had
been mainly provided by the Tacito group although it also included contributions from
other important members 410 Thus, despite their inexperience as far as political parties
were concerned, the long trajectory of the moderate Francoists, and more specifically, of
the moderate opposition in their determination to establish a democratic system in Spain
proved essential to building and running a centrist party. Suarez’s party proposed:
To offer the electorate a moderate position, like the one represented by non-Marxist 
preponderant parties in Europe, of Christian Democratic, Liberal and Social Democrat 
affiliation, in order to support president Suarez’s policy in the next elections, in the definite and 
peaceful consolidation of a stable democracy in Spain 411
The UCD won the first democratic elections since the 1930s with 35 per cent of 
the votes confirming Adolfo Suarez as president. The electorate chose the centre option 
rather than the extreme parties. On the one hand, the failure of Manuel Fraga’s AP must 
have been extremely disappointing and also humiliating, considering they achieved 
fourth place after the Communists. On the other, the Communists themselves, despite a 
third place, also failed to attract a large share of the electorate. The Left-wingers voted 
for the Socialists instead, which stood as the second political force in the country after 
Suarez’s UCD.
Regionalista Extremena led by Enrique Sanchez de Leon Morcillo, among others; (xi) the Partido Democrata 
Popular led by Ignacio Camunas; (xii) Partido Democrata Cristiano led by Fernando Alvarez de Miranda and Inigo
Cavero, among others; and (xiii) the Federacion Social Independiente led by Jesus Sancho Rof. See Martin
Merchan, Partidos Politicos, pp. 206-210.
409 Huneeus, La UCD, pp. 140-6.
410 Testimony of Manuel Nufiez Perez, 22 September 1999.
411 Quoted in Gunther et al, El sistema de partidos, p. 116.
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The result was as follows412:
Congress: UCD
PDC*
PNV
Others
PSOE
PCE
AP
34.6 per cent -166 seats 
29.3 per cent -118 seats 
9.4 per cent - 20 seats 
8.3 per cent -16 seats 
2.8 per cent -11 seats 
1.7 per cent - 8 seats 
13.9 per cent -11 seats
•frPDC stands for Partido Democrata de Cataluna
The arrival of democratic elections in 1977 marked the beginning of a new era in 
Spanish politics and indeed in society in general. The new democratic Cortes was the 
successful result of the ruptura pactada. For the first time the political tendencies of the 
country converged in a single parliament, the Spanish Cortes. By voting in favour of 
Suarez’s political reform, the members of the Francoist Cortes avoided their political 
withdrawal, which would have resulted in the victory of the rupturist option, and 
consequently guaranteed their continuity in active politics. In fact, seventy-seven 
members of the new democratic Cortes had also been part of the Francoist Cortes and 
were concentrated mainly in AP, and some in the UCD. Thus, only forty-four of the 
one-hundred and sixty-five UCD parliamentarians (16.3 per cent) had been members of 
the Francoist Cortes, whereas a staggering thirteen out of sixteen of the new AP 
parliamentarians had been members of the Francoist Cortes. Also, there were four old 
members of the Francoist Cortes amongst those labelled ‘Others’. The Francoist elite 
also seemed to have been replaced by more humble professions, thus far marginalized 
by the Francoist Cortes. In 1977, a variety of professions, including manual workers, 
technicians, employees and other professional sectors occupied the new Cortes. 
Furthermore, the dramatic decrease in military men to almost none was also another
412 Results taken from Augusto Delkader, “Las primeras elecciones libres”, in Julia et al, Memoria de la transicion, p. 
231.
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symptom of the change in regime.413 In any case, as the sociologist Richard Gunther 
argues, ‘a common and very wrong supposition, specially in the period 1976-1977, was 
to believe that to have been linked to the Movement was synonymous of having Right- 
wing political and social values; although, in fact, there were many Right-wing 
“Independents”, the most important [being] Adolfo Suarez, Fernando Abril and their 
most immediate collaborators’ 414
Thus, given the Francoist character of Manuel Fraga’s AP, we could say that the 
bulk of the UCD members of the old Francoist Cortes might have been identified with 
the reformist sector of the regime.415 Therefore, the new Spanish parliament was 
overwhelmingly reformist in membership along with members of the democratic 
opposition. A peaceful transition to a democratic regime had been made possible. 
Adolfo Suarez had succeeded in his job. According to the British journalist William 
Chislett, however, it was the King who had succeeded. ‘The King’, Chislett wrote in 
The Times, ‘as the successor to General Franco, has achieved the remarkable feat of 
being at the helm of a country which has moved from dictatorship to free elections in 
just eighteen months without serious upheavals apart from the sad deaths of sixty-seven 
people in political violence. The King’s achievement represents some kind of historical 
precedent. There is no doubt from whom he has learnt the art of political survival.’416 
Without the collaboration of rest of the population, however, the King would not have 
succeeded. The next step, that is, to consolidate the newborn democracy, was less easy.
413 Salustiano del Campo et al, “La elite politica.espanola”, in Sistema No. 48, March, 1982, pp. 37-8.
414 Gunther et al, El sistema de partidos, p. 123.
415 Lopez Rodo, Memorias IV, pp. 320-1.
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Conclusion
As seen in this Chapter, Franco’s death did not imply a dramatic change in 
Spanish political structures. Don Juan Carlos, who could not afford to alienate the 
Orthodox Francoists, had no other choice but to re-appoint the loyal Francoist Arias 
Navarro as President of the Government. But a few months after Arias’ re-appointment 
it was clear that he would not be the man to lead Spain to a democratic system. Despite 
popular pressure, Arias refused to reform the old system and clung to the idea of 
continuing the Francoist regime without Franco. During Arias’ second presidency 
(December 1975-July 1976), the reformist Ministers of his cabinet, specially Manuel 
Fraga (Interior Ministry) attempted to reform the system from above. But, Fraga’s 
reform proposal proved insufficient for the democratic opposition and even for members 
of his own team. Fraga was expected to lead the transition to a German-type of 
democratic regime, but his performance in the Interior Minister damaged his reformist 
image further. Fraga gained a reputation as duro or ‘tough’.
Popular uprisings and an active democratic opposition exerted enough pressure 
to provoke a cabinet crisis. The King asked for Arias’ resignation on 2 July 1976, and 
surprised everyone by appointing Arias’ Minister of the Movement, Adolfo Suarez, 
President. Manuel Fraga and Jose Maria de Areilza, who refused to participate in 
Suarez’s cabinet, created their own political parties instead. Their parties would attract 
the bulk of the regime. Fraga chose to change his long-standing centrist position to 
form AP, a Right-wing political party, with hard-liners of the regime. Secured finance 
and favourable opinion polls outweighed his acclaimed centrist mantra. Areilza led the 
centrist party Partido Popular, which later became the Union de Centro Democratico. 
President Suarez took over the leadership of the UCD, displacing his rival Areilza.
4,6 The Times, 17 June 1977, p. 16.
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UCD’s success in the elections confirmed Suarez’s presidency with a democratic 
mandate.
Suarez’s new cabinet showed signs of real willingness to change things. The 
main achievement was the holding of free democratic elections for the first time in more 
than forty years. Nonetheless, such an achievement could not have been made possible 
without the prior approval of the Law of Political Reform by the Francoist Cortes. The 
Reform Law approved in November 1976 ‘converted Spain into a democracy based on 
universal suffrage’.417 As this Chapter has tried to demonstrate, the success of Suarez’s 
reform, specifically the Reform Law, resulted from a combination of factors. Firstly, the 
King favoured the process of reform and advocated a democratic monarchy. Secondly, 
a strong democratic opposition used its influence not only to accelerate the process of 
reform but also help to guarantee the implementation of a minimum programme of 
reforms. Other sectors of Spanish society namely the press, the trade unions and even 
some members of the Catholic Church also influenced the population and exercised 
great pressure to the government. And thirdly, the long-standing preparation of the 
aperturistalizformisi sector of the regime for a post-Francoist era made a significant 
contribution.
By 1976, the regime reformists were aware that the social crisis could not be 
controlled much longer. Hence a number of reformists who were part of Suarez’s 
government elaborated the basis for a transformation of regime into a democracy ‘from 
above’, in an attempt to avoid the consequences of a rupturist option. Some regime 
members may have voted in favour of the Reform Law in a genuine wish for the 
establishment of a German-type of democratic system in Spain, but others surely voted 
in favour of the Law if only to guarantee their political survival. In record time,
From dictatorship to democracy (1976-1977) 330
Suarez’s government applied enough reforms to make democratic elections possible on 
June 1977. Before the elections, Suarez also legalized the PCE, which took the regime 
as a whole -  and Spain in general - by surprise. Despite the discrepancy of regime 
members, including some aperturistas/reformists, the regime learned to live with the 
Communists. After a long journey, the Spanish democratic Cortes housed 
parliamentarians of the plural society that was Spain. For the first time in a long while, 
not just one person, but a handful of Francoists (AP), a bulk of reformists (UCD) and 
the democratic opposition (some PSOE, PCE, PDC, PNV, etc.) elected by the 
population would decide the fate of the country.
417 Carr & Fusi, Dictatorship to Democracy, p. 222.
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Conclusion
After nearly forty years of existence, Franco’s regime ended with his death in 1975. 
Two days later, Prince Juan Carlos was proclaimed King of Spain and Head of State, 
marking the beginning of a new era. The transformation process from a dictatorial 
regime into a democracy was made possible thanks to the presence of a number of key 
actors. These actors included King Juan Carlos, the democratic opposition, pressure 
groups, the Spanish population, and the regime moderates, aperturistas and reformists. 
Studies on the transition to democracy in Spain have covered many aspects of the 
process, including the role of individual actors. Yet, a study of the trajectory of the 
regime moderates, aperturistas and reformists, has been so far neglected. The 
moderates, aperturistas and reformists, helped to implement Don Juan Carlos’ reform 
plans, and played an essential role in the approval of the Reform Law. The starting date 
of many studies on the transition process is normally taken as 1973, when Admiral 
Carrero Blanco was assassinated marking the unstoppable demise of the regime. Other 
studies start in 1969, when Don Juan Carlos was appointed Franco’s successor. But, the 
regime moderates’ awareness for the need to modernize the regime dates from as early 
as the 1950s. The purpose of this thesis has been the study of the trajectory of the 
regime moderates from the end of the 1950s until 1977. This study is essential to 
understand their contribution and positioning during the crucial time of the transition to 
democracy.
Although several aperturistas appeared as early as the mid-1950s, they mainly 
emerged during the economic boom of the 1960s as a result of the Francoists’ reluctance 
to introduce reforms. Franco’s regime underwent important changes throughout its
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nearly forty-years of its existence. The outstanding performance of the economy under 
the command of the Opus Dei-linked technocrats led to the creation of a large middle 
class in Spain, and brought unparalleled prosperity to many Spaniards. The economic 
boom was not matched by an appropriate programme of political reforms, which 
brought to the surface the contradictions between Franco’s institutions and the economic 
capitalist system that had developed in Spain. The so-called ‘real Spain’, which was 
enjoying better standards of living but was also starting to be conscious of the political 
limitations of the Spanish regime, contrasted with the ‘official Spain’, which refused to 
accept the need for political reform. During the 1960s, some members of the Francoist 
elite, however, understood that the most appropriate method for a peaceful transition to 
a post-Francoist Spain was the introduction of some reforms. At that point, the 
aperturistas ’ proposals were very mild, but still contrasted with the stubbornness of the 
inmovilista sector. In particular, the aperturistas supported an increase in popular 
participation in political affairs within the boundaries of the Movement, if only to avoid 
the emergence of a strong underground political force. In the late 1960s, aperturistas 
such as Manuel Fraga advocated the establishment of a network of political associations 
regulated by the Interior Ministry and outside the Movement.
The Francoist legal system, however, prohibited the formation of political 
associations and hence political parties. Until the 1964 approval of the Law of 
Associations, various laws had ratified the right of association. But the theoretical 
recognition of the right of association did not, in practice, grant permission to associate 
and meet freely. The 1964 Law gave people the opportunity to create entities with 
cultural, not political, purposes. On those grounds, some people, with different degrees 
of connection to the regime, developed alternative ways to meet in order to discuss the 
country’s political problems. These included private gatherings, publications
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(newspapers and magazines, which became popular following the 1966 Press Law), 
study groups or clubs (which normally were formed around a publication), trading or 
commercial societies, cultural associations and political dinners. Some of those who 
met in these gatherings became part of the aperturistas and some others -  the most 
progressive -  part of the democratic opposition (because they decided to ‘break’ with 
the legality of the regime and create their own political parties).
The legal ways allegedly to participate in the politics of the State were through 
the so-called ‘natural channels’ that is to say the family, municipality and unions, all 
represented in the Cortes. But, in reality not even the procuradores in the Cortes were 
able to make political decisions without Franco’s prior agreement. Some procuradores 
regarded the family sector of the Cortes as their only hope to increase popular 
representation through a network of associations of heads of families. The approval in 
1967 of the Organic Law of the State, the Law of Family Representation, and the 
Organic Law of the Movement revived hopes for greater participation in national 
politics. Yet, all of them failed to modernize the system of representation.
The period between 1967 and 1969 saw the emergence of a series of laws, which 
could have reformed the aspect of associationism in the Spanish political system. After 
an intense three-day debate in the summer of 1969, the Movement’s National Council 
approved a bill (the Legal Basis of Associations within the Movement) whereby 
political associations could be created within the boundaries of the regime. It only 
needed Franco’s signature, but Franco did not ratify it. To that end, the fact that the 
National Council (specially the aperturista sector) voted in favour of the bill implied the 
awareness for the need of greater participation in national politics, if  only to avoid the 
formation of a parallel and clandestine Spain. In the summer of 1969, the Caudillo 
appointed Don Juan Carlos as his successor and the stability of the government suffered
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a serious setback when inner problems of the regime were publicly exposed during the 
Matesa scandal. On the one hand, the Prince’s appointment led to the widespread belief 
that Francoism was secure in his hands. A few, however, claimed to have been aware of 
the Prince’s plans to reign over a democracy. On the other hand, the financial scandal 
brought to the limelight the acute separations between the different currents of opinion 
already existent within the regime. The regime showed its weaknesses infuriating 
Franco.
Meanwhile, despite Franco’s refusal to ratify the ‘Legal Bases for Associations’, 
the issue of political associations remained. In the autumn of 1969, Femandez-Miranda 
proposed to replace the old ‘National Delegation of Associations’ with one of ‘Family, 
Political Action and Participation’. The debate over the approval of the Minister's 
proposal renewed the unresolved conflict between inmovilistas and aperturistas. The 
debate prompted a group of National Councillors to send a note to the Minister urging 
him not to delay the process of associationism. Their plea was made in vain. Once 
again Franco ordered the council to withdraw the proposal, and the issue of associations 
was frozen. It was clear that Franco refused to advance, but it was also clear that a 
feeling in favour of reforms was now more widely spread among members of the 
regime, and that those who believed in the need for reform began to speak louder than 
ever.
Such was the case of Manuel Fraga, who after his dismissal from the Ministry of 
Information and Tourism in July 1969, set off on a political trajectory of his own. 
Fraga became the ‘man of the Centre’, and was regarded by many as the only one 
politician capable of providing an alternative to Carrero Blanco’s cabinet. Fraga 
advocated a centrist policy of reforms, including the right for the Spanish people to 
associate, which fell, however, quite short of the demands of the democratic opposition.
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Until then, Fraga’s main achievement had been the approval by the Cortes of the Press 
Law in 1966. Even though this law was criticized for its restrictive character, it did 
contribute to the deterioration of the Francoist foundations by opening the frontiers of 
information. Yet, while he was minister, Fraga’s reputation as a ‘hard-worker’ and 
aperturista was tarnished by his authoritarian character. For instance, Fraga did not 
protest when repression was used against in demonstrations or when there were 
persecutions of individuals in the cultural world and applications of the death penalty. 
Likewise, his aperturista reputation contrasted with a series of incomprehensible 
decisions such as the seizure, fine and closure of a number of newspapers and journals, 
whose launching had been authorized by him. The only time Fraga’s reformist side 
overshadowed his authoritarian side was between 1969 and 1975, outside the cabinet. 
From 1969, Fraga travelled around Spain delivering progressive speeches in favour of 
political reform and the introduction of a system of political associations. He secured 
the support of many young reformists, who became part of his study group later on.
The beginning of the 1970s saw the emergence of the political dinners organized 
by Antonio Gavilanes’ Centro de Estudios de Problemas Contemporaneos. Like Fraga, 
the guests at these dinners denounced the absence of possibilities to meet and discuss 
politics legally. Political dinners became a temporary substitute for political 
associations. The political dinners of the early 1970s coincided with the (quasi- 
official) political positioning of Prince Juan Carlos. Through several interviews 
conducted by foreign journalists and published abroad, the Prince hinted at his intention 
to reign over a European-type of democratic regime, which implied his acceptance of a 
pluralistic society. At the same time, the issue of political associations had been frozen 
by the Francoist authorities. Franco’s entourage was determined to fight against the 
pressing demands for reform, but an unexpected incident shook the stability of the
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regime. Carrero Blanco, guarantor of the continuity of the regime, was assassinated by 
ETA. The aperturistas and reformists of the regime as well as the democratic 
opposition knew the regime would not survive much longer after Franco’s death. Many 
started to prepare themselves for a Spain without Franco.
In those days, two major political groups emerged into the Spanish political 
scene directly from the reformist sector of the regime: Manuel Fraga’s study group, 
GODSA, and the Tacito. GODS A was created in 1973 with the objective of building 
the foundations for a political association and perhaps eventually for a political party. In 
fact, this is the study group that would eventually write the political manifesto of 
Fraga’s first political party. In those days, and while Spanish ambassador in London, 
Fraga was regarded by many as the only politician capable of bringing democracy to 
Spain. Tacito was also created in 1973 by forward-looking youth linked, directly or 
indirectly, to the ACNP and its Christian Democrat philosophy. Both groups wanted to 
arrive at a democratic system no by breaking with Franco’s regime but by reforming it.
By the time these two groups were well consolidated, the Francoist Cortes 
approved Arias’ Statute of Political Associations by Decree-law on 21 December 1974. 
From an initial idea of Prince Juan Carlos to unite the moderate forces of the regime, the 
government organized the creation of a political association under the leadership of 
Manuel Fraga, Jose Maria de Areilza and Federico Silva. In Fraga’s view, an 
association could only succeed if its programme contained a series of unquestionable 
conditions. The conditions included a parliament with a principal chamber elected by 
universal suffrage, the incorporation of the basic civic rights of the western world, 
freedom of association and trade unions and a friendly separation of Church and State 
all under the Monarchy of Don Juan Carlos. However, by early January 1975, Fraga’s 
acclaimed centrist programme was rejected by Arias’ government. In turn, Fraga’s
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refusal to form an association under Arias’ statute was one of the main reasons why the 
so-called ‘Triple Alliance’ did not prosper.
Following the failure of Arias’ plan, seventy-five personalities linked in different 
degrees to the regime, including members of GODSA and Tacito, created a commercial 
company in July 1975. The creation of FEDISA demonstrated the failure of Arias’ 
statute, and the differences between the so-called ‘official’ and the ‘real Spain’. In fact, 
as the Matesa scandal had demonstrated a few years earlier, FEDISA demonstrated that 
the ‘official Spain’ was not united. FEDISA was perhaps the most important negative 
response that the regime received from personalities who came from nearly all groups 
that had collaborated with it, including ex-ministers, and also men of high professional 
calibre. Therefore, it is worth emphasizing that despite their advocacy of a German type 
democracy (excluding the presence of the Communist Party), FEDISA’s demands for 
reform stood in clear contradiction with the regime’s politics. The Caudillo died on 22 
November 1975 in the midst of a social crisis and with an important part of his regime 
in favour of reform. Prince Juan Carlos took over as Head of State and was crowned 
King Juan Carlos I two days later. There was a general acclaim for change from not just 
the Spanish population and the democratic opposition but also from the regime 
reformists. To everyone’s surprise and disappointment, however, King Juan Carlos re­
appointed Arias as President of the Government.
Despite popular pressure, Arias refused to reform the old system and clung to the 
idea of continuing the Francoist regime without Franco. During Arias’ second 
presidency (December 1975-July 1976), the reformist Ministers of his cabinet, 
especially Manuel Fraga (Interior Ministry) attempted to reform the system from above. 
But, Fraga appeared more liberal than he really was. Fraga advocated a tightly 
controlled liberalization of the regime, not a fully democratic regime. His wish to
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reform the regime may have been sincere, but it was also insufficient. Fraga’s reform 
proposal proved insufficient not just for the democratic opposition but for members of 
his own team too. Fraga’s performance in the Interior Ministry damaged his reformist 
image further. Fraga gained a reputation as duro or ‘tough’. On many occasions, he 
allowed the use of police charges replicating the repression used during Franco’s time.
Popular uprisings often organized by an active democratic opposition created 
enough pressure to provoke a cabinet crisis. The King took the initiative and asked for 
Arias’ resignation on 2 July 1976, and surprised everyone by appointing a near 
unknown, Adolfo Suarez. Manuel Fraga and Jose Maria de Areilza, who refused to 
participate in Suarez’s cabinet, created their own political parties instead. Their parties 
would attract the bulk of the regime. On the Conservative side there was Manuel Fraga 
who chose to change his long-standing centrist position to form Alianza Popular, a 
Right-wing political party, with hard-liners of the regime. The assurance of finance and 
favourable opinion polls outweighed his acclaimed centrist mantra. On the Centre side, 
Jose Maria de Areilza led the centrist party Partido Popular, which after subsequent 
developments became the Union de Centro Democratico. President Suarez took over 
the leadership of the UCD, displacing his rival Areilza.
From the start, Suarez’s cabinet showed signs of real willingness to change 
things. The main achievement was the holding of free democratic elections for the first 
time in more than forty years. Nonetheless, such an achievement could not have been 
made possible without the prior approval of the Law of Political Reform by the 
Francoist Cortes. The Reform Law approved in November 1976 did away legally with 
the old Francoist Cortes and gave way to a new democratic Cortes. Following Franco’s 
death, the regime had no raison d ’etre, and the regime members could not contain the 
spectacular changes in the Spanish society, which had been at odds with Franco’s
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regime for years. In fact, the reformists, who were part of Suarez’s government, helped 
to deliver the King’s reform plans, which would avoid the consequences of the ruptura 
option, proposed by the democratic opposition. Generational changes in regime circles, 
substantial socio-economic changes, mounting pressure of the population and the 
democratic opposition, and above all, the King’s advocacy of change, proved to be 
essential for the overwhelming acceptance of the Reform Law by the Francoist Cortes. 
The success of the Law was also largely the result of the moderates’ early awareness and 
advocacy of the need for political reform, as this thesis has tried to prove. It is 
impossible to say who, among the Francoist procuradores, advocated a deep reform of 
the system. Some procuradores may have genuinely wished for a true transformation of 
the regime, but others surely sought to guarantee their political survival. Anyway, by 
1976, the number of regime members who advocated reform had increased with the 
arrival of the young reformists in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They were basically 
the majority in Cortes.
Suarez’s government applied enough reforms to make democratic elections 
possible in June 1977. Before the elections, Suarez also legalized the PCE, a decision 
that took the regime as a whole -  and Spain in general - by surprise. Despite strong 
discrepancies between regime members, including some aperturistas/reformisXs, the 
regime learned to live with the Communists as part of the new Spanish society. After a 
long journey, the Spanish Cortes, finally a proper Parliament housed parliamentarians of 
the plural society that Spain had always been.
In summary, given the lack of research on the subject, this thesis offers a study 
of the political careers of the moderate members of Franco’s regime (as part of a group 
of actors who made possible the success of the transition to democracy in Spain)
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between the 1960s and 1970s. This detailed examination indicates that the participation 
of aperturistasfreformists in the process of transition to democracy had not been a 
decision taken overnight. It is clear that after Carrero’s death in 1973, or, more to the 
point, after Franco’s death in 1975, many members of the regime appeared to favour a 
democratic regime under Juan Carlos (without the Communist Party) merely as a 
strategy for political survival. But, as I have tried to prove throughout this thesis, there 
were people within the regime who had advocated the introduction of different degrees 
of reform already from the mid-1950s onwards, and particularly throughout the 1960s; 
in other words, well before their political survival was clearly at stake. It goes without 
saying, however, that after 1975 their willingness to participate in this process was 
undoubtedly conditioned by the new political climate in Spain. The lack of political 
reforms implemented by the Caudillo put the political survival of the regime, including 
that of its reformist members, at risk. But, their participation in the process of 
democratizing Spain was a natural step after their long-standing advocacy of reform. 
During the transition process, the regime’s reformists acted as a bridge between the 
hard-liners of the regime and a strong democratic opposition, helping King Juan Carlos, 
Adolfo Suarez and Torcuato Femandez-Miranda to implement the 1976 Reform Law 
which did away with the Francoist political structures. The ultimate importance of the 
regime reformist in the transition to democracy, therefore, cannot be understood in 
isolation. It is beyond question, however, that the lack of a group of regime reformists 
would have yielded a different transition process.
341
Bibliography
1. Primary Sources
1.1. Unpublished material 
Interviews
Carlos Argos Garcia, 14 September 1999
12 April 2000
Santiago Carrillo , 29 November 2001
Gabriel Cisneros Laborda, 13 September 1999
27 September 1999
Manuel Fraga Iribame, 28 March 2001
Antonio Gavilanes, 21 September 1999
12 April 2000
Francisco Jose Mayans, 21 June 2001
Manuel Nunez Perez, 22 September 1999
Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, 17 May 2000
Alfonso Osorio Garcia, 17 December 1998
21 September 1999
Felix Pastor Ridruejo, 17 May 2000
Pedro Perez Alhama, 12 September 1998
16 September 1999
Statutes of the following associations
Centro de Ensenanza e Investigation, S.A (CEISA). Ministerio del Interior. Registro 
Mercantil de Madrid.
Centro de Estudios para Problemas Contemporaneos. Ministerio del Interior. 
Registro Nacional de Asociaciones.
Asociacion Espanola de Cooperation Europea (AECE). Ministerio del Interior. 
Registro Nacional de Asociaciones.
Asociacion para el Estudio de Problemas Contemporaneos (ANEPA). Ministerio 
del Interior. Registro Nacional de Asociaciones.
Asociacion Club Siglo XXI. Ministerio del Interior [Madrid]. Registro Nacional de 
Asociaciones.
Bibliography 342
• Gabinete de Orientation y  Documentation, S.A. (GODSA) Ministerio del Interior. 
Registro Mercantil de Madrid.
• Federation de Estudios Independientes, S.A. (FEDISA). Ministerio del Interior. 
Registro Mercantil de Madrid.
1.2. Published Material
Documentation of various parties and associations
• APEPA/ANEPA
Memoranda of several lectures given during the ‘round tables’ organized by 
APEPA/ANEPA in Madrid:
• El futuro del poder politico, (Madrid, 1971)
• Desarrollo de Leyes Constitucionales e Integration Politico, (Madrid: APEPA, 
1971)
• El Estado y  la Iglesia en Espana, (Madrid, 1972)
• La participation politico, (Madrid, 1973)
• 40 Politicos ante el Futuro, (Madrid: Edipasa, 1974)
• GODSA
• GODSA-MADRID.
Parte I: Programa operativo inmediato.
Parte II: Configuration organica.
Parte HI: Estudio de futuras actuaciones: modelo barrio de Chamber!
Parte IV: Memoria y disciplina del club.
• Boletin de Information y  Documentation: Aiios 1976 y 1977.
• Llamamiento para una reforma democratica. (Madrid: GODSA, 1976).
Newspapers/ Periodicals
• ABC
• La Actualidad Espanola
• The Annual Register o f World Events. Ed. Ivison S. Macadam (Aberdeen, Longman, 
1955)
• Arbor
• Blanco y  Negro
• Boletin de la Asociacion Nacional de Propagandistas
• Boletin Oficial del Consejo Nacional del Movimiento
• Boletin Oficial del Estado
• Cambio-16
• El Ciervo
• Cuadernos para el Dialogo
• Cuadernos de Ruedo Iberico
• The Daily Telegraph
• Destino
• Don Quijote
• The Economist
Bibliography 343
• Familia Espanola
• Fuerza Nueva
• Gaceta Ilustrada
• Gentleman
• The Guardian
• The Herald Tribune
• Indice
• The Listener
• Le Monde
• Mundo
• The New York Times
• Newsweek
• OECD, Economic Survey. Spain
• The Observer
• El Pals
• Patterns o f Prejudice
• Las Provincias
• Revista de Estudios Politicos
• Revista del Instituto de la Juventud
• Revista de Occidente
• Sdbado Grafico
• Tiempo Nuevo
• The Times
• YA
Memoirs. Diaries, etc.
ALVAREZ DE MIRANDA, Fernando. Del ‘contubernio ’ al consenso. (Barcelona: 
Planeta, 1985).
AREILZA, Jose Maria de. Diario de un Ministro de la Monarqula, (Barcelona:
Planeta, 1977).
-, Cuadernos de la Transition, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1983).
-, Memorias exteriores, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1984).
-, Cronica de libertad, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985).
-, Cien artlculos, (1971).
-, Escritos Politicos, (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones,1968).
ARESPACOCHAGA, Juan de. Carta a unos capitanes, (Madrid: INCIPIT Editores, 
1984).
ARMANDO, Alfonso. Al servicio de la corona, (Barcelona: Planeta, Diciembre 1983,
3 ed.).
CALVO SERER, Rafael. Mis enfrentamientos con elpoder. (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes,
1978).
-, La dictadura de los franquistas. (Paris, 1973).
-, Espana, ante la libertad, la democracia y  elprogreso, (Madrid: Guadiana de 
Publicaciones, 1968).
CARRERO BLANCO, Luis. Discursos y  escritor, 1943-1973. (Madrid: Instituto de 
Estudios Politicos, 1974).
Bibliography 344
EATON, Samuel A. The forces offreedom in Spain, 1974-1979. A personal account. 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981).
Episcopado Espanol. Documentos colectivos del Episcopado Espanol, (1870-1974),
Ed. Jesus Iribarren, (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1974).
-, Estudios sociologicos sobre la situation en Espana, (Madrid: Euramerica de 
Ediciones, 1970).
-, Estudios sociologicos sobre la situacion en Espana, (Madrid: Euramerica de 
Ediciones, 1972).
-, Estudios sociologicos sobre la situacion en Espana, (Madrid: Euramerica de 
Ediciones, 1975).
FERNANDEZ DE LA MORA, Gonzalo. Rio arriba. Memorias. (Barcelona: Planeta, 
1995).
FERNANDEZ-MIRANDA, Torcuato. El Movimiento y  el Asociacionismo. (Madrid: 
Ediciones del Movimiento, 1970).
FRAGA IRIBARNE, Manuel. Memoria breve de una vida publica. (Barcelona,
Planeta, 1980) (7 Ed.).
-, En busca del tiempo servido, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1987).
-, Asi se gobierna Espana, (Madrid: Oficina de Information Diplomatica, 1949).
-, Legitimidad y  Representation, (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1973).
-, El Desarrolio Politico, (Barcelona, 1972).
-, Un Objectivo Nacional, (Barcelona: Dirosa, 1976, 3 Ed.).
-, La familia y  la Education en una sociedad de masas y  maquinas, (Madrid: Ediciones 
del Congreso de la Familia Espanola, 9 Ed., 1969).
-, Espana en la Encrucijada, (Barcelona: Adra, 1976).
-, Ramiro de Maeztu en Londres. Lecture given on 14 February 1975 in Madrid. (The 
same lecture was previously given by Fraga on October, 21 1974 in Vitoria 
under the name of Ramiro de Maeztu y  el pensamiento politico Britanico).
-, Alianza Popular. (Bilbao, 1977).
-, El Canon Giratorio. Conversaciones con Eduardo Chamorro. (Barcelona: Grijalbo,
1982).
-, Horizonte Espanol, (Madrid: Heroes, 1968, 3 Ed.).
FRANCO BAHAMONDE, Francisco. Franco ha dicho. Primer apendice. (1 enero 
1947-1 abril 1949), (Madrid: Ediciones Voz, 1949).
-, Fundamentos del Nuevo Estado. (Madrid: Eds. de la vice-secretaria de Educacion 
Popular, 1943).
-, Palabras del Caudillo (19 abril 1937-7 diciembre 1942), (Madrid: Ediciones de la 
vicesecretaria de Educacion Popular, 1943).
-, Discursos y  mensajes delJefe del Estado (1951-1954), (Madrid: Ediciones Espanolas, 
1955).
-, Discursos y  mensajes del Jefe del Estado (1955-1959), (Madrid: Ediciones Espanolas, 
1960).
-, Discursos y  mensajes del Jefe del Estado (1960-1963), (Madrid: Ediciones Espanolas, 
1964).
-, Discursos y  mensajes del Jefe del Estado (1964-1967), (Madrid: Ediciones Espanolas,
1968).
FRANCO SALGADO-ARAUJO, Francisco. Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco, 
(Barcelona: Planeta, 1976).
GOMEZ-SANTOS, Marino. Conversaciones con Leopoldo CALVO-SOTELO. 
(Barcelona: Planeta, 1982).
Bibliography 345
HERRERO DE MINON, Miguel. Memorias de estio. (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1993,
5 Ed.).
Leyes, etc, sobre el Derecho de reunion, asociaciones politicos... Ponencias de
Manuel Fraga Iribame, Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, y Landelino Lavilla. (Madrid, 
1976).
LINZ, Juan Jose et al, IV Informe FOESSA, Vol. 1, Informe sociologico sobre el 
cambiopolitico en Espana: 1975-81 (Madrid, 1981)
LOPEZ RODO, Laureano. La larga marcha hacia la monarquia, (Barcelona: Noguer,
1978).
-, Memorias, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, Junio 1990,4 Ed.).
-, Memorias II. Anos decisivos (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, Abril 1992).
-, Memorias III El principio del fin, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, Mayo 1993).
-, Memorias IV. Claves de la Transicion, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1992)
MARTIN VILLA, Rodolfo. Al Servicio del Estado, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1984).
MELIA, Josep. Asi cayo Adolfo Suarez, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1981).
MIGUEL, Amando de (Dtor) Informe Foessa, “Vida politica y Asociativa”, Chapter 5 
of the Informe Sociologico sobre la situacion social de Espana, (Madrid: 
Euramerica, 1970), censured by the Francoist press.
OSORIO, Alfonso. Trayectoria de un Ministro de la Corona, (Planeta, Barcelona,
1980).
-, De Orilla a orilla, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 2000).
PEMAN, Jose Maria. Mis almuerzos con gente importante. (Barcelona: Dopesa,
1972, 10 Ed.).
Representacion, Participacion y  Concurrencia. (Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 
1971).
ROMERO, Emilio. Tragicomedia de Espana. Unas Memorias sin contemplaciones. 
(Madrid: Planeta, 1988), 8 Ed.
SILVA MUNOZ, Federico. Memorias Politicos (Planeta, Barcelona, 1993).
Tdcito (Madrid: Iberico Rueda de Ediciones, 1975).
TIERNO GALVAN, Enrique. sueltos (Madrid: Bruguera, Septiembre 1981, 3r Ed.).
UTRERA MOLINA, Jose. Sin cambiar de bandera, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1990).
VELARDE FUENTES, Juan. Economia y  Sociedad de la Transicion. Anotaciones en 
las libretillas, 17 octubre 1976 - 17 octubre 1977. (Ed. Nacional, Madrid, 1978).
VILALLONGA, Jose Luis de. The King. A life of King Juan Carlos of Spain. (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1993).
2. Secondary Sources
2.1. Books and unpublished theses
ALCOCER, Jose Luis. Fernandez-Miranda: agonia de un Estado. (Barcelona:
Planeta, 1986)
AMODIA, Jose. Franco s political legacy. From dictatorship to fa?ade democracy, 
(London: Allen Lane, 1977).
ANDRES, Elias & PREGO, Victoria. La Transicion. Videos No. 1-13. (RTVE, 1995). 
ANTON, J. & CAMINAL, M. Pensamiento Politico en la Espana Contemporanea, 
1800-1950 (Ed. Teide, 1992) (pp. 1007-1041).
ARANGUREN, E.J. & LOPEZ PINA, A. La cultura politica de la Espana de Franco
Bibliography 346
(Madrid: Taurus, 1976).
ATTARD, Emilio. Vidaymuerte de UCD (Planeta, Barcelona, 1983).
BAYOD, Angel. Franco visto porsus ministros (Barcelona: Planeta, 1981).
BAON, Rogelio, Fraga, genio yflgura  (Madrid: El Burgo, 1983).
BARDAVfO, Joaquin y SINOVA, Justino. Todo Franco. Franquismo y antifranquismo 
de la A a la Z. (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 2000).
BERNALDEZ, Jose Maria. El Patron de la Derecha. Biografia de Fraga (Plaza y 
Janes, 1985).
BIESCOS, Jose Antonio & Manuel Tunon de Lara (Dtors.). Espana bajo la dictadura 
franquista (1939-1975) (Barcelona: Ed. Labor, Octubre 1982, 2 Ed.).
BUSE, Michael. La Nueva Democracia Espanola. Sistema de partidos y orientacion 
de voto (1976-1983) (Madrid: Union Editorial, 1984).
BURNS MARANON, Tom. Conversaciones sobre la Derecha (Madrid: Plaza y Janes, 
1997).
CABEZAS, Octavio. Manuel Fraga, semblanza de un hombre de Estado (Madrid: Sala 
Editorial, 1976).
CALVO SERER, Rafael. Espana, ante la libertad, la democracia y  elprogreso 
(Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, 1968).
-, La dictadura de los franquistas, (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1972).
-, Mis enfrentamientos con elpoder, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1978).
CAMPO VIDAL, Manuel. La Espana que hereda Felipe Gonzalez. (Argos Vergara,
1983).
CAMUNAS, Ignacio (Dtor.). Espanaperspectiva, 1968 (Aguilar Navarro et al.), 
(Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, 1968).
-, Espana perspectiva, 1970 (Raul Morodo et al.) (Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones, 
1970).
-, Espana perspectiva, 1972 (Dionisio Ridruejo et al) (Madrid: Guadiana de 
Publicaciones, 1972).
-, Espana perspectiva, 1973, (Jose Luis Aranguren et al) (Madrid: Guadiana de 
Publicaciones, 1972).
CAPEL MARTINEZ, Rosa Maria (Coord.). M ujery Sociedad en Espana 1700-1975 
(Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1982).
CARR, Raymond. Spain 1800-1975, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982).
-, The Spanish Tragedy. The Civil War in perspective. (London: Weidenfeld, 1977).
-, & FUSI, Juan Pablo. Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1979).
r
CEBRIAN, Juan Luis. La Espana que bosteza, (Barcelona: Taurus, 1980).
CERNUDA, Pilar. Ciclon Fraga, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1997).
CIERVA, Ricardo de la. La Derecha sin itemedz'o(Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1987).
CLEMENTE, Jose Carles. Historias de la transicion, 1973-1981. El fin del apagon, 
(Madrid: Fundamentos, 1994).
-, Conversaciones con las corrientes politicas de Espana, (Barcelona: DOPES A, 1971).
-, Conversaciones sobre el presente y  futuro politico de Espana, (Barcelona: Editorial 
Juventud, 1972).
COLLIER, Ruth Berms. Paths Towards Democracy, (Cambridge: CUP, 1999).
COVERDALE, John F. The Political transformation o f  Spain after Franco, (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1979).
DAVILA, Carlos & HERRERO, Luis, De Fraga a Fraga: cronica secreta de Alianza 
Popular, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1989).
Bibliography 347
DIAZ, Elias. Pensamiento Espanol en la era de Franco (1939-1975) (Madrid: Tecnos,
1983).
DIAZ-PLAJA, Fernando. La Espana franquista en sus documentos (Madrid: Plaza y 
Janes, 1976).
DOMINGUEZ ORTIZ, Antonio (Dtor.). Historia de Espana (Barcelona: Planeta, 1991). 
ENCINAR, J.J. & NOHLEN, D. Diccionario del Sistema Politico Espanol (Ed. Akal,
1984).
Equipo Mundo. (Eduardo Alvarez Puga, Jose Carlos Clemente y  Jose Manuel Girones).
Los 90 ministros de Franco (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1971, 3 Ed.).
ESTEBAN, Jorge de. Las constituciones de Espana, (Madrid: Taurus, 1981).
-, & Lopez Guerra, Luis. Los Partidos Politicos en la Espana actual. (Barcelona, 1982). 
-, De la Dictadura a la Democracia. Diario de un periodo constituyente. (Madrid: 
Universidad Complutense, Facultad de Derecho, Section de Publicaciones,
1979).
-, La Crisis del Estado Franquista (Barcelona: Labor, 1977).
FERNANDEZ AREAL, Manuel. La libertad de Prensa (1938-1971), (Madrid: 
Cuadernos para el Dialogo, 1971)
FERNANDEZ FARRERES, German. Asociaciones y  Constitucion (Madrid: Civitas, 
1987).
FERNANDEZ-MIRANDA, Pilar y Alfonso. Lo que el Rey me ha pedido. Torcuato 
Femandez-Miranda y la Reforma Politica. (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1996). 
FERRANDO BADIA, Juan. El Regimen de Franco. Un enfoque politico-juridico 
(Madrid: Tecnos, 1984).
-, Del Autoritarismo a la Democracia. (Madrid: Rialp, 1987).
FRAGA IRIBARNE, Manuel. Estructura politica de Espana. La vida social y politica 
en el siglo XX. (Madrid: Delegation Nacional de Juventudes, 1969).
-, et al. La Espana de los anos 70. 3 Volumes, (Madrid: Moneda y Credito, 1974). 
GARCIA ESCUDERO, Jose Maria. Historia politica de la Epoca de Franco,
(Madrid: Rialp, 1987).
GARCIA SAN MIGUEL, Luis. Teoria de la Transicion. Un analisis del Modelo 
Espanol, 1973-1978 (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1981).
GILMOUR, John. Manuel Fraga Iribame and the Rebirth o f Spanish Conservatism, 
1939-1990 (Cerdigion, Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999).
GIRONELLA, J.M. & BORRAS, R. 100 Espaholes y  Franco. (Barcelona: Planeta,
1979).
GUNTHER, R. et al. El sistema de partidos politicos en Espana (Madrid: CIS, Siglo 
XXI, 1986).
HARRISON, Joseph. The Spanish Economy. From the Civil War to the European 
Community (Cambridge: CUP, 1995).
HERNANDEZ, Abel (Ed.), Fue posible la concordia. Adolfo Suarez (Madrid: Espasa- 
Calpe, 1996).
HERNANDEZ GIL, Antonio. El Cambio politico espanol y  la Constitucion (Planeta: 
Barcelona, 1982)
Historia de Espana: Ramon Menendez Pidal. Dirigida por Jose Maria Jover Zamora.
Vol. XLI. Tomo 1. La epoca de Franco (1939-1975). Politica, Ejercito, Iglesia, 
Economia y Administration. (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1996).
Historia de Espana: Ramon Menendez Pidal. Dirigida por Jose Maria Jover Zamora.
Vol. XLI. Tomo 2. La epoca de Franco (1939-1975). Sociedad, Vida y Cultura. 
(Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 2001).
Bibliography 348
HUNEEUS, Carlos. La Union de Centro Democratico y  la transicion a la democracia 
en Espana (Madrid, CIS, 1985).
JAUREGUI, Fernando & SORIANO, Manuel. La Otra Historia de UCD (Madrid,
1980).
JIMENEZ BLANCO, Jose. De Franco a las Elecciones Generales (Madrid: Editorial 
Tecnos, 1978),
JULlA, Santos et a l Memoria de la transicion (Madrid: Taurus, 1996)
LINZ, Juan Jose. El Sistema de Partidos de Espana (Narcea Publications, New York, 
1967).
LOPEZ NIETO, Lourdes. Alianza Popular: estructura y  evoluciori electoral de un 
partido conservador, 1976-1982 (Madrid: CIS, 1988).
LOPEZ RODO, Laureano. Politica yDesarrolio (Madrid: Aguilar, 1970).
LOPEZ RODRIGUEZ, Victor. El Derecho de Asociacion (Madrid: Secretaria General 
Tecnica, Ministerio del Interior, 1983).
Manuel Fraga, Homenaje Academico (Madrid: Fundacion Canovas del Castillo, 1997), 
Vol. i & n.
MARAVALL, Jose Maria. Dictadura y  Disentimiento Politico. Obreros y estudiantes 
bajo el franquismo. (Madrid: Alfaguara, 1978).
MARTIN MERCHAN, Diego. Partidos Politicos. Regulation Legal, (Madrid: Servicio 
Central de Publicaciones de la Presidencia del Gobiemo, 1981).
MARTINEZ CUADRADO, Miguel. El Sistema Politico Espanol y  el comportamiento 
electoral regional (Madrid: Instituto Intemacional de Cooperation, 1980).
MARTINEZ ESTERUELAS, Cruz. La enemistadpolitica (Madrid: Ed. Nanta, 1971).
MAZO, Mariano del et al. Los "Cenocentristas ". Radriografia Politica de unas cenas. 
(Bilbao, 1970).
DE MIGUEL, Amando. Sociologia del Franquismo. Analisis ideologico de los 
Ministros del Regimen,(Barcelona: Euros, 1975).
-, Espana, marca registrada (Barcelona: Kairos, 1972).
MILIAN, Manuel. Fraga Iribarne: retrato en tres tiempos (Barcelona: Dinosa, 1975).
MORAN, Gregorio. Adolfo Suarez. Historia de una ambition (Barcelona:
Planeta, 1979).
MORODO, Raul. Los Partidos Politicos en Espana (Barcelona, 1979).
MUNOZ ALONSO, Alfonso. Un pensador para un pueblo (Madrid: Ediciones Almena,
1969).
NICOLAS MARIN, Encama & ALTED VIGIL, Alicia, Disidencias en el Franquismo 
(1939-1975), (Murcia: Diego Marin, 1999).
OLIAS DE LIMA GETE, Blanca. La Libertad de Asociacion en Espana (1968-1974), 
(Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, 1977).
PANIKER, Salvador. Conversaciones en Madrid (Barcelona: Kairos, 1969).
PAYNE, Stanley. Spanish Catholicism. An historical overview (London: University of 
Winsconsin Press, 1984).
-, Falange (Cambridge: CUP, 1962).
-, The Franco Regime, 1936-1975 (London: Wiscosin Press, 1987).
PINAR, Bias. Combate por Espana, Vols. I & II (Madrid: Fuerza Nueva, 1975).
POWELL, Charles. Reform versus Ruptura ’ in Spain s transition to democracy. DPhil 
Thesis. Oxford University, 1989.
-, Elpiloto del Cambio. El Rey, la monarquia y la transicion a la democracia 
(Barcelona: Planeta, 1991).
-, Juan Carlos o f  Spain. A self-made monarch (London: MacMillan Press, 1996).
Bibliography 349
-, Espana en democracia, 1975-2000, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 2001).
PREGO, Victoria. Asi se hizo la transicion, (Circulo de Lectores, 1995).
PRESTON, Paul. The Triumph o f Democracy in Spain. (London: Methuen, 1996).
-, (Ed.) Spain in Crisis. The evolution and decline of the Francoist Regime. (London: 
The Harvester Press, 1986)
-, Las Derechas Espanolas en el Siglo XX: Autoritarismo, Fascismo y  Golpismo 
(Madrid: Sistema, 1986)
-, The Politics o f Revenge. Fascism and the Military in 20th Century Spain. (Ed. Unwin 
Hyman, 1990).
-, Franco. A Biography (London: Fontana Press, 1995).
PUCHE, Ignacio. Hombrespara la alternativa, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985).
QUINTANILLA, Manuel. El Pensamieno de Fraga, (Ocejon Ed., Madrid, 1976).
Representacion, Participacion y  Concurrencia, (Madrid: Ediciones del 
Movimiento, 1971).
RODRIGUEZ JIMENEZ, Jose Luis. La extrema derecha en Espana: del
tardofranquismo a la consolidacion de la democracia (1967-1982) (Ed. CSIC, 
1994).
RUIZ AYUCAR, Angel. Cronica agitada de ocho anos tranquilos, 1963-1970 (Madrid: 
Ediciones San Martin, 1974).
r r
SANCHEZ, Angel. Ouien es quien en la democracia espanola. (Barcelona: Flor de 
Viento, 1995).
SEGURA, Ignasi. Los catalanes de Franco (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1998).
SENTIS, Carlos. Politicos para unas elecciones: Manuel Fraga Iribame. Perfil 
humano y politico. (Madrid: Editorial Cambio-16,1977).
SEVILLA MERINO, Teresa. La intervencion de Alianza Popular en el proceso 
constituyente de 1978, PhD Thesis. Universidad de Valencia, Facultad de 
Derecho, 1988.
SMITH, Angel. Historical Dictionary o f Spain, (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1986).
Spain at a glance, (Madrid: Ministerio de Information y Turismo, 1964).
TAMAMES, Ramon. Espana 1931-1975. Una antologia historica. (Barcelona: Planeta,
1980).
THRELFALL, Monica. Consensus Politics in Spain. Insider perspectives. (Bristol: 
Intellect, 2000).
TIERNO GALVAN, Enrique. Leyes pollticas espanolas fundamentals, 1808-1978. 
(Madrid: Tecnos, 1984).
The Encyclopedia Americana. International Edition. Vol. 27. (Dandury, Connecticut: 
Grolier Incorporated, 1990).
TUNON DE LARA, Manuel & Jose Antonio Biescas (Dtores.). Espana bajo la
dictadura franquista, 1939-1975. Tomo X. (Barcelona: Ed. Labor, Octubre 
1982, 2 Ed.).
TUSELL, Javier. La oposicion democratica al franquismo, (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977).
-, & Jose Calvo. Gimenez Fernandez, precursor de la democracia espanola. (Sevilla: 
Mondadori, 1990).
-, et al. (Coord.), La oposicion al regimen de Franco. Estado de la cuestion y
metodologia de la investigation. [Memoranda of the International Congress 
organized by the Department of History of the UNED in Madrid from 19 to 22 
October 1988].Tomos 1 (Vol. 1) de Tomos 1 (Vols. 1 & 2) y 2.
-, Alvaro Soto (Eds.), Historia de la transicion, (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1996).
VELARDE FUENTES, Juan. Fraga, o el intelectualy la politica, (Barcelona:
Bibliography 350
Planeta, 2001).
VENCE, Anxel. Doctor Fraga y  Mister Iribarne. Una biografia temperamental, 
(Barcelona: Ed. Prensa Iberica, 1995).
VELAR, Sergio. Historia del Antifranquismo, (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes, 1984). 
VENLAS, Angel et al. Politica Comercial Exterior en Espana (1931-1975), Tomo 3, 
(Madrid: Banco Exterior de Espana, 1979).
2.2. Articles
ABELLA, Rafael. “Espana, 15 anos despues de Franco, 1975-1991”, in Historia-16, 
No.188.
ALVAREZ PUGA, Eduardo.“El Asociacionismo politico espanol”, in Dossier Mundo, 
Mayo-Junio, 1971.
-, “Los ‘familiares’, una limitada apertura”, in Dossier Mundo, Septiembre-Octubre, 
1971.
CAMPO, Salustiano del et a l “La elite politica espanola y la transicion a la
democracia”
in Sistema, 48 (Mayo, 1982).
B AENA DEL ALCAZAR, Mariano & GARCIA MAD ARIA, Jose Maria. “Elite
franquista y burocracia en las Cortes actuales”, in Sistema, 28 (Enero, 1979).
BALFOUR, Sebastian. “El movimiento obrero desde 1939”, in Institut de Ciencies 
Politiques i Socials, No. 24, Barcelona, 1990.
BAON, Rogelio.“Fraga y su poliedro”, in Manuel Fraga, Homenaje Academico, 
(Madrid: Fundacion Canovas del Castillo, 1997), Vol. I & n.
BLANCO, Francisco.“Grupos Falangistas opuestos al Franquismo, 1963-1975”, in 
Tusell, Javier et al, La oposicion al regimen de Franco.
BORJA, Jordi. “Crisis del Estado autoritario y sistema de partidos en Espana”, Papers, 
num. 8. Revista de Sociologia. (Barcelona: Universidad Autonoma de 
Barcelona, 1978).
BRADSHAW, Roy P. “Internal migration in Spain”, in Iberian Studies, Vol. I, No. 2. 
autumn 1972.
CACIAGLY, Mario. “Espana 1982: las elecciones del Cambio” in Revista Espanola 
de Investigaciones Sociologicas (Henceforth REIS), 28/84.
CAMBRE MARINO, Jesus. “La herencia del franquismo”, Cuadernos Americanos,
Ano XXXV, No.2, Marzo-Abrill976.
CASANOVA, Jose “Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain’s 
Transition to Democracy”, in Social Research, Vol. 50, No. 4 (winter 1983).
CORTAZAR, Guillermo.“U«zd« Espanola (1957-1975). Una plataforma de la
oposicion democratica frente al franquismo”, in Tusell, Javier et al. (Coords.),
La oposicion al regimen de Franco.
CUBERO, Joaquin. “El Partido Carlista. Oposicion al Estado franquista y evolution 
ideologica (1968-1975)”, in Tusell, Javier et al (Coords.), La oposicion al 
regimen de Franco. Tomo I, Vol. 1.
DIAZ, Elias. “El PSOE y el Socialismo ‘en el interior’ bajo el regimen franquista”, 
Sistema, No. 15, 1976.
DORADO, R., & VARELA, I., “Estrategias politicas durante la transicion”, in Tezanos, 
J.F., et al, La transicion democratica espanola. (Madrid: Sistema, 1989).
Bibliography 351
FERNANDEZ LAGUNILLA, Marina & OTAOLA, Concepcion. “Aproximacion al 
discurso de la derecha”, in Revista de Estudios Politicos (Nueva Epoca),
Numero 40, (Julio-Agosto 1984).
GALAn Y GUTIERREZ, Eustaquio. “dQue Universidad? Reto al Problema 
Universitario” Indice, Encarte, NoS. 233-234.
GARCIA ESCUDERO, Jose Maria.“Aportacion de Manuel Fraga al pensamiento 
politico conservador”, en Manuel Fraga: Homenaje Academico, Vol. I & II. 
(Madrid: Fundacion Canovas del Castillo, 1997).
GARCIA SAN MIGUEL, Luis.“Estructura y cambio del regimen politico espanol”, in 
Sistema, No.l, (Enero, 1973).
-, “Cambio politico y oposicion bajo el franquismo”, in Sistema, No. 4, (Enero, 1974).
GILMOUR, John. “From Francoism to Democracy: Fraga and the Spanish Right”, in 
Iberian Studies, Vol. XVI, Nos. 1 & 2, 1987, pp. 84-102.
GINER, Salvador .“Power, Freedom and Social Change in the Spanish University, 1939 
-1975”, in Paul Preston (Ed.), Spain in crisis. The evolution and decline of the 
Franco regime, (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976), p. 190.
HADIAN, Ron. “United States foreign policy towards Spain, 1953-1975”, in Iberian 
Studies, Vol. VII, No. I, spring 1978.
HARRISON, Joseph. “Towards die liberalization of the Spanish economy, 1951-9”, 
in Colin Holmes & Alan Booth (Eds.), Economy and Society: European 
Industrialisation and its social consequences. Essays presented to Sidney 
Pollard, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991).
HERMET, Guy. “Spain under Franco, the changing character of an authoritarian 
regime*, in European Journal o f Political Research, 4/1976.
-, “La presse espagnole et la censure”, in Revue Franqaise de Science Politique, Vol. 
XVm, 1968, No. 1 Frevrier.
-, “Electoral trends in Spain: an appraisal of the polls conducted under the Franco 
Regime”, in Iberian Studies, Vol. El, No. 2 (autumn, 1974).
HOLLYMAN, John. “The Press and Censorship in Franco’s Spain”, in Iberian Studies, 
Vol. IE, No. 2 (autumn, 1972).
Horizonte Espanol, “El Neonazismo: de DU (Defensa Universitaria) al PENS (Partido 
Espanol Nacional-Sindicalista) pasando por las GCR (Guerrilleros de Cristo 
Rey), in Horizonte Espanol (1), 1972. (Paris, Ruedo Iberico).
JIMENEZ CAMPO, Javier. “Aproximacion a un modelo de partido fascista. El caso 
del Partido Nacionalista Espanol”, in Sistema, 22 (Enero, 1978).
LAIN ENTRALGO, Pedro. “En tomo a la libertad academica”, in Revista de 
Occidente, No. 40, Julio 1966.
-, “La persona y el Estado”, in Revista de Occidente, No.54, Septiembre 1967.
LINZ, Juan Jose. “Opposition in and under an autoritarian Regime the case of Spain”, 
in Robert Dahl (Ed.), Regimes and Oppositions, (Yale: Yale Univesity Press, 
1973).
-, “From Falange to Movimiento-Organization: The Spanish Single Party and the 
Franco Regime, 1936-1968”, in Samuel Huntington & Clement Moore, 
Authoritarian Politics in Modem Society. The Dynamics of Established One- 
Party Systems. (London: Basic Books, 1970).
L6PEZ CASERO, Francisco. “The Social Consequences of Economic Development in 
Spain since 1960”, in Iberian Studies, Vol. XIX, Nos. 1 & 2, 1990.
LOPEZ-PINTOR, Rafael.“Francoist Reformers in Democratic Spain: the Popular
Alliance and the Democratic Coalition”, in Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and
Bibliography 352
1982. A Study o f the National Elections. Eds. Penniman, Howard R., & Mujal- 
Leon, Eusebio, M. (AEI, 1985).
LOPEZ NIETO, Lourdes. “The party mechanism: the organization and operations of 
the AP/PP political party, 1976-1993”, in Ignazi, P. & Ysnal, L, The 
Organization o f Political Parties in Southern Europe, (in press)
MACKENZIE, Leslie.“The Political Ideas of the Opus Dei in Spain”, in Government 
and Opposition, Vol. 8, Number 1, winter 1973.
MALEFAKIS, Edward. “Spain and Its Francoist Heritage”, in J.H. Herz (Dtor.), From 
dictatorship to democracy. Copying with the legacies of authoritarianism and 
totalitarism, (Westport-Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982).
MARAVALL, Jose Maria.“Modemization, Authoritarianism, and the Growth of
Working-Class Dissent: The Case of Spain”, in Government and Opposition, 
Vol.8, Number 4, autumn 1973.
MARTIN OVIEDO, Jose Maria. “La representation politica en el actual regimen 
espanol”, in Revista de Estudios Politicos, No. 198, Noviembre-Diciembre,
1974.
MIRANDA, Francisco et a/.“La oposicion dentro del regimen: El Carlismo en
Navarra”, in Tusell, et al (Coords.)^a Oposicion al regimen de Franco, Tomo I, 
Vol. n.
MONTERO, Jose Ramon. “Los ffacasos politicos y electorales de la derecha espanola: 
Alianza Popular, 1976-1986”, in REIS, 39/87.
MUNOZ ALONSO, Alejandro.“Golpismo y Terrorismo en la transicion democratica 
espanola”, in REIS, 36/86.
OSORIO, Alfonso. “La Interpretation de nuestras Leyes Fundamentales”. Lecture given 
at the Club Siglo XXI on 29 January 1974. See Espana, su monarquia y  Europa, 
(Madrid: Club Siglo XXI, 1974).
ORTEGA DIAZ AMBRONA, Juan Antonio. “Transition to Democracy in Spain”, in 
Abel, Christopher & Torrents, Nissa, Spain: Conditional Democracy, (London: 
CroomHelm, 1984).
PARLIER, Simon “Adolfo Suarez: Democratic Dark Horse”, in Martin Westlake (Ed.), 
Leaders o f  Transitions, (London: Macmillan, 2000).
POWELL, Charles T., “The ‘Tacito’ Group and the Transition to Democracy, 1973- 
1977”, in Lannon, Frances & Preston, Elites and Power in Twentieth Century 
Spain, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990).
-, “Crisis del Franquismo, Reformismo y Transicion a la Democracia”, in Tusell et al, 
Las Derechas en la Espana Contemporanea, (Madrid: UNED,1997).
PRESTON, Paul. “Spain in crisis: the assassination of Carrero Blanco and its 
aftermath”, in Iberian Studies, Vol. In, No. 1 (spring, 1974).
-, “The dilemma of credibility: The Spanish Communist Party, the Franco regime and 
after”, in Government and Opposition, Vol. 11, No. 1, winter 1976.
RAMIREZ, Luis.“Morir en el bunker”, in Horizonte Espanol, No. 1,1972 (Ruedo 
Iberico).
ROBINSON, R.A.H. “Political Conservatism: the Spanish case, 1875-1977”, in Journal 
o f Contemporary History, Vol. 14 (1979).
RODRIGUEZ JIMENEZ, Jose Luis. “Origen, desarrollo y disolucion de Fuerza
Nueva”. Una aproximacion al estudio de la extrema derecha espanola, in Revista 
de Estudios Politicos, 73 (Jul-Sept, 1991).
-, “The Extreme Right in Spain after Franco”, in Patterns o f  Prejudice, Vol. 24, Vols. 2- 
4, 1990.
Bibliography 353
SANTAMARIA, Julian. “Elecciones Generates de 1982 y Consolidacion de la 
Democracia”, in REIS, 28/84.
SERRERA CONTRERAS, Pedro Luis. “Algunas dudas sobre la legislacion de 
Asociaciones”, in Revista Critica de Derecho Inmobiliario, Ano 1971.
SILVA MUNOZ, Federico. “La hora de la participacion politica”. Lecture given at the 
Club Siglo XXI on 26 November 1973. See Espana, su monarquia y  Europa, 
(Madrid: Club Siglo XXI, 1974).
STORY, Jonathan. “Spanish political parties: before and after the elecction”, in 
Government and Oppositions, Vol. 12, No.4. (autumn, 1977).
TIERNO GALVAN, Enrique. “Student Opposition in Spain”, in Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 1, No. 4, July - September, 1966.
TOQUERO, Jose Maria. “La oposicion monarquica. La politica del Conde de
Barcelona”, in Tusell et al., La Oposicion al regimen de Franco, Tomo I, Vol. 
1.
TOVAR, Antonio. “Un comentario personal sobre la universidad libre”, in Revista de 
Occidente, No. 49, Abril 1967.
TUSELL Javier.“Los partidos politicos de oposicion al franquismo: un estado de la
cuestion”, en Tusell, et al., La oposicion al regimen de Franco. Tomos 1, Vol. 
1.
